Tearing Pages Of 'Manusmriti' During Live TV Debate Prima Facie A Cognizable Offence: Allahabad HC Denies Relief To RJD Spokesperson
Observing that act of tearing pages of 'Manusmriti' in a live TV debate prima facie amounts to a cognizable offence, the Allahabad High Court last week denied relief to Rashtriya Janata Dal Spokeperson and Jawaharlal Nehru University Ph.D. student Priyanka Bharti by refusing to quash an FIR lodged against her.Bharti has been charged under Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for...
Observing that act of tearing pages of 'Manusmriti' in a live TV debate prima facie amounts to a cognizable offence, the Allahabad High Court last week denied relief to Rashtriya Janata Dal Spokeperson and Jawaharlal Nehru University Ph.D. student Priyanka Bharti by refusing to quash an FIR lodged against her.
Bharti has been charged under Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for allegedly tearing a few pages of Manusmriti during a live debate organized by the news channels India TV and TV9 Bharatvarsh, where she was participating as a spokesperson for the RJD.
Seeking quashing of the FIR, she had moved the HC, arguing that there was no intention or deliberate attempt knowingly or unknowingly on her part to insult the sentiments and feelings of any person or religion, and in any case, her act does not amount to affect the public order.
Her counsel, Advocate Syed Abid Ali Naqvi, argued that any insult to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings do not come within section 295-A IPC, which stood substituted with Section 299 BNS.
For context, Section 299 BNS, which penalises deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs, is a cognizable and non-bailable offence, which carries a punishment of imprisonment for up to 3 years.
At the outset, the Court referred to the provision of Section 295-A IPC to note that it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.
In this regard, a bench of Justice Vivek Kumar Birla and Justice Anish Kumar Gupta referred to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mahendra Singh Dhoni vs. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar and Another and Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of UP.
The bench also referred to the top court's judgment in the case of Amish Devgan vs. Union of India and Others, noting that in this case, the Apex Court had refused to quash the FIRs lodged against News Anchor Devgan over allegations of making hate speech during the telecast of a live show.
The court specifically referred to paragraphs 65 and 76 of the Supreme Court's judgment in Amish Devgan's case, where it had held that speeches by influential individuals, such as political leaders or media figures, carry greater credibility and impact than those of ordinary people and such speeches should not incite hatred or violence (paragraph 65). Furthermore, in paragraph 76, the top court had noted that persons of influence have a duty to be responsible due to their reach, and they are expected to be cautious with their words, considering the potential impact.
Against this backdrop, the division bench opined that the petitioner's (Priyanka Bharti) act of tearing pages of "Manusmriti", which the court termed to be the "holy book of a particular religion", was nothing but prima facie reflection of her malicious and deliberate intention and an act done without any lawful excuse or without any just cause. It added that
"We cannot ignore the fact that the petitioner is a highly qualified person and was taking part as a spokesperson of a political party and thus, it can not be pleaded that the act was done ignorantly. Therefore, in our opinion, prima facie a cognizable offence is made out," the bench further remarked.
Thus, denying her relief, her plea was dismissed.
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 78