(Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372)

Administration

Compliance with Court Orders - Delay and Obstination - Harassment of Daily Wage Workers - The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union Territory, observing that the case presented a "glaring and textbook example of obstination" by state officials who took 16 years to comply with a High Court order. The Court expressed shock at the delay and the repeated harassment of poor daily wage workers through cryptic orders that disregarded the spirit of the 2007 High Court order. While the Court considered imposing exemplary costs and recommending disciplinary action against the delinquent officers, it refrained from doing so as contempt proceedings were pending before the Single Judge. The Court directed the Single Judge to expedite the contempt proceedings on a weekly basis to uphold the majesty and sanctity of law. (Para 2 – 4) Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Abdul Rehman Khanday, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 303

Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Advocate

Advocates Act, 1961 - A right of an Advocate to appear for a party and to practice in the courts is coupled with the duty to remain present in the court at the time of hearing, and to participate and conduct the proceedings diligently, sincerely, honestly and to the best of his ability. Rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, and they are inherently connected with each other. (Para 18) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Advocate-Client Relationship - Undertakings given by advocates must be with the client's express authorization. A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter. It is also clear that the lawyer is to respect the decision-making right of the client. It flows from this that any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client. (Para 10) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Applicable Law - In the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contractus). (Para 31) Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 317

Section 34(2)(b) - An Arbitral Award upholding agreement to return acquired land is liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b) as it is in conflict with the public policy of India. (Para 15) Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Bhagwan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Auroville Foundation Act, 1988

Development of Auroville - Petition filed by disgruntled residents to hamper development of Auroville - Some disgruntled and discontented residents kept on filing the petitions one after the other, dragging the Foundation into unnecessary litigations. The writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court was one of such ill-motivated petitions filed by her to abuse the process of law to hamper the development of Auroville and to cause obstructions to the smooth functioning of the Governing Board of the Foundation. Hence, the Appeal by the Auroville Foundation is allowed with cost of Rs.50,000/- (Para 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Section 19 - Residents' Assembly's role is advisory and recommendatory. While it assists in formulating the Master Plan, it does not have the power to dictate the composition of committees constituted by the Governing Board. The Residents' Assembly or any individual resident of the Auroville Foundation cannot claim any right to be a part of a Committee or Council constituted by the Governing Board of the Foundation. (Para 15) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Bail

Anticipatory Bail - Condition for Automatic Custody Upon Charge-Sheet Submission - Such a specific direction, mandating coercive steps for custody, was improper. When granting anticipatory bail, the court should leave it open for the trial court to decide on bail after the charge-sheet is filed and the accused appears. (Para 3) Ritesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 326

Arrest - Defiance of Court Order - Grant of Bail - Police, with knowledge of the protection order, hastily added serious charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 leading to the appellant's arrest. The Court deprecated this conduct, emphasizing that the police should have sought leave from the Court before arresting the appellant. The Court, considering the mala fide nature of the arrest, allowed the appeal, directing the appellant's release on bail, and made the interim order of protection absolute. (Para 5 & 7) Manish Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 325

Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Moratorium of 1 year imposed by high court to apply for bail afresh - Such a restriction was impermissible. (Para 3) Md. Gulzar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 370

Parameters for granting and setting aside bail – The Supreme Court allowed the State's appeals, setting aside the High Court's order granting bail to the accused in a case involving alleged compromise of a public recruitment examination. The Court distinguished between setting aside an order of bail and cancellation of bail, emphasizing that setting aside challenges the legality of the grant order itself, while cancellation addresses misuse of bail or supervening circumstances. The Court reiterated that while granting bail, factors like the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, and prima facie involvement of the accused are crucial. The Court stressed the importance of maintaining the sanctity of public examinations and the impact of such offenses on society's faith in public administration. The High Court erred in granting bail based on factors like lack of criminal antecedents and period of custody, without adequately considering the gravity of the offense and its societal implications. The Court directed the accused to surrender and clarified that its observations were limited to the bail matter and should not be construed as remarks on the merits of the case. The court allowed the accused to reapply for bail before the trial court after the examination of material witnesses. [Referred: Ansar Ahmad v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 974; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392 and Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278] (Para 8, 11 & 14) State of Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 300

Child Custody

Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity of individuals with disabilities to make independent decisions. When a specialist's expert opinion confirms a child's inability to make independent decisions, custody decisions should not be based on the child's implied or express consent, as it could have significant consequences for the child. (Para 22) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Cognitive Capacity - Courts should give due credence to expert opinions on a person's mental capacity, especially when dealing with individuals with cognitive limitations. In child custody matters, the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount, even when considering the wishes of a child with limited capacity. The totality of circumstances must be considered when determining the best interests of the child, including their education, support system, emotional well-being, and familial relationships. (Para 32) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Foreign Orders - Principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing order of a Foreign Court must yield to the best interests of the child, especially when the Court has decided to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this regard. Such cases must be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of 'what would serve the interests and welfare' of the minor. The preexisting order of a Foreign Court is merely one of the circumstances to consider when assessing the best interests and welfare of the person concerned. This doctrine was evolved to protect children who may, unwittingly, become collateral damage in their parents' legal disputes. It has gained significance over the past several years, owing to the frequency and ease of migration. (Para 31) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

International Parental Child Abduction - The Appellant (mother) and Respondent No. 4 (father) are US citizens, divorced in the US. Their elder son has mild intellectual developmental disorder and cerebral palsy, resulting in significant cognitive limitations. After the divorce, the father brought the child to India. The mother filed a petition in the High Court alleging illegal detention. The High Court, after a brief interaction with the child, ruled that he was consensually living with his father in India. The Supreme Court, doubting the child's capacity to make independent decisions, ordered a medical assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The assessment concluded that the child's cognitive abilities were equivalent to an 8–10-year-old, and he lacked the capacity to make complex decisions. Whether the child has the capacity to make independent decisions regarding his place of residence. What course of action would best serve the child's interests and welfare. Held, the Supreme Court relied on the expert opinions from NIMHANS and a previous evaluation by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, concluding that the child does not possess the capacity to make independent, informed decisions on complex matters like long-term residence. The High Court erred in relying solely on a brief interaction with the child. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the Supreme Court determined that the child's best interests lie in returning to the US. This decision considered the child's established life, education, support system, and close relationship with his younger brother, who also has special needs, in the US. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother. The father was directed not to impede their return and to maintain contact with his sons. The US Consulate General, Chennai was directed to return the child's passport and facilitate his return. (Para 41) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Execution of Decree - Extension of Time - Limitation - Doctrine of Merger - Executing Court's extension for depositing the advance payment cannot be interfered with. Since the Appellate Court's ruling, which lacked a time limit, superseded the Trial Court's decision under the doctrine of merger, the Executing Court was not bound by the Trial Court's timeline. (Para 10) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331

Execution Proceedings – Delay in Execution of Decree – Directions - Execution proceedings should not be used to re-litigate issues already decided in the suit. The executing court's role is limited to ensuring the decree is executed, not to question its validity. The judgment underscores the importance of timely execution of decrees and prevents parties from frustrating decrees through collusive claims raised during execution proceedings. It reaffirms the principle that executing courts cannot go behind the decree or re-adjudicate issues already decided in the suit. The Court issued directions to all High Courts to monitor and expedite the disposal of pending execution petitions, emphasizing the need to avoid delays in the execution of decrees. The Court reiterated the need for expeditious disposal of execution proceedings, directing all High Courts to ensure pending execution petitions are decided within six months. (Para 75) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Section 47 - Collusion and Delay in Execution - Whether the courts below erred in upholding objections raised by the respondents (claiming possession as cultivating tenants) against the execution of a decree for specific performance and possession. Whether the respondents are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, and whether the executing court could decide the validity of the decree on this ground. The appellants sought specific performance of a 1980 sale agreement for immovable property. The trial court decreed in their favor in 1986, directing the vendors to execute the sale deed and deliver possession. The decree was upheld by the High Court in 2004 and the Supreme Court in 2006. During execution, the respondents (nephews of the vendors) obstructed possession, claiming to be cultivating tenants in possession since 1967. They filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC, which was allowed by the executing court and upheld by the High Court. The appellants challenged the orders, arguing that the respondents' claims were collusive and aimed at frustrating the decree. Held, the respondents' claims of being cultivating tenants were raised belatedly during execution proceedings, despite being aware of the litigation since 1983. The respondents' actions, supported by the vendors, were collusive and aimed at delaying the execution of the decree. The Court rejected the respondents' claim of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, as they were only registered as tenants in 2008, long after the decree was passed. The certificate of possession granted in 2008 was based on a “no objection” from the vendors, who no longer held title to the property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the executing court. The executing court was directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the appellants within two months, with police assistance if necessary. (Para 70) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Section 47, Order XXI Rule 97 & 101 - Execution of Decree for Possession - Scope and Applicability - Section 47 of the CPC provides for the determination of questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree between the parties to the suit. Order XXI Rule 97 r/w 101, addresses specific situations where a decree-holder for possession of immovable property faces resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession. While Section 47 is a general provision applicable to all executions, Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 deal specifically with the execution of decrees for possession. Order XXI Rule 97, empowers the executing court to adjudicate on obstructions by "any person," including judgment-debtors and third parties and Rule 101 mandates the determination of all questions, including those related to right, title, or interest, arising in such proceedings. An application filed under Section 47, if pertaining to resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession, can be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 and adjudicated under Rule 98. The executing court has a duty to consider the substance of the application and apply the relevant rule, even if the application is incorrectly labeled. Dispossession is not a prerequisite for entertaining an application under Order XXI Rule 97. The procedure under order 21 rule 97 and 101 is a specific procedure, and supercedes the general procedure of section 47, when dealing with execution of a decree of possession. (Para 51 - 54) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Section 80 IPC - Mandatory Notice - State's failure to respond to appellants' notice criticized - Public authorities must address statutory notices seriously to promote justice and avoid litigation – non-response may invite adverse inference - Judgment copies to be circulated to all High Courts and State Chief Secretaries, emphasizing Section 80 CPC compliance. (Para 113 & 129) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Cancellation of Power of Attorney - Commencement of Limitation - Where a plaintiff seeks to challenge sale deeds executed under a power of attorney, limitation for such a challenge commences from the date of knowledge of the sale deeds, not from the date of cancellation of the power of attorney. Cancellation of a power of attorney does not affect prior conveyances made under the valid power conferred, nor does it create a new cause of action to challenge those conveyances. The High Court erred in holding that limitation commenced from the cancellation of the power of attorney, which was executed long after the sale deeds in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's rejection of the plaint, holding that the suit was barred by limitation. (Para 8 & 9) V. Ravikumar v. S. Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 301

Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction – Subsequent setting aside of an injunction order does not absolve a party from liability for disobedience committed during its pendency. (Para 7.4) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Rule 2A provides for punishment by attachment of property or imprisonment for up to three months for violating injunction orders issued under Rules 1 and 2. This Rule applies to disobedience of injunctions during the pendency of a suit, while violations of a decree should be addressed through execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32. (Referred to: Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, (Para 7.3 & 8) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Compensation

Doctor killed by assailants in a hospital while on duty - The Supreme Court directed the State of Uttarakhand to pay Rs. 89 lakhs, in addition to Rs. 11 lakhs already disbursed, to the family of a deceased doctor killed by assailants in a hospital while on duty. The Court noted that a proposal by the Chief Secretary to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as ex-gratia, approved by the Chief Minister, was not honored, with only Rs. 1 lakh initially paid citing rules. Despite subsequent payments and benefits like family pension, gratuity, and compassionate appointment to the deceased's son, the Court found the High Court's compensation calculation using the multiplier method unjustified. Emphasizing the gravity of the incident and nine years of litigation, the Court quantified the total compensation at Rs. 1 crore, including interest, to be paid within six weeks. (Para 5) State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 348

Constitution of India

Animosity or Hatred - 75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society. (Para 42 ix) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their in-house pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324

Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Homebuyers cannot be forced to accept possession of a property after an undue delay and are entitled to a refund if the unit is not delivered within the agreed timeframe. (Para 14) Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board v. Manohar Burde, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 360

Section 2(1)(d) - Definition of 'Consumer' - Self-Employment – Commercial Purpose - When a product is bought to be utilised in an established commercial venture by the buyer's employees and not the buyer himself, the buyer cannot be considered a 'consumer'. While a buyer using a product for 'self-employment' can be considered a 'consumer' under the Act, the facts of each case need to be examined. [Relied on: Paramount Digital Colour Lab v. Agfa India Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 81] Virender Singh v. Darshana Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 359

Section 2(1)(d) – To qualify as a "consumer" under the Act, there must be a direct contractual relationship between the parties. A party having no privity of contract with the service provider cannot be regarded as a consumer as per the Act. (Paras 17, 20, 21, 23) Citicorp Finance v. Snehasis Nanda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 332

BNS / IPC

Sections 120B, 468 and 471 IPC - Forgery of a marksheet - Handwriting Expert - Admissibility of Evidence - The conviction was based on the handwriting expert's opinion that the appellant had written the postal cover in which the forged marksheet was sent. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the original postal cover, which was crucial to establish the appellant's handwriting. Without the original document being exhibited and proved, the handwriting expert's report had no evidentiary value. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Murari Lal v. State of M.P., emphasizing that while handwriting expert opinion is relevant, it must be approached with caution and the reasons for the opinion must be carefully examined. The uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert can be accepted if the reasons are convincing and there is no reliable evidence casting doubt. However, in this case, due to the lack of the original document, the expert opinion had no basis. Therefore, the conviction based solely on the handwriting expert's opinion, without proving the original document, was unsustainable, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 12 & 15) C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 287

Sections 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436 and 332 IPC - In cases of group clashes where a large number of persons are involved, Courts must be cautious to ensure that no innocent bystander is convicted and deprived of their liberty. In such type of cases, the Courts must be circumspect and reluctant to rely upon the testimony of witnesses who make general statements without specific reference to the accused, or the role played by him. The mere presence of persons, who out of curiosity gathered to witness the incidents, should not be a ground to convict them when there is no overt act alleged against them. (Para 15) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340

Section 149 IPC - Unlawful Assembly - General statements by witnesses, without specific attribution of roles, are insufficient to convict individuals in cases involving large crowds, and the police should be cautious to book such individuals who were just bystanders without having any participation in the unlawful assembly. (Para 13) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340

Sections 147, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 323, 325, 452 IPC – Incident of 1989 – Accused assaulted multiple persons, including deceased, over a dispute – Trial Court convicted under Section 302/149 IPC with life imprisonment – High Court converted conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, reduced sentence to time served (76 days) with fine, citing advanced age of accused (70–80 years) and 28-year delay –Medical evidence inconclusive on cause of death (asphyxia, 15 days post-assault) – No intent to murder established – Long lapse of time and age of accused justified leniency –Appeal dismissed. (Para 13 & 14) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 196 BNS - Promoting enmity between groups - When an offence under section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of standards of the people who always have a sense of insecurity or those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position. (Para 33) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) BNS - The appellant, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, posted a video on social media featured a poem recited in the background, which the informant alleged incited enmity between communities, hurt religious sentiments, and threatened national unity. Held, the poem does not reference any religion, caste, or community, nor does it promote enmity, hatred, or disharmony. It advocates non-violence and resilience against injustice, using symbolic references (e.g., “throne”) to challenge rulers. No offence under Sections 196, 197, 299, or 302 of the BNS is made out, as the poem lacks mens rea or content to incite disharmony, wound religious feelings, or jeopardize national integration. Abetment under Section 57 BNS is inapplicable absent evidence of incitement. (Para 11 – 19) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Section 376 IPC - Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323

Section 298, 353 and 504 IPC - Use of offensive and derogatory terms, such as "Miyan-Tiyan" and "Pakistani," while in poor taste, does not automatically amount to deliberately wounding the religious feelings of another. Essential ingredients of the alleged offences were not made out. No assault or use of criminal force was established under Section 353 IPC, the alleged remarks did not amount to wounding religious sentiments under Section 298 IPC, and no act was found to provoke a breach of peace under Section 504 IPC. Appeal allowed; criminal proceedings quashed. (Para 19 & 20) Hari Nandan Singhv v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Section 302 IPC – Murder – Accused inflicted the knife stabs on the deceased which could only have been possible if the knife was already with him, which clearly indicates that he had come with prior intention to cause bodily injury by knife which obviously is a weapon sufficient to cause of death. In other words, the intention to kill was very much present from the beginning and is not covered by any exception to Section 300 of the IPC. This persuades to refrain from converting conviction from under Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304-I, IPC. No fault can be found with the Trial Court and the High Court, which have rightly reached the conclusion that the accused was guilty as charged. (Para 23) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Benefit of Doubt - Reliability of Witnesses - Appellant convicted by trial court and High Court under Section 302 IPC for stabbing deceased during an altercation - Held, prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Eyewitness testimonies unreliable due to inconsistencies, absence of bloodstains on witnesses' clothes despite carrying bleeding deceased, failure to report incident to nearby police, and delayed recording of statements - Prior enmity between appellant and deceased raised possibility of false implication - Conviction unsustainable; appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Judgments of trial court and High Court set aside - Appeal allowed. (Para 21 & 22) Aslam @ Imran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 365

Section 302 IPC - The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court and the High Court for the murder of his two minor children. The murders were committed allegedly as a result of familial discord over the appellant's sister-in-law's relationship with a co-worker, which the appellant disapproved of. The appellant was also separately convicted for the murders of his sister-in-law and mother-in-law. The case was based on circumstantial evidence, and the prosecution relied on witness testimonies, SMS messages, and call records to establish the appellant's guilt. Whether the prosecution proved the homicidal death of the children beyond reasonable doubt? Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt? Whether the death sentence was appropriate, or should it be commuted to life imprisonment without remission? Held, the Court reiterated the principles governing the imposition of the death penalty, emphasizing that it should be reserved for the rarest of rare cases. While the circumstantial evidence in this case was strong, the absence of criminal antecedents and other mitigating factors warranted commutation of the death sentence. The judgment also highlighted the importance of considering all mitigating circumstances, including the possibility of reformation, before imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murders of his children. However, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission, considering the following mitigating factors: (i) The appellant had no prior criminal antecedents. (ii) He had good relations with his family, as testified by prosecution witnesses. (iii) The case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, and while the evidence was unimpeachable, the Court found that the death penalty was not the only appropriate punishment. The gravity of the crime, involving the murder of innocent children, was undeniable. However, the Trial Court had not adequately considered all mitigating circumstances, including the appellant's lack of criminal history and his behavior during the trial. The appeals were partly allowed. The conviction was upheld, but the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission. The appellant will remain in prison for the remainder of his natural life. (Para 16 & 17) Ramesh A. Naika v. Registrar General, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 281

Section 306 and 420 IPC - Abetment of suicide - Cheating - Quashing of Proceedings – Held, there was no proximate or direct instigation leading to the deceased's suicide. The time gap between the alleged fraudulent acts and the suicide indicated the absence of immediate provocation. FIR quashing under Section 306 IPC upheld, but reinstated under Section 420 IPC. The High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for quashing the case under Section 420 IPC despite material evidence collected during the investigation. The trial court was directed to proceed with the case under Section 420 IPC, and the accused were given the liberty to seek discharge in accordance with the law. Appeal partly allowed. (Para 15, 18 & 19) R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 363

Sections 306 and 114 IPC - Abetment of suicide - The appellants were accused of abetting the suicide of an individual who allegedly consumed poison due to blackmail by the appellants over compromising photographs and videos. The trial court and the High Court had convicted the appellants. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the charge of abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Key issues included the delayed filing of the FIR, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, lack of recovery of incriminating evidence (such as the alleged suicide note, poison, or stolen ornaments), and the absence of proximate instigation by the appellants leading to the suicide. Mere harassment or blackmail, without direct incitement or proximate acts compelling suicide, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. The appellants were acquitted. (Para 36 & 40) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Section 376 IPC - Rape - Consent - Promise of Marriage - Quashing of Proceedings – The Court reiterated that a breach of a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape unless fraudulent intent existed at the time of consent. Relationship between appellant and complainant, both major and closely related, was consensual, as evidenced by repeated interactions and voluntary visits to hotel. High Court erred in not exercising inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process. Proceedings quashed. (Para 11 - 13) Jothiragawan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 347

Section 376 IPC - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Quashing of FIR - Where a complainant, a highly qualified major woman, alleges rape based on a false promise of marriage after a 16-year long consensual relationship, the allegations are deemed unreliable due to material contradictions and prolonged silence. The deletion of Section 313 IPC (causing miscarriage) by the Investigation Officer and the lack of evidence against other co-accused further weaken the complainant's case. The prolonged period of consensual sexual relations, the complainant's independent life and travel to meet the accused, and her portrayal of herself as the accused's wife indicate a live-in relationship gone sour, not rape. Applying the principles of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921; Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204 the court held that the physical relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise, and prolonged consensual relations negate the claim of vitiated consent. Mere breach of promise does not equate to a false promise, and the accused's mala fide intent must be established. The FIR and subsequent proceedings are quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 19, 26, 29, 30, 34, 37 & 39) Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Section 376 IPC - Rape - The High Court had overturned the Trial Court's conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence, citing glaring lacunae in the prosecution's case. Key issues included the prosecutrix's lack of cooperation during medical examination, the absence of physical evidence (such as semen or blood), and contradictory testimonies from the prosecutrix's parents, particularly her mother, who turned hostile. The Court noted the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and the failure to establish the prosecutrix's mental state conclusively. The High Court's acquittal was based on the benefit of the doubt, and the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere, upholding the acquittal. (Para 10 & 12) State of Himachal Pradesh v Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 297

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sisters-in-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278

BNSS / Cr.P.C.

Additional Accused - If a court intends to add a person as an accused, it cannot direct the police to include their name in the charge sheet. Instead, the court may issue a summons to the proposed accused if sufficient grounds exist, even if they are not named in the charge sheet. (Para 3) Gopal Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 328

Criminal Appeal - Old age of the accused and the long lapse of time from the commission of the offence can always be a ground available to give some priority to the appeals against conviction of the accused on bail. (Para 15) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 50 Cr.P.C. – Mere arrest memo lacking detailed particulars does not satisfy the mandate under Section 50, violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Arrest and remand set aside. Ashish Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 367

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - When an informant approaches the police with information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the 2 police owes a duty to promptly register an F.I.R. and initiate investigation in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC. The police authorities are not vested with any discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry to assess the credibility of the information before registering the F.I.R. Any such practice would be contrary to the established principles of criminal law. (Para 34) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Section 154 and 174 Cr.P.C. - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 18A – Abetment of Suicide - Student suicides due to academic pressure, caste discrimination, and harassment - Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 when information discloses a cognizable offence, such as abetment of suicide or caste-based atrocities, without scope for preliminary inquiry unless exceptional circumstances apply; police cannot limit action to Section 174 inquiry into cause of death. Inquiry under Section 174 is restricted to ascertaining apparent cause of death (suicide, homicide, etc.) and cannot substitute for investigation into alleged cognizable offences under Section 154; premature closure of case as suicide without FIR registration disapproved. FIR registration for offences under SC/ST Act is obligatory without preliminary inquiry; allegations of caste-based discrimination and harassment in educational institutions mandate investigation. (Section 22, 34 & 40) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. (Para 8) Ranjit Singh Bath v. Union Territory Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 329

Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Delay in recording an eyewitness's testimony would not draw an adverse inference against the prosecution's case if the delay is adequately explained. (Para 21) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349

Section 173 BNSS - Police Duty and Preliminary Inquiry - Under Section 173(1) of the BNSS, registering an FIR is mandatory for cognizable offences, but Section 173(3) allows a preliminary inquiry for offences punishable between 3 and 7 years to ascertain a prima facie case. Here, the police failed to exercise this discretion, which could have protected the appellant's rights. Police, as part of the State under Article 12, must respect constitutional ideals. The Court criticized the lack of sensitization among police regarding Article 19(1)(a) and urged training programs. (Para 30) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Section 173 (3) BNSS - Preliminary inquiry must be conducted before lodging the FIR, if the offences alleged are dealing with speech and expressions. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Section 174 Cr.P.C. – Scope of - Investigation under Section 174 is limited in scope and is confined to the ascertainment of the apparent cause of death and should not be equated with investigation into cognizable offences under Sections 160 and 161 of the CrPC respectively. The procedure under Section 174 of the CrPC is for the purpose of discovering the cause of death and the evidence taken is very short. The police's closure of the cases as suicides after Section 174 inquiries was premature and bypassed due process. (Para 22 & 40) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Section 200 Cr.P.C. / Section 223 BNSS - Recording the complainant's statement on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality. The object of recording the complainant's statement and witnesses, if any, is to ascertain the truth. The learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth. The examination is necessary to enable the Court to satisfy itself whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. After considering the complaint, the documents produced along with the complaint, and the statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any, the learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC. The corresponding provision under the BNSS is Section 227. Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter. The accused faces serious consequences in the sense that he has to defend himself in the trial. (Para 10) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Section 200 Cr.P.C. - While filing a complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. (Para 21) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Section 256 Cr.P.C. / Section 279 BNSS - Non-appearance of a complainant will not always result in the acquittal of the accused. Acquittal under this section is warranted only when the complainant is absent on the date which was set for the appearance of the accused. If the date was set for a purpose other than the appearance of the accused, the absence of the complainant on such a date will not warrant the acquittal of the accused. (Para 19 & 20) Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 369

Section 227 Cr.P.C. – Penal Code, 1860; Section 304 Part II - Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder - Accidental Death due to Electrocution - Absence of Intention or Knowledge - Appeal against rejection of discharge applications - Where two employees, engaged in decorating a shop, died due to electrocution and a fall from a height while working on a signboard using an iron ladder, and the appellants, who were the contractor and store operation manager, were charged under Section 304 Part II IPC for not providing safety equipment, held, no prima facie case of culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC was made out. There was no intention to cause death or knowledge that the act would likely cause death. The absence of intention and knowledge, crucial ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC, warranted the discharge of the appellants under Section 227 CrPC. At the stage of discharge, the focus is on whether there are sufficient grounds to initiate a criminal trial, not on a threadbare analysis of evidence. Consequently, the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court rejecting the discharge applications were set aside, and the appellants were discharged. [Distinguished: Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. (1996) 6 SCC 129] (Para 16 - 18) Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 304

Section 319 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Summoning Additional Accused - Revisional Jurisdiction - Relation Back - Trial Court's Functus Officio - Opportunity of Hearing - When a High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC, sets aside a Trial Court's order rejecting an application under Section 319 CrPC, the rectified order relates back to the date of the original Trial Court order. Consequently, a summoning order issued by the Trial Court in compliance with the High Court's revisional order also relates back to the initial rejection of the Section 319 application, deeming it to have been passed before the conclusion of the trial. Unlike initial Section 319 applications, the conclusion of trial does not bar the adjudication of a Section 319 application directed by the High Court in revision. The Trial Court is not rendered functus officio in considering a Section 319 application after trial conclusion when acting on a revisional order. A summoning order issued pursuant to a High Court's revisional order is an extension of that order, effectively replacing the original rejected Section 319 application. A person summoned under Section 319 CrPC does not have a right to be heard before being added as an accused, unless they were previously discharged in the same proceeding before trial. However, if a trial court rejects a 319 CrPC application, and therefore a right accrues to the proposed accused, and the high court in revisional jurisdiction then passes an order prejudicial to that right, the high court must provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused, as mandated by Section 401(2) CrPC. (Para 115) Jamin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 294

Section 406 Cr.P.C. - Transfer of Trial – Principles - Whether the Supreme Court can transfer a case under Section 406 Cr.P.C. if the court where the complaint is filed lacks territorial jurisdiction? Held, lack of territorial jurisdiction alone not sufficient ground. Broad factors to be considered include: (i) Prosecution acting in collusion with the accused. (ii) Likelihood of accused influencing witnesses or causing harm to complainant. (iii) Comparative inconvenience and hardship to parties and witnesses. (iv) Communally surcharged atmosphere affecting fair trial. (v) Hostile persons interfering with the course of justice. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. Ensuring a fair trial is the paramount consideration. (Para 49) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Section 432 Cr.P.C. / Section 473 (1) BNSS – Remission - Accused has undergone more than 14 years and 10 months of actual incarceration and the contention that his case be considered by the provision/policy in vogue at the time of his conviction, if not, a more beneficial policy, could be applied. In this background, the Court gives liberty to the accused to apply afresh with a detailed representation justifying his claim to be considered for pre-mature release accounting for his actual incarceration of over 14 years and with remission included, of over 20 years. Upon such representation being filed, the State Government shall pass a reasoned order expeditiously and latest within 3 months from the date of filing such representation, in line with the legal principles outlined by the Court. (Para 30) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of FIR - Preliminary Stage of Investigation - There is no absolute rule that the High Court cannot interfere in a Section 482 CrPC petition if the investigation is at a primary stage. Kulandaisamy v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 357

Section 482 Cr.P.C. / Section 528 BNSS - Quashing of FIR - Abuse of Process of Law - Repetitive False Allegations - Respondent filing multiple identical FIRs against different individuals - Lack of cooperation with investigation – Where a complainant files multiple, near-identical FIRs alleging serious offenses (including rape and molestation) against numerous individuals across different police stations, and fails to cooperate with the investigation, coupled with lack of other evidence beyond her statement, the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused constitute an abuse of the process of law. In such circumstances, the High Court ought to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (as per new Act, under Section 528 BNSS) to quash the FIR. (Para 5 - 9) Rakesh Walia v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 282

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - In the present case, the allegations against the appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation and trial. The appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs under Section 482 CrPC, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum. (Para 13) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

Section 39 (9) - Denial of Input Tax Credit (ITC) due to clerical or arithmetical errors - Examination of timelines for correction of bona fide mistakes in tax filings - Judicial observations on software limitations in tax compliance. Held, timelines for rectifying bona fide errors in tax filings should be realistic, as denial of ITC due to inadvertent mistakes unfairly burdens taxpayers. Denying correction rights in cases of genuine errors contradicts the fundamental right to conduct business. Software limitations cannot justify denying taxpayers the right to correct mistakes, as compliance mechanisms should facilitate, not hinder, rectifications. Special Leave Petition dismissed declining to interfere with the High Court's judgment, as there was no loss of revenue. Bar Code India Ltd. v. Union of India, (2024) SCC OnLine P&H 13853; Yokohama India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, (2023) 108 GSTR 115 [Held not good law] Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs v. Aberdare Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 361

Contempt of Court

Contempt Jurisdiction - The Court reiterated that contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts, and when there is an express violation of a court order, contempt proceedings are justified. However, considering the age and health of one of the appellants, the Court modified the High Court's order by deleting the imprisonment sentence while upholding the attachment of property and enhancing the compensation payable. (Para 14) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Disobedience of Court Orders - Contempt powers are exercised to maintain the dignity of the court and ensure compliance with its orders. Alienation of the subject matter property despite express orders of the Court entirely justify the stand taken by the High Court in punishing the appellants for contempt of Court. When there has been an express violation of an order of a Court, as is in the present case, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction cannot be faulted with. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, confirmed. (Para 12 & 13) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Customs Act

Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - Petroleum Act, 1934; Section 2 (c) - 'Flash-point' - High Speed Diesel (HSD) or Base Oil - Confiscation Proceedings – Held, Classification of imported goods under the Act 1975, requires the Customs Authority to prove the goods are "most akin" to the specified tariff heading (e.g., HSD under CTH 27101930), as per Rule 4 of the General Rules for Interpretation, rather than relying on the "preponderance of probability" standard. Where goods declared as Base Oil (CTH 27101960) were tested for only 14 of 21 parameters under IS 1460:2005, with discrepancies (e.g., flash point exceeding 93°C), and neither test reports nor expert opinion categorically identified them as HSD, the evidence was inconclusive. The burden of proof lies on the Department, and incomplete scientific evidence cannot justify confiscation or penalties. Benefit of doubt granted to appellants due to evidentiary gaps and passage of time. Directed respondents to ensure facilities for testing all specified parameters within six months to avoid future uncertainty. High Court judgment set aside. Appeals allowed. (Para 80, 83, 84 & 88) Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 366

Doctrines

Moulding of relief - The concept of moulding of relief refers to the ability of a court to modify or shape a relief sought by a party in a legal proceeding based on the circumstances of the case and the facts established after a full-fledged trial. The principle enables the court to grant appropriate remedies even if the relief requested in the pleading is not exact or could not be considered by the court or changed circumstances have rendered the relief obsolete. The court aims that justice is served while taking into account the evolving nature of a case. The above road map is pursued by a court based on the notion of flexibility in relief, equitable jurisdiction, and is tempered by judicial discretion. When moulding the relief, the court considers the issues and circumstances established during the full-fledged trial, looks at shortening the litigation, and then in its perspective, renders complete justice to the issue at hand. The converse of the above is that the moulded relief should not take the aggrieved party by surprise or cause prejudice. The relief is moulded as an exception and not as a matter of course. (Para 20) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Moulding of relief - Shortening Litigation - It would not be in the interest of justice to make the executor-HBN Shetty (80 years) to file another suit to oblige the terms of the Will of the testatrix, who was found as a real owner of the property. Therefore, instead of asking him to file another suit, the High Court was justified in moulding the relief in favor of the executor so that the fruits of the Will could be reaped by the beneficiary- Vinayagamurthy and his children. (Relied on: Shivanna v. B.S. Puttamadaiah (Dead) Through Lrs. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1969; Para 22 & 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Education

Admission Eligibility - Curing Defect During Course - Interim Orders - Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit - Where a student, initially admitted to a B.A.M.S. course without fulfilling the mandatory English subject requirement, subsequently passed the English exam during the pendency of a writ petition and completed the entire course under interim orders, and where the college itself had provisionally admitted the student subject to passing the English exam, the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based solely on the initial ineligibility. The principle of "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" dictates that an act of the court should not prejudice anyone, and this principle was disregarded by the High Court. The student's subsequent fulfillment of the eligibility criteria, coupled with the college's provisional admission and the completion of the course under interim orders, warranted the issuance of the B.A.M.S. degree. (Para 8) Zaid Sheikh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 319

Rights of Persons with Disabilities - Appointment of Special Teachers - Non-compliance with prior judicial orders - Directions issued. Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Election Law

Recount of Votes - Sanctity of Electoral Process - Principle of secrecy of ballots - Conditions under which a recount can be ordered - Whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was justified in ordering a recount of votes in an election for the post of Gram Pradhan under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The appellant challenged the election results for the post of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat alleging discrepancies in the vote count. The appellant claimed that the Presiding Officer orally informed him of 1194 votes cast in three polling booths, while the official Form 46 recorded 1213 votes. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered a recount, but the High Court set aside this order, citing lack of documentary evidence and the principle of secrecy of ballots. Held, a recount of votes should not be ordered lightly and must be based on specific allegations supported by material facts. A recount is permissible only when: (i) The election petition contains adequate material facts supporting the allegations of irregularities. (ii) The court is prima facie satisfied that a recount is necessary to ensure justice. (iii) The secrecy of the ballot is not compromised without sufficient cause. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. Each vote holds intrinsic value, and any irregularities in the counting process must be addressed to uphold democratic principles. The Court found that the appellant had raised legitimate concerns about the discrepancy in vote counts and the missing Presiding Officer's diary, which was a crucial document. Additionally, three out of four candidates supported a recount, further justifying the need to verify the election results. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order for a recount of votes. The judgment reaffirms the principles of free and fair elections, the sanctity of the ballot, and the conditions under which a recount can be ordered. It highlights the judiciary's role in ensuring that electoral processes adhere to constitutional values and democratic norms. The appeal was allowed. (Para 1, 15, 16, 19) Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 296

Employment

Public Employment - Interview-Based Selection - Presumption of Favouritism - Arbitrariness and Judicial Review - When a government itself acknowledges that a selection process based solely on interviews carries an inherent risk of arbitrariness and potential for misuse, this perception is a significant factor in judicial review. An assessment of candidates based solely on interview marks can reasonably lead to a presumption of favouritism. In such circumstances, courts should exercise significant restraint in substituting their judgment for the government's decision, especially when the government has acted to rectify a selection process perceived as flawed. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Recruitment Process - Cancellation of Select List by Successor Government - Judicial Review - Proportionality Test - Scope of Interference - Where a successor government cancels a select list prepared by a previous government due to detected illegalities and irregularities, the judicial review court must apply the proportionality test to assess whether the cancellation was justified. The court should consider whether the government's decision was so disproportionate and incommensurate with the detected illegalities/irregularities as to warrant interference. The court should not substitute its own view for that of the government, especially when the government's decision is not unreasonable or implausible. The government's decision to ensure diversity, inclusivity, and fairness in public service, even if it entails canceling a tainted selection process, should be given due deference. (Para 52) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Absence of Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidates - The absence of a challenge from unsuccessful candidates does not preclude the government from addressing perceived arbitrariness or potential for favouritism in a selection process. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Each case regarding the cancellation of a select list must be decided on its own facts. The court must determine if the recruiting authority's decision to cancel the entire process, rather than save a part of it, is disproportionate and irrational. If the selection process borders on fraud, such as through violations of reservation policies, the decision to cancel the entire process can be justified. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Rights of Empanelled Candidates - Empanelment does not grant an indefeasible right to appointment, but empanelled candidates have a right to challenge adverse decisions. The appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel arbitrarily; there must be cogent reasons for not making appointments. Policy decisions not to carry forward the selection process must be bona fide, justifiable, and free from arbitrariness. (Para 53) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Courts should scrutinize whether the decision to cancel a selection process is wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe. When systemic fraud or irregularities vitiate a recruitment process, the entire process becomes illegitimate. If wrongdoers can be segregated, innocent candidates should not be penalized by the cancellation of the entire process. In cases involving larger public interest, additional grounds can be considered to examine the validity of an order. The court can review the original reasons that caused the cancellation of the select list. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Recruitment Process - Constable positions in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) - Political Change and Cancellation - The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by publishing fresh advertisement. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the PET. It would be desirable if rules are framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias or arbitrariness. (Para 63 & 64) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Environment

Constitution of India - Articles 14, 19 and 21 - Though it is true that precautionary principle and polluter pays principle are part of the environmental law of the country, it is equally true that while the right to clean environment is a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the right to development equally claims priority under the fundamental rights, particularly under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is a need for sustainable development striking a golden balance between the right to development and the right to clean environment. (Para 17) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) and 14 - Not every environmental dispute constitutes a "substantial question relating to environment" under Section 2(1)(m) of the NGT Act. A substantial question must involve a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation under the enactments in Schedule I. The NGT cannot assume jurisdiction and interfere with an approved Master Plan under the guise of applying the "Precautionary Principle" when no substantial environmental question arising from the implementation of Schedule I enactments is established. The Auroville Foundation Act, 1988, being a special Act with overriding effect, must be considered in assessing the validity of NGT directions. (Para 9, 13 & 14) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) - Substantial question relating to environment - Auroville Township Project – National Green Tribunal barred the Auroville Foundation from developmental activities in their township in Puducherry - Held, no substantial question relating to environment had arisen, nor violation of any of the enactments specified in Schedule-I was alleged. The Tribunal therefore had committed gross error in assuming the jurisdiction and giving directions untenable in law. (Para 18 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312

Factories Act, 1948

Section 2 (k) and (m) - Interpretation of "Factory" and "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning as Manufacturing - Welfare Legislation - Applicability of Definition under Central Excise Act – Held, the definition of "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948, clearly encompasses "washing and cleaning" of any article or substance with a view to its delivery. The Act is a welfare legislation aimed at protecting workers' health and safety, and therefore, its provisions must be interpreted liberally to give effect to the legislative intent. The Court rejected the High Court's reliance on the definition of "manufacture" under the Central Excise Act, 1944, stating that the Factories Act provides its own specific definition, which must be applied. The Court underscored that the inclusion of "washing and cleaning" in the 1948 Act, absent in the 1934 Act, was a deliberate expansion to include previously excluded undertakings. Thus, a laundry business involving cleaning and washing clothes, including dry cleaning, using power and employing more than ten workers, falls within the definition of "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. (Paras 30, 36, 38 & 42) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276

Section 2(k) and 2(m) - Interpretation of - "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning - Applicability to Laundry Services - Effect of ESIC Act Amendments – Held, the activity of washing and cleaning, including dry cleaning, carried out by a laundry service, constitutes a "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. This activity, aimed at the use, delivery, or disposal of cleaned linen, squarely falls within the definition. Consequently, the premises where such activity is conducted, employing more than ten workers with the aid of power, qualifies as a "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that dry cleaning does not render a product usable or saleable, emphasizing the plain meaning of the statutory definition. The Court distinguished prior judgments under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) Act, noting that the definition of "manufacturing process" was incorporated into the ESIC Act only in 1989, and thus, earlier decisions based on the pre-amendment definition are inapplicable. The 1948 Act's definition, which explicitly includes "washing and cleaning," must prevail. The registration of the respondent as a factory under the ESIC Act, although not the sole basis of the decision, supports the conclusion that the respondent's activities fall within the scope of the Factories Act, 1948. (42-49) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276

Family

Divorce by Mutual Consent - Mediation - Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006

Food Safety Officer - The State Government has no authority to impose additional restrictions or interpretations on qualifications for the post of Food Safety Officer (FSO) as prescribed by the central government. (Para 23 – 27) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Haj Policy 2025

These Writ Petitions, filed by various Haj Group Organisers (HGOs), challenged the Union of India's quota allocation for Haj pilgrims under the Haj-2025 Policy. The petitioners alleged arbitrary and discriminatory allocation. The Court, after hearing the parties, initially directed a meeting to facilitate equitable redistribution of quota among HGOs. Following this, some redistribution occurred, and the Court extended the deadline for submission of revised Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to allow for further discussions. The Court clarified that it was not interfering with the Haj-2025 Policy itself, but addressing its initial implementation issues. The petitions were disposed of, with liberty granted to parties to raise future grievances before the appropriate forum. Interlocutory applications seeking to raise additional issues were dismissed as not maintainable. (Para 8 – 12) Kolkata Tours and Travels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 335

High Court Rules

High Court Rules (Calcutta) - Rule 26 - Roster Allocation - Chief Justice's Power - Judicial Discipline - Division Bench of the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide a writ petition when the case was not allocated to it by the Chief Justice, who is the master of the roster. The Court reiterated that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction, and any adjudication beyond the assigned roster is void. The impugned order of the Division Bench, which had allowed the writ petition, was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration by a bench assigned by the Chief Justice. (Para 7) Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers v. GRSE Workmens Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 322

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Condonation of Delay - National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) - Lengthy Orders - Verbose Submissions - The Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the NCLAT's practice of issuing excessively lengthy orders, particularly in applications for condonation of delay, citing a 17-page order in the present case. The Court acknowledged that while detailed orders may sometimes be necessary, it also pointed to the role of "verbose and unnecessary long submissions of the members of the Bar" in contributing to such lengthy adjudications. The Court observed a trend of lengthy submissions and pleadings from legal practitioners before the NCLAT, even in routine matters like condonation of delay. (Para 4) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Section 14 and 96 - Distinction between the moratorium applicable to a corporate debtor under Section 14 of the IBC and the interim moratorium applicable to individuals and personal guarantors under Section 96 of the IBC - The former is much broader in scope and stays all proceedings against the corporate debtor, including execution and enforcement actions. However, Section 96 of the IBC is more limited in its scope, staying only "legal actions or proceedings in respect of any debt." Unlike corporate insolvency proceedings, where the goal is a comprehensive resolution of the company's liabilities, individual insolvency proceedings are designed primarily for restructuring personal debts and providing relief to the debtor. The legislative intent behind limiting the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC must be respected, and a blanket stay on all regulatory penalties would result in defeating the objectives of consumer protection laws. (Para 30) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Section 31(1) – Effect of Resolution Plan Approval - Post-Resolution Income Tax Demand - Held, once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority, all claims not included therein, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, stand extinguished. (Para 8) Vaibhav Goel v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Section 61(2) - Condonation of Delay - Limitation - Hyper-technical Approach - Foreign Company – Held, while timelines under the IBC are crucial, a hyper-technical approach by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) can lead to undue delays, defeating the purpose of the Code. In a case where an appeal was e-filed within the permissible 15-day condonation period under Section 61(2) of the IBC, but the hard copy was filed after a weekend holiday, the delay adequately explained. The appellant's status as a foreign company, the NCLAT should have exercised discretion and condoned the delay. The Court set aside the NCLAT's order rejecting the condonation of delay and directed the NCLAT to proceed with hearing the appeal on merits. (Para 2, 5 & 6) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Section 79 (15) - "excluded debts" - Damages awarded by NCDRC for deficiency in service fall under "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of IBC, thus not covered by moratorium. The definition of "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of the IBC, which includes fines and statutory penalties, reinforces that such liabilities remain enforceable despite an ongoing insolvency process. (Para 32 & 33) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Section 95 and 96 - Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 27 - Whether the execution of penalty orders imposed by the NCDRC can be stayed during an interim moratorium under IBC. The appellant, a real estate developer, faced multiple penalties (27 in total) imposed by the NCDRC for failing to deliver possession of residential units to homebuyers within the agreed timeline. The appellant sought a stay on the penalty proceedings, citing an interim moratorium triggered under Section 96 of the IBC due to insolvency proceedings initiated against them under Section 95 of the IBC. The NCDRC rejected the application, holding that consumer claims and penalties do not fall within the moratorium under the IBC. Held, regulatory penalties imposed under the Consumer Protection Act for non-compliance with consumer rights do not fall within the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC. The decision reinforces the distinction between debt recovery proceedings and regulatory actions, ensuring that consumer protection mechanisms remain effective even during insolvency proceedings. (Para 37) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Section 96 - Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 27 – Penalties imposed by the NCDRC are regulatory and punitive in nature, aimed at ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws, and do not fall within the definition of "debt" under the IBC. The interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC applies only to debts and does not extend to regulatory penalties or criminal proceedings. The Court distinguished between civil debt recovery proceedings and regulatory penalties, emphasizing that the latter serve a public interest function and cannot be stayed under the IBC moratorium. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on precedents related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, noting that penalties under the Consumer Protection Act are distinct and serve a different purpose. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to comply with the NCDRC's penalty orders. (Para 29, 38, 40) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Insurance

Insurance Policy - Suppression of Material Facts - Exclusion Clause - Hospital Cash Benefit Policy - Repudiation of Claim - Chronic Alcoholism – Pre-existing Condition – Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums - The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) against an order of the NCDRC which had upheld the decisions of the State and District Consumer Forums directing LIC to compensate the respondent-claimants under the “Jeevan Arogya” hospital cash benefit policy. The deceased insured, a chronic alcoholic, had suppressed this fact in the proposal form, answering “No” to questions regarding alcohol consumption. Following his hospitalization and death due to complications linked to chronic liver disease and cardiac arrest, LIC repudiated the claim under Clause 7(xi) of the policy, which excludes coverage for conditions arising from alcohol misuse. Held, the lower forums erred in interpreting the policy terms and the exclusion clause, as the deceased's chronic alcoholism was a material fact directly related to his hospitalization and death. Overruling the NCDRC's reliance on Sulbha Prakash Motegaoneker v. LIC, the Court clarified that suppression of a pre-existing condition justifies repudiation if it is linked to the cause of death. The appeal was allowed, the NCDRC order was set aside, and the repudiation upheld. However, considering the respondents' hardships and payments already made (approximately ₹3,00,000), the Court directed that no recovery of these amounts be sought, though no further payments were to be made. (Para 16 – 21) Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 346

Judicial Service

Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Labour

Master-Servant Relationship - For a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct master-servant relationship must be established on paper. (Para 7) Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education v. Raj Kumar Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 343

Land Law

Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971; Section 6 - Legal Presumption of Title - Pattadar Passbook issued to appellants raised a rebuttable presumption of ownership and possession - State failed to produce evidence proving land was assigned with non-alienation conditions - Burden on State to disprove title not discharged - Held, appellants' title prima facie established. (Para 123) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 – The State failed to produce any documentary evidence (e.g., assignment records or D-Form Patta) to prove the land was assigned with non-alienation conditions. The burden was on the State to prove the land was assigned post-1954 with restrictions, which it did not discharge. The High Court erred in applying retrospective operation of 1977 Act without such evidence. State's claim of lawful resumption unsustainable. (Para 69, 86 & 92) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Land Acquisition - Determination of Market Value - The determination of the prevalent market value of the acquired land is not an algebraic formula and that cannot be determined in a precise or an accurate manner. Some amount of guess work is always permissible. Therefore, a judge has to sit in an arm chair and without much taxing his mind has to determine the market value in a prudent manner. (Para 13) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition - Enhancement of Compensation - Supreme Court enhanced compensation for acquired agricultural land from Rs. 30 per sq. mt. to Rs. 95 per sq. mt., based on GIDC's allotment of nearby commercial plot at Rs. 180 per sq. mt. in 1988 - Adjusted for 5% price rise over one year to Rs. 190 per sq. mt., followed by 50% deduction (40% for development costs, 10% for larger area). (Para 14) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition - Income from Fruit-Bearing Trees – Compensation for trees requires documentary proof of income, not mere presence. (Para 15) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition – Large areas do not attract the same price as is offered for the small plots of lands. Therefore, some amount of deduction is also normally permissible on account of largeness in area. Thus, deduction of at least 10% has to be applied to determine the rate of compensation. (Para 12) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 48 - Land acquired by the government through its sovereign power of eminent domain for public purposes cannot be transferred back to the original owner by the beneficiary of the acquisition through private agreements. (Para 16) Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Bhagwan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 26 - Determination of Market Value - Theory of Deduction - Circle Rates - Held, theory of deduction applied under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to adjust market value for development costs, is not mandatory under the Acquisition Act, 2013. Section 26(1) mandates compensation based on the highest of: (a) market value under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899; (b) average sale price of similar land; or (c) consented amount. Explanation 4 allows the Collector discretion to adjust this value if it does not reflect actual market value, potentially applying deduction, but requires recorded reasons. Absent such adjustment, circle rates fixed under the Stamp Act govern. Public authorities must adhere to State-fixed circle rates, which citizens pay as stamp duty. Appeals dismissed emphasizing scientific fixation of circle rates for equitable compensation and governance. (Para 37 - 43) Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 364

Lease

Agreement to Lease - An agreement to lease does not automatically confer leasehold rights until a formal lease deed is executed. Where the Delhi Development Authority ("DDA") executed an agreement to lease in 1957 but a formal lease deed was never executed, and the property was subsequently sold through liquidation proceedings, the auction purchaser acquired only those rights, if any, held under the agreement to lease. The auction sale, conducted on an "as is where is" basis, did not confer ownership or leasehold rights upon the auction purchaser. The DDA retained the right to pursue remedies for possession and unearned income, and that any regularization of the transaction would require the auction purchaser to apply to the DDA and for the DDA to consider such application in accordance with law. Funds held in liquidation proceedings could not be appropriated for unearned income payments without considering the claims of other creditors, particularly where the liquidation was still ongoing. (Para 10 - 16) Delhi Development Authority v. S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Limitation Act, 1963

Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Dispute over Government Land - Liberal Approach - Substantial Justice - Although a delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical grounds of limitation. A liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays when the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. (Para 14) Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Mental Health

Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions - The recurring instances of student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions, including private educational institutions, serve as a grim reminder of the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the existing legal and institutional framework in addressing mental health concerns of students on campuses and to prevent the students from taking the extreme step of committing suicides. These tragedies underscore the urgent need for a more robust, comprehensive, and responsive mechanism to address the various factors which compel certain students to resort to taking their own lives. In light of the concerns expressed above, a National Task Force to address the mental health concerns of students and prevent the commission of suicides in Higher Educational Institutions is being constituted. (Para 69) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Determination of compensation – Monthly income of deceased fruit seller – Multiplier – Deduction for personal expenses – Inclusion of father and sister as dependents – Liability of insurer to pay and recover from driver and owner - Deceased, aged 24, died in a motor vehicle accident. Tribunal awarded compensation based on a notional income of Rs. 4,500 per month, deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses, and excluding the deceased's father and sister as dependents - High Court affirmed - Whether the Tribunal and High Court correctly assessed the monthly income, applied the appropriate multiplier, made the correct deduction for personal expenses, and rightly excluded the father and sister as dependents – Held, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' assessment of the deceased's monthly income. Considering the deceased's occupation as a fruit seller, the Court adopted the minimum wage for an unskilled worker (Rs. 6,500 per month) as a basis. The multiplier of 18, as applied by the High Court, was upheld as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, entitling them to compensation. Therefore, the deduction for personal expenses was reduced to 1/4th. The insurance company must first pay the award and then recover from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, as the driver lacked a valid license. The total compensation was enhanced from Rs. 9,77,200 to Rs. 17,52,500. The appeals was allowed, and the tribunals order was modified. (Para 16 & 17) Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Direct Bank Transfer of Compensation - Streamlining Payment Process – Directions issued. (Para 17 - 21) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318

Enhancement of Compensation - 100% Disability – The Supreme Court enhanced compensation awarded to a 21-year-old claimant who suffered 100% permanent disability (quadriplegia) in a motor vehicle accident. The Court reassessed the claimant's income, considering his qualifications and potential, and granted future prospects. Additional compensation was awarded for attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, future medical expenses, loss of marriage prospects, and physiotherapy. (Para 8 - 13) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318

Foreign Earnings - Multiplier in motor accident claims cannot be reduced on the ground that the deceased was earning in foreign currency. The multiplier is fixed on the basis of the age of the victim and cannot be altered based on the ground of foreign income. The exchange rate prevailing as on the date of the filing of the petition has to be adopted. (Para 9 & 10) Shyam Prasad Nagalla v. Andhra Pradesh State Board Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 351

Legal Representative - A legal representative is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child. The term 'legal representative' under the Motor Vehicle Act should not be given a narrow interpretation to exclude those persons as claimants who were dependent on the deceased's income. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Act entitling them to compensation. [Relied on: Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, (1987) 3 SCC 234 & N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd. (2022) 14 SCC 712, (Para 13 – 15)] Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Make of the vehicle - Discrepancy in the make of the vehicle cannot be a ground to deny a rightful claim when the vehicle's registration number and other key details are consistent and correctly mentioned. (Para 4) Parameshwar Subray Hegde v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 334

Section 166 - Contributory Negligence – Learner's License - In a motor accident claim, contributory negligence cannot be presumed merely from the driver's possession of a learner's license. The collision at the trailer's tail-end did not inherently indicate negligence by the driver. Negligence must be proved by evidence, with preponderance of probabilities as the standard. (Para 12 & 13) Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 352

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 406 - Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction? Held, a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Power to transfer cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly. Mere inconvenience or hardship to the accused, such as travel or language barriers, does not justify transfer unless there is a reasonable apprehension of injustice. (Para 49 & 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Section 138 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 406 - Whether the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. encompasses cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act? Held, the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not include cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Section 138 - Reply to the Statutory Notice - This was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Complaint and cognizance order set aside, leaving civil remedies open. (Para 20 - 23) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Section 138 – Return of a dishonoured cheque simpliciter does not create an offence under Section 138 NI Act. The cause of action arises only when a demand notice is served and payment is not made within the stipulated fifteen-day period. (Para 9) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314

Section 138 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 & 17 - Where the cause of action for an offence under Section 138 NI Act arises after the imposition of a moratorium under Section 14 IBC, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be initiated against the Director of the Corporate Debtor. Upon the imposition of a moratorium and the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) under Section 17 of the IBC, the management of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP, and the powers of the Board of Directors are suspended. Consequently, the Director lacks the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by a notice under Section 138 NI Act. The judgment in P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 is distinguishable, as in that case, the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the imposition of the moratorium. Proceedings under section 138 of the NI Act are quashed, when the cause of action arises after the imposition of moratorium, and the director of the company has been suspended from his duties, and the IRP has taken over the management of the company. (Para 11 - 13) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314

Section 138 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Transfer Petition – Maintainability - The issue of lack of territorial jurisdiction in complaints filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is a matter to be raised before the Trial Court. The Magistrate has the power to return the complaint for presentation to the proper court if satisfied that the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the issue of territorial jurisdiction cannot be adjudicated in a transfer petition. (Para 2 & 3) Kamal Enterprises v. A. K. Constructions Co, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 289

Section 138 r/w. 141 – Vicarious Liability of Non-Executive Directors – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Held, Non-executive and independent directors cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act for dishonor of cheques unless specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement in the company's affairs at the relevant time. Mere designation as a director or attendance at board meetings does not create automatic liability. The complaint must contain specific averments establishing a direct nexus between the directors and the financial transactions in question. In the absence of such specific allegations and where records confirm a non-executive role without financial decision-making authority, criminal proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act against non-signatory, non-executive directors are liable to be quashed. (Para 16 & 18) K.S. Mehta v. Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 286

Section 138 and 142 (2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 406 - Petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, to the Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. The petitioner argued that the entire transaction, including the loan processing, EMI deductions, and SARFAESI proceedings, occurred in Coimbatore, and no cause of action arose in Chandigarh. The petitioner also cited inconvenience, language barriers, and harassment as grounds for transfer. The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act, as amended in 2015, the jurisdiction for complaints under Section 138 lies with the court where the cheque is delivered for collection through the payee's bank account. The court in Chandigarh had jurisdiction as the cheque was presented for collection there, even if the transaction occurred in Coimbatore. The petitioner's grievances did not meet the threshold for transfer, as the Chandigarh court had valid jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the transfer petition, holding that no case was made out for transferring the proceedings from Chandigarh to Coimbatore. It is always open for the petitioner accused to pray for exemption from personal appearance or request the Court that he may be permitted to join the proceedings online. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Partnership Act, 1932

Section 14 - A contribution made by the partner to the partnership firm becomes the firm's property and neither the partner nor his legal heirs would have an exclusive right over the firm's property after the partner's death or retirement except the share in profit in proportion to the contribution made in partnership firm. No formal document is required to be made for transferring the property to the partnership firm, as the transfer occurs by virtue of the partner's contribution to the firm. However, a relinquishment deed could be made to formalise the transfer of property to the partnership firm. (Para 14 - 16) Sachin Jaiswal v. Hotel Alka Raje, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 342

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 7 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291

Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Validity of Sanction – Held, the High Court acted improperly by conducting a mini-trial at the pre-trial stage and quashing the case before the actual case material were brought on record. The issue of conviction prospects and invalid sanction are matters to be determined during the trial. (Para 12 & 14) State v. G. Easwaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 356

Section 20 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Trap Case - Inconsistencies in Complainant's Testimony - Hostile Independent Witnesses - Reasonable Doubt – Acquittal - Where a trap was laid based on a complaint alleging demand and acceptance of bribe by public servants for processing a license application, and the complainant's testimony regarding the amount demanded was inconsistent and contradictory to the written complaint, and the independent witnesses turned hostile and contradicted the prosecution's version of the trap proceedings, and the evidence raised reasonable doubt as to the actual acceptance of the bribe, the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside. The prosecution failed to establish the demand and acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt, precluding the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. (Para 16) Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 310

Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002

Accused cannot be kept in custody if order taking cognizance of Enforcement Directorate (ED) complaint has been quashed. (Para 5) Arun Pati Tripathi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 371

Amount Involved - Determination of Statutory threshold - The argument that proceedings under the PMLA are invalid due to the amount involved not meeting the statutory threshold of Rs. 30 lakhs (prior to amendment) is rejected. The determination of the threshold must be based on the entirety of the transaction and the overall financial trail, not isolated instances. The alleged proceeds of crime, including land allotment fraud, hawala transactions, and illegal gratification, significantly exceeded the threshold. The totality of evidence, even on a prima facie assessment, indicated that the proceeds of crime were substantially higher than the statutory limit, rendering the appellant's reliance on the threshold baseless. (Para 26 - 29) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Continuing Offence - Offence of money laundering under PMLA is a continuing offence. Act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. Legislative intent of PMLA is to combat money laundering, which involves transactions spanning over time. Continued utilization and concealment of proceeds of crime, even in recent times, extends the offence. Money laundering is an ongoing activity as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy. Proceedings initiated under PMLA for continuing offences are valid. (Para 24 & 25) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Quashing of Proceedings - In cases involving serious economic offences under the PMLA, such as illegal diversion and layering of funds leading to revenue losses, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution. Proceedings should not be quashed absent compelling legal grounds. Where allegations suggest significant financial misconduct, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and ensure accountability. The cascading effect of such offences necessitates a thorough judicial process to protect state revenue and legitimate investment sectors. (Para 31) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Registration of Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) - High Court cannot direct Enforcement Directorate (ED) to register ECIR merely on prima facie finding that predicate offence existed. (Para 5) P. Madhavan Pillai v. Rajendran Unnithan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 295

Seized Property - Person need not be named as accused in complaint to retain seized property under Section 8(3). (Para 10) Union of India v. J.P. Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 338

Preventive Detention

Bail - Preventive detention should not be used merely to circumvent bail granted by a competent court when the ordinary criminal law is sufficient to address the situation. (Para 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - Grounds for Detention - Non-application of Mind - Grant of Bail - Failure to Consider Bail Conditions – Effect - Where a person is detained under the COFEPOSA Act based on allegations that are the same as those in a criminal prosecution where the person has been granted bail with specific conditions, the detaining authority must consider the efficacy of those bail conditions. Failure of the detaining authority to examine whether the bail conditions imposed by the jurisdictional magistrate are sufficient to curb the alleged activities, which form the basis of the preventive detention, amounts to a non-application of mind. While courts cannot scrutinize the reasonableness of the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, they must ensure that the authority has indeed applied its mind to relevant factors, including existing bail conditions. When there is a grant of bail with conditions, the detaining authority has to consider if those conditions are sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in the activities that the preventive detention is trying to prevent. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order, directing the detenu's release, due to the detaining authority's failure to consider the bail conditions. (Para 16 - 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Non-supply of an application for cancellation of bail, which was filed after the detention order was passed and not pursued by the department, does not render the detention order illegal. (Para 12) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Past Narcotics case - A mere reference to a past narcotics case, not forming the basis of the present detention order, does not vitiate the order, especially when used only to highlight the detenu's propensity to engage in illegal activities. (Para 10) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Property

Title through Court Auction - Validity of Subsequent Sale –The court auction sale on 04.05.1962, conducted while Somasundaram was alive, and the subsequent sale deed on 25.09.1963 vested absolute title in Padmini. Somasundaram's will (30.05.1962) could not override this, as he no longer held title at his death on 14.06.1962. Since the property was sold via court auction before the will's execution took effect, Defendant No. 1 inherited no rights, making the 1992 sale deeds to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 void. Padmini's will (30.09.1975) explicitly bequeathed the Plaint Schedule to Vinayagamurthy and his children, not the Trust. Thus, the Trust had no claim to the property. The court justified moulding relief in favor of the executor (H.B.N. Shetty) to execute Padmini's will, citing judicial discretion to shorten litigation and ensure justice. Given the age of the surviving executor and the death of others, requiring a fresh suit would be unjust. The appellants (Defendant Nos. 3 to 6) were not prejudiced, as they fully contested the title issue. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that moulding relief was appropriate to implement Padmini's testamentary intent without prolonging litigation. (Para 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Life Imprisonment - While conviction under both IPC and POCSO Act may be justified, the High Court erred in enhancing the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court to "imprisonment for the remainder of natural life" in an appeal against conviction. Courts have discretion to award life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, but it is not mandatory that it extend to the remainder of the convict's natural life. In cases where life imprisonment is deemed appropriate but a fixed term is considered insufficient, courts may impose a modified sentence specifying a fixed period beyond 14 years. In this case the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court was reinstated, but without the addition that it will enure till the natural life of the appellant, along with a fine of 5,00,000/- to be paid to the victim. (Para 28 & 31) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Section 42 - Sentencing - Overlapping Offences - Where acts constitute offences under both the POCSO Act and the IPC, the law providing for the greater degree of punishment applies. (Para 19 & 21) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Section 42A - Overriding effect - Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which gives overriding effect to the POCSO Act in cases of inconsistency with other laws, pertains to procedural aspects and does not override the substantive provision of Section 42 regarding punishment. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Section 42A - No plea for a lesser punishment under the POCSO Act can be entertained if the IPC prescribes a higher punishment for certain offences by arguing that Section 42A, as a special law, overrides the IPC, which is considered a general law. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Sentencing – Enhancement of - High Court erred in enhancing sentence in absence of appeal for enhancement by state The High Court had clarified that the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court would mean imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. While the trial court had the discretion to award life imprisonment, the High Court could not enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially without an appeal for enhancement by the State. (Para 27) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Public Interest Litigation

Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275

Recruitment

Educational Qualification - A candidate possessing a higher degree of qualification cannot be rejected solely because a lower degree of qualification is required for a particular post. (Para 32) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Registration of FIR

Blanket Direction - Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but would also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law. (Para 14) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Cognizable Offence - Preliminary Inquiry – Scope of - the landmark decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. The Lalita Kumari decision reaffirmed "the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. (Para 12) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Discovery of illicit cash at official premises of a Judge - The Supreme Court refused to entertain a writ petition seeking the registration of an FIR against Justice Yashwant Varma of Delhi High Court, over the alleged discovery of illicit cash at official premises. The petition, which also challenged the in-house inquiry being conducted by a committee of three judges as per the directions of the Chief Justice of India, was premature. Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372

Suicide occurring on campus – Responsibility of maintaining the safety and well-being of students rests heavily on the administration of every educational institution. Therefore, in the event of any unfortunate incident, such as a suicide occurring on campus, it becomes their unequivocal duty to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with the appropriate authorities. Such action is not only a legal obligation but also a moral imperative to ensure transparency, accountability, and the pursuit of justice. Simultaneously, it is incumbent upon the police authorities to act with diligence and responsibility by registering the FIR without refusal or delay. This ensures that due process of law is upheld, and a thorough investigation can be conducted to uncover the truth and address any underlying causes. The harmonious discharge of these duties by both educational institutions and law enforcement agencies is essential to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and to preserve trust in societal institutions. In a given case, failure on part of the administration of any educational institution may be viewed strictly. (Para 47) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Employment Rights - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Service

Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (Karnataka); Rule 16(a)(iii) – Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (Karnataka); Rule 6 – Cadre Change at Employee's Request – Effect on Seniority - Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error in directing the appellant to grant seniority to the respondent in the cadre of First Division Assistant with effect from the date in which the said respondent has entered service in the cadre of Staff Nurse from 05.01.1979, instead of 19.04.1989, when she was appointed in the new cadre of First Division Assistant. (Para 24) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350

Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (Kerala) and Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (Kerala) govern completely separate cadres. Rule 4(b) of the Special Rules applies only after appointment as Assistant Engineer, and cannot be applied for lower promotions. (Para 24) Sajithabhai v. Kerala Water Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 358

Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - the default retiral scheme applicable to the University's employees is General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity, unless the employee has specifically opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme. (Para 9) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316

Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - Appeal against High Court order dismissing writ petition seeking inclusion in University's General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Appellant, appointed as Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987, did not opt for Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) despite opportunities. University statutes provided for two retiral benefit schemes: CPF (opt-in) and General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity (default). University issued Office Order dated 21.02.2008, reiterating this, stating non-exercise of CPF option would result in inclusion in the default scheme. Appellant's name was omitted from the list of those included in the default scheme. Whether the appellant, who did not opt for CPF, is entitled to be included in the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Held, Yes. University statutes and Office Order clearly stipulate that non-exercise of CPF option automatically entitles employees to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based on non-exercise of option, as non-exercise led to inclusion in the default scheme. Similar relief granted to similarly placed persons by the High Court. High Court order set aside. University directed to provide retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme within four months, subject to adjustments of CPF benefits, if any, availed by the appellant. Appeal allowed. (Para 12) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316

Seniority – If a government employee holding a particular post is transferred on public interest, he carries with him his existing status including seniority to the transferred post. However, if an officer is transferred at his own request, such a transferred employee will have to be accommodated in the transferred post, subject to the claims and status of the other employees at the transferred place, as their interests cannot be varied without there being any public interest in the transfer. Subject to specific provision of the Rules governing the services, such transferees are generally placed at the bottom, below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. (Para 19) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350

Supreme Court Rules 2013

Appearances of Advocates - A strange practice was being followed in the Supreme Court regarding the marking of the presence of the number of advocates for the party, without anybody certifying whether they all are authorised to appear for the party. In most of the matters, simple or complicated, a number of appearances of advocates would be shown in the proceedings, running into pages and pages, without any verification as to whether such advocates were in fact present in the Court or were in fact authorised to appear for a particular party. Every vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance filed in the case carries a lot of responsibility and accountability. (Para 5 & 17) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Appearances of Advocates - Appearances of only Senior Advocates or Advocate-on-Record or Advcoate, who are physically present and arguing in the Court at the time of hearing of the matter and one Advocate/Advocate-on-Record each for assistance in Court to such arguing Sr Advocate, Advocate-on-Record or Advocate, as the case may be, will be recorded in the record of proceedings. The Appearance Slip as per Form 30 prescribed by the SC Rules only allowed the recording of these appearances. (Para 20) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Appearances of Advocates - No advocate, other than the Advocate-on-Record for a party, can appear, plead and address the Court in a matter unless he is instructed by the AOR or permitted by the Court. A Senior Advocate shall not appear without an AOR in the Supreme Court. Though an advocate is entitled to appear before the Supreme Court, his appearance would be subject to the 2013 Supreme Court Rules. As per Rule 1(b) of Order IV, no advocate other than AOR can appear for the party. On a conjoint reading of this Rule along with Rule 20, no AOR can authorise any person except another AOR to act for him in any case. Similarly, Rule 1(b) has to be read with Rule 2(b), which says that no Senior Advocate can appear without an AOR. (Para 13) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Suppression of Material Facts

It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court. (Para 11) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 28 - Mere delay in depositing the balance sale consideration does not render a decree of specific performance inexecutable. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, considering factors such as the bona fides of the decree holder, the cause of delay, and the equities created in favor of the judgment debtor. (Para 46) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283

Slum Areas

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 - Once a slum area is declared as 'censused slum' i.e., the slums located on land belonging to government or municipal undertaking, then such slums are automatically eligible for redevelopment under the Slum Act without the need for a separate notification. (Para 16) Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali v. Tahsildar-I, Special Cell, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 308

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

Section 15 - Rule 15 of TADA Rules - Confession to Police Officer - Admissibility - Procedural Safeguards - Kartar Singh Guidelines - Issue Estoppel - Confessional statements were unreliable and failed to meet the procedural safeguards under the Act, as the recording officer failed to ensure the voluntariness of the accused while taking confessions. The statements of the accused did not contain the time of recording of the confession or indicate from where they were produced. No time was given to the accused for reflection before the recording of the confessional statements, which vitiated the said statements. There was nothing on record to suggest that the witness who recorded the statement was authorized to do so. The procedure laid down in the Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (e.g., voluntariness, free atmosphere, reflection time) regarding the recording of confessional statements in coercive environments (BSF camp, Joint Interrogation Centres) under the TADA was violated. Accused confession further barred by issue estoppel from prior acquittal in 2002. Eyewitnesses failed to identify accused, and unrecovered murder weapon weakened prosecution case. Special Court's acquittal upheld as no evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; no error or perversity found. (Para 22 - 27) State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 337

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Gift, Settlement Deed and Will - Distinction Between – Explained. (Para 11 - 14) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345

Section 53A - Lis Pendens - Protection under Section 53A for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. (Para 9) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331

Section 41 and 122 - When a property transfer involves considerations such as love and affection while the donor retains a life interest, it qualifies as a settlement deed in the form of a gift. Once the donee accepts the gift through the settlement deed, the donor cannot unilaterally revoke it. Mere reservation of life interest of the donor and the postponement of the delivery of the possession to the donee would not make the document a Will. Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Upon the retention of the life interest, the donor will continue only as an ostensible owner of the property. Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345

Section 122 - Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father also, is invalid. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956

Degree - Meaning of - The term 'degree' is defined under Section 22(3) the UGC Act, which states that the 'degree' means the 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and the 'Doctorate Degree'. Thus, wherever the word 'degree' is used, unless a specific exclusion is provided, the same would include within its scope and ambit all three, 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and a 'Doctorate Degree'. (Para 29) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Vexatious Litigation

Trick and Stratagem - If the parties misuse the process and attempt to obtain an order by "trick and strategem", the Courts would be justified in imposing the costs for igniting such vexatious litigation. (Para 9) Leelawati v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 321

Writ Petition

Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313