S.39 Specific Relief Act | Principles On Grant Of Mandatory Injunction : Supreme Court Explains
The Supreme Court on Monday (July 14) observed that a grant of mandatory injunction under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (“SRA”) is discretionary, and can be granted only upon the breach of an enforceable legal obligation. The Court said that a mandatory injunction cannot be granted unless there exists a legal right and there's a breach of that legal right. The...
The Supreme Court on Monday (July 14) observed that a grant of mandatory injunction under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (“SRA”) is discretionary, and can be granted only upon the breach of an enforceable legal obligation.
The Court said that a mandatory injunction cannot be granted unless there exists a legal right and there's a breach of that legal right.
The bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan heard a case involving the allotment of alternative plots to the Respondent-Oustees, whose lands were acquired by the appellant for the development of residential sectors. Under HUDA's 1992 policy, the respondents were entitled to rehabilitation by way of alternative plots at the 1992 rates, provided they complied with the procedural requirements, namely, submitting an application in the prescribed format and depositing 10% of the earnest money as a condition for seeking a mandatory injunction.
The Appellant-Haryana Urban Development Authority (“HUDA”) was aggrieved by the High Court's decision granting blanket reliefs without considering the procedural defaults of the Respondent/plaintiffs and without evaluating their individual eligibility under the policy.
Before the Supreme Court, the Appellant-HUDA argued that the High Court erred in granting relief to the Respondents without considering the fact that the Respondents hadn't complied with 1992 policy for seeking rehabilitation under the policy which mandated them to file an appropriate application in the prescribed format followed by depositing 10% of the earnest money as a condition precedent for seeking mandatory injunction.
Accordingly, the appellant contended that the respondents had no legal right to seek a mandatory injunction, as they had failed to comply with the conditions set out in the 1992 policy for availing rehabilitation benefits. Consequently, there was no breach of obligation on the appellant's part that could justify invoking Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act.
Finding force in the Appellant's contention, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala emphasized that mandatory injunction is a discretionary and exceptional remedy, which should only be granted when there is a clear breach of duty or obligation, the plaintiff has fully complied with necessary conditions to claim the benefit, the equities of the case are in plaintiff's favor.
“The breach of obligation and performance and compulsion to perform certain acts in relation to such obligation must be specifically established before a mandatory injunction can be granted. The plaintiff in a suit instituted by him under Section 39 of the Act 1963 is obliged to satisfy the court with appropriate pleadings and cogent evidence that the defendant is committing breach of a particular obligation which is binding on him and there are certain acts which are capable of being enforced by the court in view of the terms of the policy of allotment of plot so far as the case on hand is concerned.”, the court observed.
The Court summarized the conditions for granting a mandatory injunction as developed over time by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court as under:
"i) Obligation: There must be a clear obligation on the part of the defendant.
ii) Breach: A breach of that obligation must have occurred or be reasonably apprehended
iii) Necessity: It must be necessary to compel the performance of specific acts to prevent or rectify the breach.
iv) Enforceability: The court must be able to enforce the performance of those acts.
v) Balance of Convenience: The balance of convenience must be in favour of the party seeking the injunction.
vi) Irreparable Injury: The injury or damage caused by the breach must be irreparable or not adequately compensable in monetary terms."
Applying the law, the Court found that Respondents (oustees) did not submit applications as per the prescribed format, nor did they deposit 10% earnest money, as mandated by the 1992 policy for entitlement claim. Further, the Court noted that some of the plaintiffs had approached courts 15 years after the policy without complying with its essential terms.
Thus, the Court held that Respondents had no enforceable legal right, and therefore the Appellant had no corresponding legal obligation to allot the plots. Hence, a mandatory injunction could not be granted.
“When the scheme in question specifically provides that an oustee shall file an application in a specified format with deposit of the requisite amount towards earnest money then it is a part of the obligation on the part of the oustee to do so before he calls upon the State to allot the plot in accordance with the terms of the scheme.”, the court observed.
However, because large number of Oustees left helpless because of their fault to comply with the procedural requirements to claim rehabilitation under HUDA's 1992 policy, the Court granted four weeks' time all the respondents herein to prefer an appropriate online application with deposit of the requisite amount in accordance with the policy of 2016, after which no application would be entertained.
Other relevant observation by the Court:
“This litigation is an eye opener for all States in this country. If land is required for any public purpose law permits the Government or any instrumentality of Government to acquire in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or any other State Act enacted for the purpose of acquisition. When land is acquired for any public purpose the person whose land is taken away is entitled to appropriate compensation in accordance with the settled principles of law. It is only in the rarest of the rare case that the Government may consider floating any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons over and above paying them compensation in terms of money. At times the State Government with a view to appease its subjects float unnecessary schemes and ultimately land up in difficulties. It would unnecessarily give rise to number of litigations. The classic example is the one at hand. What we would like to convey is that it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must. Any beneficial measures taken by the Government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners.”
Cause Title: ESTATE OFFICER, HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS. VERSUS NIRMALA DEVI
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700
Click here to read/download the judgment
Appearance:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR Mr. B. K. Satija, AOR Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen, AOR Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G. Mr. B.k. Satija, A.A.G. Mr. Samar Vijay Singh, AOR Ms. Sabarni Som, Adv. Mr. Fateh Singh, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit K. Nain, AOR Mr. V. K. Verma, AOR Mr. Siddharth Mittal, AOR Mr. Abhijeet Varshney, Adv. Mr. Darshan Sejwal, Adv. Mr. Sumit Kumar Sharma, Adv. Mrs. Shilpa G Mittal, Adv. Mr. Rajiv Raheja, AOR Mr. Ravi Ranjan, Adv. Mr. Anurag Jain, Adv. Mr. J K Bhola, Adv. Mr. Sanjiv Raheja, Adv. Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, AOR Mr. Abhijit Sengupta, AOR Mr. Sanjay Singh, Adv. Mr. Umang Shankar, AOR Mr. Siddharth Jain, Adv. Mr. Vidyut Kayarkar, Adv. Mr. Shalender Singh Negi, Adv. Mr. Shree Pal Singh, AOR Mr. Ajay Kumar Singh, AOR Mr. Ankit Goel, AOR Mr. Subhasish Bhowmick, AOR Mr. D. Bharat Kumar, Adv. Mr. Narender Hooda, Sr Adv. Ms. Pallvi Hooda, Adv. Mr. Shiv Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. Yuvraj N. Adv. Ms. Tannu, Adv. Mr. Aditya Soni, Adv. Mr. Rajat Sharma, Adv. Mr. Shree Pal Singh, Adv. Mr. S.K. Pabbi, Adv. Ms. Disha Singh, Adv. Mr. Shivendu Gaur, Adv. Ms. Nidhi Sharma, Adv.