SUPREME COURT HALF YEARLY DIGEST 2025

BHARTATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 (BNS) / INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (IPC)

Section 3(5). General explanations- Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention

Sections 34, 149 IPC - Difference between 'Common Intention' (S.34 IPC) & 'Common Object' (S.149 IPC) - Section 34 IPC (Common Intention): Requires active participation and proof of an overt act coupled with the intention to commit the crime. Mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient without evidence of participation. Conviction under S.34 necessitates a criminal act done in furtherance of a shared intention, with the accused actively contributing. Section 149 IPC (Common Object): Imposes joint liability on members of an unlawful assembly for offences committed in pursuit of a common object, regardless of individual intent or awareness of the specific act. Liability is based on membership in the assembly and the common object, not individual actions or intentions. S.34 focuses on individual participation and intent, making it more restricted than S.149, which emphasizes the collective object of the assembly. S.34 also differs from conspiracy and abetment by requiring active involvement in the criminal act. (Para 42 - 54) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Sections 34, 149 IPC - Distinction from S.120B IPC (Criminal Conspiracy) - S.34 requires both agreement and participation in the criminal act, unlike S.120B, where a mere agreement to commit an offence may suffice, or an overt act by any conspirator is enough if the act is not an offence by itself. S.34 also differs from abetment, which does not require the abettor's participation in the act. (Para 51) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Section 34 IPC - Common Intention - The appeals arose from a judgment of the High Court, which reversed the trial court's acquittal of Constables in a case involving the death of a woman caused by a bullet fired by Head Constable (A1) during an attempt to intercept a car suspected of smuggling illegal liquor. The trial court had convicted A1 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act but acquitted the other accused due to lack of evidence of shared common intention. The High Court, however, convicted the other accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, holding that their presence in the car with A1 was sufficient to infer common intention. The Supreme Court reiterated the legal principle that for conviction under Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must prove prior meeting of minds and shared common intention among all accused to commit the crime. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellants (accused Nos. 2, 3, and 4) had any prior common intention with A1 to shoot the deceased. The trial court's acquittal of the appellants was based on the lack of evidence of their mental involvement in the crime, and the High Court's reversal of this acquittal was deemed unwarranted. The Supreme Court emphasized that interference in an acquittal is only justified if the trial court's decision is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable view other than guilt is possible. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashed the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's acquittal of the appellants. Mere presence in the same vehicle as the principal accused was insufficient to convict the appellants under Section 34 IPC without evidence of shared common intention. The trial court's acquittal was upheld, and the High Court's interference was found to be unjustified. Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2025 INSC 114 : (2025) 5 SCC 433

Section 22. Act of a person of unsound mind

Sections 84 & 302 IPC - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing— suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370

Section 34. Things done in private defence

Sections 96 to 106 and Section 300 IPC - Murder - Right of private defence - The right of private defence under Sections 96 to 106 IPC is subject to the restrictions in Section 99, which prohibits the use of excessive force. Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC applies only if the accused acts in good faith, without premeditation, and without intending to cause more harm than necessary. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies to acts committed in the heat of passion without premeditation, provided there is no undue advantage or cruelty. The burden of proving self-defence lies on the accused, but it can be discharged by establishing a preponderance of probabilities. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Sections 96 to 106 and Section 302 IPC - Murder - Right of private defence - Private defence must be strictly preventive and not punitive or retributive. Causing death can only be justified when the accused is faced with a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The impending danger must be present, real or apparent. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 61 (2). Criminal conspiracy - punishment

Sections 120B r/w. 420 IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 91 / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 94 - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 24 - Entitlement to Unrelied Documents - Whether an accused under the PMLA is entitled to access a list of unrelied upon documents and statements collected by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) during investigation but not relied upon in the prosecution complaint. Held, an accused under the PMLA is entitled to a list of statements, documents, material objects, and exhibits not relied upon by the ED. This ensures the accused has knowledge of such materials to apply for their production under Section 91 CrPC (Section 94 BNSS) at the defence stage. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in allowing such applications, denying them only in exceptional circumstances due to the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA. (Para 30, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Enforcement Directorate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 120B IPC - Defective investigation does not automatically invalidate a prosecution's case if other credible evidence exists. Upholding the conviction under Sections 304 Part II and 120B IPC, the Court emphasized that flaws in investigation are not fatal when corroborated evidence, such as witness testimony and motive, establishes guilt. [Para 7, 13 & 14] R. Baiju v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : 2025 INSC 488

Section 120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 61(2) BNS - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493

Sections 120B, 468 and 471 IPC - Forgery of a marksheet - Handwriting Expert - Admissibility of Evidence - The conviction was based on the handwriting expert's opinion that the appellant had written the postal cover in which the forged marksheet was sent. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the original postal cover, which was crucial to establish the appellant's handwriting. Without the original document being exhibited and proved, the handwriting expert's report had no evidentiary value. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Murari Lal v. State of M.P., emphasizing that while handwriting expert opinion is relevant, it must be approached with caution and the reasons for the opinion must be carefully examined. The uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert can be accepted if the reasons are convincing and there is no reliable evidence casting doubt. However, in this case, due to the lack of the original document, the expert opinion had no basis. Therefore, the conviction based solely on the handwriting expert's opinion, without proving the original document, was unsustainable, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 12 & 15) C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2025 INSC 309 : (2025) 4 SCC 487 : AIR 2025 SC 1441

Section 63. Rape definition.

Sections 375, 376 IPC – Rape – Live-in Relationships – False Promise of Marriage – Held, prolonged cohabitation in a live-in relationship (over two years in this case) implies mutual consent to sustain the relationship without reliance on a promise of marriage. Allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage are unsustainable when two adults voluntarily cohabit for an extended period, as such cohabitation raises a presumption of consensual relations not contingent on marriage. The Court noted the absence of specific allegations that the physical relationship was induced solely by a promise of marriage and emphasized that extended cohabitation reflects a voluntary choice by both parties. Acknowledging the growing prevalence of live-in relationships, driven partly by women's financial independence, the Court advocated a pragmatic judicial approach, favoring a presumption of implied consent based on the relationship's duration and the parties' conduct over a pedantic interpretation. The criminal proceedings were held to be an abuse of process, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 10, 14 - 16) Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2025 INSC 635

Section 64. Punishment for rape

Section 376 IPC - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Misuse of Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - The appellant, a 23-year-old student, was accused by a married woman (separated, not legally divorced, with a four-year-old child) of rape under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 377, 504, and 506 IPC, alleging sexual intercourse based on a false promise of marriage. The consensual relationship lasted over 12 months, with the complainant's divorce deed (Khulanama) executed after its commencement. The High Court declined to quash the FIR, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether the allegations constituted a cognizable offence under Section 376 IPC; (2) Whether the FIR was maliciously filed, warranting quashing under Section 482 CrPC; (3) Whether a consensual relationship with a married woman, based on an alleged promise of marriage, amounts to rape. Held: The complainant was legally married at the relationship's outset, rendering any promise of marriage by the appellant unenforceable. No evidence of inducement or misrepresentation under Section 90 IPC was found, and the complainant's conduct—sustaining the relationship for over 12 months and visiting the appellant at lodges—indicated consent, negating allegations of coercion or deceit. The Court held that a breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape absent proven fraudulent intent from the outset. Treating failed relationships as false promise cases burdens courts and unjustly harms the accused's reputation. The FIR was quashed as it disclosed no cognizable offence and constituted an abuse of the criminal justice system. A consensual relationship turning sour cannot justify invoking criminal law, especially when the complainant was married during the relationship. The Court cautioned against misuse of Section 376 IPC in failed relationships. Appeal allowed; FIR quashed. (Paras 8, 9) Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2025 INSC 782

Section 376(2)(g) IPC - The appellants were charged with abduction, confinement, and gang rape of the prosecutrix. They argued they did not commit any penetrative act. The trial court and High Court convicted them, finding they acted with common intention. Whether all accused in a gang rape case under Section 376(2)(g) IPC can be held liable if only one commits a penetrative act, provided there is common intention. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions for gang rape, affirming that under Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, a penetrative act by one accused is sufficient to implicate all others sharing a common intention. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove a completed act of rape by each accused. The Court relied on Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 2 SCC 143, emphasizing that common intention is implicit in the charge of gang rape, and evidence of acting in concert is sufficient for conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) were met based on the victim's testimony and the sequence of events. (Paras 22 - 24) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615

Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC - Rape - False promise of marriage - Breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape unless consent was obtained through fraud from the outset. The complainant knowingly entered a consensual sexual relationship with the accused for over a year, aware of his subsisting marriage. Terming the criminal proceedings an abuse of process, the Court noted a growing trend of initiating criminal cases when relationships sour, emphasizing that consensual relationships with a possibility of marriage cannot be deemed fraudulent if they fail. No fraudulent intent was proven, and the complainant's consent was not based on a misconception of fact, as she was fully aware of the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, and set aside the impugned findings noting that the physical relationship between the Complainant and the Appellant was consensual, cannot be said to be without her consent or against her will. (Para 15, 16 & 20) Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 404 : 2025 INSC 458 : AIR 2025 SC 1925 : (2025) 5 SCC 749

Section 376 IPC - Rape - Consent - Promise of Marriage - Quashing of Proceedings – The Court reiterated that a breach of a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape unless fraudulent intent existed at the time of consent. Relationship between appellant and complainant, both major and closely related, was consensual, as evidenced by repeated interactions and voluntary visits to hotel. High Court erred in not exercising inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process. Proceedings quashed. (Para 11 - 13) Jothiragawan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2025 INSC 386

Section 376 IPC - Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807

Section 376 IPC - Rape - The High Court had overturned the Trial Court's conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence, citing glaring lacunae in the prosecution's case. Key issues included the prosecutrix's lack of cooperation during medical examination, the absence of physical evidence (such as semen or blood), and contradictory testimonies from the prosecutrix's parents, particularly her mother, who turned hostile. The Court noted the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and the failure to establish the prosecutrix's mental state conclusively. The High Court's acquittal was based on the benefit of the doubt, and the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere, upholding the acquittal. (Para 10 & 12) State of Himachal Pradesh v Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2025 INSC 331

Sections 376, 384, 323, 504, 506 IPC - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Quashing of FIR - Where a complainant, a highly qualified major woman, alleges rape based on a false promise of marriage after a 16-year long consensual relationship, the allegations are deemed unreliable due to material contradictions and prolonged silence. The deletion of Section 313 IPC (causing miscarriage) by the Investigation Officer and the lack of evidence against other co-accused further weaken the complainant's case. The prolonged period of consensual sexual relations, the complainant's independent life and travel to meet the accused, and her portrayal of herself as the accused's wife indicate a live-in relationship gone sour, not rape. Applying the principles of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921; Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204 the court held that the physical relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise, and prolonged consensual relations negate the claim of vitiated consent. Mere breach of promise does not equate to a false promise, and the accused's mala fide intent must be established. The FIR and subsequent proceedings are quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 19, 26, 29, 30, 34, 37 & 39) Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 279 : 2025 INSC 308 : (2025) 4 SCC 197

Section 74. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.

Sections 354 and 506 IPC - Quashing of criminal proceedings - The allegations did not meet the essential ingredients of the offense, as there was no evidence of criminal force or intent to outrage the complainant's modesty. The record contained only vague assertions without any concrete evidence of physical or mental harassment. The charge of criminal intimidation was not established, as there was no evidence of any threat with the intent to cause alarm or compel to act against will. The High Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage but should ensure that the allegations, if taken at face value, constitute an offense. In this case, the allegations were found to be insufficient to proceed against the appellant. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the criminal proceedings holding that no prima facie case was made out against him under Sections 354 and 506 IPC. The Court reiterated that vague allegations without supporting evidence cannot form the basis for criminal charges. The inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of the legal process. The judgment emphasized the importance of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not used as tools for harassment, especially in cases arising from business disputes. Appeal Allowed. Naresh Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2025 INSC 19 : AIR 2025 SC 582 : (2025) 2 SCC 604

Section 80. Dowry death

Sections 304B and 498A IPC - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2025 INSC 133

Section 85. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Section 498A IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent powers - Quashing of FIR - Cruelty- Generic allegations - Limitation period for cognizance - The Supreme Court quashed FIR and chargesheet filed in dowry harassment case under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC, citing generic and ambiguous nature of allegations - Unreliable of complainant and absence of specifics of time, date or place and incriminating material produced by Complainant to prove ingredients of “cruelty” under Section 498A, IPC – Held, judicial decision cannot be blurred to the actual facts and circumstances of the case - No prima facie case is made out against appellant and his family - Also stressed that distant relatives cannot be prosecuted based on omnibus allegations alone - Supreme Court expressed disappointment on the fact that complainant being the officer of State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner - Set aside order passed by High Court and quash FIR- Appeals allowed. [Paras 11-13] Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2025 INSC 803 : AIR 2025 SC 3236

Sections 498-A, 324, 355, 504, 506 r/w. 149 IPC - Inconsistent judicial decisions by co-ordinate benches of the High Court in a domestic violence case, leading to quashing of proceedings against the husband while allowing prosecution against in-laws, undermining judicial consistency and public trust. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing a domestic violence case against the husband, emphasizing that co-ordinate benches must adhere to stare decisis or provide reasoned distinctions for departing from prior rulings. The High Court's failure to reference an earlier decision refusing to quash proceedings against co-accused in-laws created an illogical inconsistency, fostering sharp practices like forum shopping and eroding public trust in the judiciary. The impugned order was deemed arbitrary, infracting judicial propriety, and the criminal proceedings against the husband were revived. (Para 11, 13, 17) Renuka v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2025 INSC 596

Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 & 4 - Misuse of Cruelty and Dowry Provisions - Vague Allegations - Abuse of Process - FIR filed in 1999 against the appellant-husband for alleged cruelty (S. 498A IPC) and dowry demands (S. 4 DP Act). Complainant-wife alleged physical and mental cruelty, including assault, forced narcotics consumption, and dowry demands of ₹2 lakhs. The couple cohabited for only 12 days post-marriage. Allegations lacked specifics (dates, times, or independent witnesses) and medical evidence for the claimed miscarriage. Issues: (1) Whether the allegations under S. 498A IPC and S. 4 DP Act were supported by credible evidence. (2) Whether the vague and omnibus nature of the complaint justified prosecution. Held: The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant-husband due to lack of credible evidence and vague, unsubstantiated allegations. The Court cautioned against the misuse of S. 498A IPC and DP Act provisions, noting a trend of falsely implicating the husband's relatives without specific evidence. The absence of details regarding dates, times, or incidents undermined the prosecution's case and the complainant's credibility. As the marriage was dissolved, further prosecution was deemed an abuse of process. Charges quashed; appeal allowed. The Court expressed concern over the malicious inclusion of the husband's relatives (e.g., aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters) in matrimonial disputes and emphasized that vague complaints undermine the legitimate invocation of criminal law. [Paras 13 & 14] Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2025 INSC 671 : AIR 2025 SC 2836

Section 498A IPC – Supreme Court dismisses PIL challenging constitutional validity of Section 498A IPC (now Section 84 BNS) under Article 14, upholding its legitimacy within Article 15's framework for positive discrimination. Court rules that vague allegations of misuse do not justify striking down the provision, emphasizing its critical role in addressing persistent dowry-related offences. Misuse to be tackled on a case-bycase basis, not through wholesale invalidation. PIL's demands for gender-neutral laws, mandatory investigations, and procedural guidelines rejected as encroaching on legislative authority. (Paras 6–12) Janshruti (People's Voice) V. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2025 INSC 536

Section 498A IPC - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Courts have no discretion to deny probation under the Act when statutory conditions are met, imposing a mandatory duty to consider release on probation. The court set aside the High Court judgment for failing to evaluate probation eligibility, remitting the case for reconsideration based on a probation officer's report. (Paras 28 - 31) Chellammal v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : 2025 INSC 540

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Bail - Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sistersin-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Sections 498A, 302 and 504 r/w. 34 IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Husband acquitted in dowry-related murder case due to lack of overt act proving common intention under S.34, despite presence at the crime scene where his mother set his wife ablaze. (Para 92) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Section 4 - Groom refuses to cooperate with wedding reception over gold demand - The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for harassing his wife for dowry. The High Court modified the sentence from three years to two years imprisonment under Section 498A IPC, with one year imprisonment under Section 4 of the DP Act, to run concurrently. The Court relied on the testimonies of PW-1 (family friend), PW-4 (wife/de facto complainant), PW-7 (mother of PW-4), and PW-11 (photographer), which established the appellant's demand for 100 sovereigns of gold and harassment of PW-4. The Court noted the appellant's willingness to render community service as an IT professional and the prolonged duration of the case. The conviction was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone (approximately 3 months), considering the prolonged litigation (19 years) and the fact that both parties had moved on in life, with a direction to pay compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the victim. The appeal was partly allowed. M. Venkateswaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2025 INSC 106 : AIR 2025 SC 777 : (2025) 3 SCC 578

Section 87. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc.

Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 3(2)(v) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 114A - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615

Section 102 Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.

Section 301 IPC - Doctrine of Transfer of Malice (Transmigration of Motive) - Applicability - Section 301 IPC embodies the doctrine of transfer of malice, whereby if A intends to kill B but kills C (unintended victim) in the course of an act likely to cause death, the intent to kill is attributed to A. Even absent premeditated intent toward deceased, culpability under Section 302 follows unless Exception 4 mitigates to culpable homicide not amounting to murder in sudden fight scenarios. [Para 37, 42] Ashok Saxena v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 163 : 2025 INSC 148

Sections 301, 300 (Exception 4), 302, and 304 Part-I IPC - Accused trespassed into informant's house with knife intending to assault informant but killed informant's wife who intervened - Trial Court acquitted accused; High Court convicted under Section 302 - Held, doctrine under Section 301 applicable, attributing intention to kill deceased to accused despite lack of specific intent toward her - Conviction modified to Section 304 Part-I applying Exception 4 to Section 300 (sudden fight without premeditation) - Sentence reduced to period already undergone considering incident date (1992) and accused's advanced age - Appeal allowed in part. (Para 37, 42) Ashok Saxena v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 163 : 2025 INSC 148

Section 103 (1) Punishment for murder

Section 302 IPC - Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 302 IPC - Accused sentenced to death for the alleged murder of six family members, including his four children and brother. Held, the prosecution failed to establish key incriminating circumstances, including motive, last-seen evidence, and reliable recovery of evidence, as the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report did not link the recovered weapons to the crime. The investigation was conducted negligently, with failures to examine independent witnesses near the crime scene and to ensure the safekeeping of recovered articles. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence and testimonies of interested witnesses, which were insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and allowed the appeal. (Paras 34, 36) Gambhir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 175 : 2025 INSC 164

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial Evidence - Credibility - Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require rigorous scrutiny. They must be voluntary, truthful, and inspire confidence. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. Extra-judicial confessions require corroboration by other evidence. (Para 16 – 19 & 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Credibility and Voluntariness - The credibility of the witnesses testifying to the confession is crucial. Confessions made in a doubtful mental state lack voluntariness and reliability. (Para 19) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Material Omissions and Contradictions - Significant omissions in statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that contradict courtroom testimony, undermine credibility. Such omissions can be considered contradictions under the explanation to section 162 of the Cr.P.C. (Para 21 & 22) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for credible evidence. Convictions must be based on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 24) Evidence Law - Benefit of Doubt - If the evidence is weak and lacks credibility, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 24 & 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - The accused was convicted of murdering his live-in partner. The conviction was primarily based on extra-judicial confessions to witnesses. The accused's mental state was questioned, and there was a lack of corroborating physical evidence. Material omissions were noted in witness statements. Therefore, the conviction was overturned. (Para 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Sections 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392 r/w. 397 and 201 IPC - The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court for the murder, rape, and other offences. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, CCTV footage, and an alleged extra-judicial confession. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Whether the circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, CCTV footage, and extra-judicial confession, was sufficient to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the failure to produce a Section 65-B certificate for the CCTV footage rendered it inadmissible. Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, satisfying the principles of circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116. Held, the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The CCTV footage, which was a crucial piece of evidence, was rendered inadmissible due to the prosecution's failure to produce a Section 65-B certificate, as mandated by the Indian Evidence Act. The Court emphasized that in cases involving the death penalty, strict adherence to procedural requirements is essential. The evidence of witnesses who claimed to have last seen the appellant with the deceased was found unreliable due to delays in recording their statements, contradictions in their testimonies, and the possibility of prior exposure to the appellant's photograph in the media. The time gap between when the accused and deceased were last seen together and the discovery of the deceased's body must be sufficiently small to rule out the possibility of any other person being involved. The alleged extra-judicial confession made to PW-9 was deemed unreliable due to inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the fact that PW-9 had a prior quarrel with the appellant, casting doubt on his credibility. The recoveries of the trolley bag and other items were not convincingly linked to the appellant, and the prosecution failed to explain why the appellant would retain the deceased's college ID card for over two months. The prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the appellant. The evidence presented was insufficient to meet the stringent standards required for a conviction, especially in a death penalty case. The Court reiterated the caution required in cases based on circumstantial evidence, as outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, and emphasized that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appeal allowed; appellant acquitted. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2025 INSC 116 : AIR 2025 SC 1103 : (2025) 7 SCC 401

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a TIP of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend. Every piece of relevant fact needs to be sewn via the golden thread of duly proved circumstances, in order to ultimately formulate the fabric of guilt. (Para 24 & 25) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person's guilt. The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. (Para 14) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Disclosure statements and subsequent recoveries - The Investigating Officer failed to provide the exact words of the accused, neglected to exhibit the statements or recovery memorandums, and did not establish a clear connection between the accused and the recovered articles. Procedural irregularities, such as the absence of sealing or test identification, further weaken the evidentiary value of the recoveries. (Para 20 & 21) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Right of private defence - The appellant did not have a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger to justify the use of lethal force in self-defence or defence of property. The appellant's actions exceeded the necessary force required for private defence, as he continued to assault the deceased even after inflicting fatal injuries. The case did not fall under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant's actions were not in good faith and were disproportionate to the threat faced. The case also did not fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant used a deadly weapon against an unarmed deceased, indicating cruelty and undue advantage. The Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the conviction. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Conviction and Appeal - The Court reiterated the principle that concurrent findings of fact by two courts should not be interfered with unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice or manifest illegality. The recovery of weapons (axe and iron pipe) and the medical evidence supported the prosecution's case, even though some witnesses turned hostile. While the Court upheld the appellants' involvement in the assault, it found that the intent to kill was not conclusively established. The death resulted from cumulative injuries, and the appellants did not have a clear motive or premeditation. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and sentenced the appellants to the time already served, with a fine imposed for the benefit of the deceased's family. Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2025 INSC 47 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3148 : (2025) 3 SCC 378

Sections 302 r/w. 149 IPC - Explosive Substances Act, 1908; Section 5 - The appellants challenged the FIR's timing, alleging it was ante-timed and contained interpolations. They argued that the prosecution's case was fabricated, with inconsistencies in witness testimonies and improper investigation. They contended that the recovery of weapons and the inquest report were flawed, and the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The State defended the High Court's judgment, asserting that the evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and medical reports, sufficiently established the guilt of the convicted accused. Held, minor contradictions in witness testimonies do not render them unreliable. It upheld the principle that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) does not apply in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Court found the testimonies of eyewitnesses credible and consistent, corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recovery. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the investigation was flawed, stating that defective investigation alone cannot lead to acquittal if other evidence supports the prosecution's case. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld. Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : 2025 INSC 28 : AIR 2025 SC 444 : (2025) 3 SCC 273

Sections 302, 307, 147, 148 and 149 IPC - The petitioners, initially named in the FIR but exonerated by the Investigating Officer in a closure report, were summoned based on the testimony of the original informant during the trial. The Court reiterated that under Section 319 CrPC, a Trial Court can summon individuals not initially charge-sheeted if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial. The Court emphasized that the power under Section 319 is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly, based on evidence stronger than a prima facie case but not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The closure report, though not considered by the Trial Court, was deemed irrelevant once the Court invoked Section 319. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition, allowing the petitioners to raise all legal defenses, including reliance on the closure report, before the Trial Court. Omi @ Omkar Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2025 INSC 27 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 956 : (2025) 2 SCC 621

Section 105. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Section 304 Part I and 201 IPC - The appellant, along with friends, encountered the deceased in an inebriated condition beneath a bridge. An altercation ensued, during which the appellant struck the deceased with a cement brick, causing fatal head injuries. The appellant subsequently set the deceased's body on fire to destroy evidence. Both Trial Court and High Court held the appellant guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, citing grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for Section 304 Part I and 2 years for Section 201 IPC. Held, the Court examined the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which requires the provocation to be both grave and sudden, depriving the accused of self-control. The Court noted that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of the moment, with the appellant using a nearby cement brick, not a weapon. However, the Court found that the provocation (a slap and verbal abuse) was not sufficiently grave to fully justify the reduction of the crime from murder to culpable homicide. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (4 years), considering the appellant's time served and the circumstances of the case. Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld but sentence reduced to time already served. Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2025 INSC 90 : (2025) 3 SCC 671

Section 108. Abetment of Suicide

Section 306 IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 319 - Summoning of additional accused - Prima facie evidence sufficient – Held, a summoning order under Section 319 CrPC, cannot be quashed based on alibi evidence presented by the additional accused at the summoning stage. The threshold for summoning an additional accused is the existence of prima facie evidence indicating involvement in the offence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. The plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established during trial, not at the stage of summoning. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to quash the trial court's summoning order, emphasizing that untested documentary evidence (e.g., parking chit, chemist's receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip) cannot be treated as conclusive at the summoning stage. The trial court's order summoning the additional accused was restored. (Para 11, 13) Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2025 INSC 634

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Use of Insulting remarks like 'Impotent' - FIR against husband's in-laws - Held, merely using insulting remarks like "impotent" does not constitute abetment of suicide. Abetment requires direct instigation or persistent cruelty with clear mens rea, which was absent, as the suicide occurred a month after the alleged incident with no subsequent contact. The decision overturned the High Court's refusal to quash the FIR, emphasizing that abusive language alone, without intent to instigate suicide, does not meet the ingredients of Section 107 IPC. (Para 14, 15 & 19) Shenbagavalli v. Inspector of Police, Kancheepuram District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2025 INSC 607

Section 306 and 420 IPC - Abetment of suicide - Cheating - Quashing of Proceedings – Held, there was no proximate or direct instigation leading to the deceased's suicide. The time gap between the alleged fraudulent acts and the suicide indicated the absence of immediate provocation. FIR quashing under Section 306 IPC upheld, but reinstated under Section 420 IPC. The High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for quashing the case under Section 420 IPC despite material evidence collected during the investigation. The trial court was directed to proceed with the case under Section 420 IPC, and the accused were given the liberty to seek discharge in accordance with the law. Appeal partly allowed. (Para 15, 18 & 19) R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 363 : 2025 INSC 402

Sections 306 and 114 IPC - The appellants were accused of abetting the suicide of an individual who allegedly consumed poison due to blackmail by the appellants over compromising photographs and videos. The trial court and the High Court had convicted the appellants. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the charge of abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Key issues included the delayed filing of the FIR, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, lack of recovery of incriminating evidence (such as the alleged suicide note, poison, or stolen ornaments), and the absence of proximate instigation by the appellants leading to the suicide. Mere harassment or blackmail, without direct incitement or proximate acts compelling suicide, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. The appellants were acquitted. (Para 36 & 40) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2025 INSC 322 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 1843

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Appeal against the acquittal - The informant (deceased's father) died naturally before the trial, and the Court found the Trial Court erred in allowing the investigating officer to prove the FIR's contents. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's reversal of the Trial Court's conviction, citing insufficient evidence for abetment of suicide and improper use of the FIR. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 306 r/w. 107 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – Ingredients of Instigation – Proximity and Mens Rea – Quashing of Proceedings - The appellant challenged the order of the High Court which quashed the charges against two co-accused but upheld the charges against her under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide). It was alleged that the appellant disapproved of her son's relationship with the deceased and made remarks suggesting that the deceased "need not be alive" if she could not live without her son. The High Court concluded that these remarks constituted sufficient instigation for framing charges under Section 306 IPC. Whether the remarks made by the appellant amounted to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. Held, to sustain a charge under Section 306 IPC, there must be a clear proximate link between the act of the accused and the commission of suicide. Mere disapproval of a relationship or casual remarks do not amount to instigation under Section 107 IPC unless accompanied by clear mens rea and an act that pushes the victim to commit suicide. The remarks made by the appellant were found to be too remote and indirect to constitute abetment of suicide. There was no evidence of intentional aid, conspiracy, or direct instigation. A casual remark or expression of disapproval cannot be construed as instigation without any evidence of a positive act that left the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. For an act to constitute abetment of suicide under Sections 306 and 107 IPC, it must involve (i) direct or indirect instigation, (ii) proximity to the commission of suicide, and (iii) clear mens rea to abet the act. Mere disapproval or casual remarks, in the absence of intentional and proximate incitement, do not satisfy the ingredients of abetment. Appeal allowed. Proceedings against the appellant were quashed, while the trial against the other accused was allowed to continue. Laxmi Das v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2025 INSC 86

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of suicide - Communications demanding repayment of a loan - Held, to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC, there must be: (i) Instigation or intentional aiding of suicide. (ii) An active or direct role in the commission of suicide. (iii) Mens rea (guilty mind) to push the deceased to commit suicide. Mere demand for loan repayment, even if harsh or persistent, does not amount to abetment unless it leaves no option but suicide. Emotional exchanges or heated arguments without intent to incite suicide cannot be termed as instigation. Demanding loan repayment was within the appellant's duty and did not constitute instigation or abetment to suicide. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was discharged from the charges. Mere financial disputes or demands for loan repayment, without any evidence of intentional instigation or a direct act compelling the deceased to commit suicide, do not constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC. Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2025 INSC 76 : AIR 2025 SC 568 : (2025) 4 SCC 801

Sections 306, 498-A and 304B IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 113A and 113B - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Section 109. Attempt to murder

Section 307 IPC - Attempt to Murder - Quashing Based on Settlement - The mere inclusion of Section 307 IPC in an FIR or charge-sheet does not bar the High Court from quashing criminal proceedings based on a settlement between parties, provided the allegations do not substantiate the offence. Factors such as the nature of the offence, severity of injuries, conduct of the accused, and societal impact are crucial in deciding whether a non-compoundable offence can be quashed on compromise. In this case, the invocation of Section 307 IPC was unjustified due to vague allegations, minor injuries, and the death of the primary accused, with the offence, at most, aligning with Section 326 IPC. Given the settlement, the nature of the injuries, and minimal societal harm, the Court quashed the proceedings, deeming further trial futile and an abuse of process. The appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. (Para 9 -12) Naushey Ali v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2025 INSC 182 : AIR 2025 SC 1035 : (2025) 4 SCC 78

Section 115 (2) Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt

Sections 323, 324, 307 and 506 r/w. 34 IPC - Additional accused can be summoned based on pre-trial evidence such as the unrebutted examination-in-chief of the witness without waiting for cross-examination to conclude. (Para 13 & 17) Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2025 INSC 416 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 708 : (2025) 5 SCC 740

Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 IPC - The appellant, a police officer, challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class directing the registration of an FIR against him under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 of the Penal Code (IPC) based on a complaint filed by a practicing advocate. The High Court rejected the appellant's application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. affirming the Magistrate's order. Whether the Magistrate mechanically ordered police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. without proper application of mind. The scope and prerequisites for invoking Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and the judicial discretion of the Magistrate. Held, Magistrates must apply their minds before directing police investigation. The order should not be mechanical, and the Magistrate must ensure that the complaint discloses cognizable offences. The Court highlighted the need for affidavits and prior applications to the police before invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate. The Court held that no cognizable offence was made out, and the continuation of the investigation would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The appeal was allowed, and the investigation was quashed. Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2025 INSC 139 : AIR 2025 SC 970

Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 IPC - Attempt to transform civil dispute into criminal matter - Workplace harassment case – Held, allegations stemmed from employment disputes exaggerated into a criminal matter. The proceedings were a deliberate attempt to reclassify a civil dispute as a cognizable criminal offense to pressure the appellants into settling. The complainant alleged forcible demand for resignation, confiscation of belongings, and physical and verbal harassment, invoking Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. The complaint lacking essential facts to substantiate these offenses and mala fide intentions to coerce a settlement. The High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings was set aside, and the criminal case against the appellants was quashed. (Para 38 - 41) Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2025 INSC 105 : (2025) 3 SCC 612

Section 118 (2) - Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means

Sections 326, 358, 500, 501, 502, 506 (b) r/w. 34 IPC - Section 197 Cr.P.C. - Police Act, 1963 (Karnataka); Section 170 - Prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act is required to prosecute police officers even for acts exceeding their authority, as long as a reasonable nexus with their official duties existed. (Para 38 & 39) G.C. Manjunath v. Seetaram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2025 INSC 439 : (2025) 5 SCC 390

Sections 326, 324, 341 and 34 IPC - Common Intention – The incident arose from a property dispute between close relatives, resulting in a physical altercation. Accused No. 3 stabbed the complainant with a knife, causing severe injuries. Accused No. 2 was armed with a chopper and inflicted injuries on the complainant's son. The Sessions Court convicted all accused under Sections 326 and 341 read with Section 34 IPC, acquitting them under Section 307. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, reducing sentences and acquitting Accused No.1. It also converted Accused No.2's conviction from Section 326 to Section 324, reducing his sentence to the period already undergone. Whether the High Court was justified in converting the conviction of Accused No.2 from Section 326 to Section 324 and reducing his sentence, despite the presence of common intention under Section 34 IPC. Held, severity of injuries caused by individuals acting with common intention cannot justify reducing a harsher punishment to a lighter one. The High Court erred in concluding that Section 34 IPC was not made out against Accused No.2. Both Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were present at the scene, armed with deadly weapons, and actively participated in the assault. The Court observed that common intention could arise spontaneously during the incident. Thus, the conversion of conviction from Section 326 to Section 324 was incorrect. The Court restored the conviction of Accused No.2 under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced him to two years of rigorous imprisonment, similar to Accused No.3, along with a fine of ₹75,000/-. The acquittal of Accused No.1 was not disturbed. State of Karnataka v. Battegowda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Section 132. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty

Sections 353, 186 IPC - Omission of crucial facts in the First Information Report (FIR), which are later introduced through witness statements under Section 161 CrPC, indicates an afterthought and raises doubts about the case's credibility. An FIR, while not an encyclopedia of all incident details, must disclose the nature of the alleged offence to avoid being quashed. The Court quashed criminal proceedings against the appellant under Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC, finding no allegations of criminal force or assault (essential for Section 353) in the FIR, only obstruction (Section 186). Subsequent inclusion of Section 353 allegations in Section 161 CrPC statements was deemed an afterthought, as vital facts known to the complainant were not mentioned in the FIR. Taking cognizance by the Trial Court was flawed due to the absence of Section 353 ingredients in the FIR and witness statements. The Court emphasized a clear distinction between “creating obstruction” (Section 186) and “assault” or “criminal force” (Section 353), noting that equating disturbance with assault amounts to an abuse of the legal process. Criminal proceedings against the appellant were set aside as the FIR and witness statements lacked the necessary ingredients for Section 353 IPC. Criminal proceedings quashed; cognizance by the Trial Court held vitiated. (Paras 25-27, 32) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 137 (2). Punishment for kidnapping

Sections 363 and 366 IPC - Kidnapping and Abduction of a Minor Girl Aged 16-18 Years – Held, the prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied the accused and lived with him as his wife. No evidence established "taking" or "enticing" of the minor from her lawful guardian, as required for offences under Sections 363 (kidnapping) or 366 (abduction) of the IPC. The prosecutrix's testimony confirmed she willingly traveled with the accused, signed marriage documents, and did not raise any alarm. Inconsistencies in her testimony and conflicting evidence regarding her age raised reasonable doubt. Considering the prosecutrix's voluntary actions, her proximity to the age of majority, and her capacity to discern right from wrong, the ingredients of kidnapping or abduction were not made out. The High Court's conviction under Sections 363 and 366 IPC was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. [Paras 11, 17-20] Tilku @ Tilak Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2025 INSC 226

Section 363 and 366 IPC - Kidnapping from lawful guardianship - Age of the victim crucial for invoking Sections 361 and 363 IPC - Victim was 19 years old at the time of the incident, and thus, the provisions of Sections 361 and 363 IPC were not applicable. Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2025 INSC 103

Sections 363 and 366A IPC - Procuration of Minor Girl - Kidnapping - The prosecutrix testified that she voluntarily went with the appellant, with no evidence of coercion or force. Testimonies revealed that discussions of marriage between the appellant and prosecutrix were ongoing but opposed by her father due to caste differences. No evidence indicated illicit intent, which is essential to sustain a charge under Section 366-A IPC. The prosecutrix's sister, who allegedly saw the incident of kidnapping, was not produced as a witness, weakening the prosecution's case. Medical evidence suggested the prosecutrix's age ranged between 16-18 years. In the absence of contrary evidence, the possibility of her being 18 years old could not be ruled out, impacting the kidnapping charge. The absence of bodily injuries does not negate allegations of sexual assault, referring to established legal principles and the Supreme Court's Handbook on Gender Stereotypes (2023). However, in this case, the prosecutrix herself stated that no force was used, and there was no evidence of sexual assault. The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of Sections 363 and 366-A IPC. The conviction was therefore unsustainable. The impugned judgment was quashed, and the appellant was discharged from his bail bond. Appeal allowed. Conviction set aside. Dalip Kumar @ Dalli v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Sections 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 IPC - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Section 4 - Credibility of the testimony of the prosecutrix - Delay in lodging FIR and contradictions in testimony - Requirement of confidence-inspiring evidence for conviction in rape cases - An FIR was lodged based on the statement of the prosecutrix, aged 16 years, alleging that the accused kidnapped her, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. The Trial Court acquitted the accused citing inconsistencies in the testimony, unexplained delay in filing the FIR, and lack of corroborative evidence. The High Court upheld the acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that the testimony of the prosecutrix did not inspire confidence. It was noted that: The prosecutrix's statement had multiple contradictions. There was no corroborative medical evidence of physical injuries. The delay in lodging the FIR was unexplained. Conviction in rape cases can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but such testimony must be credible and consistent, which was not the case here. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondent was upheld. State (Gnct of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Section 189 (1). Unlawful assembly

Sections 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436 and 332 IPC - In cases of group clashes where a large number of persons are involved, Courts must be cautious to ensure that no innocent bystander is convicted and deprived of their liberty. In such type of cases, the Courts must be circumspect and reluctant to rely upon the testimony of witnesses who make general statements without specific reference to the accused, or the role played by him. The mere presence of persons, who out of curiosity gathered to witness the incidents, should not be a ground to convict them when there is no overt act alleged against them. (Para 15) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2025 INSC 381

Section 190. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.

Section 149 IPC - Unlawful Assembly - General statements by witnesses, without specific attribution of roles, are insufficient to convict individuals in cases involving large crowds, and the police should be cautious to book such individuals who were just bystanders without having any participation in the unlawful assembly. (Para 13) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2025 INSC 381

Section 149 IPC - Illustration - A member of an unlawful assembly aiming to harm a community may be held liable for a murder committed by another member, even if they personally opposed the act, provided they remained part of the assembly during the offence. (Para 43) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Section 191 (2) Rioting - Punishment for rioting

Sections 147, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 323, 325, 452 IPC – Incident of 1989 – Accused assaulted multiple persons, including deceased, over a dispute – Trial Court convicted under Section 302/149 IPC with life imprisonment – High Court converted conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, reduced sentence to time served (76 days) with fine, citing advanced age of accused (70–80 years) and 28-year delay –Medical evidence inconclusive on cause of death (asphyxia, 15 days post-assault) – No intent to murder established – Long lapse of time and age of accused justified leniency –Appeal dismissed. (Para 13 & 14) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2025 INSC 377 : AIR 2025 SC 1818 : (2025) 4 SCC 616

Section 209. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under Section 84 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Section 174A IPC - Proclaimed Offender Status - Whether the status of a "proclaimed offender" under Section 82 Cr.P.C. subsists if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the offence for which the proclamation was issued. Whether the subsistence of a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is necessary for authorities to proceed against an accused under Section 174A IPC. A complaint was filed in 2010, and the appellant was declared a proclaimed offender in 2016 for non-appearance in court. The appellant was later acquitted of the main offence but faced charges under Section 174A IPC for failing to comply with the proclamation. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the proceedings, leading to the present appeal. Held, the status of a proclaimed offender under Section 82 Cr.P.C. does not automatically cease upon acquittal in the main offence. However, if the accused is acquitted, the necessity for securing their presence in court is nullified, and the proclamation can be quashed. Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence. Prosecution under this section can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is no longer in effect. However, if the accused is acquitted in the main offence, the court may consider this as a ground to close proceedings under Section 174A IPC, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court's judgment and all criminal proceedings, including the FIR under Section 174A IPC. The appellant's status as a proclaimed offender was also quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2025 SC 511

Section 221. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.

Sections 186 and 353 IPC – Quashing of FIR –Cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC impermissible on police report – Section 195 CrPC mandates complaint by aggrieved public servant or superior – No allegation of assault or criminal force under Section 353 IPC – Appellants' actions lacked mens rea for obstruction under Section 186 IPC – Prosecution deemed vexatious and mala fide – Criminal proceedings quashed – Appeal allowed. (Para 28, 32, 34) Umashankar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 551 : 2025 INSC 653 : . AIR 2025 SC 2571

Sections 186, 353 IPC - Non-Cognizable Offences - Requirement of Magistrate's Approval for Investigation - Safeguards under Section 195 CrPC – Quashing of FIR under Sections 186 and 353 IPC - Police cannot investigate non-cognizable offences without prior approval from a Judicial Magistrate, as a safeguard to balance the coercive powers of the police and protect citizens' liberty, as per Section 156 CrPC. For non-cognizable offences under Section 186 IPC, a written complaint by the public servant to a Judicial Magistrate is mandatory for taking cognizance. Complaints to an Executive Magistrate are invalid. Section 353 IPC requires proof of assault or criminal force to deter a public servant, not mere obstruction. Absence of such elements renders the charge unsustainable. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and criminal proceedings against the appellant, holding that: Cognizance under Section 186 IPC was illegal due to the absence of a valid complaint by the public servant to a Judicial Magistrate. The FIR under Section 353 IPC lacked allegations of assault or criminal force, making it unsustainable. The criminal proceedings were quashed due to non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Section 195 CrPC for Section 186 IPC and lack of essential ingredients for Section 353 IPC. (Para 9) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 302. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person.

Section 298, 353 and 504 IPC - Use of offensive and derogatory terms, such as "Miyan-Tiyan" and "Pakistani," while in poor taste, does not automatically amount to deliberately wounding the religious feelings of another. Essential ingredients of the alleged offences were not made out. No assault or use of criminal force was established under Section 353 IPC, the alleged remarks did not amount to wounding religious sentiments under Section 298 IPC, and no act was found to provoke a breach of peace under Section 504 IPC. Appeal allowed; criminal proceedings quashed. (Para 19 & 20) Hari Nandan Singhv v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2025 INSC 305

Section 308 (4). Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.

Section 387 IPC - Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion - An offence under Section 387 IPC is constituted when a person is put in fear of death or grievous hurt to facilitate extortion, without requiring actual delivery of property. Reversing the High Court's decision to quash summons in a case involving gunpoint threats to extort ₹5 lakh/month, held, unlike Section 383 IPC, Section 387 IPC does not require property transfer. The trial court proceedings were restored, emphasizing that instilling fear is sufficient for prosecution under Section 387 IPC, and an expedited trial was directed. (Para 25, 26) Balaji Traders v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2025 INSC 806

Section 309 (4). Robbery- Punishment for robbery

Sections 392, 397 and 411 IPC - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 – Arrest of the Accused - Robbery - Recovery of Weapons - In cases of robbery by unknown persons, where the accused are not known to witnesses, meticulous examination of evidence is crucial. Courts must scrutinize: (a) how the investigating agency identified the accused; (b) the manner of arrest; (c) the identification process; and (d) the discovery/recovery of looted articles. Mere proof of robbery is insufficient; credible evidence linking the specific accused to the crime is essential. (Para 13 & 14) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341

Section 310 (2) Dacoity punishment

Section 395 r/w. 397 IPC - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 - Arrest of the Accused - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Nonexamination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 14 Feb 2025 [Evidence] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 318 (1). Cheating

Sections 415 - 420 IPC - Civil Dispute - The Supreme Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000 on the State of Uttar Pradesh for the police's action in converting a civil dispute into a criminal case by filing an FIR under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504, and 506 IPC. The Court permitted the State to recover the amount from the errant officers. The bench quashed the criminal proceedings, criticizing the practice of registering criminal cases for civil disputes as "unacceptable" and a violation of the rule of law. The Court reiterated its disapproval of such practices by the Uttar Pradesh Police, referencing prior directions in Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 for proper chargesheet documentation and warning of further costs for non-compliance. Rikhab Birani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2025 INSC 512

Sections 415, 420 IPC - Quashing of FIR - Allegations of Fraudulent Land Grabbing and Property Sale - Dispute primarily civil in nature, involving co-ownership rights under litigation since 2018. Complainant's suppression of ongoing civil suits while filing FIR in 2020 justified quashing of criminal proceedings. The Court allowed the appeal against the High Court's dismissal of the petition to quash the FIR, holding that the complaint failed to establish the ingredients of cheating under Section 415 IPC. (Paras 12, 13) Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : 2025 INSC 31 : 2025 Cri LJ 710 : AIR 2025 SC 361

Section 318 (4). Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.

Section 420, 406 IPC - Non-payment of the sale price constituted a civil dispute and not an offense of criminal breach of trust or cheating. The continuation of the FIR was deemed an abuse of the process of law. A mere failure to pay the sale price does not automatically amount to cheating or criminal breach of trust; fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction must be proven. The dispute was primarily a civil matter concerning unpaid sale consideration, and converting it into a criminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of law. (Para 16 & 17) Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2025 INSC 614

Section 319 (2). Cheating by personation punishment.

Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC - Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972; Section 83 - The appellant, an official of the Madhya Pradesh State Housing Board, was implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of forgery and cheating related to the transfer of property. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR and subsequent proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which was refused by the High Court. Whether the appellant, as a public servant, was protected under Section 83 of the Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972, akin to Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., which requires prior sanction for prosecution of public servants for acts done in their official capacity. Whether the allegations against the appellant, including conspiracy and forgery, were substantiated by evidence. Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in light of the civil nature of the dispute and the absence of mens rea on the part of the appellant. Held, offences in the chargesheet cannot be based on bald assertions of connivance. There must be some substance to it. The appellant's actions were in furtherance of his official duties, and there was no evidence to suggest that he acted with any dishonest intent or knowledge of the alleged forgery. The allegations of conspiracy and forgery were not substantiated by the chargesheet or witness statements, and no prima facie case was made out against the appellant. The case was essentially civil in nature, and the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the process of law. The High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR, as the ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC were not met. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. All proceedings arising from the FIR and subsequent chargesheet were quashed. Dinesh Kumar Mathur v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2025 INSC 16 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 617

Section 352. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace

Section 504 IPC - Intentional insult under Section 504 IPC requires a deliberate intent to provoke a reasonable person to breach public peace or commit another offence. Verbal reprimands by a senior at the workplace regarding official duties do not constitute an offence under Section 504 unless there is clear intent to provoke a breach of peace. Mere abuse, discourtesy, or rudeness does not meet the requirements of Section 504. The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against the Director of NIEPID, Secunderabad, for reprimanding an employee for negligence, holding that such admonitions, aimed at maintaining workplace discipline, do not amount to intentional insult. The High Court's refusal to quash the case was set aside, as the reprimand was an administrative action, not an intentional insult. The Court cautioned against interpretations that could misuse liberty and undermine workplace discipline, noting that failure to address employee misconduct could encourage similar behavior. The criminal proceedings were quashed, as the reprimand lacked intent to provoke and did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 504 IPC. [Paras 21 - 29] B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2025 INSC 194 : (2025) 3 SCC 475

Section 356 (1). Defamation

Section 499 and 500 IPC - Defamation - Ninth Exception - Freedom of Speech - Peaceful Protest by consumers – Held, a right to protest peacefully without falling foul of the law is a corresponding right, which the consumers ought to possess just as the seller enjoys his right to commercial speech. Any attempt to portray them as criminal offences, when the necessary ingredients are not made out, would be a clear abuse of process and should be nipped in the bud. (Para 16, 22, 30 and 34) Shahed Kamal v. A. Surti Developers Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2025 INSC 502 : AIR 2025 SC 2166

Sections 499 and 500 IPC – Defamation – Allegation of article implying auction of counterfeit artworks – Held, the complaint lacked specific allegations against the Editorial Director and revealed procedural irregularities, including the Magistrate's failure to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC before issuing summons. No evidence established reputational harm or auction-related loss due to the article. General or vague allegations without specific details are insufficient to summon the accused. Absence of witness examination to prove reputational damage and the futility of prolonged litigation, given the auction occurred over a decade ago, noted. While affirming the right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court cautioned media, particularly those in influential positions, to exercise utmost responsibility and accuracy in reporting to avoid reputational harm, emphasizing the media's role in shaping public opinion and the need for publications to be in good faith and public interest. Criminal defamation proceedings quashed; media advised to exercise caution in publications. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241