S.5 Of Limitation Act Applies To Revision Pleas Under Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Act: Patna High Court

Facts

All the revision applications in the present case were filed against different arbitral awards, passed by the Bihar Public Works Contract Disputes Arbitration Tribunal in different reference cases along with interlocutory applications for condonation of delay.

The aforementioned civil revision applications are said to be barred by limitation inasmuch that they were filed after more than ten months from the date of the Award. The period of limitation, under the Limitation Act, 1963, is of three months for filing of civil revision application against an Award. The Act, however, does not prescribe any upper limit within which the civil revision application must be filed. It was claimed that the Limitation Act was applicable to the provisions of the

Contentions

The Counsel for Applicant submitted that the Section 5, Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 34 (3), Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”). It was further submitted that BPWCDA Act shall follow the principle of ACA. The Counsel highlighted that in Civil Revision No. 9 of 2017 vide order dated 05.04.2023, co-ordinate bench of this Court while dealing with a similar issue had held that Section 5, Limitation Act would be applicable to Section 13, as its applicability is not excluded by the provisions of BPWCDA Act.

On the other hand, the Counsel for Respondent placed reliance on the order of this Court in Civil Revision No. 84 of 2018 vide order dated 15.04.2024, wherein another co-ordinate bench in a similar case had observed that in view of the bar provided in the proviso to Section 34(3), ACA that the delayed application under Section 34 may be entertained up to a further period of 30 days beyond the period of limitation but not thereafter. Thus, Section 5, Limitation Act did not apply to BPWCDA Act.

Observations

The Court pointed out that Section 8, BPWCDA Act specifically states that the provisions of the Act will be in addition to and supplemental to ACA and not in prerogative way. The Court observed that the question involved while exercising revisional power under Section 13, BPWCDA Act is that if the revision is filed beyond 90 days from the date on which the Award or interim Award is made or reviewed under this Act does it exclude the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and in-consequent of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysing the law, the Court observed that it was clear that an application to set aside an Arbitral award under Section 34 must be within 3 months from the receipt of the award or the date of disposal of a request under Section 33. Further, the Court may exercise discretion to entertain the application, within a further period of 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown, but not thereafter. As per Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the effect of there being a different limitation period under Section 34(3) is that, Section 3 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as if the 3-month limitation period is the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

The Court further observed that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to determine whether the application is within the period of limitation, “insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded”. The Court observed that there were two aspects necessary for its consideration – (i) interpretation of the 'express exclusion' and second, the extent of such exclusion.

The Court observed that the mere prescription of a period of limitation that is different from the Limitation Act, even if mandatory and compulsory is not sufficient to displace the applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act. Such an inference could be drawn from the language and scheme of the special law.

The Court highlighted that Section 34(3), ACA clearly provided that the application may be entertained within a period of 3 months extended by thirty days but not thereafter whereas Section 13, BPWCDA states that application be made to it within three months and it does not clearly exclude the same as it is in addition to and supplemental to ACA. In view of the settled law, the Court observed that an express reference to an exclusion was not essential and the court could examine the language of the special law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that certain provisions of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded. Thus, the Court concluded that Section 5, Limitation Act is applicable to the revisional power of the High Court under Section 13, BPWDCA Act.

Since conflicting views had been taken on this point by co-ordinate benches of this Court, the Court was of the view that the question whether Section 5, Limitation Act shall have an application for condoning delay in a proceeding under Section 13, BPWCDA or the condonation of delay as laid down under Section 34, ACA shall be applicable in view of Section 8, BPWCDA should be examined by a larger bench.

Accordingly, the Court directed that the records be placed before the Chief Justice of the Court for referring the matter to an appropriate larger bench.

Case Title – State of Bihar & Others v. Dayanand Sinha & Others

Case No. – Civil Revision No. 34, 66 and 112 of 2017

Appearance-

For Applicant – Mr. Ashok Kumar Dubey, AC to AAG – XI, Mr. Dinesh Maharaj, AC to AAG - XI

For Respondent – Mr. Lal Babu Singh, Advocate and Mr. Nilesh Kumar Pandey, Advocate

Date – 25.08.2025

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