Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute...
Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders. The detenu's actions, related to pending criminal cases under various statutes, did not amount to a disturbance of public order justifying detention. The detaining authority failed to substantiate how the detenu's conduct threatened public order, and the State should have sought bail cancellation instead. The detention order was quashed, emphasizing that preventive detention must strictly comply with legal and constitutional standards. [Para 17 - 22] Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2025 INSC 809 : AIR 2025 SC 2868
Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753
Article 19(1)(g) - Right to carry on Business - Article 19(1)(g) includes right to shut down a business subject to reasonable restrictions - Right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry it on. [Para 7] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801
Article 226 - Public Trust Doctrine – Transparent Allocation of Public Resources – Industrial Land Allotment – Systemic Flaws in UPSIDC Process - The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a 125-acre industrial land allotment to Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) due to payment defaults, as confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 2017. The Court criticized UPSIDC for systemic flaws in allotting the land in 2003 within two months without competitive bidding, violating the Public Trust Doctrine. This doctrine mandates transparent, fair, and publicly beneficial allocation of state resources, requiring consideration of economic benefits, environmental sustainability, and regional development. The Court noted that UPSIDC's non-transparent process deprived the public exchequer of revenue and undermined the State's fiduciary duty to citizens. It directed Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC to ensure future allotments are transparent, non-discriminatory, and aligned with public interest, industrial development, and environmental goals, with the subject land to be re-allotted strictly per these principles. (Paras 29 - 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791
Article 226 - Cancellation of Land Allotment – Validity of Legal Notice - The Supreme Court dismissed the Trust's appeal, affirming that UPSIDC's cancellation of the allotment complied with procedural requirements under Clause 3.04(vii) of the UPSIDC Manual. The appellant argued that only the notice dated 13.11.2006 qualified as a "legal notice," claiming three consecutive notices were required. However, the Court held that prior communications dated 14.12.2004 and 14.12.2005 also met the criteria for valid legal notices, as they clearly outlined the default, breach, intent to take legal action, and consequences, despite not being explicitly labeled as such. A valid legal notice requires clear facts, notice of breach, intent to hold the recipient liable, and compliance with statutory provisions, without suppressing material information. No prejudice was caused to the appellant, and the High Court's decision was upheld. (Paras 22 - 24) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791
Article 32 and 226 - Fake Encounters - The petitioner, an advocate, challenged a High Court order dismissing his Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking an independent probe into alleged fake police encounters in Assam. The petition claimed over 80 fake encounters since May 2021, citing non-compliance with PUCL guidelines, including failure to register FIRs against police personnel and inadequate investigations. Specific cases, such as the Tinsukia encounter, were highlighted, alleging procedural irregularities and police coercion. The Supreme Court directed the Assam Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to conduct an independent, expeditious inquiry into allegations of 171 fake encounters, ensuring victim participation and confidentiality. The petition alleged widespread violation of guidelines laid down in People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 635, regarding police encounter investigations. The Court underscored the role of human rights commissions in safeguarding civil liberties and the rule of law, noting that proven fake encounters violate Article 21 of the Constitution. While each of the 171 cases requires objective scrutiny, blanket directions based solely on compiled allegations were deemed unwarranted. The AHRC was granted authority to initiate further investigations, with state cooperation mandated and institutional barriers to be removed. The Assam State Legal Services Authority was directed to provide legal aid to victims, and measures were ordered to protect the identities of victims, families, and witnesses. The Court dismissed concerns raised by the Solicitor General about potential misuse of legal assistance, affirming confidence in the judicial system. The petitioner's locus standi was upheld, recognizing the role of individuals in exposing alleged state excesses. While most cases did not prima facie indicate flagrant violations of PUCL guidelines, some warranted further scrutiny. The Court clarified that PUCL guidelines mandate investigation of the encounter incident, not necessarily the police officers involved. (Para 55) Arif Md Yeasin Jwadder v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2025 INSC 785
Article 129 – Environmental Law – Contempt of Court – Unauthorised Tree-Felling in Delhi Ridge – Delhi Development Authority (DDA) – Constitutional Morality – Public Interest – Afforestation Measures – The Supreme Court held DDA officials in contempt for unauthorised tree-felling in the Delhi Ridge without prior court approval for a road-widening project to facilitate access to CAPFIMS Paramilitary Hospital. Two violations identified: (i) failure to seek court permission, and (ii) deliberate concealment of tree-felling, constituting criminal contempt. Contempt proceedings against former DDA Vice Chairman Subhashish Panda closed due to his dissociation from DDA. Other DDA officials fined ₹25,000 each as an environmental fee, with formal censure, without prejudice to departmental action. The Court directed: (i) mandatory disclosure of pending court proceedings in all notifications/orders related to afforestation, tree-felling, or ecologically impactful activities; (ii) urgent afforestation by DDA and GNCTD within three months, overseen by a court-constituted committee; (iii) identification of 185 acres for afforestation, costs borne by DDA; (iv) joint compliance reports by DDA and Forest Department; and (v) a one-time levy on beneficiaries of the road-widening project. The Court emphasized constitutional morality, social justice, and public interest in providing medical access to paramilitary personnel, while condemning the incident as a “classic case of institutional missteps and administrative overreach” due to non-compliance, disregard for court orders, and environmental degradation. Ignorance of pending court proceedings no longer a valid defense. Afforestation plan to be framed and implemented under committee supervision, with periodic compliance reports. (Paras 16, 21, 28, 32 & 33) Bindu Kapurea v. Subhasish Panda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2025 INSC 784 : AIR 2025 SC 2901
Article 136 - Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction - Limited Interference with Concurrent Findings - Exceptional Circumstances - No Ordinary Appellate Jurisdiction - Scope of Review - In criminal appeals by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is distinct from its appellate jurisdiction under Article 134. The scope of interference in such appeals is limited and subject to self-imposed constraints, as established in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2022) 10 SCC 321] and Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab [(1976) 4 SCC 158]. Key principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 include: The Supreme Court does not generally interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court based on pure appreciation of evidence. Reappraisal or review of evidence is not undertaken unless the assessment is vitiated by: Errors of law or procedure. Misreading of evidence. Non-consideration of glaring inconsistencies or striking features that demolish the prosecution's case. Violation of principles of natural justice or mandatory legal provisions causing serious prejudice or injustice. Interference is warranted only in rare and exceptional cases where there is manifest illegality, substantial and grave injustice, or disregard of judicial process, as highlighted in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (paras 63, 71) and Mst Dalbir Kaur (paras 2, 3, 8). The Supreme Court is not an ordinary court of criminal appeal. Appeals under Article 136 are not regular appeals, and the Court does not reassess evidence or credibility of witnesses to substitute its own opinion unless special circumstances exist, such as perverse findings or conclusions based on no evidence. The Court examines the High Court's judgment and evidence to determine if the principles laid down are followed. Findings of fact may be disturbed if the High Court overlooks critical evidence that undermines the prosecution's case or arrives at conclusions that are manifestly perverse or unsupportable. These decisions do not preclude reappreciation of evidence to assess whether a case falls within the parameters for interference but emphasize that such power is exercised sparingly to prevent grave miscarriage of justice. (Paras 37 - 39) Agniraj v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2025 INSC 774 : AIR 2025 SC 2674
Articles 21 and 22 - Requirement to Communicate Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) in Warrant-Based and Warrantless Arrests - Held, Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard mandating that grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrestee. In warrantless arrests, non-compliance with Article 22(1) renders the arrest illegal, prohibiting further custody. Grounds must pre-exist, be documented, and conveyed meaningfully to the arrestee, preferably with notice to their family, to facilitate release arrangements. In arrests pursuant to a warrant, reading the warrant aloud to the arrestee satisfies Article 22(1), and no separate grounds are required. Police must prove compliance with Article 22(1) if non-communication is alleged, supported by diary entries or documents. Appeal dismissed, affirming compliance with Article 22(1) in warrant-based arrest. (Para 16, 36) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2025 INSC 768
Article 32, 226 - Village Recognition - Inter-District Boundary Dispute - Non-Compliance with Village Recognition Criteria - Inadequate Consideration of Objections - Requirement for Fresh Public Notice and Comprehensive Objection Review - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order directing recognition of Kakiho Village within three months, holding that the conditions for village recognition under the Nagaland State Government's Memoranda dated March 22, 1996, and October 1, 2005, were not satisfied. The Court found that objections, including those raised by the appellant (Jalukai Village Council), were not adequately considered. It directed the State to issue a fresh public notice for Kakiho Village's recognition, conduct a comprehensive review of all objections, and complete the process within six months, with strict compliance mandated. The Court clarified that the inter-district boundary dispute between Kohima and Dimapur is irrelevant to Kakiho Village's recognition, as the village is located approximately 3.7 km outside the disputed buffer zone. The matter was listed as part-heard, to be reviewed after six months. (Paras 49, 63, 73) Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2025 INSC 766
Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757
Part III, IV - Article 21 - Forest Act, 1927, Section 29 – Forest Conservation Act, 1980, Sections 2, 3A, 3B – Zudpi Jungle/Forest in Maharashtra – Protected Forests – Sustainable Development – Encroachments – Afforestation – Non-Forestry Use – Compensatory Afforestation – Special Task Force – State Accountability – The Supreme Court, following the T.N. Godavarman judgment (1996), declared Zudpi Jungle lands in Maharashtra as forest lands under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, requiring Central Government approval for any non-forestry use under Section 2. Pre-December 12, 1996, allotments of Zudpi Jungle lands may be regularized without compensatory afforestation or Net Present Value (NPV) payments, subject to State approval under Section 2. Post-December 12, 1996, allotments require Central Government approval, strict compliance with forest laws, and punitive action against officers for illegal allotments under Sections 3A and 3B. Pre-1980 encroachments may be regularized if legally permissible; post-1980 commercial encroachments must be cleared within two years by a district-level Special Task Force. Approximately 7.76 lakh hectares of unallotted Zudpi Jungle lands to be transferred to the Forest Department within one year for afforestation. Unallotted fragmented parcels (<3 hectares, not adjoining forest areas) to be declared Protected Forests under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Sub-Divisional Magistrates to prevent future encroachments, with accountability for violations. Non-forestry use proposals require FC Act compliance and cannot be diverted to non-governmental entities. Zudpi Jungle lands may be used for compensatory afforestation only if non-forest land is unavailable, certified by the Chief Secretary, with double the area afforested per MoEF&CC guidelines. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to monitor land transfer and compliance. State Governments/Union Territories to investigate and recover forest lands allotted to private entities or recover afforestation costs if retention serves public interest. (Para 138) In Re: Zudpi Jungle Lands, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2025 INSC 754
Article 12 - Whether Air Force School constitutes a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for teachers' employment disputes. Held, Air Force School is not a “State” under Article 12. The school, managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, operates as a non-profit, non-public fund entity primarily funded by student fees and voluntary contributions from IAF personnel, not from the Consolidated Fund of India. No evidence of deep or pervasive control by the Government or Indian Air Force (IAF) over the school's administration. Ex-officio IAF officers on governing committees do not indicate statutory or governmental control. The school's operations, including staff employment, are governed by private contracts, lacking a public law element. Even if the school performs a public function (education), this alone does not bring it within Article 12. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on: St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, (Para 22-24)] Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2025 INSC 749
Article 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 84 - Legal Insanity - Held, a person with mental insanity cannot be held criminally liable as they lack the capacity to exercise their right to self-defense under Article 21. The Court found prosecution witnesses' evidence raised reasonable doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence in 2018. Under Section 84 IPC, the accused need only establish reasonable doubt of legal insanity, not conclusive proof. Medical examination conducted in 2023, five years post-incident, was deemed irrelevant. The Court criticized the prosecution's failure to conduct a timely medical examination despite evidence of the appellant's mental instability. Granting the benefit of doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Convictions under Sections 302, 352, and 201 IPC set aside due to reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental sanity at the time of the offence. (Paras 8, 10) Dashrath Patra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 618
Article 51A - Legality of Ex-Post Facto Environmental Clearances (ECs) under Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 - Supreme Court declared ex-post facto ECs for projects, particularly mining, commenced without prior EC as illegal and restrained the Central Government from granting such clearances in the future. Set aside the 2017 Notification, 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), and related circulars/orders permitting ex-post facto ECs as violative of the EIA Notification, 2006. Clarified that ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain unaffected. Held that the EIA Notification, 2006 mandates prior EC, and ex-post facto approvals contradict this requirement. Projects initiated without prior EC cannot be regularized, as such actions by companies, real estate developers, and others constitute "gross illegalities." The 2021 and 2022 OMs created an impermissible framework for post-facto approvals, undermining the mandatory "prior environmental clearance" requirement reiterated 34 times in the EIA Notification, 2006. Rejected the Union's argument that denying regularization would cause environmental harm through demolitions, emphasizing compliance with the polluter pays principle and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (Para 32 -34) Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2025 INSC 718 : AIR 2025 SC 2843
Article 226 - In academic matters, the Courts are generally reluctant to interfere, inasmuch as they do not possess the requisite expertise for the same. However, when the academicians themselves act in a manner that adversely affects the career aspirations of lakhs of students, the Court is left with no alternative but to interfere. (Para 8) Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : 2025 INSC 714
Article 142, 246, 254 - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC); Sections 14, 238 - Moratorium under Section 14 of IBC does not bar property attachments under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act). The MPID Act, enacted under the State List, enables recovery for victims of financial fraud through asset attachment, and such vesting with the State Competent Authority is unaffected by the IBC moratorium. No inconsistency exists between the IBC and MPID Act, negating claims of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. Arising from the 2013 NSEL scam involving ₹5,600 crore in defaults, the case involved a challenge to property attachments under the MPID Act during an IBC moratorium. The Court, exercising its powers under Article 142, upheld the actions of a Supreme Court-appointed Committee in executing decrees and distributing proceeds from attached properties to ensure equitable distribution to depositors, despite the IBC moratorium. Section 238 of the IBC was held inapplicable due to the absence of conflict between the two statutes. (Paras 48, 51, 52) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694
Article 21 - Human Rights Act, 1993; Section 2(1)(d) - Dignity - FIR Registration - Police Misconduct - Compensation - Every citizen approaching a police station to report a crime is entitled to be treated with dignity. The Supreme Court upheld the State Human Rights Commission's order directing the government to pay ₹2 lakh as compensation, recoverable from a police inspector who refused to register an FIR and used derogatory language against the complainant's mother. The inspector's actions, including failure to register the FIR and use of objectionable language, were held to violate human rights under Section 2(1)(d). The High Court's order affirming the SHRC's decision was upheld, and the petition was dismissed. (Para 6 - 8) Pavul Yesu Dhasan v. Registrar State Human Rights Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2025 INSC 677
List II in the Seventh Schedule - the event, that is inter-State movement of the goods, Civil Appeal Nos. 941-945 of 2004 & Ors. Page 44 of 47 which does not amount to inter-State sale, falls within the legislative domain and power of the State Legislature. The State, when it imposes such tax, does not exceed its power to impose tax conferred by the State List as inter-State sale of goods is not being subjected to tax. C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2025 INSC 661
Article 142 - Law is, thus, well-settled that exercise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible. The statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 28) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654
Article 142 - It is only rarely, and in extraordinary cases, that this Court may, in the exercise of its plenary power to temper justice with mercy grant a convict a prison-term waiver. As and by way of illustration, a convict (on bail) who is too ill to understand why he needs to be sent to prison or too ill to be taken to prison or the like, could qualify for grant of extreme leniency by this Court but only on production of unimpeachable evidence to that effect. (Para 30) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654
Article 32, 226 - Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us. It is the Constitution which imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in the three organs. The power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary. Statutes are subject to judicial review to test their constitutionality as well as for judicial interpretation. Therefore, when the constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution. (Para 7) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647
Article 32, 226 - Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court's consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty. (Para 9) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647
Articles 14, 16, 21 - Reasonable Accommodation - Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) - MBBS Admission - Held, reasonable accommodation for PwBD candidates is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 16, and 21, not a discretionary benefit. The Supreme Court directed the allotment of an MBBS seat for the 2025-26 session at AIIMS, New Delhi, under the Scheduled Castes Persons with Benchmark Disability (SC/PwBD) quota for the appellant, who has congenital absence of multiple fingers in both hands and left foot involvement. Denial of admission was deemed "grossly illegal, arbitrary, and violative" of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16, reflecting institutional bias and systemic discrimination. The Court declared the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring "both hands intact" for MBBS admission as arbitrary and directed its revision within two months, before the 2025-26 counselling session, in line with Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236. The appellant, with a NEET-UG 2024 category rank of 176, was found functionally capable by a Medical Board, with the minor challenge of wearing sterilized gloves insufficient to justify denial of admission. The Court ordered admission without requiring the appellant to reappear for NEET-UG 2025, emphasizing individualized, evidence-based assessments to ensure substantive equality and dignity for PwBD candidates. (Paras 9, 14) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2025 INSC 623 : AIR 2025 SC 2861
Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Article 142; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 34 and 37 - The Supreme Court's plenary powers under Article 142 can be cautiously exercised to modify arbitral awards to ensure complete justice and expedite protracted proceedings, provided such modifications do not interfere with the award merits or violate the core principles of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Modifications must align with fundamental rights and the legislative intent of the Act, aiming to resolve disputes efficiently while saving time and costs, without rewriting the award. [Relied: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 375]. Justice KV Viswanathan dissented, holding that Article 142 cannot be used to modify arbitral awards, as Section 34 provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging awards under the 1996 Act. He opined that such modifications contravene substantive law, undermine the ethos of arbitration, and could create uncertainty, thereby diminishing arbitration's efficacy as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605
Article 226 - Tender - Judicial Review - Government may cancel and reissue tenders to safeguard state financial interests, with judicial intervention limited to cases of mala fide intent or manifest arbitrariness. Setting aside the High Court's ruling, which quashed the Kerala Forest Department's 2020 e-tender cancellation for tree felling due to low participation amid COVID-19, the government's decision to invite fresh tenders was held rational and aimed at ensuring fair competition. The scope of judicial review in tender matters is narrow, rejecting the High Court's view that re-tendering solely to obtain better prices is impermissible. Appeal allowed, affirming the government's authority in tender processes to promote public interest and fair play. (Paras 22 & 23) Principal Chief Conservator of Forest v. Suresh Mathew, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 482 : 2025 INSC 569
Article 226 - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565
Article 226 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554
Article 300A - Delay in filing an appeal against a land acquisition compensation award does not justify denying landowners just, fair, and reasonable compensation. The Court allowed the appeal filed after a 4908-day (13.5-year) delay, overturning the High Court's dismissal for refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and mandates fair compensation for land acquired under eminent domain, the Court reiterated a liberal approach to condoning delays in land acquisition cases, especially considering factors like poverty and illiteracy of land losers. However, no interest on compensation is payable for the delayed period. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, excluding the issue of delay, with no interest awarded for the condoned delay period. [Paras 11 & 13] Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : 2025 INSC 550
Article 14 - A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute. (Para 15) Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2025 INSC 535
Article 32 - Writ Petition - Challenge to Supreme Court's Final Judgments - Impermissible - Article 32 cannot be used to challenge the Supreme Court's final judgments, directly or indirectly, as it undermines judicial finality, hierarchy, and the principle of res judicata. A conscious distinction of an earlier precedent does not render a judgment per incuriam. Aggrieved litigants must seek remedies through review or curative petitions, not writ proceedings under Article 32, which is a remedial provision for enforcing fundamental rights. In this case, retired employees challenged the Court's ruling in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77, which upheld the repeal of a pension scheme with cut-off dates, alleging it was per incuriam for ignoring D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305. The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that Rajesh Chander Sood validly distinguished D.S. Nakara and remains binding. The petitioners were directed to pursue review or curative remedies. Writ petition dismissed as misconceived. (Para 29, 30, 32) Satish Chander Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2025 INSC 491 : AIR 2025 SC 2050
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Property Rights - Unlawful Occupation - Held, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and can be exercised in exceptional cases to address prolonged injustice, despite the availability of alternative remedies. The High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition seeking recovery of flats unlawfully occupied by the Maharashtra Police Department since 1940, without rent payment since 2008, by citing the availability of a civil suit. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedies is a rule of discretion, not compulsion. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, criticizing its failure to consider the 84-year unlawful occupation, likely initiated by forcible taking during British rule in the 1940s. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit undertaking to vacate the flats within four months and hand over possession to the appellants. Appeal allowed; Maharashtra Police Department ordered to vacate the flats within four months. Neha Chandrakant Shroff v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2025 INSC 484
Article 141 - Ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, is applicable irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon. What is relevant is the ratio and not the stage. Such contentions go against the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490
Article 200 – Powers and Functions of the Governor – Legislative Process – Assent to Bills – Judicial Review - Options under Article 200: The Governor, under Article 200, has three options when a bill passed by the State legislature is presented: (i) to give assent; (ii) to withhold assent; or (iii) to reserve the bill for the President's consideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - First Proviso - The first proviso is intrinsically linked to the option of withholding assent, mandating the Governor to return the bill with a message for reconsideration by the House(s) "as soon as possible" when withholding assent. The decision in State of Punjab correctly interprets this linkage, and the expression in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary that a bill "falls through unless the procedure under the first proviso is followed" does not imply discretion in initiating the proviso. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - No Pocket or Absolute Veto: The concepts of 'pocket veto' or 'absolute veto' are impermissible under Article 200. The Governor must act expeditiously, as the phrase "shall declare" and "as soon as possible" indicate a constitutional obligation to choose one of the three options without delay or arbitrary inaction. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Judicial Precedents - The decision in State of Punjab is not per incuriam and aligns with Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary. However, B.K. Pavitra is per incuriam to the extent it suggests the Governor has discretion in reserving bills for the President's consideration or that such actions are beyond judicial scrutiny, contradicting Samsher Singh and the removal of "in his discretion" from the Government of India Act, 1935. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Governor's Discretion - The Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 200, except in cases under the second proviso to Article 200, specific constitutional provisions requiring Presidential assent (e.g., Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2)), or where a bill endangers fundamental principles of representative democracy. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Reconsideration of Bills - The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the President's consideration in the second round after reconsideration under the first proviso, unless the bill is materially different from the original. The phrase "shall not withhold assent therefrom" mandates assent in such cases. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Timelines for Action: While Article 200 does not prescribe explicit time-limits, the Governor must act within a reasonable period. The Court prescribes: (i) one month for withholding assent or reserving a bill for the President with the Council's advice; (ii) three months for withholding assent or reservation contrary to advice; and (iii) one month for granting assent after reconsideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Judicial Review - The Governor's actions under Article 200, particularly when exercised in discretion, are subject to judicial review on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or irrelevance. The President's actions under Article 201 are also justiciable, especially for arbitrary withholding of assent or inaction beyond three months. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 201 - President's Role under Article 201 - The President must either grant or withhold assent to a reserved bill, with reasons for withholding, and act within three months. In cases of patent unconstitutionality threatening democratic principles, the President should seek an advisory opinion under Article 143. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - The Governor's reservation of ten bills for the President's consideration in the second round on 28.11.2023 was illegal and set aside, as was any subsequent Presidential action. Due to the Governor's undue delay and lack of bona fides, the bills are deemed assented to on 18.11.2023 under Article 142. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Constitutional Duty of the Governor - The Governor must act in harmony with the State legislature and government, respecting the democratic will of the people, and avoid actions driven by political expediency. The constitutional oath mandates prioritizing the welfare of the State's people. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Constitutional Values - Constitutional authorities must uphold the spirit of the Constitution, reflecting on whether their actions align with their oath and the ideals enshrined therein, as emphasized by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's remarks on the efficacy of the Constitution depending on those who operate it. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - The writ petition is disposed of, declaring the Governor's actions erroneous and non-est, with the ten bills deemed assented to on 18.11.2023. The Governor and State Government are urged to work harmoniously for the people's welfare. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 226 - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Articles 14 and 16 - West Bengal Central School Service Commission Recruitment Case (2016) - Selection Process for Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X, XI-XII) and Non-Teaching Staff (Groups C, D) - Cancellation of Entire Process - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's en bloc cancellation of the 2016 recruitment process conducted by the West Bengal Central School Service Commission (WBSSC) for 12,905 Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X), 5,712 Assistant Teachers (Classes XI-XII), 2,067 Group C, and 3,956 Group D non-teaching staff, due to systemic irregularities including OMR sheet manipulation, rank jumping, out-ofpanel appointments, and destruction of records. The Court found segregation of tainted and untainted candidates impossible due to WBSSC's failure to retain OMR sheets and discrepancies in recovered data, justifying cancellation despite some selectees' claims of innocence. Principles of natural justice were deemed satisfied by public notices, given the scale of fraud (over 6,276 illegal appointments). Pleas of delay and laches were rejected as illegalities surfaced in 2021-2022. The Court modified the High Court's relief: tainted candidates' services terminated with salary refunds at 12% interest; untainted appointees terminated without refunds; previously employed candidates allowed to rejoin prior posts with preserved seniority; disabled candidates (except one) to continue with wages until fresh selection, with age relaxation for all eligible candidates. (Para 43 – 51) State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2025 INSC 437 : AIR 2025 SC 1882
Article 226 - The responsibility, of fixing qualifications for purposes of appointment, promotion etc. of staff or qualifications for admissions, is that of expert bodies (in the present case, the AICTE), and so long as qualifications prescribed are not shown to be arbitrary or perverse, the Courts will not interfere. In other words, normally, courts should not interfere with the decisions taken by expert statutory bodies regarding academic matter: may it relate to qualification for admission of students or qualification required by teachers for appointment, salary, promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale etc. However, this does not mean that Courts are deprived of their powers of judicial review. It only means that courts must be slow in interfering with the opinion of experts in regard to academic standards and powers of judicial review should only be exercised in cases where prescribed qualification or condition is against the law, arbitrary or involves interpretation of any principle of law. Consequently, where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits. (Para 25) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605
Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656
Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society. (Para 42 ix) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem 2 disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383
Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their inhouse pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2025 INSC 351
Article 226 - Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638
Article 226 - Writ Petition - Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638
Article 21, 51A(e) - Rights of Breast Feeding Women – Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2025 INSC 302
Article 15 - Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 15 - Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 15 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 226 - Mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not deprive a High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant appropriate relief. If the State disputes facts solely to create grounds for rejecting a writ petition, the High Court must reject such contentions and investigate the disputed facts when required in the interest of justice. The Court clarified that issues like possession, as in this case involving the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, may constitute a mixed question of law and fact, not purely a factual dispute. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, which had overturned a Single Judge's ruling, and restored the Single Judge's judgment, emphasizing that Article 226 remains effective even in cases involving disputed facts if the State's objections are merely tactical. (Para 48) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274
Article 226 - Conflicting Supreme Court Judgments - When two Supreme Court decisions appear inconsistent, High Courts must not prefer one over the other but should attempt to reconcile both, following the decision most aligned with the facts of the case at hand. (Para 35) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274
Article 226 - While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. (Para 22) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269
Article 226 - The power of judicial review in matters concerning implementation of policy objectives should transcend the standard power of judicial review to issue writs to perform statutory duty and proceed to examine whether the duty bearers, the authorities and bodies constituted properly and also whether they are functioning effectively and efficiently. By ensuring institutional integrity we achieve our institutional objectives. Further, effective and efficient performance of the institutes can reduce unnecessary litigation. (Para 23) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269
Article 246A - A penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Article 212 – Legislative Privilege - Expulsion – Proportionality – Judicial Review – Held: Legislative decisions, distinct from proceedings, are subject to judicial review. Ethics Committee recommendations are not immune from scrutiny as they do not constitute legislative functions. Disproportionate punishment undermines democratic principles and electorate rights. The Supreme Court quashed expulsion of a Member of Legislative Council (MLC) for defamatory remarks against the Chief Minister, finding the punishment "grossly excessive" and disproportionate. Though the MLC's conduct was "reprehensible" and unbecoming, permanent expulsion was unwarranted. The expulsion violated fundamental rights and the electorate's rights. The Council's process breached natural justice principles, including denying the MLC an adequate opportunity to defend himself. The seven months of expulsion already served were deemed sufficient as a suspension. Judicial review of such decisions does not infringe legislative privilege under Article 212. The bye-election notification for the MLC's seat was quashed, and he was cautioned against future misconduct. Invoking Article 142, the Court substituted the punishment to uphold proportionality and democratic values. (Para 88) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264
Article 14 - Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 – Section 27A – Conversion Fee Exemption – No Exemption for Land Exceeding 25 Cents – Held, the exemption from conversion fee under Section 27A applies only to landholdings up to 25 cents and not to larger landholdings exceeding 25 cents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had directed that the conversion fee for land exceeding 25 cents be calculated after deducting 25 cents. The notification dated 25th February 2021 intended to exempt small landholdings (up to 25 cents) from the conversion fee to facilitate construction without financial burden. The exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly and literally, and the State was competent to classify landholdings into two categories: those up to 25 cents (exempt) and those exceeding 25 cents (liable for 10% of fair value as fee). A subsequent notification dated 23rd July 2021 and Rule 12, Clause 9 of the Rules, 2008, further clarified that no exemption applies to land exceeding 25 cents. The High Court's interpretation, which fused the two categories, was erroneous. (Para 18, 19, 24) State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2025 INSC 255
Article 226 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591
Article 226 - Contempt Proceedings - Mediation - Validity of High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without mutual consent - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without the consent of both parties. Mediation is a consensual process and cannot be thrust upon unwilling parties, particularly in contempt proceedings where compliance with judicial orders is at stake. The Court criticized the High Court's approach of referring the matter to mediation based solely on the State's willingness to offer alternative land, despite opposition from the appellant. The Supreme Court directed the State to comply with the High Court's earlier judgment dated 10th February 2020, failing which the Chief Secretary was ordered to appear before the Court. High Court's mediation order set aside; State directed to comply with High Court's judgment. (Para 9, 10, 12) Rupa and Co. v. Firhad Hakim, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2025 INSC 245
Article 19(1)(a) - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 499, 500 – Criminal Defamation – Quashing of Proceedings – Freedom of Speech – Media Responsibility – The Supreme Court quashed a criminal defamation case filed in 2014 against the Editorial Director of Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. (Times of India) and others over an article allegedly implying the complainant auctioned counterfeit artworks. The Court set aside the High Court's order and the Magistrate's summons, citing insufficient specific allegations, non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC, and failure to demonstrate reputational harm. Highlighting the primacy of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court underscored the media's responsibility to exercise caution in publishing content, given its influence on public opinion and potential to cause reputational damage. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241
Article 226 - Blacklisting of Contractors - An authority's power to blacklist a contractor must be exercised judiciously, based on substantial grounds, not mere allegations of contractual breach. A show cause notice for blacklisting must comply with judicial principles, ensuring careful evaluation of facts and the nature of the alleged violation. Blacklisting, being a severe measure that can ruin a contractor's livelihood, requires significant deviation or aberrant conduct, as held in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70. Issuing a show cause notice without sufficient grounds is a hollow formality, leading to avoidable litigation. Relying on Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 9, the Court identified three grounds for blacklisting: habitual failure to supply equipment on time, unsatisfactory performance of supplied equipment, or unjustified failure to honor a bid. In this case, the appellant faced a show cause notice for blacklisting and forfeiture of EMD due to delays in printing books caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court quashed the blacklisting portion of the notice as unjustified, while upholding other parts. The Court criticized authorities for issuing show cause notices with predetermined intent to blacklist, burdening High Courts with unnecessary litigation. Authorities must apply judicial principles at the notice stage to prevent such outcomes. (Para 30, 32) Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 217 : 2025 INSC 236
Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Undertrial Accused - Prolonged Detention - Excessive Witnesses - Judicial Responsibility - Accused, charged under UAPA for alleged Naxalite activities, in custody since 2020. Prosecution planned to examine 100 witnesses, with 42 already examined, many providing repetitive testimonies. Bail granted due to excessive trial delays violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, irrespective of the offence's gravity. Prolonged detention (6-7 years) as an undertrial, coupled with unnecessary examination of excessive witnesses to prove a single fact, deemed unwarranted.. Delayed trials cause significant stress, financial loss, social stigma, and disruption to the accused's life, with no remedy for acquitted individuals. Such delays undermine justice for the accused, victims, society, and the judicial system's credibility. Courts must leverage Criminal Procedure Code provisions to ensure efficient trial progression. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order denying bail, and granted bail to the accused. [Para 14, 15] Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 211 : 2025 INSC 222 : AIR 2025 SC 940
Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of *functus officio* does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127
Article 226 - Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 - Promissory Estoppel - Public Interest - Electricity Tariff Rebates - Recovery of Incentives - Public Exchequer - Whether the Goa Government's withdrawal of electricity tariff rebates under the 1991 Notification and recovery of rebates erroneously granted under the 1996 amendments, as mandated by the 2002 Act, violates promissory estoppel. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the Goa Government's authority to withdraw electricity tariff rebates in the public interest, particularly when such incentives strain public finances. The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply rigidly when government promises conflict with public interest, as safeguarding the public exchequer prevails over private commercial interests. The Court affirmed the High Court's ruling that demand notices for recovery of rebates were valid, relying on Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2010) 6 SCC 499, which upheld the constitutionality of the 2002 Act. The 1996 amending notifications, which purported to extend rebate benefits, were declared void ab initio by the Bombay High Court in 2001, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. Citing Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP SEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251, the Court reiterated that public interest overrides strict enforcement of promissory estoppel in cases involving withdrawal of incentives. The appeal by the industrial units was dismissed, as they were not entitled to rebates post the rescission of the 1991 Notification on 31 March 1995, despite applying for power supply prior to its withdrawal. (Para 28) Puja Ferro Alloys v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2025 INSC 217
Article 21 - Judicial Language - Condemnation of Misogynistic Terms - Gender Bias Addressed - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's use of terms such as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” to describe a woman in a void marriage, holding that such language is misogynistic and violates the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted a gender disparity, as similar derogatory terms were not applied to men in void marriages, highlighting judicial gender bias. The ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which prescribes gender-just terminology for legal pleadings, orders, and judgments. The use of such misogynistic terms in judicial pronouncements was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the constitutional ethos of dignity. (Para 24) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197
Article 136 - There is no bar for the Supreme Court to erase defective orders by setting them aside, even in the absence of any challenge thereto. (Para 21) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183 : AIR 2025 SC 1201
Article 226 - High Courts, under Article 226, exercise discretionary powers and may refrain from interfering in cases of procedural violations if it serves substantial justice. The Court set aside a High Court judgment that invalidated a 2007 bank auction sale due to a procedural lapse (non-issuance of 15-day notice), emphasizing that such technicalities should not override equitable considerations when the auction had attained finality. The appellant, an auction purchaser, faced frivolous litigation initiated by the guarantor in 2008, despite the sale certificate being issued and significant investment (approx. Rs. 1.5 Crore) made in the property. The High Courts should adopt a practical approach, considering the factual context and equities, rather than acting as a court of appeal. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside; no costs imposed on the respondent. [Para 5, 8, 10] M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : 2025 INSC 177
Article 32, 226, 248 - The Supreme Court dismissed the Union Government's appeals against the High Court's ruling, holding that lottery distributors are not liable to pay service tax under clause (zzzzn) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2010. The Court affirmed that the activity of promoting, marketing, or organizing lotteries constitutes "betting and gambling" under Entry 62, List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusively within the State Legislature's taxing competence. The relationship between lottery distributors and the State of Sikkim was held to be principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent, thus no service is rendered by distributors to attract service tax liability. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the said clause is ultra vires the Constitution and reiterated that only the State Government can levy gambling tax on such activities. [Para 15 - 18] Union of India v. Future Gaming Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2025 INSC 181
Article 226 - Habeas Corpus - Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159
Article 21 and 22 - Arrest and Detention - Communication of arrest grounds to a relative is not equivalent to informing the arrestee. Arrest memo contents (e.g., name, address, FIR details) do not include grounds of arrest. Vague or afterthought diary entries cannot substitute compliance with Article 22(1). (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 22 (1) - Compliance with - Duty to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest - Held, informing an arrestee's relative (e.g., wife) about the arrest does not fulfill the constitutional obligation under Article 22(1) to directly inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. Recording arrest details in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary does not constitute compliance with this mandate, as these documents merely note the fact of arrest, not the reasons for it. Reliance on vague or non-contemporaneous case diary entries was deemed insufficient. The Court declared the appellant's arrest illegal for non-compliance with Article 22(1) and set aside the High Court's decision. Appeal allowed. (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, which mandates informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner, renders the arrest illegal. Such violation constitutes a breach of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, warranting the accused's immediate release or grant of bail, even in the presence of statutory restrictions. The Court emphasized the magistrate's duty to verify compliance with Article 22(1) during remand proceedings. (Paras 20, 21) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 50 (Section 47 of the BNSS) - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111
Article 19, 21, 32 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90
Article 224A - Appointment of ad-hoc Judges - Rising backlog of cases in High Courts - Implementation of continuing mandamus for judicial appointments - The Supreme Court, while considering the issue of pendency of cases in High Courts, observed that as of 25.01.2025, over 62 lakh cases were pending, with more than 18.2 lakh criminal cases and over 44 lakh civil cases. Referring to its earlier judgment dated 20.04.2021, the Court reiterated that the Constitution should be dynamic to address existing judicial challenges. In light of the situation, the Court temporarily set aside the condition that appointments under Article 224A should only be made if 80% of the sanctioned judicial strength was either working or recommended. The Court allowed High Courts to appoint ad-hoc Judges (ranging from 2 to 5, not exceeding 10% of the sanctioned strength) to expedite the disposal of criminal appeals. These ad-hoc Judges would function under a Bench presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. The Court directed that the existing Memorandum of Procedure be followed for such appointments and granted liberty to the parties to file further applications if necessary. The matter remains open for further directions. Lok Prahari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 144
Article 32 - The petitioners sought several reliefs, including a declaration that a judgment of the High Court was illegal for being passed without hearing necessary parties, a direction to survey properties to ascertain encroachment on government land, regularization of their apartments, and an injunction against interference by the State and its agents. Held, the High Court's judgment could not be declared illegal under Article 32. The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing for recall of the judgment or challenging it under Article 136. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the petitioners free to explore other legal remedies. Vimal Babu Dhumadiya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 140
Article 21, 22 - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 22 - Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 22 - Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 19, 21, 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Natural Justice - The courts under its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of statutory provisions. Administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 16) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126
Article 12 and 226 - Writ Jurisdiction and Private Entities - Public vs. Private Law - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a private company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not qualify as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it does not perform any public or sovereign functions. The Court reiterated the distinction between public and private law, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is generally limited to actions involving public duties or functions. Private entities, unless performing public functions or discharging statutory obligations, are not subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 12 and 226 - Regulatory Compliance and Writ Jurisdiction - The petitioner argued that Muthoot Finance Ltd., being a non-banking financial institution regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), could be subject to writ jurisdiction if it breached statutory regulations. The Court rejected this argument, stating that regulatory compliance does not transform a private entity into a "State" or imbue it with public functions. The Court clarified that the petitioner's appropriate remedy lies in civil litigation or arbitration, as per the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The High Court had also protected the petitioner's interests by directing the deposit of Rs. 24,39,085/- (from the sale of pledged gold) in a fixed deposit, with interest accruing to the petitioner. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 12 and 226 - Function Test for Writ Jurisdiction - The Court emphasized the "function test" for determining whether a body is subject to writ jurisdiction. A private entity may be subject to writ jurisdiction only if it discharges a public duty or function, which Muthoot Finance Ltd. does not. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no case was made out for interference. The petitioner was left free to pursue civil remedies or arbitration. The judgment reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against private entities unless they perform public functions or are statutorily obligated to do so. Private disputes, even involving regulated entities, must be resolved through civil or arbitration proceedings. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 136 - While exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to scrutinize not only the conviction of an accused but also the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. (Para 23) Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2025 INSC 111
Article 14, 15 - Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2025 INSC 125 : AIR 2025 SC 1445
Articles 21 and 22(1) - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - The Court recognized the appellant's right to dignity in death and freedom of religion but balanced it against the State's duty to maintain public order and provide designated burial grounds. The Court criticized the Gram Panchayat for failing to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the dispute. The Court underscored the importance of secularism and fraternity, as enshrined in the Constitution, and called for harmony among different religious communities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, directing the appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with State support. The Court also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months to avoid similar controversies in the future. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - Whether the appellant, a Christian, has the right to bury his deceased father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors were buried, despite objections from the local Hindu and tribal communities. Whether the State's refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard and insistence on using a Christian burial ground 20-25 km away violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Whether the Gram Panchayat's failure to formally designate a burial ground for Christians in the village constitutes a violation of the appellant's rights. The appellant, a third-generation Christian, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors had been buried for decades. However, the local villagers, predominantly Hindu and tribal, objected to the burial, leading to threats and police intervention. The appellant approached the High Court seeking permission to bury his father in the village graveyard and police protection. The High Court denied relief, citing potential public unrest and the availability of a Christian burial ground in a nearby village, Karkapal, 20-25 km away. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard violated his fundamental rights, including the right to dignity in death and freedom of religion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna held that the appellant should be allowed to bury his father in his private agricultural land in Chhindwada, with police protection. She emphasized that the Gram Panchayat had failed to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the controversy. She also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented, holding that the appellant should bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground in Karkapal, as per the State's rules. He emphasized the importance of maintaining public order and the State's duty to provide designated burial grounds for all communities. The Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the appellant bury his father in the Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with logistical support and police protection from the State. The Court emphasized the need for an expeditious and dignified burial, given the prolonged delay. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109
Article 226 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2025 INSC 91 : (2025) 4 SCC 1
Article 226 - Judicial Review - Disciplinary Proceedings - Bank Officials - Adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. (Para 16) General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89
Article 14 and 16 - Fair and open recruitment processes - Negative Equality - The petitioner's claim of discrimination based on the promotion of two other employees to the post of Tracer was rejected. Held, Article 14 does not permit negative equality, and illegal actions by the State cannot be perpetuated. Past illegalities cannot justify future violations of statutory rules. The Court expressed concern over the State's casual approach in handling the litigation, noting that the relevant 1979 Rules were not properly presented before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Court criticized the State for creating false hopes among employees by granting promotions contrary to the Rules, leading to unnecessary litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Tracer is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the 1979 Rules, and the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure justice. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary of Odisha for corrective action. Petition dismissed. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87
Article 142 - Scope of Appeal - Special leave petition was granted on a limited question regarding the applicability of the PC Act and the quantum of sentence for other offenses. Whether the scope of appeal could be expanded beyond the limited notice issued by the Supreme Court. Held, even when a limited notice is issued, the Court has the discretion to expand the scope of the appeal under Article 142 of the Constitution if substantial justice so requires. This discretionary power remains with the Court even after granting special leave. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2025 INSC 85
Article 21, 47 and 48A - Whether the lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India violates the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Whether the State and Union Territories are obligated to provide separate, accessible, and well-maintained toilet facilities for men, women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons in all court complexes. Held, access to clean, functional, and hygienic toilet facilities is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life includes the right to live with dignity, and the absence of proper sanitation facilities in court premises undermines this right. The State's duty under Articles 47 and 48A of the Constitution to improve public health and protect the environment, which includes providing adequate sanitation facilities. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468
Article 21, 47 and 48A - Lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India - Directions Issued - Construction and Maintenance of Toilets - Formation of Committees - Maintenance and Hygiene - Special Facilities - Funding and Transparency - Compliance Reporting - All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must ensure the construction and availability of separate toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises and tribunals across the country. Toilets must be clearly identifiable, accessible, and equipped with functional amenities such as water, electricity, hand soap, napkins, and toilet paper. Each High Court shall constitute a committee chaired by a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with members including the Registrar General, Chief Secretary, PWD Secretary, Finance Secretary, and a representative of the Bar Association. The committee will conduct a survey, assess infrastructure gaps, and ensure the implementation of adequate toilet facilities. Regular maintenance of toilets must be ensured, preferably through outsourcing to professional agencies. A mandatory cleaning schedule and periodic inspections must be implemented. A grievance redressal mechanism must be established for reporting and resolving issues related to toilet facilities. Separate washrooms must be provided for judges, advocates, litigants, and staff. Child-friendly washrooms must be constructed in family courts. Nursing rooms with breastfeeding facilities and changing stations must be provided for mothers. Sanitary pad dispensers must be installed in women's, PwD, and transgender washrooms. State Governments/UTs must allocate sufficient funds for the construction and maintenance of toilet facilities. A transparent and separate monetary fund must be established for this purpose. All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must file a status report within four months. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition with the above directions, emphasizing that access to proper sanitation is not merely a matter of convenience but a fundamental right essential for human dignity and the fair administration of justice. This judgment reinforces the constitutional obligation of the State to provide basic sanitation facilities as part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. It also highlights the need for inclusive and accessible infrastructure in public spaces, particularly in judicial premises, to ensure equality and justice for all. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63
Article 226 - Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183
Article 226 - Interpretation of Statutes - A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183
Article 226 - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2025 INSC 9 : AIR 2025 SC 1083 : (2025) 3 SCC 266
Article 21 - Right to Appeal against Conviction - Appeal challenging the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the High Court due to a delay of 1637 days in filing - The appellant, convicted under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, sought condonation of delay, citing lack of monetary resources and his absence from the station to earn a livelihood. The High Court had dismissed the delay condonation application, construing the appellant's absence as absconding, and consequently dismissed the appeal. Held, right to appeal, particularly in cases affecting personal liberty, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Dismissing an appeal solely on the grounds of delay without examining the reasons for the delay is erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the criminal appeal, and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28
Article 226 - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 226 - Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2025 INSC 26