Special Intensive Revision In Bihar: Statutory Authority, Constitutional Limits, And Policy Concerns

In June 2025, the Election Commission of India initiated a Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls in Bihar, invoking its powers under Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. Ostensibly aimed at refining electoral records in the wake of urban migration and duplication, this revision departs sharply from established statutory frameworks by combining concepts of “special” and “intensive” revision not contemplated in either the Act or the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. More strikingly, it demands extensive proof of citizenship from millions of voters, effectively transforming an administrative exercise into a sweeping verification exercise without any constitutional or legislative mandate to adjudicate citizenship. This conflation of electoral roll revision with citizenship determination does not merely raise questions of statutory interpretation; it strikes at the heart of India's constitutional guarantees of universal suffrage and equality before law. The Bihar revision poses a deeper challenge: can procedural innovations that lack statutory foundation and impose disproportionate burdens on specific classes of voters ever be justified in a constitutional democracy committed to inclusion, equality, and the rule of law?

Statutory Ambiguity

The legal basis of the electoral roll revision ordered by the Election Commission of India (ECI) remains unclear. In its notice dated 24 June 2025, the ECI claimed to be “empowered” under Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RPA) to direct a “special intensive revision” of the electoral rolls.^[1] However, the expression “special intensive revision” finds no mention in either Section 21 of the RPA or in the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. 

Section 21 of the RPA refers to “revision” and “special revision,”^[2] while the 1960 Rules recognise “intensive revision” and “summary revision”^[3] as the two procedural modes. Consequently, the phrase “special intensive revision” appears to be a conflation of terms from both the Act and the Rules.

The ECI's use of the terms “special” and “empowered” may suggest that the exercise is being undertaken under Section 21(3) of the RPA. This is because the rest of Section 21 does not mention the term “special” and is framed in a manner that implies obligation, rather than discretion.  Section 21(3), by contrast, appears to confer discretion on the Commission. However, ECI's subsequent notice dated 30 June 2025 describes the revision as being mandatory under Section 21(2)(a) of the RPA and Rule 25 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.^[4] This creates a clear ambiguity as to the exact legal provision being invoked. It appears that ECI has somehow combined the terminologies used in RPA, 19050 and Electoral Rules, 1960 to come with 'Special Intensive Revision'. 

The ambiguity demonstrated above has significant implications. If the revision is being conducted under Section 21(2)(a), the use of the term “special” becomes questionable, as that provision concerns routine revisions before elections. Conversely, if the revision falls under Section 21(3), which provides for a “special revision”, then portraying it as part of a routine electoral update is misleading. Furthermore, Section 21(3) authorises special revision only for “any constituency or part thereof”, suggesting that the legislature envisaged it as a targeted, situation-specific mechanism, not a blanket, statewide revision.

Even assuming that Section 21(3) permits a state-wide special revision, it remains debatable whether the circumstances cited by the ECI warrant such a step. The 24 June 2025 notice refers to “rapid urbanisation and frequent migration” leading to “repeated entries”, but provides no empirical data to substantiate these claims. Reports indicate that a summary revision of electoral rolls was already conducted in Bihar between June and November 2024, with no anomalies of the scale that would justify a special revision.^[5] This raises a fundamental question: has the ECI exercised its discretion appropriately and proportionately in ordering a “special intensive revision”?

Citizenship Verification and Constitutional Concerns

In addition to the legal ambiguities regarding its authority to conduct such a revision, the ECI's approach raises concerns about citizenship verification. No law empowers the ECI to independently adjudicate an individual's citizenship status during roll revision. Article 326^[6] and Section 16 of RPA^[7] provide that only citizens are entitled to vote. But questions of who is or is not a citizen are governed by the Constitution and the Citizenship Act, 1955, and not by the electoral laws. Recently, the court has signalled serious doubts about the ECI's self-assumed role in probing voters' citizenship by pointing out that “citizenship is an issue to be determined not by the Election Commission of India, but by the Ministry of Home Affairs”.^[8] The ECI's June 24 order, issued under Section 21(3) RPA 1950, imposed new documentary requirements on electors and treated citizenship as a “qualifying” criterion.^[9] But aside from citing its broad revision powers, it did not point to any constitutional or statutory source authorising the electoral body to verify citizenship. No new legislation or amendment authorises the ECI to demand proof of citizenship from existing voters. The commission's authority to prepare the rolls under Article 324 and RPA Section 21^[10] is unquestioned, but those powers must yield to other laws, in particular, the Citizenship Act, when it comes to determining who is a citizen.

The Citizenship Act sets out criteria and procedures for acquiring and terminating Indian citizenship (by birth, descent, registration, or naturalisation). It does not contemplate routine electoral re-verification of status. A person is a citizen by operation of the Constitution/Act (for example, born in India on or after 1950) or by grant of certificate, and this status is not usually “tested” by electoral authorities. If a voter's citizenship is genuinely in doubt (e.g. a foreign infiltrator), the normal course is for the ECI to coordinate with the Home Ministry or refer cases to Foreigners Tribunals under the Foreigners Act. By contrast, the Bihar SIR scheme effectively shifts that burden onto voters themselves. It requires millions of electors to prove that they are Indian citizens. SIR's citizenship criterion is ad hoc: it is not based on any change in law, but on the Commission's judgment that post-2003 enrollees must re-validate their nationality. 

Bihar last underwent an intensive roll revision in 2003, conducted over roughly a year in multiple states. In that revision, citizenship was assumed for anyone included in the newly prepared rolls; only “new” additions (who met age/residence criteria) had to declare their qualifications. Crucially, voters entered in the 2003 roll were implicitly treated as citizens without further inquiry.^[11] Similarly, in 2004, the ECI ordered intensive revisions in five Northeast states and Jammu & Kashmir.^[12] The official instructions show a standard timeline of preparation, enumeration, draft rolls, and objections over several months, but no demand for proof of citizenship from all voters. The only verification came from cross-checking against existing rolls; no blanket documentary hurdles were imposed. The 2025 SIR is in sharp contrast to these past precedents. It has introduced a 'temporal classification' without precedent. The ECI is treating the 2003 roll as a sacrosanct baseline: everyone on it automatically passes the citizenship test, while those added afterwards face new burdens. The 2003 revisions were year-long and did not discriminate between early and late enrollees. By contrast, the 2025 SIR is compressed into 30 days and explicitly distinguishes voters by registration date. No earlier revision (including the last nationwide intensive overhaul in 2003–04) required such retroactive proof of citizenship.

The SIR imposes heavy documentary requirements on several classes of voters. All voters not on the 2003 list must furnish proof of citizenship, identity and residence. In practice, this means that voters on the rolls in 2003 must simply verify that they were listed in the 2003 final roll. If their name appears on that base list, they face no further test. Voters aged 40+ (born before 1985) but not in the 2003 roll must provide documents proving their citizenship (for example, a birth certificate) and residence. Voters aged 21–40 (born 1985–2004), because they were too young for the 2003 roll, must show either (a) that one of their parents was enrolled in 2003, or (b) their own citizenship/identity plus both parents' identity and citizenship. Voters below 21 (born after 2004) likewise must prove their identity and citizenship, plus those of both parents, or parental enrollment in 2003. These conditions go far beyond normal practice. In effect, millions of electors must now “establish their right to vote all over again”. This new burden raises serious equality and rights concerns. Article 326 guarantees adult suffrage to all citizens, but the SIR effectively splits the electorate into two classes: a protected older set (pre-2003 enrollees) and a scrutinised younger set (post-2003 enrollees). The former are presumed citizen by virtue of their presence on an outdated list, while the latter must prove their status. Such arbitrary classification undermines the guarantee of equality before the law embedded in Article 14. 

The SIR closely mirrors the NRC, particularly when it comes to rigid documentary requirements. Like the NRC, the SIR demands that voters prove citizenship through a narrow set of documents, including birth certificates or proof of their parents' enrollment in past electoral rolls. However, unlike the NRC, which was implemented under the explicit mandate of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and overseen by Foreigners Tribunals under judicial review, the SIR operates without any legislative or statutory backing. The Election Commission's authority to revise electoral rolls under Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act does not include the power to verify or adjudicate citizenship, which constitutionally lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs and designated judicial bodies. This lack of a legal framework creates a significant constitutional anomaly. The NRC, for all its criticisms, was at least rooted in law and accompanied by procedural safeguards, including notice, hearing, and appeal. In contrast, the SIR enforces a quasi-citizenship verification regime through electoral officers who are neither trained nor empowered to assess nationality. Further, by demanding that every post-2003 voter furnish birth certificates or parental roll‑entry proof, the Commission is effectively creating a preliminary registry of “suspect” citizens. If these voters cannot meet the arbitrary evidentiary bar today, there is nothing to prevent that same incomplete record being repurposed as a de facto NRC tomorrow, when failure to prove inclusion could result not just in loss of voting rights, but in official classification as a non-citizen. In this way, SIR becomes a Trojan horse for a nationwide NRC. 

Policy Implications

The policy and legal implications of Bihar's Special Intensive Revision (SIR) are deeply concerning, as the exercise blurs the constitutional distinction between electoral administration and citizenship adjudication, potentially infringing upon Articles 14 and 326 of the Constitution. Legally, the ECI's reliance on Section 21 of the RPA, 1950, to justify a special intensive revision lacks clear statutory grounding, as neither the Act nor the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, envisage such a process combining “special” and “intensive” revision powers. Policy-wise, by imposing disproportionate documentary burdens on voters enrolled after 2003, the SIR risks mass disenfranchisement, especially among socio-economically marginalised populations lacking formal birth or parental records.

Moreover, courts have consistently held that citizenship determination lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs and Foreigners Tribunals under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and Foreigners Act, 1946, not the ECI. This conflation of administrative revision with citizenship verification, absent legislative mandate or procedural safeguards, undermines democratic inclusion and sets a dangerous precedent for electoral governance by enabling exclusionary practices under the guise of roll revision, potentially eroding trust in electoral institutions and threatening constitutional guarantees of universal adult suffrage.

Views Are Personal. 

1. Election Commission of India, 24 June 2024 ↑

2. 21. Preparation and revision of electoral rolls.—

   (1)The electoral roll for each constituency shall be prepared in the prescribed manner by reference to the qualifying date and shall come into force immediately upon its final publication in accordance with the rules made under this Act.

   (2)The said electoral roll—

   (a)shall, unless otherwise directed by the Election Commission for reasons to be recorded in writing, be revised in the prescribed manner by reference to the qualifying date—

   (i)before each general election to the House of the People or to the Legislative Assembly of a State; and

   (ii)before each bye-election to fill a casual vacancy in a seat allotted to the constituency; and

   (b)shall be revised in any year in the prescribed manner by reference to the qualifying date if such revision has been directed by the Election Commission:

   Provided that if the electoral roll is not revised as aforesaid, the validity or continued operation of the said electoral roll shall not thereby be affected.

   (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Election Commission may at any time, for reasons to be recorded, direct a special revision of the electoral roll for any constituency or part of a constituency in such manner as it may think fit:

   Provided that subject to the other provisions of this Act, the electoral roll for the constituency, as in force at the time of the issue of any such direction, shall continue to be in force until the completion of the special revision so directed. ↑

3. The Registration Of Electors Rules (1960) ↑

4. Election Commission of India, 30 June 2024 ↑

5. The Reporters' Collective, 'The Bihar Electoral Roll Investigation' (2025) ↑

6. 326. Elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of States to be on the basis of adult suffrage

   The elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage; that is to say, every person who is a citizen of India and who is not less thaneighteen years of age on such date as may be fixed in that behalf by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under this Constitution or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election. ↑

7. A person shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll if he—

   is not a citizen of India; or

   is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or

   is for the time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any law relating to corrupt practices and other offenses in connection with elections ↑

8. https://www-livelaw-in.demo.remotlog.com/top-stories/supreme-court-hearing-bihar-voter-list-revision-case-election-commission-of-india-297123 ↑

9. https://www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ECI-SIR-Electoral-Rolls-Bihar.pdf ↑

10. 21. Preparation and revision of electoral rolls.—

    (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Election Commission may at any time, for reasons to be recorded, direct a special revision of the electoral roll for any constituency or part of a constituency in such manner as it may think fit:

    Provided that subject to the other provisions of this Act, the electoral roll for the constituency, as in force at the time of the issue of any such direction, shall continue to be in force until the completion of the special revision so directed. ↑

11. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/assembly-elections/bihar/parental-proof-first-time-in-roll-revision/articleshow/122349497.cms?from=mdr ↑

12. https://scroll.in/article/1084364/the-curious-case-of-a-missing-election-commission-order-on-2003-voter-list-revision-in-bihar ↑