On Reforming The District Judiciary In India : Justice Ravindra Bhat Writes
The Constitution of India arguably provides for a federal structure of government that treats the Union and the states as distinct. While the legislative and executive branches are separate for the Union and the states, the judiciary is a single pyramidical structure. The district judiciary constitutes the foundational rung, exercising jurisdiction at the district level or in a more localized manner; the High Courts (HCs) constitute the middle rung, exercising original and appellate jurisdiction at the level of the State/Union Territory; and the Supreme Court of India (SCI) is at the apex level. Funding for court administration is provided by the states, and certain administrative aspects of the functioning of district courts are regulated by the states. In all other matters, the district courts are under the supervision of the HCs. The unitary character and set-up of the judiciary was a deliberate act on the part of the Constitution makers, for whom a single integrated judiciary was essential for uniform standards of judicial governance and judicial independence.
Independence of the judiciary is a fundamental tenet of every democracy. The values of independence, impartiality and equality underpin public confidence in the judicial system. In this context, this essay examines the structure and independence of the district courts in India, their relationship with the HCs and the methods used to improve fairness and efficiency of the judicial process and guarantee access to justice, while ensuring that the conditions of service of judges and other employees are fair and reasonable. The essay will also address issues plaguing these courts, such as case pendency, inadequate judge strength, infrastructural inadequacies, difficult service conditions, problems with budgetary allocation and utilization and plausible efforts at mitigating them in a meaningful manner, so as to ensure access to justice and preservation of the independence of the judiciary.
Issues such as case pendency, arrears management, determination of judge strength and filling of vacancies, as well as budgeting and infrastructural development, all require customized solutions. A top-down, one-size fits all approach has, time and again, proved unworkable. Imposing uniform timelines for disposal of cases, or common categorization of cases across the board, does a disservice to the rich district-specific data that can be analysed and harnessed.
The primary challenge to such empirically informed approaches is the lack of uniform, comparable judicial data with sufficient granularity. The National Judicial Digital Grid (NJDG) was launched in 2015 as a facet of the larger e-Committee Project (launched in 2007) by the Ministry of Law and Justice in collaboration with the SCI e-Committee to create a digital repository for judicial data at all levels. The NJDG provides real-time consolidated figures on institution, disposal and pendency across all courts in India. In a bid to promote transparency, this data is accessible to the public, albeit on limited parameters. While NJDG data is extensive, the limited temporal aspect of the data, that is, that it can only be viewed as on the present day and cannot be extracted for a past date or across a uniform time period (by non-institutional stakeholders), limits the usage of this data in analytical models. The NJDG platform also provides data on delay determinants but is wholly dependent on the accuracy with which the designated staff performs this data-entry role. A large proportion of judicial orders are uploaded belatedly due to limited infrastructure, inadequate capacity and challenges faced during digitization of handwritten files.As per the NJDG data on 3 November 2024, a total of 70,013,441 orders had not been uploaded.
The proximate remedy for accurate data collection and analysis would be to institute in each district a cadre of judicial court staff who are trained statisticians and data analysts, to replace the reliance on court staff who are temporarily diverted for this purpose, or even judicial officers who are overburdened. This cadre of specialized staff could work solely on streamlining data collection and categorization, carry out statistical analysis to identify trends and causes for judicial delays, and contribute towards policy recommendations to combat pendency, both at the level of the individual court (in the context of its unique capacities and constraints), and at the macro level, for state-wide or nation-wide implementation. Similarly, distinct cadres may also be set up for IT services which would manage the digital infrastructure in courts, and for other duties that are purely administrative in nature. Such a cadre could be comprised of individuals with judicial understanding or experience, alongside technical training and required skills.
The delegation of such roles to separate cadres would perform three functions: first, ensuring consistent and accurate data collection and analysis, which in turn would lead to empirically sound policy recommendations; second, freeing up judicial time to be spent on core judicial functions; and third, augmenting the capacity of court staff and officials who can take charge of a technical area of administration and work collaboratively with judges and members of the executive and legislative branches (as in the case of budgeting needs, for example), to improve judicial efficiency.
In the Indian context, any court management cadre related suggestion would require careful delineation of responsibilities to the limited extent of judicial management, while still retaining the control and responsibility of the district courts and supervision of the HCs as prescribed in the Constitution.Instituting stringent mechanisms for case flow management, that is, a system for empirically analysing which cases are to be prioritized for early disposal, will play a large part in addressing pendency. The methodology of case flow management itself also requires greater analysis and consideration. With the rapid digitization of district courts and availability of more granular data, opportunities are ripe to optimize these strategies.
Judicial Impact Assessment
The issues plaguing judicial administration are compounded by the lack of a comprehensive process in place for analysing the impact of new legislations on the judiciary. As far back as in 2005, a report was submitted to the SCI, on the need for judicial impact assessment of new legislations. It was recommended, inter alia, that 'the financial memorandum attached to each bill must estimate the budgetary requirement for meeting the expenses of the additional litigation that may arise out of the new bill when it is passed by the legislature. The said budget must mention the number of civil and criminal cases likely to be generated by the new Act, how many courts are necessary, how many judges and staff are necessary and what is the infrastructure necessary . . . 'Following this recommendation, the SCI issued directions to the Central Government,and a detailed report was prepared on the question of judicial impact assessment.
The 2005 Report noted that every legislation enacted by the Parliament adds to the burden of state courts, since the subject of '[a]dministration of justice, constitution and organization of all the subordinate courts' is enumerated under the Concurrent List in the Constitution of India. The major brunt of the burden of administering and enforcing new legislations is borne, in most cases, by the district and sessions courts in each state. Pursuant to Article 117 (3), bills are required to be accompanied with a financial memorandum only if they involve expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India. Similarly, under Article 207 (3), a financial memorandum must accompany bills placed before state legislatures, where funds are to be drawn from the Consolidated Fund of the state. Where any authority or agency is created under the proposed legislation, the expenses for establishment and maintenance are provided from the budget of the sponsoring ministry.
In practice, however, funds for the implementation of laws, irrespective of whether they are central laws, state laws or laws enacted under the Concurrent List, are primarily drawn from the state exchequer. The Task Force on Judicial Impact Assessment, for example, examined a number of financial memoranda attached to central bills presented in the Parliament, which invariably stated that the expenditure on the courts were to be borne by the state governments. The Task Force noted that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 that had been introduced in 1989 resulted in 25 lakh cases being added to the case load of the district courts, which had to saddle the entire burden. Recently, the SCI considered the issue of burgeoning litigation caused by the enactment of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971. The NJDG data revealed that a total of 1,612 cases under the legislation were pending before the Bombay HC, of which 135 cases were over ten years old. While the Act was a beneficial legislation intended to provide basic housing, the Court noted that the 'propensity and the proclivity of the statute to generate litigation are worrisome.' The Court went on to direct the HC to initiate suo motu proceedings for a performance audit of the legislation, with a focus also on the judicial impact vis-à-vis achieving the social justice goals of the beneficial legislation.
Performance audits would also be useful for commercial courts and ADR mechanisms where they are mandated to assess whether they have had the impact of delivering speedy justice, as envisioned. Such exercises are valuable in enhancing access to justice and managing the docket in a sustainable manner. However, they cannot be conducted in an ad hoc manner, pursuant to directions issued by the courts in individual cases or for particular legislations. Streamlined processes involving the requisite officers with knowledge of judicial administration and the needs of the district judiciary, as well as scientific experts, statisticians and members of the executive branch, have not thus far been set up for the purpose of conducting judicial impact assessments as a procedural requisite.
The fundamental challenge, again, is the non-availability of the required data on judicial management and performance at different levels. A second difficulty is the lack of an independent body/dedicated cadre capable of collating and analysing information, identifying variables and drawing up realistic estimates through economic models and statistical interpretation. The need of the hour is to set up a joint mechanism of the judicial and executive branches at the national and state levels, staffed by well-trained, empirical social science research personnel, court administrators and financial experts.
Conclusion
The field of judicial administration is vast and complex. At the same time, it is the most fundamental determinant of judicial independence, fairness and equality in justice delivery, and consequently, ensures adherence to the rule of law. The processes, procedures and methodologies of judicial administration, in that sense, represent the actual working of the Constitution on the ground. While the functioning of the HCs and the SCI have garnered wide attention, the details of administration of the district courts are under-studied. Uneven workload, vacancies and inadequate case management systems have been found to be causes for inefficiency in the system. Improving data collection methods and accessibility of the said data will play a decisive role in reforming judicial administration at the district level. Policy solutions for case management, capacity building, infrastructure planning, etc. need to be data-driven and localized to impact justice outcomes for the common individual.
A look at recent case disposal figures at the level of the district judiciary is indicative of the sheer extent of the workload that judges are faced with. Between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2023, a total of 25,514,157 cases were disposed of by the district judiciary across 710 districts.Efforts need to be made to fill judicial vacancies and bolster judge strength, but this alone will not mitigate pendency and arrears. The judiciary's capacity also needs to be strengthened through the creation of distinct cadres for core administrative tasks such as statistical analysis, development and management of IT facilities, developing inclusive and accessible infrastructure and scientifically determining budgets. Such augmentation of judicial capacity will enable long-term planning and allow meaningful policies to be framed for revolutionizing judicial administration.
The burden on the district judicial officer (who is tasked with administrative and executive functions in addition to judicial duties) has to be empirically and holistically understood, so as to develop strategies that optimize 'judicial hours' and minimize leakages of time towards other responsibilities – whether quasi-judicial or administrative. Speaking relatively, the HCs too need to be free of duties keeping judges away from the core task of judging. Now more than ever, in the seventy-fifth year of the Republic and the promulgation of the Constitution, new ideas and proposals grounded in empirical study have to be implemented swiftly across all areas of judicial administration to enhance the independence and efficiency of the judicial system.
The author is a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India.
This is an excerpt from Justice(Retired) S Ravindra Bhat's essay “The Administration of the District Judiciary in India : Challenges and Opportunities” in '[In]Complete Justice? The Supreme Court at 75′, edited by S. Muralidhar and published by Juggernaut Books.
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