Spouse Can Sue Partner's Lover Seeking Damages For Interfering With Marriage : Delhi High Court Discusses 'Alienation Of Affection'
"Third party must not intentionally and wrongfully interfere with marital relationship by acts calculated to alienate the affection of a spouse"
The Delhi High Court has held that a civil suit by a spouse claiming damages from the other spouse's lover for intentionally interfering with the marriage is maintainable. The High Court discussed the novel concept of "Alienation of Affection" to hold that such an action is maintainable.
Also, such a suit can be filed before the Civil Court and not the Family Court.
Overruling the objections to the suit's maintainability, the Court issued summons to the husband and his alleged lover in the wife's suit.
The Court held that a civil action for wrongful interference in marriage is sustainable, so long as the plaintiff can, on proper pleading and proof, establish :
(i) intentional and wrongful conduct by the defendant directed at alienating the marital relationship of the plaintiff,
(ii) clear causation linking that conduct to a legally cognisable injury to the plaintiff,and
(iii) that the loss claimed is susceptible of rational assessment.
The Court observed that a third party must not "intentionally and wrongfully interfere" with a marriage to cause the alienation of the spouse's affection to the other spouse.
“….a spouse is held to possess a protectable interest in marital consortium, intimacy, and companionship, the correlative legal duty would be that any third party must not intentionally and wrongfully interfere with that relationship by acts calculated to alienate the affection of a spouse to the other spouse, which the other spouse is legally entitled to,” Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav said.
“At the same time, a spouse retains the inherent liberty to make personal choices. Where the conduct of a spouse is completely voluntary, not induced and uncoerced, that exercise of such liberty of one spouse will defeat third-party liability,” the Court added.
Justice Kaurav was dealing with a suit filed by a married woman seeking damages on the ground that she was entitled to the affection and companionship of a man and that such affection was allegedly withdrawn on account of the active and mala fide conduct of the man's lover.
While seeking damages for “Alienation of Affection”, the woman also alleged that the other woman had knowingly and intentionally interfered with her marital relationship, thereby causing its breakdown.
It was the woman's case that on confrontation, the man allegedly refused to end the said relationship, and her husband began openly appearing with the third party at social gatherings and humiliating her at public functions. Her husband had then filed for divorce.
In this backdrop, the wife filed a suit in the Delhi High Court, arraying the other woman as defendant no.1 and the husband as defendant no.2. She sought damages from defendant no.1 for causing the Alienation of Affection of her husband.
The defendants objected to the maintainability of the suit, arguing that the dispute emanates from a marital relationship and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, citing Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. It was also argued that alleged adultery was an issue pending adjudication in the husband's divorce petition.
The High Court, holding the suit to be maintainable, held that the alleged act was an actionable civil injury arising from independent tortious conduct
Issuing summons in the suit, the Court said that the Indian legislation does not expressly recognise the tort of Alienation of Affection and that the concept is derived from Anglo-American Common Law and belongs to the category of so-called “heart-balm” torts.
“Although a third party may be instrumental in alienating the affection or companionship of a spouse, it is rare for the aggrieved spouse to pursue an action against such an intruder. Even if such an action were pursued, it would raise questions as to whether the injury could be adequately compensated through monetary damages, since such a remedy may not restore the marriage, but only compensate for harm suffered,” the Court said citing a Supreme Court ruling in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 48.
It noted that no reported civil case had been brought to the knowledge of the Court by either of the parties which alluded to the enforcement of damages for the tort of AoA, as the concept remains judicially acknowledged, but not formally adopted.
“To date, no Indian Court appears to have granted relief in a civil suit seeking damages solely on the basis of AoA, nor has any Court prescribed a procedure for adjudicating such a claim. Thus, while Indian jurisprudence has acknowledged the concept in principle as a possible tort, and the action by the aggrieved spouse to be maintainable, the Courts have, thus far, not evolved any substantive law or remedies to support its enforcement in practice,” the Court said.
It further said that the pendency of parallel matrimonial proceedings between the plaintiff woman and her husband does not bar the institution of separate civil suit for damages against the man she was in a relationship with.
“The relief sought in this suit, i.e., compensation for tortious interference, is distinct from the remedies pursued under the matrimonial law. Even if there is factual overlap, the Civil Court is competent to proceed, and these considerations do not warrant rejection of the plaint at the threshold stage of issuing summons,” it said.
The Court further stated that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joseph Shine decriminalised adultery, it was still a ground for civil action.
"The decision in Joseph Shine decriminalised adultery; it did not create a license to enter into intimate relationships beyond #marriage, free from civil or legal implications...While the exercise of personal liberty is not criminal and therefore cannot attract penal sanction by the State as a matter of public offence, such conduct may nevertheless give rise to civil consequences," the Court said.
The Court also said that the bar under Section 7(d) of the Family Courts Act is not attracted as it is confined to suits or proceedings “arising out ofa marital relationship." Saying that the present suit was for a tortious action, the Court said that a civil court can entertain the matter.
Title: SHELLY MAHAJAN v. MS BHANUSHREE BAHL & ANR