Supreme Court Weekly Digest [October 8 - 15, 2025]

Army Act, 1950 - Sections 63, 69, 70, 162 - Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 - Section 15(6) - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections 3, 25(1-B) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 222 - Substitution of Conviction - Act Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline - Possession of Ammunition - Scope of AFT's Power to Substitute Finding – Held, Section 15(6)(a) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, vests the Tribunal with the power to substitute a finding of guilty for any other offence for which the offender could have been lawfully found guilty by the court martial and pass a sentence afresh - This power is in pari materia with Section 162 of the 1950 Act and akin to Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which permits conviction for a lesser or cognate offence on the same set of facts - Noted that the legislative intent is that the appellate forum is not denuded of power to render a lawful finding where the evidence sustains a different, though related, offence - The twin conditions for exercising this power are fulfilled: (i) the accused could have been lawfully found guilty of the substituted offence by the original court-martial based on the evidence presented; and (ii) the Tribunal may pass a new sentence - The concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of ammunition from the appellant's possession were not assailed as perverse - Since the recovery of old, aged ammunition was established, this factual foundation clearly disclosed an act or omission prejudicial to good order and military discipline under Section 63 of the 1950 Act, reflecting the appellant's failure to follow mandatory procedure for disposal and accounting of old ammunition - The appellant could lawfully have been convicted under Section 63 of the 1950 Act based on the proved facts - The scope of interference by the Supreme Court in an appeal under Section 30 of the 2007 Act is limited - It would interfere only if the order is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious - This exercise of discretion was found to be just and proportionate, balancing disciplinary needs with fairness, and thus did not call for any interference - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Union of India & Ors. v. R. Karthik, (2020) 2 SCC 782; Paras 17-27] S.K. Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2025 INSC 1215

Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 528 - Inherent Power of High Court - Review/Recall of Own Order - Held that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS [Section 482 CrPC] cannot be invoked to review or recall its own judgment or order on merits, as the power of review is specifically barred under Section 403 BNSS [Section 362 CrPC], except for the purpose of correcting clerical or arithmetical errors - The inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code - Held that High Court grievously erred in recalling/reviewing its reasoned order dated January 16, 2025, on the ground of an "inadvertent clerical mistake" when the subsequent application was, in effect, a prayer for review of the earlier order by acceding to the initial prayer for transfer of investigation, which the earlier order had consciously declined - The Supreme Court quashed the High Court's orders dated January 24, 2025 (recalling the earlier order) and February 4, 2025 (transferring investigation to CBI), as they were based on an erroneous premise of a clerical mistake and amounted to an impermissible review of a reasoned order passed under the inherent jurisdiction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Another (1990) 2 SCC 437; Para 18, 20, 26-31] State of Rajasthan v. Parmeshwar Ramlal Joshi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 984 : 2025 INSC 1205

CBI Investigation - Extraordinary Powers of Constitutional Courts - Reiterated that the extraordinary power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI investigation must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations - Such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police - Held that it must be necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing fundamental rights. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 12-41] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Civil Procedure – Compromise/Settlement – Mediation – Supreme Court – Power of Trust, Simplicity, and Efficacy in Dispute Resolution - A protracted litigation, spanning almost four decades, was successfully resolved through mediation efforts undertaken by Senior Advocate, appointed by the Court, who travelled to Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, interacted with rival family members, and inspected the properties - Supreme Court lauded the efforts, noting that the resolution was a direct consequence of the parties trusting the mediator. Raksha Devi v. Parkash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2025 INSC 1216

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) —Order VIII Rule 10 - Right to Cross-Examination — Held, the reason given by the Trial Court for taking the cross-examination of the Defendant as "Nil" (failure to file WS) is perverse and contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant - Even if a defendant does not file a Written Statement, and the suit proceeds ex-parte, the limited defence, including the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses to prove the falsity of the plaintiff's case, is not foreclosed - The denial of the right to cross-examine cannot be taken away when the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, as cross-examination is vital to elicit the truth and impeach the witness's credibility - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 INSC 724; Paras 31] Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Aroush Motors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988 : 2025 INSC 1202

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 - Karur Stampede Incident - Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Formation of Supervisory Committee - Supreme Court takes cognizance of the Karur stampede incident that resulted in the death of 41 persons and injuries to over 100 people during a political rally organized by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) - Noted that top police officials publicly defended the actions of subordinate officers, creating doubt about the investigation's impartiality in the minds of the general public - Observed a contradiction between the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, which denied CBI investigation holding local police investigation was not flawed, and a Single Judge of the Main Seat, who suo moto directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) - Held that Due to the political undertone, the gravity of the incident with wide ramifications, the need to restore public faith in the criminal justice system, and to ensure an impartial and fair investigation - Court directed the transfer of investigation to the CBI - The direction for the appointment of the SIT and the one-man enquiry commission set up by the Chief Minister were suspended - A three-member Supervisory Committee, headed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.), was constituted to monitor the CBI investigation. [Relied on State of W.B. V. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 33-35] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Complaint - Caste Certificate – Held, the High Court committed a grave error by conducting a 'mini-trial' at the stage of considering a petition for quashing a criminal complaint under Section 482 C.r.P.C. - The question of whether the offences under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC (Forgery related offences) or Section 420 IPC (Cheating) are made out will depend on the evidence adduced at the trial - At the stage of quashing, it cannot be said that the prosecution should be nipped in the bud - High Court's findings about "legal illiteracy" were conjectural and patently erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kumari Madhuri Patil and Another vs Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 241; Paras 13, 23, 26, 27, 28] Komal Prasad Shakya v. Rajendra Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1004

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 313 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 302 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 8 (Conduct) and Section 27 (Discovery) - Circumstantial Evidence - Five Golden Principles - i. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully established ("must" or "should" be proved, not "may be" proved); ii. The established facts should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, excluding every other hypothesis; iii. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; iv. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; v. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused - Supreme Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish a cogent link in the cabin of circumstances and did not satisfy the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sardas case - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 25, 39, 56-58] Nilesh Baburao Gitte v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2025 INSC 1191

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order VIII Rule 1 (Proviso) (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015) — Written Statement — Extension of Limitation (COVID-19 Pandemic) — Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses (Even without Written Statement) — Appeal against rejection of Written Statement and decreeing of suit - The Supreme Court noted that the period for filing the Written Statement (WS) fell within the duration (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) excluded for the purpose of computing limitation - Held that WS filed belatedly in a commercial suit after the mandatory period of 120 days cannot be rejected when it was filed during COVID-19, as the delay fell entirely within the COVID-19 limitation extension ordered by Supreme Court. [Relied on In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117; Aditya Khaitan & Ors. v. IL & FS Financial Services Limited 2023 INSC 867; Paras 28, 29] Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Aroush Motors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988 : 2025 INSC 1202

Criminal Law – Bail - Juvenile Justice - Sexual Offences - Sex Education - Supreme Court reiterated its direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh to file an additional affidavit informing the Court on how sex education is provided as a part of the curriculum in higher secondary schools (Classes IX to XII) so that young adolescents are made aware of the hormonal changes that come with puberty and the consequences that may flow therefrom — Pursuant to the direction, an additional affidavit was filed detailing the curriculum provided by the Secondary Education Department, Uttar Pradesh, for classes IX to XII, which was stated to be in keeping with the directives of the National Council of Educational Research & Training (NCERT)— Need for earlier implementation — Supreme Court opined that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards — It is for the authorities concerned to apply their mind and take corrective measures, so that children are informed of the changes that happen after puberty and the care and cautions to be taken in relation thereto — That aspect was left open for the authorities concerned to take necessary steps. [Para 7-10] Juvenile X v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Criminal Law - Kidnapping, Rape, POCSO, SC/ST Act - Concurrent Convictions - Evidence - Reliability of Victim's Testimony - Proof of Age - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 154 - Hostile Witness - Judicial Discretion - Supreme Court expressed concern over the indiscriminate granting of permission to declare a witness hostile - Held that before a witness can be declared hostile and cross-examined by the party calling him, there must be some material to show that the witness is not speaking the truth or has exhibited an element of hostility - The contingency of cross-examining one's own witness is an extraordinary phenomenon, and permission should be given only in special cases after the Court scans and weighs the circumstances properly - Small or insignificant omissions cannot be the basis for treating a witness hostile - The permission to cross-examine one's own witness should only be granted when- i. the witness exhibits 'an element of hostility'; ii. The witness has resiled from a “material statement” made earlier; iii. The court is satisfied the witness is “not speaking the truth” - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 1976 4 SCC 233; Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 Paras 10-15, 19] Shivkumar @ Baleshwar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1006

Environment Pollution - Air Quality – Firecrackers - Green Crackers - Delhi-NCR Ban - Right to Life - Right to Profession - Relaxation; Diwali – NEERI - Supreme Court allows limited sale and use of NEERI-approved Green Crackers in NCR for a specified period (18 October 2025 till 20 October, 2025) around Diwali as a temporary 'test case' measure, relaxing the previous complete ban - Directs strict compliance with time restrictions and regulatory terms - Supreme Court decided to take a balanced approach to avoid compromising environmental concerns while acknowledging the interests of the industry and the practical difficulty in enforcing a complete ban - Noted that the situation is different now as both the Central and NCTD Governments are seeking relaxation of the ban. [Relied on Arjun Gopal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. W.P. (C) No. 728, 2025; Paras 20-23] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1005

Environment Pollution - Supreme Court issued directions - i. Sale shall only be from designated locations in the entire NCR, to be identified by District Collectors/Commissioners in consultation with the District Superintendent of Police and given wide publicity; ii. Use of firecrackers shall be confined between 6:00 AM to 7:00 AM and 8:00 PM to 10:00 PM on the two days, i.e., the one before and on the Diwali day; iii. Only green crackers as uploaded on the NEERI website, manufactured by those registered with NEERI and licensed by PESO; iv. Banned items like firecrackers joined in series, barium, no sale or purchase through e-commerce networks; v. Patrolling teams shall be constituted to keep vigil, conduct regular reconnaissance, take random samples for analysis, and ensure only permitted products with QR Codes are sold; vi. Violations will lead to penalties and cancellation of PESO/NEERI licence/registration. [Para 24] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1005

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of Proof - Circumstantial Evidence – Murder - Acquittal Reversal – Held, a conviction for murder can solely rest on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is complete and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused - When an accused offers a false explanation regarding the cause of death that took place within the confines of his house, such falsity becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused - While the general burden of proof is on the prosecution, Section 106 applies to exceptional cases where it would be impossible or disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused - Supreme Court reverses acquittal of man for daughter-in-law's murder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681; Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer (1956) 1 SCC 337; State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Others (2000) 8 SCC 382; Paras 12-21] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Janved Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1003 : 2025 INSC 1229

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 - Disclosure Statement - Circumstantial Evidence, DNA Report - The theory of a confessional/disclosure statement under Section 27 leading to the discovery of incriminating articles and the body was held to be a "creation of the Investigating Officer - This was because the officer had already shared the minute details of the crime and the body's location with the complainant before the appellant's purported confession was recorded - The DNA report was rendered redundant as the prosecution miserably failed to prove the chain of custody of the forensic samples (seized articles and blood samples) from the time of seizure till they reached the FSL, thereby breaching the sanctity of the procedure - Held that prosecution had failed to prove the 'last seen' circumstance, the credibility of the CCTV footage, the validity of confessional statements, and the integrity of forensic/DNA evidence, rendering the chain of circumstantial evidence incomplete. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 666; Para 54, 60, 71, 74, 76] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act) – Section 7-A - Children's Act, 1960 – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Illegal Detention/Breach of Article 21 - Murder Convict – Claim of Juvenility - Supreme Court ordered release of the murder convict under the JJ Act, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence in 1981 – Held, JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act - The plea of juvenility, which can be raised at any stage, is governed by Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000 - This section mandates that courts are under an obligation to consider the plea and grant appropriate relief if the convict was a juvenile on the date of the offence - The maximum period of detention for a juvenile under the JJ Act, 2000, is 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g) - Since the petitioner was a child at the time of the offence and had been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty was curtailed "not in accordance with procedure established by law." Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is "writ large," thereby extending the benefit of release from detention - The Court considered the respondent's contentions regarding the heinous nature of the offence (murder) and the petitioner's act of absconding and evading arrest from 2009 to 2022. However, the Court granted relief, noting that the petitioner had "suffered incarceration for more than the period permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2005 3 SCC 551; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2010 5 SCC 344; Para 4, 5, 12-14] Hansraj v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993 : 2025 INSC 1211

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 - Singur Land Acquisition - Restoration of Acquired Land – Held, the remedial framework in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) was anchored in the recognition that the acquisition disproportionately affected vulnerable communities ("poor agricultural workers") lacking financial resources and institutional access to challenge governmental action - Relief conceived to prevent impoverishment among the disadvantaged farmers cannot be extended to commercial enterprises with financial capacity and institutional sophistication, as this would defeat the remedy's foundational intent - The entity is precluded by its conduct and the principle of estoppel from claiming restoration after a delay of an entire decade - Held that land acquisition can/t be challenged after accepting compensation. [Relied on Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2016 SC 4156] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222

Mediation – Swadeshi Mediation – Lawyers as Mediators – Cultivating New Skills- Supreme Court emphasized the power of trust, simplicity, and efficacy of persuasion through mediation as opposed to adversarial litigation - Observed that if lawyers are to evolve as mediators, they must cultivate a distinct set of skills and adopt a new attitude towards dispute resolution, one that diverges from adversarial litigation - The fundamental principle for this evolution is to "listen, rather than speak," where "Mediators speak by listening" - The model envisioned by the Court, termed "Swadeshi Mediation," involves transcending the binary often embedded in western approaches that separate professionalism from individual character, by affirming that "Goodness is an essential value, it is neither divorced from professionalism nor unattainable through power of the will" - This process requires the mediator to shed argumentative skills and adversarial demeanour. [Paras 5-8] Raksha Devi v. Parkash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2025 INSC 1216

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 149(2) - Insurance - Breach of Policy Condition - Fake Driving Licence - Owner's Liability - 'Pay and Recover' Directions - Proof of Wilful Breach by Insured – Held, the owner of a vehicle, an employer, is not expected to verify the authenticity of the driving licence from the licensing authority; they can only rely on the licence produced by the prospective driver seeking employment - For the insurance company to avoid liability or get 'pay and recover' rights against the insured-owner on the ground of a fake driving licence, the insurance company must establish that the breach was on the part of the insured, meaning the insured had deliberately committed a breach in entrusting the vehicle to a driver who had a fake licence or that the owner did not employ due diligence at the time of entrustment - The mere production of the driving licence by the owner before the Court, or the driver keeping away from the witness box, does not lead to a valid inference of collusion between the employer and the employee - In the absence of pleading or substantiation that the owner allowed the driver to drive the vehicle knowing the licence was fake, or failed to employ due diligence in the driver's employment/entrustment, the High Court erred in issuing 'pay and recover' directions against the insured-owner - The insurance company must prove the insured's wilful breach of the policy condition (entrusting the vehicle to a driver without a valid licence) to be entitled to the right of recovery against the insured, even if the driver's licence is fake - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Geeta Devi, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 938; United India Insurance Company v. Lehru and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338; Paras 6-10] Hind Samachar Ltd. v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 987 : 2025 INSC 1204

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138, 141 - Criminal Liability - Maintainability of Complaint without arraying Trust as Accused - Indian Trusts Act, 1882 - Sections 3, 13 - Issue - Whether a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of a Trust, who signed the dishonoured cheque on behalf of the Trust, without arraying the Trust itself as an accused – Held, cheque dishonour complaint maintainable against trustee without arraying trust as accused- Trust is not a Legal Entity/Juristic Person - A 'Trust' under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is defined as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and not a legal entity with a separate existence capable of suing or being sued - It is the Trustee(s) who are legally bound to maintain and defend all suits for the preservation of the trust property- Therefore, a Trust is not like a corporation or 'body corporate' - Liability of Cheque Signatory - Held that the signatory of a cheque that is dishonoured is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 (by analogy to a company officer) - For such a person, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible to the entity for the conduct of its business - Appeal allowed. [Relied on SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K K Ahuja v. V K Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; Paras 18, 22, 23, 25- 27] Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2025 INSC 1210

Orders in personam vs. in rem - Held that orders quashing acquisition on grounds personal to individual objectors (like vitiated consideration of specific Section 5-A objections) operate in personam and benefit only those who contested the matter - Benefits of quashing do not accrue to non-parties unless the entire acquisition is struck down on fundamental grounds applicable to all - Filing objections under Section 5-A, which are subsequently rejected, does not exhaust the remedies; failure to pursue judicial challenge renders the notification conclusive proof of waiver. [Paras 19, 20] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) - Section 6 r/w 5(m), 8 r/w 7 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 207, 366 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27- Constitutional Right to Fair Trial & Legal Aid - Violation of Articles 21 & 22(1) - CrPC Section 207 – Held that the trial was vitiated due to a denial of effective opportunity for defence - The mandatory requirement of providing copies of relied-upon documents under Section 207 CrPC was not complied with before charges were framed - The legal aid counsel was appointed only four days before the commencement of the prosecution evidence, giving insufficient time to prepare the matter and conduct effective cross-examination. [Relied on Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Para 35, 38] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 (Jharkhand) - Rule 4 (Eligibility) vs. Rule 21 (Merit List) - Calculation of Marks in Intermediate Examination - Exclusion of Vocational Subject Marks - Supreme Court set aside suspension of school teachers in Jharkhand, finding that they were declared ineligible based on a different charge, which was never labelled against them in the show cause notice – Held, Rule 21 A (ii) (A) of the 2012 Rules, which excludes marks obtained in the "additional subject" for the purpose of calculating the "educational merit point" for preparation of the "Merit List," is not applicable for determining the "minimum qualification" or "eligibility" of a candidate - Rule 4, which deals with eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test, does not provide for the exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject - The method of calculation provided on the reverse side of the marksheet - which includes the bonus marks secured in the vocational subject (over and above the pass marks) to the aggregate to improve the result - must be followed for determining the minimum eligibility marks in the absence of a bar or an alternate method in the eligibility rule (Rule 4) - Department erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding the eligibility criteria, an error also committed by the Division Bench of the High Court - Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment, which upheld the termination of the appellants' services (Intermediate Trained Teachers for Classes I-V) - The termination was based on two grounds: (i) invalid graduation certificates and (ii) securing less than the minimum qualifying marks (40% for Scheduled Tribe candidates) in the intermediate examination. [Paras 10 - 29] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Jurisdiction - PIL enables representation of similarly situated vulnerable persons who lack means to approach courts individually. A financially resourceful entity that failed to pursue available statutory remedies falls outside this representative framework - Permitting an industrial entity to claim benefits from litigation secured by others would incentivize strategic inaction and undermine the fundamental principle that legal benefits flow from the active pursuit of remedies, not passive opportunism - Appeal allowed. [Para 21, 23, 26, 27] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222

Quashing of Proceedings – FIR and Chargesheet – CBI Investigation – Consent under Section 6 - Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946 - Requirement of State Government's Consent - Held, Lack of consent from the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946, for a CBI investigation ought to be raised soon after the registration of the FIR - Once the investigation is complete, a chargesheet has been filed, and the court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance of the chargesheet, the plea regarding the lack of consent cannot be raised to vitiate the validity of the order taking cognizance - This general rule is subject to exceptions: (i) when raising the plea causes severe miscarriage of justice; or (ii) where proceedings for quashing the FIR were initiated, and the chargesheet was filed during the pendency of the quashing proceedings - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd,, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1001

Railways Act, 1989 - Section 124A – Untoward Incident – Compensation – Proof of Bonafide Passenger Status- Evidentiary Burden - Hyper Technical Approach – Welfare Legislation – Held, the Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings, allowed the appeal in part, and directed the Railways to pay compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/-- Initial burden on the claimants to prove the deceased was travelling in the train was discharged by the sworn statement of the deceased's wife and reliance on the Divisional Railway Manager (DRM) which, inter alia, indicated the deceased was traveling and had fallen from the train, sustaining fatal injuries, which the High Court itself found to fall under 'untoward incident' - Initial burden on the claimant can be discharged by filing an affidavit of relevant facts, upon which the burden shifts to the Railways - Mere absence of a ticket with the deceased does not negate the claim of being a Bonafide passenger - Proceedings under Section 124A are governed by principles of preponderance and probabilities, not the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal trials - Once foundational facts - i. possession or issuance of a valid ticket and ii. The occurrence of an accidental fall from train - are established through credible material, it must be statutorily presumed that the victim was a bona fide passenger - A hyper-technical approach that frustrates the object of providing relief to victims must be eschewed - The absence of a seizure memo or inability to preserve physical evidence cannot by itself defeat a legitimate claim when the totality of circumstances supports the claimant's version - This principle shall guide all future tribunals and High Courts - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi (2019) 3 SCC 572: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 198; Doli Rani Saha vs. Union of India (2024) 9 SCC 656 (Para 11); Kamukayi and Others v. Union of India & Others 2023 19 SCC 116; Paras 9, 11, 12] Rajni v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2025 INSC 1201

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Sections 26, 28 – Land Acquisition – Determination of Market Value – Rental Compensation/Mesne Profits for Illegal Occupation – Held, the Reference Court's enhancement of compensation under Section 26 of the 2013 Act was justified as it correctly adopted the "average sale price" method by considering one-half of the highest-priced sale instances, along with a 10% annual increase for the time gap, as mandated by Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2 - The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) erred in relying solely on the ready reckoner rates while ignoring genuine and undisputed sale instances of similar land in the vicinity - High Court was wrong to interfere with the Reference Court's finding on market value - Noted that the 'rental compensation' in land acquisition proceedings is granted only when the owner is completely deprived of its property's use - that rental compensation requires complete deprivation of property; denies Rs. 238 Crore claim against respondent - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R.L. Jain v. DDA 2004 4 SCC 79; Shankarrao Bhagwantrao Patil and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2022) 15 SCC 657; Paras 24-35] Pradyumna Mukund Kokil v. Nashik Municipal Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1007 : 2025 INSC 1236

Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA); Section 3(2) - Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FCA) - Basic Housing for Forest Dwellers - Whether the construction of a pakka (permanent) dwelling house for a forest dweller is an exempted facility under Section 3(2) of the FRA, thereby overriding the requirement for prior approval under the FCA – Held, Section 3(2) is a limited exception - Section 3(2) of the FRA, which contains a non-obstante clause, provides an exemption from the mandate of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FCA), but this exemption is strictly limited to the facilities specifically provided therein and to activities undertaken by the Government -Exemption does not include pakka houses - The construction of a pakka dwelling house is not included in the list of exempted activities/facilities specified under Section 3(2) of the FRA - Duty to Balance Rights and Conservation - The issue requires the Court to balance the important value of providing minimum basic housing to forest dwellers with the State's and citizen's obligation to protect the national forest resource - Direction to Government for Mechanism - Since pakka housing is not covered by the Section 3(2) exemption, the Supreme Court directed the Union of India (through the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change) to file an affidavit setting out the mechanism or policy that the Government proposes to frame to address the need for basic housing for forest dwellers while ensuring full compliance with the mandate of the FCA. [Paras 4-6] Sugra Adiwasi v. Pathranand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 995

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI ACT) - Section 17(5) - Expeditious Disposal of Securitisation Application (S.A.) - Time Limit – Held, any application made under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act must be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application - The DRT may extend the sixty-day period for reasons to be recorded in writing, provided that the total period of pendency of the application with the DRT shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application - Once the statute itself mandates that the DRT should dispose of the matter within the stipulated time, it is incumbent upon the DRT to abide thereby - In the event the DRT fails to dispose of the matter within the stipulated time, the proviso to Section 17(5) ordains that reasons need to be recorded. Indian Overseas Bank v. Radhey Infra Solutions (Pvt.) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 997

Service Law - Principles of Natural Justice - Termination of Service - The termination orders were vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice - The termination orders were held to be violative of the principles of natural justice because the Department shifted the basis for termination to the exclusion of vocational marks after the appellants had successfully replied to the original charges in the show cause notice- This new reason, which was not alleged in the show cause notice, denied them a fair opportunity to defend themselves. [Relied on Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, V.P. & others, (2004) 4 SCC 281; Paras 30-36] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212

Stamp Act, 1899 – Schedule 1-B – Articles 40 and 57 – Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed – Chargeability of Stamp Duty - Issue- Whether the stamp duty on the instrument "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" is chargeable under Article 40 or Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Held, Principle of Chargeability, in matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies - The Court is duty-bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument - Definition of Mortgage-Deed - Held that the instrument, in both cases, fulfils the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed as defined under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, because it transfers, or creates, a right over specified property in favour of the creditor to secure the performance of an engagement (or repayment of a loan). Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207

Stamp Act, 1899 – Scope of Article 57 - Held that Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, operates in two distinct limbs - The second limb, which refers to a deed "executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract," is restricted in its application to the execution of a security bond or mortgage deed by a surety to secure the obligations of another, and does not extend to cases where the principal itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations - Definition of Surety - Held that the term "surety" must be strictly understood in accordance with Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which establishes that a contract of guarantee is inherently tripartite (surety, principal debtor, and creditor) - the essential requirement for invoking Article 57 is the presence of a surety distinct from the principal debtor - Where the principal debtor itself executes a deed mortgaging its own property, Article 57 is inapplicable - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 14-29] Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207

Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021; Section 4(iii)(c)(I) — Retrospective Application — Vested Rights — Reproductive Autonomy — Article 21 – Held, the age-restriction prescribed for 'intending couples' under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (which limits the female age to 50 years and the male age to 55 years for eligibility certification) does not have retrospective operation and, consequently, does not apply to intending couples who had commenced the surrogacy procedure prior to the Act's commencement on January 25, 2022 - Right to Surrogacy & Article 21 - The right of a couple, medically incapable of conceiving/bearing children naturally, to pursue surrogacy is an exercise of their decisional and reproductive autonomy, which is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209

Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 - Commencement of Procedure – Held, for the purpose of non-retrospective application, the 'commencement' of the surrogacy process is defined as the stage where the intending couple has completed the extraction and fertilisation of gametes and has frozen the embryo with the intention of transfer to the womb of the surrogate mother - This stage constitutes the crystallization of the process - The age restriction under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) will not apply if an intending couple had: (i) commenced the surrogacy procedure prior to January 25, 2022; (ii) were at the stage of creation and freezing of embryos after extraction of gametes; and (iii) were on the threshold of transfer of embryos to the uterus of the surrogate mother. Such couples are exempted from seeking certification on the qualifying age. [Relied on A vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 6 SCC 32; K. Gopinathan Nair vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 10 SCC 1; Paras 7, 9-18] Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209

Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 - Rule Against Retrospectivity – Held, the Act does not contain a manifest intention to apply the age-limits retrospectively. Where a statutory provision which is not expressly made retrospective seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligations, such a provision cannot be said to have any retrospective effect by necessary implication - The right to make autonomous decisions regarding the age at which one wished to pursue surrogacy had already vested in the intending couples. Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA) – Section 53A – Doctrine of Part Performance – Availability of Defence – Readiness and Willingness to Perform – Held, the defence of part performance under Section 53A of the TPA is only available if the transferee proves that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract - Noted that appellant, by refusing the extraordinary monetary award granted by the Court and obstructing the execution of the decree, demonstrated a lack of willingness to perform, thereby disentitling himself to any equitable relief or protection under Section 53A - The Executing Court and the High Court were correct in directing the issuance of warrants of possession with police assistance, as the litigant had exhausted all remedies and was simply attempting to delay the inevitable execution - The maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit is intended to ensure that no party suffers due to a mistake of the court and must be exercised in furtherance of justice, not to the disadvantage of litigants - The maxim cannot be invoked by a party who seeks to exploit the process of law to perpetuate injustice and retain possession while spurning a court-moulded equitable relief - Appeal dismissed with costs of Rs. 10 Lakhs. [Relied on Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRS. And others 2002 3 SCC 676; Jang Singh v. Brij Lal 1963 SCC ONLine SC 219; Paras 6-10, 15, 16] Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 996 : 2025 INSC 1214

Value Added Tax (VAT) - Input Tax Credit (ITC) - Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (DVAT Act) - Section 9(2)(g) - Entitlement of Purchasing Dealer when Selling Dealer Fails to Deposit Tax - Whether the benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC) is available to registered purchaser dealers who paid taxes to registered seller dealer(s) through valid invoices, even though the seller dealer(s) did not deposit the collected tax with the Government – Held, the Input Tax Credit (ITC) on goods purchased from registered dealers cannot be denied to bona fide purchasers merely because the seller failed to deposit - There is no dispute that the selling dealer was registered on the date of transaction and neither the transactions nor invoices were doubted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no good reason to interfere with the High Court's order directing the grant of ITC benefit after due verification. [Relied on Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine Delhi 13037; Paras 3-7] Commissioner Trade and Tax Delhi v. Shanti Kiran India (P) Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Voice Sample Test - Power of Magistrate to Direct a Witness to Give Voice Sample - Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) – Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) - Rule against Self-Incrimination – Held, the Magistrate has the power to order any person (not just an accused) to give a voice sample for the purpose of investigation - Reiterated that compelling a person to give a specimen handwriting, signature, finger impression, or a voice sample does not amount to 'testimonial compulsion' and thus does not violate the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) - These samples are considered "material evidence" for comparison, not oral or documentary testimony which would, by itself, have the tendency to incriminate the accused - Held that CrPC lacked an explicit provision, whereas precedents conceded the power to the Judicial Magistrate to order a voice sample by adopting the identical principle from Kathi Kalu Case, which dealt with handwriting, signature and finger impressions - This power was conceded to the Magistrate until explicit provisions were incorporated - With the advent of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, Section 349 now specifically incorporates the provision empowering the Magistrate to direct a person to provide a voice sample - Held that whether the CrPC or BNSS is applicable, the Magistrate was empowered to pass the order. [Relied on Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 8 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808); Paras 4-11] Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1002 : 2025 INSC 1223

Writ Petition - High Court Jurisdiction & Propriety - Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Rallies – Supreme Court expressed concern and sought an explanation from the Registrar (Judicial) of the Madras High Court as to how a Writ Petition (Criminal) was entertained for the relief of framing SOP/Guidelines for political rallies, which affects the general public at large, and why such matters were not treated as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and listed before a Division Bench - Noted the impropriety of a Single Judge entertaining a matter, the cause of action of which (Karur stampede) fell under the jurisdiction of the Madurai Bench, without the Chief Justice's order, especially when similar matters were pending before the Division Bench in Madurai. Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224