When High Court Appoints, High Court Extends: Clarifying Jurisdictional Anomaly Under Section 29A Of Arbitration Act

Section 29A of the Arbitration Act mandates that an arbitral award must be passed within twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings. This period may be further extended by mutual consent of the parties for an additional six months. Once this statutory period expires, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal can be extended only by the court under Section 29A(4).

The question that arises as to which court retains the authority to extend an arbitrator's mandate when the appointment is made by the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Recently, the Calcutta High Court grappled with this question in Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan.

The Legislative Puzzle

Section 29A(4) of the Act provides that an arbitrator's mandate “shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period.” The court is also empowered to substitute the arbitrator under this section.

Section 2(1)(e) defines “Court” as “the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.”

On a bare reading of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, it is evident that for the purposes of Section 29A, the “Court” may either be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or a High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction.

However, a significant question arises: Can an application under Section 29A for extension of the arbitrator's mandate be filed before the principal civil court when the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11?

A textual interpretation of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act may suggest that such an application could indeed be filed before the principal civil court. Yet, this leads to a deeper and more critical inquiry — did Parliament intend to allow a subordinate court to extend or even substitute an arbitrator appointed by a superior forum such as the High Court?

How Different Courts Have Viewed It

Over the years, the different High Courts have taken different views on this issue.

● The Gujarat High Court in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel and the Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. both held that the same court which appoints an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act must also have the power to extend the mandate.If such an interpretation were not adopted, it would lead to a situation where a subordinate court could interfere with an order passed by a superior court.

● Similarly, the Delhi High Court recently in Ovington Finance Pvt. Ltd. versus Bindiya Nagar held that if the contention of the respondent—that once the arbitrator is appointed either by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the power to extend the time or substitute the arbitrator vests in the court having subject-matter jurisdiction—is accepted, it would vest jurisdiction to extend or substitute the arbitrator in a court other than the High Court or the Supreme Court, which would go against the scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Therefore, the meaning of the term “Court” for the purpose of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act must mean the court which has appointed the arbitrator.

● The Andhra Pradesh High Court, however, differed in Dr. V.V. Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala (2024) where it held that it is a settled principle of law that any construction which defeats the purpose of the statute must be avoided. It observed that the term “Court” must be understood textually, as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, for the purposes of Section 29A, and does not require a different contextual interpretation. On this basis, the Court concluded that since it did not qualify as a “Court” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e), it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 29A for extension of the arbitrator's mandate.

The Calcutta High Court while disagreeing with the above view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Best Eastern Business observed that “If the interpretation in Dr. V.V. Subbarao (supra) is accepted, in that event it will vest the civil court, which is subordinate to the High Court with the power to substitute Arbitrator(s) appointed by the superior court, by partaking the role of the appointing court. This would be completely contrary to the legislative intent and lead to an absurdity. The observation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that exercise of power under Section 11 and Section 29A were distinct and separate and the sections operated at different stages of an arbitral proceeding, will lead to an anomalous situation and respectfully cannot be treated to be the correct interpretation.”

Therefore, the Court held that the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e) cannot be construed in a strictly textual manner, since the context requires otherwise. A literal interpretation, it observed, would lead to an absurd situation where the authority to substitute an arbitrator would vest in a court different from the one that appointed the arbitrator under Section 11(6).

While it is true that once an arbitrator is appointed under Section 11(6), the appointing authority becomes functus officio for the arbitral proceedings, this does not divest it of the power to extend the arbitrator's mandate. Such power is substantive rather than procedural, and carries with it several consequential authorities — including the power to reduce the arbitrator's fee, substitute the arbitrator, determine the stage from which proceedings shall continue, and impose conditions or costs, if necessary.

The court also distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC & C JV (2024) which seemed to favor the literal interpretation of the word “court”. It noted that since the Meghalaya High Court did not exercise original civil jurisdiction in the above case, it was held that it could not be regarded as the principal civil court for the purposes of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, in that context, where the arbitrator had been mutually appointed by the parties, they were directed to approach the Commercial Court at Shillong, which qualified as the principal civil court under Section 2(1)(e).

This interpretation posed no difficulty, as the arbitrator had not been appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act; therefore, any substitution by the Commercial Court would not amount to the removal of an arbitrator appointed by the High Court. The powers under Section 29A thus did not overlap, and the decision must be read and understood within the specific factual context in which it was rendered.

The Calcutta High Court in Best Eastern Business

This question resurfaced again before the Calcutta High Court in 'Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. (supra), where the arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. After the expiry of time period under section 29A, the application seeking extension of the arbitrator's mandate was subsequently filed before the same High Court. The respondent, however, objected to its maintainability on the ground that, in accordance with Section 2(1)(e), the application ought to have been filed before the Commercial Court at Siliguri, being the principal civil court of original jurisdiction for that district.

The Court rejected the respondent's objections, holding that Section 2(1)(e) opens with the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires,” which incorporates a degree of flexibility into the statute and allows the definition of “Court” to be interpreted contextually rather than rigidly.

“It is inconceivable that the legislature would vest the power with the Commercial Court at Siliguri to substitute an arbitrator who has been appointed by the High Court.”

The Court further observed that under Section 29A(6) of the Arbitration Act the Court is empowered not only to extend the mandate of the arbitrator but also to substitute the arbitrator, if necessary. The power to substitute, it held, is inseparable from the power to appoint. Consequently, when the appointing authority is the High Court, it must logically retain the power to extend the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A, as both powers are co-extensive and flow from the same statutory scheme.

It held that “the provisions of section 2(1)(e) in the context of Section 29A, cannot be interpreted to allow an inferior court to overrule or undo an order of the High Court. The Parliament could not have ever intended the district court to substitute an Arbitrator appointed by the High Court.”

A Contextual Reading, Not A Mechanical One

The Calcutta High Court relied on the judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court in Tara Chand Sumit Construction (supra) where it was held that “in case a petition under Section 29A is filed before the Principal Civil Court for extension of mandate and the occasion for substitution arises, then the Principal Civil Court will be called upon to substitute an arbitrator who had been appointed by the Supreme Court or High Court. This would lead to a conflict between the power of superior Courts to appoint arbitrators under Section 11 and those of the Civil Court to substitute under Section 29A... The only way to reconcile this conflict is to interpret 'Court' in the context of Section 29A as the Court which appointed the arbitrator.”

The Court further referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai (2022 LiveLaw (SC) 65) where it was observed that statutory interpretation must harmonize both text and context, and that no provision should be construed in isolation from the overall scheme and purpose of the enactment.

“The statute must be looked into as a whole and it must be deciphered what each section or each word meant, so as to fit into the scheme of the Act.”

In light of the above discussion it was concluded that the High Court's power to extend flows naturally from its power to appoint. Once an arbitrator is appointed under Section 11, the High Court does not supervise the proceedings but retains a residual authority to ensure continuity of the tribunal under Section 29A.

The decision of the Calcutta High Court has resolved the issue of jurisdictional anomaly surrounding Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. By adopting a contextual interpretation of the provision, the Court harmonised Sections 2(1)(e), 11, and 29A, thereby ensuring that the statute functions coherently within the broader judicial framework.

The High Court rightly held that the power to extend the mandate of an arbitrator is co-extensive with the power to appoint. Consequently, when an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court, it logically follows that the same court retains jurisdiction not only to extend the mandate but also to substitute the arbitrator, if necessary.

Allowing a subordinate court to entertain such an application would result in a jurisdictional anomaly and disrupt the hierarchical balance envisaged by the legislature.

The author is an Assistant Professor at Galgotias University and Legal Correspondent at Livelaw. Views are personal.

References

1. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 2(1)(e), 11, and 29A (as amended by Act 33 of 2019).
   
   
2. Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan, 2025:CHC-OS:190 (Calcutta High Court, per Shampa Sarkar, J.).
   
   
3. Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel, 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 5017.
   
   
   
4. DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2501.
5. Ovington Finance Pvt. Ltd. versus Bindiya Nagar, 2024 LiveLaw (Del) 1307
6. Dr. V.V. Subbarao v. Dr. Appa Rao Mukkamala & Ors., (2024) 1 SCC (AP) 94.
   
   
7. Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC & C JV, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 425.
   
   
8. Cabra Instalaciones Y Servicios v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., MANU/MH/2097/2019.
   
   
9. Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai & Ors.
   , 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 65.

10. Magnum Opus IT Consulting Pvt. Ltd. v. Artcad Systems, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2861.
    
    
11. Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111.
    
    
12. State of Haryana v. AGM Management Services Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 520.
    
    
13. Law Commission of India, 246th Report on Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (August 2014).