The Madurai bench of the Madras High Court, on June 24, 2025, delivered a split verdict in a matter involving the legality of animal sacrifice at the historic Sikkandar Badhusha Dargah, which is located on the Thiruparankundram Hills. At the heart of the issue is a deeply entangled faith, law, and public order, thereby raising serious questions under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, balancing the right to religious freedom against concerns of animal welfare and heritage preservation. While Justice J. Nisha Banu gave an assenting opinion, upheld the right to ritual sacrifice as part of protected religious practice, while Justice S. Srimathy dissented, calling for a civil court trial to first establish its historicity and legality.
Background
The Writ Petitions number (W.P. 2277, 2678 of 2025, among others) filed by Advocate M. Kannan and others sought a complete ban on the practice of animal sacrifice and thereby the subsequent distribution of the meat at the Dargah. The Petitioners argue that such animal sacrifice practices disrupted the “Holiness of the Hill”, which they asserted was intrinsically associated with the Arulmigu Subramaniya Swamy Temple, one of the most prominent Hindu religious sites in the area. They further contended that animal sacrifice had practically no historical background at the Dargah and thus posed a threat to public order, environmental integrity, and communal harmony.
In response to this, the Dargah authorities invoked the Kanthoori festival, which is a long-standing Sufi ritual characterised by communal feasting, animal sacrifice and collective worship. They argued that practice was an integral part of their religious tradition and was observed with interfaith participation from local Hindu communities, thus making it an emblem of syncretic tradition and not religious provocation.
Assenting opinion- Justice Nisha Banu
Citing the seminal precedent in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endownments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur mutt[1], Justice Banu, stated that courts are not competent enough to classify what comes under the “essential religious practises” unless such practices offend public order, morality, health, or are otherwise regulated by law. She upheld the constitutional validity of animal sacrifices at the Dargah. The practices carried out were safely under the scope of Article 25(1) of the Constitution and fall squarely within the scope of “right to freely profess, praise and propagate religion” which includes observance and rituals specifically where no legislative bar to prohibit them exists.
Justice Banu further contended that in the absence of any statutory prohibition, the court does not have any right to impose a judicial ban on animal sacrifice, since such intervention will amount to judicial overreach. Also, the petitioners contended that the violation of the Places of Worship ( Special Provision) Act, 1991, to which she denied, stating that the religious character of Dargah predates the Act's cut-off date of 15.08.1947. Also, the stress was laid upon the Syedna Taher Saifuddin v. State of Bombay[2], wherein she warned the courts against allowing one religious community to interfere with or restrict the beliefs of another.
Dissenting opinion: Justice S.Srimathy
Justice Srimathy's reasoning aligned with the Supreme Court's caution in Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India[3], which noted that places of worship and practice cannot be automatically deemed essential unless proven. Also, the reference was taken from the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958, since the Thiruparankundram Hill is a protected monument zone where even religious activity may be subject to regulation.
Taking a more cautious and evidence-based approach, Justice Srimathy insisted that no historical proof was produced to show that animal sacrifice was an “essential or uninterrupted practice at the Dargah”. Even past civil litigation, including O.S. No. 4 of 1920 and Privy Council Appeal No. 5 of 1930, established only limited property rights for the Dargah and did not affirm any ritual practices. Lastly, she contended that animal sacrifice is an “exceptional practice” and must be proved as integral to religion through a civil court trial before claiming any constitutional protection.
Religious Freedom, Regulation, and Public Order
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to demonstrate the existence of any statutory prohibition of animal sacrifice practices at the Dargah, ultimately rendering their claims rooted more in subjective moral discomfort and influenced by majority sentiments rather than based on profound legal norms. Although animal sacrifice may fall under the ambit of constitutionally protected religious practice under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, such protection isn't absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions. Laws, such as the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, govern animal welfare and can legitimately regulate or limit such practice, particularly in public places, but in the present scenario, the petitioners failed to consider that.
Both the judges collectively acknowledged the State's constitutional duty to uphold public order and maintain religious neutrality, though they approached it from differing emphases. Justice Banu emphasised the need for peaceful coexistence of all religions since India is a secular country, and thus mutual respect for all pluralistic traditions must exist among citizens. Justice Srimathy expresses concerns over the potential disruptions of civic harmony due to the absence of an evidentiary basis supporting the religious claim. This divergence illustrates the delicate judicial task of balancing religious freedoms on one side with the regulatory oversight in a pluralistic democracy.
Jurisdiction over the Sacred Space
Amid this case, there is another discussion over the territorial sanctity, religious infinity and complete clients of entitlement over this Shrine. The Thiruparankundram Hills hold profound spiritual significance for both communities. While the temple authorities assert its sacredness and cultural legacy, the Dargah authorities invoke a historical tradition of ritual significance and interfaith harmony. These overlapping claims are not just about ritual practice, but about who belongs and who has the right to perform religion in such a contested sacred geography. In adjudicating such disputes, courts are called upon to balance competing faith narratives, keeping in mind the constitutional morality and statute's legitimacy, rather than choosing one religion over another.
While delivering this split verdict, the Madras High Court's judgments reflect a dependent constitutional dilemma: Can the faith practices of minority communities, particularly those that unsettle dominant moral sensibilities, be shielded from public discomfort and majority influence? This case is not just about animal sacrifice alone; it's a test of our constitutional fidelity in fraught times. On one side, one judge affirms ritual liberty to be at the centre of religious freedom, while the other insists on an evidentiary basis for granting constitutional protection.
Both of these opinions underscore legitimate concerns, yet the real challenge still lies in reconciling individual rights with regulatory oversight, without letting politics have an influence on religion.
As the matter awaits some sort of resolution by a larger bench or civil court, this verdict stands as a timely reminder: religious freedom must not at all be surrendered to the tide of intolerance and prevail over communal majoritarianism.
Author is a 3rd Year Law Student at Maharashtra National Law University. Views Are Personal.