Allahabad High Court Alters Husband's S. 307 IPC Conviction To 324 & Then 'Acquits' Him Based On Compromise With Wife
The Allahabad High Court recently 'altered' a husband's conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) to Section 324 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous means) and then 'acquitted' him after recording that he and victim-wife had reconciled and were living together as husband and wife since 1988 and had raised two children. With this, a bench of Justice Madan Pal...
The Allahabad High Court recently 'altered' a husband's conviction under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) to Section 324 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous means) and then 'acquitted' him after recording that he and victim-wife had reconciled and were living together as husband and wife since 1988 and had raised two children.
With this, a bench of Justice Madan Pal Singh allowed the criminal appeal filed by husband (Pramod Kumar) challenging the 1987 judgment and order of conviction. Interestingly, the Bench first 'quashed' the trial court's judgement and order of conviction and then 'set it aside' based on the compromise between the parties.
Briefly put, the trial court, in 1987, sentenced the husband and his parents under Sections 307 and 307/34 IPC for allegedly attempting to burn his wife Kiran on 5 June 1983 on account of inadequate dowry.
During the hearing in the HC, counsel for the appellant produced a joint affidavit signed by both the husband and wife, stating that they had “amicably settled their disputes” and had been living together peacefully for decades (since 1988).
The affidavit said that the children of the couple, now senior citizens, were now adults and that they had rebuilt their family life.
In its 26-page order the Court noted that there was nothing on record to indicate either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the husband (appellant no.1) and the complainant-wife.
However, before addressing the compromise deed, the Court closely examined the medical evidence and testimony of the doctor (P.W.-4) and noted that the medical report reflected simple injuries, a superficial burn on the left ring finger and swelling on the limbs, none of which were on vital parts or likely to cause death.
Thus, finding that the ingredients of attempt to murder (Section 307 IPC) were not made out, the Court altered the conviction to Section 324 IPC for voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous means or means.
"...after examining the medical evidence adduced during course of trial like medical examination report of the victim/complainant and the testimony of the doctor who has been examined as P.W.-4 has already held that since no case under Section 307 I.P.C. is made out against the appellant nos. 1 to 3, whereas Section 324 I.P.C. would be made out against them in that place, as such the conviction under Section 307 I.P.C. is liable to be altered to Section 324 IPC...", the Court recorded in its judgment.
Furthermore, the Court addressed the question of quashing of the proceedings, the Court noted that though Section 324 IPC is non-compoundable, the fact of the matter was that the dispute is matrimonial in nature and the parties were now living a happy and peaceful life after settling their dispute soon after the filing of the appeal.
Thus, the bench opined that it was appropriate and expedient to quash the impugned judgment and order of conviction, as it will “result into a fruitless and vain exercise in the peaceful life of husband and wife as also their sons and daughter”.
In this regard, it referred to the top court's ruling in the cases of as B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, Nikhil Merchantv. CBI, and Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where inherent powers were exercised to quash proceedings in the interest of justice once the parties genuinely reconciled.
The bench noted that though it was in an appellate jurisdiction under Section 374 read with Section 389 CrPC, it had to be kept in mind that the aim and object of law is not only to punish the culprit, but, the objective of the law is also to maintain peace, tranquility, prosperity and harmony in society as well as in the country.
"If there is a compromise between husband and wife and they are living to live together and to lead happy family life, then it will also be ideal in building our society", the bench remarked.
In this regard, the Court also observed that if a husband or a father (appellant no.1) has to go to jail again, not only his wife (complainant herein) but also their children would suffer from mental trauma and they would also have to face humiliation and bad feelings in the society.
"…little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions, resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts", the bench further remarked.
Importantly, the bench stressed that marriage is a sacred ceremony of our society, the main objective of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully
Against this backdrop, it added that parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.
The appeal was accordingly allowed. The Court ordered that the conviction be altered to Section 324 IPC and then set aside entirely in light of the compromise by recording 'acquittal' of the accused. The Court directed that the appellant need not surrender, and that his bail bonds be discharged.