No Representation, No Governance': The Constitutional Mandate vs. Political Delay In Local Body Polls

When street lights stop functioning or garbage isn't collected for days, citizens naturally reach out to their elected local leaders. These corporators and councillors are supposed to be the first point of contact for solving everyday problems. But what happens when there are no elected representatives at all?

This isn't a hypothetical question for millions of people in Maharashtra. For nearly five years now, the state's urban and rural areas have been governed by administrators appointed by the government, not elected representatives chosen by the people. A legal dispute over reservations has left several cities and towns in Maharashtra without democratically elected local bodies since 2021.

The trouble began when Maharashtra's government passed a law in 2021 giving 27% reservation to Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in local body elections. This law was enacted to get around the Supreme Court guidelines, however, the legitimacy of the same was questioned in court. The Court had earlier laid down a "triple test" that had prescribed the setting up of a commission by the states to study backwardness in local areas, the determination of the percentage of reservation required to be maintained, and the imposition of a 50 % cap on the total reservation provided.^[1]

When Maharashtra's law was challenged, the Supreme Court stopped all local elections because the state hadn't collected proper data before announcing 27% reservations for OBCs.^[2] The Court offered a middle path: elections could be held by converting OBC reserved seats to general category seats.^[3] But Maharashtra chose to wait for a final decision instead.

When Administrative Bottlenecks Impede Court Orders

In May 2025, pending the adjudication of the dispute, the Supreme Court permitted the elections to be conducted on the basis of the former reservation policy. The Court expected elections to be completed within four months - by September 2025^[4]. However, when September arrived, no progress was made and the election was nowhere on the horizon.

The State Election Commission gave routine administrative reasons: not enough voting machines available, school premises wouldn't be free because of board exams, and insufficient staff to conduct elections. In September 2025, the Supreme Court had to intervene again. The judges observed that the Election Commission had "failed to take desired action" and set a new firm deadline: January 31, 2026^[5].

This sequence of events reveals something troubling. Even when the highest court in the country sets clear timelines, the system has enough gaps to allow indefinite delays. Administrative excuses - however legitimate they may sound - can postpone democracy itself. By the time elections actually happen, millions of citizens will have spent nearly five years without any elected representatives.

This isn't just Maharashtra's problem. Similar reservation disputes have delayed local elections in states like Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. What's worse, in Maharashtra, numerous panchayat samitis are also being run by administrators. This means both urban and rural local governance has been suspended across large parts of the state.

The Constitutional Vacuum

The constitutional problem is clear but troubling. The Constitution says local body elections must be held within six months of the previous term ending.^[6] But it doesn't say what happens when legal disputes prevent elections. The result? Administrator rule becomes the default, even though the Constitution never intended this.

In 2022, the Supreme Court in Hemant Narayan Rasne vs. Commissioner Pune^[7] actually said administrator appointments are legal. While this solved one legal question, it created a bigger democratic problem. If unelected rule is constitutionally valid, what stops it from becoming prolonged whenever there's a legal dispute?

Think about what this means for ordinary people. Unelected administrators approve budgets and disburse funds worth thousands of crores. Town planning decisions that affect where you live and work are made by officials you didn't vote for and can't vote out. Development projects in your neighbourhood are decided by people who aren't answerable to you.

This democratic deficit has real consequences. When there's no elected corporator to approach, citizens have no one to hold accountable for poor services. There's no local political process to influence how money is spent or priorities are set. The voice of residents is absent from decisions about their own localities. Policy decisions are implemented, but without the consent of the governed.

A Skeletal Flaw

The disparity between what courts can order and what plays out at the grassroot level reveals the lack of Constitutional apparatus to tackle these situations. Courts can set deadlines, but new administrative obstacles keep appearing with fresh justifications, turning what should be a one-time fix into an endless cycle. The Constitution simply doesn't have strong enough mechanisms to prevent legal complexities from becoming democratic vacuums.

This pattern of court intervention across multiple states shows that judicial solutions can't fix what is essentially a constitutional design flaw. Courts can devise stop-gap arrangements, but they can't resolve the inherent inadequacy: systematic constitutional deficiencies allow courtroom battles to suspend local democracy indefinitely.

Maharashtra's nearly five-year gap without elected local bodies reveals a fundamental contradiction in our system. The same Constitution that promises local self-governance also permits its indefinite suspension. As more Indians move to cities, this becomes a bigger problem. We could have cities across the country run by government appointed unelected officials rather than elected councillors – sound legally but superficial democratically.

Administrator rule would gain legitimacy if this trend continues for long. For their ulterior motives, some regimes may deliberately use court cases as a tool to disrupt elections, knowing that governance will continue uninterrupted through their appointed officials. Allowing this to happen would send us down a slippery slope leading to compromised democratic principles and potentially irreversible damage.

The Path Forward

Robust protective mechanisms are required to be incorporated within the constitution. We need well-defined constitutional provisions which can prevent an indefinite dissolution of democracy during the pendency of legal disputes. This could include administrator appointments with a mandatory end date clause, provisional election procedures that allow elections to take place despite pending legal challenges, or independent election tribunals that can fast-track resolution of disputes to prevent an electoral impasse. A watertight mechanism like this would mitigate the risk of abuse of rule by bureaucrats acting as administrators.

For several years, the state populace has been deprived of its right of electing their local leaders. The real concern is not when the local bodies will go to polls but how long the citizens must wait to secure a constitutional framework adequately equipped to prevent similar gridlocks in the future.

The Maharashtra experience should be an eye-opener for policy makers, prompting urgent constitutional reform to prevent this from becoming a systemic issue in Indian governance.

Views Are Personal. 

1. Vikas Kishanrao Gawali vs. State of Maharashtra – LL 2021 SC 13 ↑

2. Rahul Ramesh Wagh vs. State of Maharashtra – (2022) 12 SCC 778 ↑

3. Rahul Ramesh Wagh vs. State of Maharashtra – (2022) 12 SCC 790 ↑

4. Supreme Court Directs Holding Of Maharashtra Local Body Elections With OBC Reservation Before Banthia Commission Report ↑

5. Supreme Court Directs To Conduct Maharashtra Local Body Elections By January 31, 2026; Pulls Up State Election Commission For Delay ↑

6. Article 243E(3)(b) and Article 243U(3)(b) of the Constitution. ↑

7. 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 895 ↑