Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786Advocates Act, 1961 - Enrolment Fees - Contempt Petition - Bar Councils can't collect any amount as “optional fee” during enrolment - Supreme Court closed a contempt petition after the Bar Council of India (BCI) affirmed its commitment to ensuring State Bar Councils (SBCs) comply with judgment in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India,...
Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Advocates Act, 1961 - Enrolment Fees - Contempt Petition - Bar Councils can't collect any amount as “optional fee” during enrolment - Supreme Court closed a contempt petition after the Bar Council of India (BCI) affirmed its commitment to ensuring State Bar Councils (SBCs) comply with judgment in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 which prohibits charging enrolment fees beyond the stipulated amount under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 - Supreme Court clarified that no “optional” fees can be collected by any State Bar Council or the BCI, and fees must strictly adhere to the direction in the main judgment. [Paras 4-9] K.L.J.A. Kiran Babu v. Karnataka State Bar Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Alimony & Property Settlement – Held, alimony received after first divorce was not a relevant factor to determine the alimony payable after the divorce of the second marriage - The respondent's claim for Rs. 12 crores in permanent alimony and encumbrance-free ownership of the apartment as unjustified, considering that appellant-husband is an unemployed person and has responsibility of an autistic child - Appeal allowed. [Para 17, 20] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11 - Scope of - Arbitrability of disputes - Serious allegations of fraud - Arbitrability of disputes arising from agreements for custom milling of paddy, where allegations of massive fraud and criminal proceedings were initiated against rice millers – Held, mere pendency of criminal cases alleging simple fraud, no bar to arbitration - Since there existed a valid arbitration agreement, it would be impermissible at the referral stage to dive deeper into the dispute, instead referred the same to the arbitration for its adjudication. [Paras 21, 24-28] Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation v. Sanjay Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2025 INSC 933
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 92 - Purpose of - Section 92 is a 'representative suit' intended to protect public trusts from harassment by frivolous suits - the Court must look at the 'dominant purpose of the suit' as discernible from the plaint's allegations to determine if leave should be granted - the suit must be of a representative character - instituted in public interest and not merely for the vindication of individual or personal rights - Held that a society, even if not an express trust, can be considered a 'constructive trust' under Section 92 CPC if it functions for a public charitable purposes and receives endowments for that purpose - That dominant purpose of the suit and representative character of plaintiffs are paramount for Section 92 actions. [Paras 34-38] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Section 92 - Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Public Charitable Trusts - Constructive Trust - Maintainability Suit – Held, a formal 'entrustment' of property or funds by a third party is not a necessary ingredient to deem a society for public charitable purposes, by its very nature, is intended for the benefit of those in need, thereby becoming property 'entrusted' to it, thus acquiring the character of a 'constructive trust' - A constructive trust arises by operation of law where a person holding title to property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched - Appellant is engaged in a 'public purpose of charitable nature' given its principal activity of providing healthcare services to underprivileged sections - Supreme Court reiterated that the 'dominant purpose' of the suit, accessible strictly from the plaint's allegations, determines whether leave must be granted under Section 92 CPC, and that such suits are of a representative character for vindication of public rights, not merely personal rights - Entity won't lose character of public trust by mere registration under Societies Registration Act - There's no bar to a representative suit under Section 92 of CPC against a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, if it qualifies as a 'Constructive Trust' - Appellantentity was not a registered 'trust', it functions at par with a 'constructive trust' because its funds are meant solely for public benefit - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 42-55, 90, 107, 136] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 389 - Suspension of sentence - Fixed term sentence v. Life imprisonment - Liberal approach – Held, when a convicted person is sentenced to affixed period of sentence and files an appeal, suspension of sentence should be considered liberally by the Appellate court unless there are exceptional circumstances or statutory restrictions - This approach differs from cases involving life imprisonment, where the consideration for suspension is different - The Appellate Court is duty-bound to objectively assess the matter and record reasons for concluding that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail - The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick lacunae or loopholes in prosecution's case - What needs to be looked at is something palpable, apparent or gross on the face of record, on the basis of which the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable - Mere fact that the accused was granted bail during trial and did not misuse liberty is not of much significance for suspending the sentence after conviction, as effect of bail granted during trial loses significance upon conviction - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and remanded the matter to High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-22] Aasif @ Pasha v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 784 : 2025 INSC 944
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 389 - Suspension of Sentence - High Court suspended sentence of POCSO convict observing no sign of sexual assault was found by medical expert on prosecutrix and no FSL/DNA report available on record – Held, High Court did not advert to relevant factors for considering case for suspension under Section 389 CrPC - High Court shall examine whether prima facie there was anything palpable on the record to indicate if the accused had a fair chance of overturning the conviction - While considering an application for suspension, it is must to examine whether the material on record is sufficiently strong to prima facie suggest likelihood of the convict's acquittal - If answer is affirmative then the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this court, he should not be behind the bars for long time till the conclusion of appeal - Distinguished between setting aside of bail by a higher Court and cancellation of bail - While cancellation of bail is due to some supervening circumstances like breach of condition and setting aside of bail is concerned not with the breach of condition but with justifiability and soundness of the order granting bail - High Court did not even consider antecedents - Set aside order of high Court, directing respondent to surrender before Trial Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-16] Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2025 INSC 935
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 193 - Cognizance of offences - Whether a Court of Session can summon an accused under Section 193 CrPC based on materials in the Police Report, independent of Section 319 CrPC, in cases exclusively triable by it – Held, Sessions Court can summon additional accused at committal stage under Section 193 CrPC - The term 'cognizance' means conscious application of mind by court, leading to initiation of criminal proceedings or steps to ascertain of there's a basis for such proceedings - Cognizance is taken of offence and not the offenders - If Court during its proceedings comes to know about involvement of the other accused, has the power to summon them - Court of Sessions has complete jurisdiction to summon any individual accused of the crime - This power under Section 193 CrPC is distinct from Section 319 CrPC, which comes into play after evidence has been recorded - Sessions Court's role after committal, as per sections 226, 227 and 228 CrPC, is limited to deciding whether there is sufficient material, to proceed with the trial or discharge the accused - It does not involve deciding whether cognizance of offence should be taken - Once the Court takes cognizance of the offence, it becomes the Court's duty to find out the real offenders and if it comes to the conclusion that besides the persons put up for trial by the police some others are also involved in the commission of the crime, it is the Court's duty to summon them to stand trial along with those already named, since summoning them would only be part of the process of taking cognizance - Petition dismissed. [Paras 16, 20, 45-48, 58-60, 69, 77, 86, 89, 90, 103] Kallu Nat @ Mayank Kumar Nagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 770 : 2025 INSC 930
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319(4)(b) is a deeming provision, dispensing with the formal committal order by providing that the person added will be deemed to have been an accused even when cognizance was taken first - Cognizance is of offence and not the offenders - It is duty of the Court to find out who the offenders are - This is clear from section 190 of the CrPC read with section 2(d), definition of complaint, which include allegations against unknown person also - No dispute regarding powers of Court to bring the person under section 319(1) CrPC. [Para 103] Kallu Nat @ Mayank Kumar Nagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 770 : 2025 INSC 930
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Anticipatory Bail - High Court allowed pre-arrest bail to Respondent 2 in FIR registered under Sections 498A, 323, 313, 506, 307 and 34 of IPC r/w Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Held, condition imposed by High Court while granting bail to accused (resumption of conjugal life and maintenance with dignity and honour) is “beset with risk” and ought not to have been imposed - Pre-arrest bail deserved to be granted within the settled parameters and only conditions traceable to Section 438(2) of CrPC could be imposed. [Paras 4-8] Anil Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 762
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, there was no evidence, particularly no forensic evidence, to support the allegation of rape committed when the prosecutrix was a minor - Promise to marriage and subsequent relationship based on consent won't amount to rape - Allegation of rape under the POCSO Act was made more than 3 years after the alleged incident - A promise to marry followed by a consensual physical relationship does not amount to rape - Supreme Court quashed FIR against appellant citing it as abuse of the process of law - Set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. Kunal Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 765
Constitution of India - Article 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80 – State – Notice – Held, Appellant, being a State Financial Corporation and thus a 'State' under Article 12 of Constitution was entitled to mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC - When a suit is filed against State instrumentality, the plaintiff must either issue a notice under Section 80(1) CPC or obtain leave under Section 80(2) CPC - Failure to do so bars the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction against the State, rendering the suit unsustainable and liable to dismissal - A judgement rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, including execution or collateral proceedings - The Trial Court has a duty to address the satisfaction of Section 80 notice as a precondition for initiating a suit. [Para 13, 29, 30] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928
Constitution of India - Article 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498A of IPC, finding allegation to be 'common place, banal and vague” and “without any specific instances mentioned” having been filed one year after the couple's admitted separation - Set aside order of High Court and quashed FIR and ended marriage by using its powers under Article 142. [Paras 13-16] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926
Constitution of India - Articles 124(4), 124(5), 217, 218 - Judicial Misconduct - In House Procedure - Constitutional Validity - Removal of Judges - Fundamental Rights - Confidentiality of Inquiry - In-house procedure devised by the Supreme Court is a legally sanctioned, internal mechanism to address complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting judges of High Court and Supreme Court - It is not a parallel or extra-constitutional mechanism - the inquiry under the “in-house procedure” is a confidential, fact-finding exercise, distinct from a guilt-finding inquiry and is akin to a preliminary inquiry preceding disciplinary proceedings - the 'in-house procedure' has legal sanction, finding its roots in the law declared by Supreme Court under Article 141 of Constitution - The report of such an inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final - Paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the “in house procedure”, which allow the CJI to intimate the President and PM regarding serious misconduct short of impeachment serving as a vital mechanism for maintaining institutional integrity, public confidence and judicial accountability - The entire process under the “in house Procedure” is confidential, and placing incriminating evidence (like photographs/video footage) against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a measure provided or approved by the procedure - Held that this procedure violates Article 14 and 21 is unsustainable, as the procedure laid down is considered fair and just and does not compromise judicial independence. [Paras 80, 112, 114, 116, 121, 123-125] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943
Constitution of India - Petitioner's Conduct & Waiver - Maintainability of Writ Petition - The writ petition challenging the “In-house Procedure” and the inquiry report was not entertained primarily due to the petitioner's conduct, specifically acquiescing to the uploading of incriminating evidence and participating in the inquiry without demur, only raising objections after the report was submitted - Held that Petitioner's conduct did not inspire confidence for the Court to entertain writ petition. [Para 104-106] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943
Contempt of Court - Conflicting orders by two judges - Forgiveness vs. Punishment - Role of Bar and Bench – Held, castigating lawyers over small mistake may affect their career - Order was passed by Supreme Court arising from conflicting orders passed by two Judges of this Court, this matter was placed before a three-judge bench by CJI - Supreme Court agreed with the views expressed by Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, stating that the majesty of law lies not in punishing but in forgiving a person who acknowledges their mistake - Bar and Bench are like two wheels of the Golden Chariot of Justice, working in tandem - Majesty of law lies not in punishing someone but forgiving them for their mistakes - Both advocates have rendered apology and both advocates have expressed their remorse with promise not to repeat this in future - Application dismissed. [Paras 8-13] N. Eswaranathan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 777
Criminal Jurisdiction - Directions to High Court Judge - Reconsideration on CJI's request - Role of Supreme Court - Institutional Integrity - Supreme Court recalled direction to remove Allahabad HC Judge from criminal jurisdiction - Modification came after an undated letter from the CJI requested a reconsideration of directions issued in paras 25 & 26 of previous order - Held that its initial intention was not to cause embarrassment or cast aspersions on the concerned Judge, but to intervene when the dignity of institution is imperiled, especially given a pattern if erroneous orders from said judge - Supreme Court reiterated the importance of maintaining the dignity and authority of the judiciary and the faith reposted in it by the people - High Courts are final court of justice for 90% of litigants and they expect the justice delivery system to function in accordance with law - High Court should always uphold the Rule of Law and institutional credibility - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4-12] Shikhar Chemicals v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 768 : 2025 INSC 945
Doctrine of Sub-Silentio - A judgement is an authority only for what it decides - When a judgment fails to address issues raised, it is said to be 'sub-silentio' and cannot be held as a binding precedent on those undecided issues - Precedents sub silentio, not accompanied by reasons, cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect under Article 141 of Constitution. [Para 13] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928
Electricity (Amendment) Rules, 2024 - Rule 23 – Held, any gap/regulatory asset, aligning with clause 8.2.2. of National Tariff Policy, 2006 - Under Rule 23, any gap created should not exceed 3% of the approved ARR and must be liquidated with carrying costs in a maximum of three equal yearly instalments from next financial year - Existing gaps should be liquidated in a maximum of 4 years - APTEL- Appellate tribunal under Section 111 of Electricity Act has appellate jurisdiction to re-appreciate facts and apply the law, examining legality, propriety or correctness of law and issue directions to Regulatory Commissions when they fail to comply with Act - Regulatory Commissions are accountable for managing regulatory assets effectively - The Court also directed all State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) to submit detailed time-bound roadmaps outlining the schedule for regulatory asset liquidation, including the associated carrying costs. [Paras 71, 70, 68, 69, 69.8] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937
Electricity Act, 2003 - Regulatory Asset - Creation, continuation and liquidation - A “regulatory asset” is an intangible asset created by regulatory commissions to acknowledge an uncovered revenue gap or shortfall when a distribution licensee cannot fully recover reasonably incurred costs through tariff revenue - this amount is recoverable in future over a period of time - It is generally created when projected revenue from determined tariffs is significantly lower than the revenue required by the distribution company to recover costs and achieve a return on investment - the creation of a regulatory asset can also occur during truing up if actual revenue realization is less than the Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) - Such assets are often created to prevent “tariff shock” to consumers by deferring recovery over subsequent years. [Para 67, 69] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937
Electricity Act, 2003 - Regulatory Asset - Statutory Basis and National Tariff Policy - the creation and continuation of a regulatory asset is not a statutory concept or a power explicitly granted under the Electricity Act, 2003 - The National Tariff Policy, 2006 mandates that a regulatory asset should be created only in exceptional circumstances, clearly defined through regulations and limited to natural causes or force majeure conditions - Held that recovery should be time-bound, preferably within the control period and not exceeding three years - Electricity is a public good and its distribution is statutorily regulated, being a material resource under Article 39 of Constitution, mandating equitable distribution. [Para 63, 67, 65, 70] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937
Electricity Act, 2003 - Sections 61, 62, 64, 86 - Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 32 - Income Tax Rules, 1962 (Rules, 1962) - Rule 5 - Accelerated depreciation - Tariff determination - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - State Instrumentality - Whether wind energy projects that did not avail accelerated depreciation were entitled to seek a separate tariff determination from the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC), even after entering into PPAs with a fixed tariff applicable to projects availing accelerated depreciation – Held, tariff determination is an exercise of statutory power and not solely a matter of contractual volition, allowing for review by appropriate commission if public interest dictates - GUVNL-appellant is a State instrumentality and bound to promote the State's policy objectives, including development of renewable energy sources and cannot act as “model citizen” and cannot act like a “Shylock” - In IT Act and Rules, 1962, allow an assessee to choose between accelerated and normal depreciation at the time of filing their return for assessment year in which power generation commenced - This statutory liberty cannot be curtailed by appellant unilaterally fixing a binding price in a PPA entered into long before statutory option is to be exercised - Merely signing PPAs with a tariff applicable to projects availing accelerated depreciation did not bind respondent companies to that price for entire life of their projects - Appellant's conduct, seeking to bind the companies to an inapplicable tariff, was patently unfair and did not reflect positively on a State instrumentality - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 20, 24] Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Green Infra Corporate Wind Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 767 : 2025 INSC 922
Environmental Law - Powers of Pollution Control Boards – Held, environmental regulators have a compelling duty to adopt and apply preventive measures irrespective of actual environmental damage - Ex-ante action is necessary for this purpose and a certain measure in exercise of powers under Section 33A and 31A of the Water and Air Acts is essential - The powers of Boards under above sections are identical to those under section 5 of Environment Protection Act, which includes power to direct polluting industries to pay amounts for remedial measures - Boards are empowered to take similar actions - Recent 2024 amendments to Water & Air Acts, introducing decriminalization and the office of “Adjudicatory Officer” do not create a conflict with the State Board's power to direct payment of environmental damages - Boards have the discretion to decide appropriate action against a polluting entity, whether its punishment by penalty or immediate restoration, or both - This power must be guided by transparency and non-arbitrariness - Supreme Court directed that necessary subordinate legislation (Rules and Regulations) must be notified to ensure fair, transparent and non-arbitrary imposition of restitutionary and compensatory environmental damages, with procedural certainty - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10, 12, 27, 31, 33, 35, 36] Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2025 INSC 923
Environmental Law - Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Water Act) - Section 33A - Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Air Act) - Section 31A - Polluter Pays Principle – Compensatory / Restitutionary Damages vs. Penalties – Held, Pollution Control Boards can impose environmental compensation on polluting entities but was not empowered to levy compensatory damages under Section 33A of Water Act and Section 31A of Air Act as such actions amounted to imposition of penalties for which a specific procedure under Chapters VII & VI of respective Act was contemplated - There is distinction between a direction for payment of restitutionary and compensatory damage as a remedial measure for environmental damage and a punitive action of fine - Punitive action can only be taken through procedure prescribed in statute - Environmental restitution is a constitutional and statutory obligation, not punitive action. [Paras 19, 20, 27, 30] Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2025 INSC 923
Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) - Section 157- Confessional FIR - Admissibility in Evidence - FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence - It can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 or to contradict under Section 145 of IEA - In a criminal trial, if the maker of the FIR is the accused, it cannot be used against him as evidence if it is inculpatory in nature - The exception is if the accused offers himself to be examined as a witness - A confessional statement made by an accused person to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence against him due to absolute protection provided under section 25 of IEA and also protected by Section 162 CrPC - FIR can be used for limited purposes - i. to prove conduct under section 8; ii. Admissions under section 21; iii. Discovery under Section 27- High Court erred in corroborating Medical evidence with confessional contents of FIR lodged by appellant himself - Appeals allowed. [Paras 16-25] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927
Evidence Act, 1872 - Expert Witness (Medical Evidence) - is examined for their specialized knowledge to prove the contents of reports like a post-mortem report - Evidence provided by an expert is advisory in nature, and its credibility depends on the reasons and underlying data supporting their conclusions - An accused cannot be convicted of murder solely based on medical evidence. [Paras 27, 28] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Section 13B - Settlement Agreement - Mutual Consent Divorce- Withdrawal of consent - Supreme Court acknowledged that the respondent-wife's withdrawal from the mutual consent divorce agreement at the second motion was a valid exercise of her statutory right - Held that subsequent demand of wife for a higher alimony demonstrated an intention to coerce a better settlement, and her allegations of coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud regarding the initial settlement were unsubstantiated. [Para 18] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926
Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 144C v. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation - Dissenting Opinion (Nagarathna, J.) – Held, provisions of section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive but are mutually inclusive - the period of limitation prescribed under Section 153(2A) or 153(3) is applicable, even when matters are remanded - the non-obstante clause in section 144C(1) does not extend to the timelines prescribed under section 153 - The timelines under Section 153 does not automatically include the process conceived under Section 144C - the entire proceedings, including the hearing and directions by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), must be issued within 9 months as contemplated under Section 144C(12) of the Income Tax Act - the Act is workable even if Section 144C proceedings are subsumed within the limitation prescribed under Section 153(1) or (3) - no final assessments orders can be passed in these cases as same would be time-barred - Appeal Dismissed. [Para 15] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946
Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 144C v. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation - Supreme Court delivers split verdict on time limit for assessments under Section 144C - Interpretation of section 144C in light of Section 153 of IT Act – Held, Section 144C was introduced as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to facilitate expeditious resolution of tax disputes, especially for foreign companies - To reduce the time consumed in making assessment orders for eligible assesses - Satish Chandra Sharma; J. held that timelines in 144C (4) & (13) are independent and in addition to the timeline under Section 153(3) and that section 153(3) applies only to the passing of the draft assessment order - If entire Section 144C procedure were subsumed within Section 153(3), it would make the system unworkable and lead to a “complete catastrophe for recovering tax” - Section 153(3) applies to the passing of draft assessment order and Section 144C extends the timeline for the final order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6.1, 6.2, 8] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946
Insolvency and bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 62 – Appeal - Section 14 - Moratorium - IBC Moratorium doesn't bar voluntary surrender of corporate debtor's leased property to lessor if retaining the asset is deemed unviable and the Committees of Creditors (CoC) endorses decision - Held that commercial wisdom of the CoC should be given primacy during CIRP (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) - this case was distinguished from a simple recovery of property barred by Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, as the CoC and Resolution Professional themselves desired to return the property due to adverse financial implications of retaining it - The respondent was stalling the process for “undisclosed and extraneous reasons” - Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC states that once the adjudicating authority, by order, declares a moratorium, it would prohibit, amongst other acts, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or is in the possession of the corporate debtor - Set aside NCLAT's order and restored NCLT's order. [Paras 9, 10] Sincere Securities v. Chandrakant Khemka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 774 : 2025 INSC 931
Interest on delayed payments to small scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (1993 Act) - If purchase/supply order pre-dates the enactment of the 1993 Act, then interest is governed by section 34 CPC and not the 1993 Act, which operates prospectively - The Act is considered retroactive in the sense that if goods are supplied after its enforcement, the supplier is entitled to the benefit of statutory protection for interest, even if the agreement was entered into prior to the Act's enforcement - The Act mandates payment of compound interest with monthly interests at the rate mentioned in Section 4 - Set aside order of High Court citing miscarriage of justice and excessive interest calculation - Appeals Allowed. [Paras 31-35] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928
Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation - Harmonious Construction - Purposive Construction - Non-obstante Clause - A statute must be read as a whole and one provision construed with reference to others to achieve a consistent enactment, avoiding inconsistency or repugnancy - Courts should harmonize conflicting provisions - A construction that renders a provision futile or a 'useless lumber' is to be avoided - non-obstante clause operates only in case of a conflict to give enacting part an overriding effect, not otherwise - If the enacting part and non-obstante clause can be read harmoniously, they should be. [Paras 9.2-9.6] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946
Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Rule 12 - Determination of age - Evidentiary value of school certificates vs. Public Documents and Medical Opinion - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 35 - Relevancy of Entry in public Record - Section 74 - Public Documents - High Court declared respondent 2 as 'Juvenile' – Held, a school transfer certificate issued by a private school where entry of date of birth was based solely on the oral representation of the father, without any supporting documents, is unreliable - Such school's records are not “public documents” and its Headmaster is not a 'public master' for the purposes of Evidences Act - In cases where school records about age on oral representations and are contradicted by statutory documents like a Family Register (maintained under U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947), Voters List and a Medical Board Report, the latter hold more weight - Medical evidence based on scientific investigation should be given due weight and precedence over school administration records that give rise to hypothesis and speculation - Benevolent legislation of the Juvenile Justice Act is meant for genuine child accused and cannot be used as a ploy to subvert justice by accused individuals of matured mind - In serious offences, documents and statutory public records should take precedence over school records that create reasonable doubt about juvenility - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21-23, 25, 26] Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2025 INSC 918
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) - Section 163A - Special provisions as to payment of compensation - No-fault liability - Supreme court referred to a larger bench the issue of whether a claim under Section 163A of MV Act, can be maintained by the owner/insurer of a vehicle, or their legal representatives, for death or injury arising from a motor vehicle accident – Held, Section 163A is a special provision with a non-obstante clause, overriding other provisions of MV Act, other laws in force, and any instrument having the force of law, including insurance policy terms that confine claims for an owner-driven to a fixed sum - Supreme Court distinguished claims under Section 163A (no-fault liability) from those under Section 166, where proof of negligence is necessary - Section 163A is a beneficial provision - Claims survive against the insurer even if the insured dies after the accident, the liability shifts to the owner's estate and the insurance company must pay if the policy is valid - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with previous two-judge bench decisions that restricted such claims to third party risks and indicated that section 163A should cover liability with respect to death of an owner or a driver, even if it goes beyond the statutory liability under section 147 or contractual liability in the insurance policy. [Paras 13-17] Wakia Afrin (Minor) v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 764 : 2025 INSC 919
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138, 142(2)(a) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 200, 482 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Dishonour of Cheque - Place of filing complaint – Held, Section 142(2)(a) which was amended in 2015, specifies that an offence under Section 138 should be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction 'if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where payee maintains the account is situated”- Jurisdiction vests in Court where the payee maintains their account and the cheques delivered for collection - Set aside High Court's Order - Appeals allowed. [Paras 7-9] Prakash Chimanlal Sheth v. Jagruti Keyur Rajpopat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 769 : 2025 INSC 897
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 376 – Rape - Conviction based on sole testimony of prosecutrix - Evidentiary value of Prosecutrix's statement vis-à-vis Medical Evidence - Supreme Court reiterates that conviction in rape cases can be based solely on the creditworthy and consistent testimony of prosecutrix if it inspires confidence, even if medical evidence is not conclusive or does not show external injuries - The Court emphasized that the absence of injuries on private parts is not fatal to the prosecution's case and minor discrepancies in the victim's statement should not be grounds for rejection - Insufficiency of medical evidence or absence of external injury marks does not invalidate a creditworthy victim's testimony in rape cases - Appeal dismissed. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Proof of Minority – Held, the victim's 8th standard marksheet, showing her date of birth, corroborated by testimony of her parents, was cogent and reliable evidence to establish her minority at the time of the incident, thereby attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act - Supreme Court focused on need of a sensitive approach in dealing with sexual assault charges, noting that an unmerited acquittal encourages offenders and that rape causes severe psychological and physical harm. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929
Protection of Children from sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) - Sections 6, 29 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 506 - Aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Presumption of Guilt - Criminal Intimidation – Held, incestuous sexual violence committed by parent requires severest punishment, upheld fathers POCSO conviction - Crimes of sexual abuse, especially against children and by a parent, constitute an unspeakable betrayal of trust and assume a “demonic character”, deserving the “severest condemnation and deterrent punishment” - Incestuous sexual violence by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence, with no mitigation in sentencing for such crimes - A father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional - The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response - Directed Rs. 10,50,000/- to be paid as compensation to the victim by State. [Paras 9-16] Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 781 : 2025 INSC 934
Public Institutions - Disapproval of the manner in which present litigation has been conducted by appellant-corporation - Supreme Court noted that Public Institutions particularly those entrusted with the stewardship of public funds, are expected to conduct themselves in legal proceedings with highest standards of diligence, responsibility and accountability - This present case is stark example of how a state owned corporation has been unjustly and unsustainably saddled with financial liability. [Para 47] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928
Service Law - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (1995 Act) - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (1947 Act) - Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) - High Court upheld termination of a driver found to be color blind, without offering alternate employment – Held, Respondent failed to make demonstrable efforts to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, violating statutory obligations and administrative fairness - Clause 14 of Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dt. 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared color blind with pay protection and continuity of service - This clause remains valid & enforceable - The subsequent MOS dt. 22.12.1986, neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement - Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the 1986 settlement being general and the 1979 settlement addressing a specific category of disability (color blindness) - A general provision does not override a specific provision - Failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical retirement is a substantive illegality that violates the appellant's right to livelihood and equal treatment - This obligation is rooted in constitutional discipline and statutory expectation flowing from Article 14 & 21 - The burden lies on Respondent-Corporation to establish that no suitable alternate post was available - Directed Respondent-Corporation to appoint appellant to a suitable post - The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment. Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 21, 25-27, 33, 35, 37, 40] Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2025 INSC 920
Temple Administration - Supreme Court appoints Ex-Allahabad HC Judge Ashok Kumar as Head of Committee to administer Bankey Bihari Temple - Supreme Court modifies previous order regarding the use of temple funds for land acquisition, restoring the position to status quo ante, where the State cannot use temple funds for land acquisition - Stays operation of the ordinance's provisions that grants the State powers to constitute a Trust for managing the temple's affairs, specifically Sections 3 & 5, until the validity of the Ordinance is resolved by the High Court - Supreme Court directs establishment of a High-powered Temple Management Committee to oversee the day-to-day functioning of the Thakur Shree Bankey Bihari Ji Maharaj Temple, noting the ineffectiveness of previous management - The Committee is tasked with planning the holistic development of the Temple and its vicinity, including privately negotiating and land purchases or directing the State Government to acquire land - Held that apart from 4 Goswami members on the Committee, no other Goswami or sevayat is permitted to interfere in the Temple's critical functions, except for puja/sewa and offering prasad to the deity - Supreme Court stays operation and further proceedings of Single judge of High Court in a matter concerning the Ordinance's constitutionality to avoid parallel proceedings, requesting the Chief Justice of High Court to list such petitions before a Division Bench. [Paras 16-36] Management Committee of Thakur Shree Bankey Bihari Ji Maharaj Temple v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 785
Trust - Constructive Trust - Supreme Court laid down tentative list which may signify that the society may be considered as a 'constructive trust' - i. the method of devolution of property to the institution or its acquisition and circumstances along with the intention behind the grant of property i.e. whether it was for the benefit of the organization/public beneficiaries or for the personal benefit of any particular individual/family; ii. Whether grant is accompanied with any obligation or qualified with a condition, either express or implied, regarding its use by the grantee; iii. Whether the 'dedication' was complete i.e. whether there was an absolute cessation or complete relinquishment of ownership of property on part of the grantor and subsequent vesting of the property in another individual for the said object; iv. Whether public user or an unascertained class of individuals could exercise any 'right' over the organization and its properties; v. the manner of use of profits accrued, more particularly, whether it is applied/re-applied towards the benefit of the organization and its objectives etc. [Para 137] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775