Mere Correction Of Typographical Error In Arbitral Award Does Not Extend Limitation Period For Plea U/S 34(3) Of A&C Act: Delhi HC
The Delhi High Court held that mere correction of typographical error does not extend the period limitation for filing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). The court further held that the limitation period begins from the date of disposal of an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act and not from the date when a...
The Delhi High Court held that mere correction of typographical error does not extend the period limitation for filing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). The court further held that the limitation period begins from the date of disposal of an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act and not from the date when a signed corrected copy of the award is received by the party.
A bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta held that “where an application under Section 33 of the Act is filed, irrespective of whether it results in correction or not, the starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) is the date on which the application is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal.”
Tefcil Breweries Ltd. had entered into an agreement with Alfa Level India for supply, erection and commissioning of brewery plant at Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. Disputes arose between the parties regarding non-performance and payments and the arbitration was initiated. The Arbitral Tribunal passed an award on 17/10/2017 and later an additional award on 18/05/2018 by which it awarded Alfa an additional amount of Rs. ₹31,23,889. Later, the tribunal made corrections in the additional award and the corrected copy of the award was sent to both the parties.
The signed corrected copy by Alfa was received on 21.08.2025. Tefcil filed a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act challenging both the awards. The tribunal dismissed the petitions holding that they were barred by limitation as the limitation began from the date when the application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act was disposed of. Tefcil had filed an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
The Appellant submitted that corrections in the award were done without notice, therefore they should be considered as suo moto correction under section 33(3) of the Arbitration Act. It was further submitted that the limitation under section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act begins from the date when a signed corrected copy of the award is received under section 31(5). Relying on MMRDA v. Mumbai Metro One Pvt. Ltd., it was contended that delivery of the signed corrected copy of the award is essential to trigger the limitation.
Per contra, the Respondent submitted that the correction was not suo moto and made at its instance. The correction was communicated to both parties. It was further submitted that the date of disposal of the application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act was relevant for the purpose of section 34(3). Relying on Ved Prakash Mithal & Sons v. Union of India, it was argued that the date of disposal of the application is relevant, not delivery of the corrected award.
Findings:
The Court upheld the single judge's finding that the petition was time barred. It rejected the appellant's contention that the correction was suo moto. The court held that “the correction made on 23rd May 2018 was done at the behest of the Respondent who brought the typographical error to the notice of the Arbitrator. The said communication was simultaneously marked to the Appellant's counsel. Hence, it cannot be termed as a suo motu correction.”
On limitation period, the court observed that if no section 33 application is filed, the limitation period begins from the date of receipt of the award and where such an application is filed, the time starts from the date when the application is disposed of.
Quoting from the Supreme Court's judgment in Geojit Financial Services Ltd., it held that “Where an application under Section 33 of the Act is filed, irrespective of whether it results in correction or not, the starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) is the date on which the application is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal.”
The court further held that the corrections were only technical and did not alter the award's findings and reasoning. The Appellant was aware of the correction as of May 2018. The court held that “the attempt on behalf of the Appellant to rely on an inadvertent clerical error to seek an extension of time is specious to say the least. The purpose of fixing strict timelines under the Arbitration Act would be completely defeated if such arguments are accepted.”
Accordingly, the present appeal was dismissed.
Case Title: M/S TEFCIL BREWERIES LTD. versus M/S ALFA LAVAL INDIA PVT. LTD.
Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 37/2025 & CM APPL. 13366/2025
Order Date: 08/10/2025