Supreme Court Weekly Digest March 2025 [March 24 - 31, 2025]

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Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372BNS / IPCSections 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436 and 332 IPC - In cases of group clashes where a large number of persons are involved, Courts must be cautious to ensure that no innocent bystander is convicted and deprived of their liberty. In such type of cases, the Courts must be circumspect and reluctant to rely upon the testimony...

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Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372

BNS / IPC

Sections 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436 and 332 IPC - In cases of group clashes where a large number of persons are involved, Courts must be cautious to ensure that no innocent bystander is convicted and deprived of their liberty. In such type of cases, the Courts must be circumspect and reluctant to rely upon the testimony of witnesses who make general statements without specific reference to the accused, or the role played by him. The mere presence of persons, who out of curiosity gathered to witness the incidents, should not be a ground to convict them when there is no overt act alleged against them. (Para 15) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340

Section 149 IPC - Unlawful Assembly - General statements by witnesses, without specific attribution of roles, are insufficient to convict individuals in cases involving large crowds, and the police should be cautious to book such individuals who were just bystanders without having any participation in the unlawful assembly. (Para 13) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340

Section 196 BNS - Promoting enmity between groups - When an offence under section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of standards of the people who always have a sense of insecurity or those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position. (Para 33) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and 3(5) BNS - The appellant, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, posted a video on social media featured a poem recited in the background, which the informant alleged incited enmity between communities, hurt religious sentiments, and threatened national unity. Held, the poem does not reference any religion, caste, or community, nor does it promote enmity, hatred, or disharmony. It advocates non-violence and resilience against injustice, using symbolic references (e.g., “throne”) to challenge rulers. No offence under Sections 196, 197, 299, or 302 of the BNS is made out, as the poem lacks mens rea or content to incite disharmony, wound religious feelings, or jeopardize national integration. Abetment under Section 57 BNS is inapplicable absent evidence of incitement. (Para 11 – 19) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Section 302 IPC – Murder – Accused inflicted the knife stabs on the deceased which could only have been possible if the knife was already with him, which clearly indicates that he had come with prior intention to cause bodily injury by knife which obviously is a weapon sufficient to cause of death. In other words, the intention to kill was very much present from the beginning and is not covered by any exception to Section 300 of the IPC. This persuades to refrain from converting conviction from under Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304-I, IPC. No fault can be found with the Trial Court and the High Court, which have rightly reached the conclusion that the accused was guilty as charged. (Para 23) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Benefit of Doubt - Reliability of Witnesses - Appellant convicted by trial court and High Court under Section 302 IPC for stabbing deceased during an altercation - Held, prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Eyewitness testimonies unreliable due to inconsistencies, absence of bloodstains on witnesses' clothes despite carrying bleeding deceased, failure to report incident to nearby police, and delayed recording of statements - Prior enmity between appellant and deceased raised possibility of false implication - Conviction unsustainable; appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Judgments of trial court and High Court set aside - Appeal allowed. (Para 21 & 22) Aslam @ Imran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 365

Section 306 and 420 IPC - Abetment of suicide - Cheating - Quashing of Proceedings – Held, there was no proximate or direct instigation leading to the deceased's suicide. The time gap between the alleged fraudulent acts and the suicide indicated the absence of immediate provocation. FIR quashing under Section 306 IPC upheld, but reinstated under Section 420 IPC. The High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for quashing the case under Section 420 IPC despite material evidence collected during the investigation. The trial court was directed to proceed with the case under Section 420 IPC, and the accused were given the liberty to seek discharge in accordance with the law. Appeal partly allowed. (Para 15, 18 & 19) R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 363

Section 376 IPC - Rape - Consent - Promise of Marriage - Quashing of Proceedings – The Court reiterated that a breach of a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape unless fraudulent intent existed at the time of consent. Relationship between appellant and complainant, both major and closely related, was consensual, as evidenced by repeated interactions and voluntary visits to hotel. High Court erred in not exercising inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process. Proceedings quashed. (Para 11 - 13) Jothiragawan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 347

BNSS / Cr.P.C.

Bail Application – Moratorium of 1 year imposed by high court to apply for bail afresh - Such a restriction was impermissible. (Para 3) Md. Gulzar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 370

Registration of FIR - Suicide occurring on campus – Responsibility of maintaining the safety and well-being of students rests heavily on the administration of every educational institution. Therefore, in the event of any unfortunate incident, such as a suicide occurring on campus, it becomes their unequivocal duty to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with the appropriate authorities. Such action is not only a legal obligation but also a moral imperative to ensure transparency, accountability, and the pursuit of justice. Simultaneously, it is incumbent upon the police authorities to act with diligence and responsibility by registering the FIR without refusal or delay. This ensures that due process of law is upheld, and a thorough investigation can be conducted to uncover the truth and address any underlying causes. The harmonious discharge of these duties by both educational institutions and law enforcement agencies is essential to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and to preserve trust in societal institutions. In a given case, failure on part of the administration of any educational institution may be viewed strictly. (Para 47) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Register of FIR - The Supreme Court refused to entertain a writ petition seeking the registration of an FIR against Justice Yashwant Varma of Delhi High Court, over the alleged discovery of illicit cash at official premises. The petition, which also challenged the in-house inquiry being conducted by a committee of three judges as per the directions of the Chief Justice of India, was premature. Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372

Section 50 Cr.P.C. – Mere arrest memo lacking detailed particulars does not satisfy the mandate under Section 50, violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Arrest and remand set aside. Ashish Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 367

Section 154 Cr.P.C. - When an informant approaches the police with information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the 2 police owes a duty to promptly register an F.I.R. and initiate investigation in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC. The police authorities are not vested with any discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry to assess the credibility of the information before registering the F.I.R. Any such practice would be contrary to the established principles of criminal law. (Para 34) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Section 154 and 174 Cr.P.C. - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 18A – Abetment of Suicide - Student suicides due to academic pressure, caste discrimination, and harassment - Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 when information discloses a cognizable offence, such as abetment of suicide or caste-based atrocities, without scope for preliminary inquiry unless exceptional circumstances apply; police cannot limit action to Section 174 inquiry into cause of death. Inquiry under Section 174 is restricted to ascertaining apparent cause of death (suicide, homicide, etc.) and cannot substitute for investigation into alleged cognizable offences under Section 154; premature closure of case as suicide without FIR registration disapproved. FIR registration for offences under SC/ST Act is obligatory without preliminary inquiry; allegations of caste-based discrimination and harassment in educational institutions mandate investigation. (Section 22, 34 & 40) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Delay in recording an eyewitness's testimony would not draw an adverse inference against the prosecution's case if the delay is adequately explained. (Para 21) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349

Section 173 BNSS - Police Duty and Preliminary Inquiry - Under Section 173(1) of the BNSS, registering an FIR is mandatory for cognizable offences, but Section 173(3) allows a preliminary inquiry for offences punishable between 3 and 7 years to ascertain a prima facie case. Here, the police failed to exercise this discretion, which could have protected the appellant's rights. Police, as part of the State under Article 12, must respect constitutional ideals. The Court criticized the lack of sensitization among police regarding Article 19(1)(a) and urged training programs. (Para 30) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Section 173 (3) BNSS - Preliminary inquiry must be conducted before lodging the FIR, if the offences alleged are dealing with speech and expressions. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Section 174 Cr.P.C. – Scope of - Investigation under Section 174 is limited in scope and is confined to the ascertainment of the apparent cause of death and should not be equated with investigation into cognizable offences under Sections 160 and 161 of the CrPC respectively. The procedure under Section 174 of the CrPC is for the purpose of discovering the cause of death and the evidence taken is very short. The police's closure of the cases as suicides after Section 174 inquiries was premature and bypassed due process. (Para 22 & 40) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Section 200 Cr.P.C. / Section 223 BNSS - Recording the complainant's statement on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality. The object of recording the complainant's statement and witnesses, if any, is to ascertain the truth. The learned Magistrate is duty-bound to put questions to the complainant to elicit the truth. The examination is necessary to enable the Court to satisfy itself whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. After considering the complaint, the documents produced along with the complaint, and the statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any, the learned Magistrate has to apply his mind to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC. The corresponding provision under the BNSS is Section 227. Setting criminal law in motion is a serious matter. The accused faces serious consequences in the sense that he has to defend himself in the trial. (Para 10) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Section 200 Cr.P.C. - While filing a complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. (Para 21) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Section 256 Cr.P.C. / Section 279 BNSS - Non-appearance of a complainant will not always result in the acquittal of the accused. Acquittal under this section is warranted only when the complainant is absent on the date which was set for the appearance of the accused. If the date was set for a purpose other than the appearance of the accused, the absence of the complainant on such a date will not warrant the acquittal of the accused. (Para 19 & 20) Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 369

Section 432 Cr.P.C. / Section 473 (1) BNSS – Remission - Accused has undergone more than 14 years and 10 months of actual incarceration and the contention that his case be considered by the provision/policy in vogue at the time of his conviction, if not, a more beneficial policy, could be applied. In this background, the Court gives liberty to the accused to apply afresh with a detailed representation justifying his claim to be considered for pre-mature release accounting for his actual incarceration of over 14 years and with remission included, of over 20 years. Upon such representation being filed, the State Government shall pass a reasoned order expeditiously and latest within 3 months from the date of filing such representation, in line with the legal principles outlined by the Court. (Para 30) Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 349

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of FIR - Preliminary Stage of Investigation - There is no absolute rule that the High Court cannot interfere in a Section 482 CrPC petition if the investigation is at a primary stage. Kulandaisamy v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 357

Suppression of Material Facts - It is settled law that a litigant who, while filing proceedings in the court, suppresses material facts or makes a false statement, cannot seek justice from the court. The facts suppressed must be material and relevant to the controversy, which may have a bearing on the decision making. Cases of those litigants who have no regard for the truth and those who indulge in suppressing material facts need to be thrown out of the court. (Para 11) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

Section 39 (9) - Denial of Input Tax Credit (ITC) due to clerical or arithmetical errors - Examination of timelines for correction of bona fide mistakes in tax filings - Judicial observations on software limitations in tax compliance. Held, timelines for rectifying bona fide errors in tax filings should be realistic, as denial of ITC due to inadvertent mistakes unfairly burdens taxpayers. Denying correction rights in cases of genuine errors contradicts the fundamental right to conduct business. Software limitations cannot justify denying taxpayers the right to correct mistakes, as compliance mechanisms should facilitate, not hinder, rectifications. Special Leave Petition dismissed declining to interfere with the High Court's judgment, as there was no loss of revenue. Bar Code India Ltd. v. Union of India, (2024) SCC OnLine P&H 13853; Yokohama India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, (2023) 108 GSTR 115 [Held not good law] Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs v. Aberdare Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 361

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 80 IPC - Mandatory Notice - State's failure to respond to appellants' notice criticized - Public authorities must address statutory notices seriously to promote justice and avoid litigation – non-response may invite adverse inference - Judgment copies to be circulated to all High Courts and State Chief Secretaries, emphasizing Section 80 CPC compliance. (Para 113 & 129) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Compensation

The Supreme Court directed the State of Uttarakhand to pay Rs. 89 lakhs, in addition to Rs. 11 lakhs already disbursed, to the family of a deceased doctor killed by assailants in a hospital while on duty. The Court noted that a proposal by the Chief Secretary to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as ex-gratia, approved by the Chief Minister, was not honored, with only Rs. 1 lakh initially paid citing rules. Despite subsequent payments and benefits like family pension, gratuity, and compassionate appointment to the deceased's son, the Court found the High Court's compensation calculation using the multiplier method unjustified. Emphasizing the gravity of the incident and nine years of litigation, the Court quantified the total compensation at Rs. 1 crore, including interest, to be paid within six weeks. (Para 5) State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 348

Constitution

75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society. (Para 42 ix) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362

Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Homebuyers cannot be forced to accept possession of a property after an undue delay and are entitled to a refund if the unit is not delivered within the agreed timeframe. (Para 14) Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board v. Manohar Burde, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 360

Section 2(1)(d) - Definition of 'Consumer' - Self-Employment – Commercial Purpose - When a product is bought to be utilised in an established commercial venture by the buyer's employees and not the buyer himself, the buyer cannot be considered a 'consumer'. While a buyer using a product for 'self-employment' can be considered a 'consumer' under the Act, the facts of each case need to be examined. [Relied on: Paramount Digital Colour Lab v. Agfa India Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 81] Virender Singh v. Darshana Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 359

Customs

Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - Petroleum Act, 1934; Section 2 (c) - 'Flash-point' - High Speed Diesel (HSD) or Base Oil - Confiscation Proceedings – Held, Classification of imported goods under the Act 1975, requires the Customs Authority to prove the goods are "most akin" to the specified tariff heading (e.g., HSD under CTH 27101930), as per Rule 4 of the General Rules for Interpretation, rather than relying on the "preponderance of probability" standard. Where goods declared as Base Oil (CTH 27101960) were tested for only 14 of 21 parameters under IS 1460:2005, with discrepancies (e.g., flash point exceeding 93°C), and neither test reports nor expert opinion categorically identified them as HSD, the evidence was inconclusive. The burden of proof lies on the Department, and incomplete scientific evidence cannot justify confiscation or penalties. Benefit of doubt granted to appellants due to evidentiary gaps and passage of time. Directed respondents to ensure facilities for testing all specified parameters within six months to avoid future uncertainty. High Court judgment set aside. Appeals allowed. (Para 80, 83, 84 & 88) Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 366

Doctrines

Moulding of relief - The concept of moulding of relief refers to the ability of a court to modify or shape a relief sought by a party in a legal proceeding based on the circumstances of the case and the facts established after a full-fledged trial. The principle enables the court to grant appropriate remedies even if the relief requested in the pleading is not exact or could not be considered by the court or changed circumstances have rendered the relief obsolete. The court aims that justice is served while taking into account the evolving nature of a case. The above road map is pursued by a court based on the notion of flexibility in relief, equitable jurisdiction, and is tempered by judicial discretion. When moulding the relief, the court considers the issues and circumstances established during the full-fledged trial, looks at shortening the litigation, and then in its perspective, renders complete justice to the issue at hand. The converse of the above is that the moulded relief should not take the aggrieved party by surprise or cause prejudice. The relief is moulded as an exception and not as a matter of course. (Para 20) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Moulding of relief - Shortening Litigation - It would not be in the interest of justice to make the executor-HBN Shetty (80 years) to file another suit to oblige the terms of the Will of the testatrix, who was found as a real owner of the property. Therefore, instead of asking him to file another suit, the High Court was justified in moulding the relief in favor of the executor so that the fruits of the Will could be reaped by the beneficiary- Vinayagamurthy and his children. (Relied on: Shivanna v. B.S. Puttamadaiah (Dead) Through Lrs. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1969; Para 22 & 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Insurance Law

Insurance Policy - Suppression of Material Facts - Exclusion Clause - Hospital Cash Benefit Policy - Repudiation of Claim - Chronic Alcoholism – Pre-existing Condition – Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums - The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) against an order of the NCDRC which had upheld the decisions of the State and District Consumer Forums directing LIC to compensate the respondent-claimants under the “Jeevan Arogya” hospital cash benefit policy. The deceased insured, a chronic alcoholic, had suppressed this fact in the proposal form, answering “No” to questions regarding alcohol consumption. Following his hospitalization and death due to complications linked to chronic liver disease and cardiac arrest, LIC repudiated the claim under Clause 7(xi) of the policy, which excludes coverage for conditions arising from alcohol misuse. Held, the lower forums erred in interpreting the policy terms and the exclusion clause, as the deceased's chronic alcoholism was a material fact directly related to his hospitalization and death. Overruling the NCDRC's reliance on Sulbha Prakash Motegaoneker v. LIC, the Court clarified that suppression of a pre-existing condition justifies repudiation if it is linked to the cause of death. The appeal was allowed, the NCDRC order was set aside, and the repudiation upheld. However, considering the respondents' hardships and payments already made (approximately ₹3,00,000), the Court directed that no recovery of these amounts be sought, though no further payments were to be made. (Para 16 – 21) Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 346

Labour Law

For a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct master-servant relationship must be established on paper. (Para 7) Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education v. Raj Kumar Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 343

Land Law

Andhra Pradesh (Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books) Act, 1971; Section 6 - Legal Presumption of Title - Pattadar Passbook issued to appellants raised a rebuttable presumption of ownership and possession - State failed to produce evidence proving land was assigned with non-alienation conditions - Burden on State to disprove title not discharged - Held, appellants' title prima facie established. (Para 123) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 – The State failed to produce any documentary evidence (e.g., assignment records or D-Form Patta) to prove the land was assigned with non-alienation conditions. The burden was on the State to prove the land was assigned post-1954 with restrictions, which it did not discharge. The High Court erred in applying retrospective operation of 1977 Act without such evidence. State's claim of lawful resumption unsustainable. (Para 69, 86 & 92) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344

Land Acquisition - Determination of Market Value - The determination of the prevalent market value of the acquired land is not an algebraic formula and that cannot be determined in a precise or an accurate manner. Some amount of guess work is always permissible. Therefore, a judge has to sit in an arm chair and without much taxing his mind has to determine the market value in a prudent manner. (Para 13) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition - Enhancement of Compensation - Supreme Court enhanced compensation for acquired agricultural land from Rs. 30 per sq. mt. to Rs. 95 per sq. mt., based on GIDC's allotment of nearby commercial plot at Rs. 180 per sq. mt. in 1988 - Adjusted for 5% price rise over one year to Rs. 190 per sq. mt., followed by 50% deduction (40% for development costs, 10% for larger area). (Para 14) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition - Income from Fruit-Bearing Trees – Compensation for trees requires documentary proof of income, not mere presence. (Para 15) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Land Acquisition – Large areas do not attract the same price as is offered for the small plots of lands. Therefore, some amount of deduction is also normally permissible on account of largeness in area. Thus, deduction of at least 10% has to be applied to determine the rate of compensation. (Para 12) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 26 - Determination of Market Value - Theory of Deduction - Circle Rates - Held, theory of deduction applied under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to adjust market value for development costs, is not mandatory under the Acquisition Act, 2013. Section 26(1) mandates compensation based on the highest of: (a) market value under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899; (b) average sale price of similar land; or (c) consented amount. Explanation 4 allows the Collector discretion to adjust this value if it does not reflect actual market value, potentially applying deduction, but requires recorded reasons. Absent such adjustment, circle rates fixed under the Stamp Act govern. Public authorities must adhere to State-fixed circle rates, which citizens pay as stamp duty. Appeals dismissed emphasizing scientific fixation of circle rates for equitable compensation and governance. (Para 37 - 43) Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 364

Limitation Act, 1963

Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Dispute over Government Land - Liberal Approach - Substantial Justice - Although a delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical grounds of limitation. A liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays when the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. (Para 14) Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Mental Health

Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions - The recurring instances of student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions, including private educational institutions, serve as a grim reminder of the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the existing legal and institutional framework in addressing mental health concerns of students on campuses and to prevent the students from taking the extreme step of committing suicides. These tragedies underscore the urgent need for a more robust, comprehensive, and responsive mechanism to address the various factors which compel certain students to resort to taking their own lives. In light of the concerns expressed above, a National Task Force to address the mental health concerns of students and prevent the commission of suicides in Higher Educational Institutions is being constituted. (Para 69) Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Motor Accident Compensation - Foreign Earnings - Multiplier in motor accident claims cannot be reduced on the ground that the deceased was earning in foreign currency. The multiplier is fixed on the basis of the age of the victim and cannot be altered based on the ground of foreign income. The exchange rate prevailing as on the date of the filing of the petition has to be adopted. (Para 9 & 10) Shyam Prasad Nagalla v. Andhra Pradesh State Board Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 351

Section 166 - Contributory Negligence – Learner's License - In a motor accident claim, contributory negligence cannot be presumed merely from the driver's possession of a learner's license. The collision at the trailer's tail-end did not inherently indicate negligence by the driver. Negligence must be proved by evidence, with preponderance of probabilities as the standard. (Para 12 & 13) Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 352

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 - Reply to the Statutory Notice - This was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Complaint and cognizance order set aside, leaving civil remedies open. (Para 20 - 23) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Partnership Act, 1932

Section 14 - A contribution made by the partner to the partnership firm becomes the firm's property and neither the partner nor his legal heirs would have an exclusive right over the firm's property after the partner's death or retirement except the share in profit in proportion to the contribution made in partnership firm. No formal document is required to be made for transferring the property to the partnership firm, as the transfer occurs by virtue of the partner's contribution to the firm. However, a relinquishment deed could be made to formalise the transfer of property to the partnership firm. (Para 14 - 16) Sachin Jaiswal v. Hotel Alka Raje, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 342

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Validity of Sanction – Held, the High Court acted improperly by conducting a mini-trial at the pre-trial stage and quashing the case before the actual case material were brought on record. The issue of conviction prospects and invalid sanction are matters to be determined during the trial. (Para 12 & 14) State v. G. Easwaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 356

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Accused cannot be kept in custody if order taking cognizance of Enforcement Directorate (ED) complaint has been quashed. (Para 5) Arun Pati Tripathi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 371

Property Law

Title through Court Auction - Validity of Subsequent Sale –The court auction sale on 04.05.1962, conducted while Somasundaram was alive, and the subsequent sale deed on 25.09.1963 vested absolute title in Padmini. Somasundaram's will (30.05.1962) could not override this, as he no longer held title at his death on 14.06.1962. Since the property was sold via court auction before the will's execution took effect, Defendant No. 1 inherited no rights, making the 1992 sale deeds to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 void. Padmini's will (30.09.1975) explicitly bequeathed the Plaint Schedule to Vinayagamurthy and his children, not the Trust. Thus, the Trust had no claim to the property. The court justified moulding relief in favor of the executor (H.B.N. Shetty) to execute Padmini's will, citing judicial discretion to shorten litigation and ensure justice. Given the age of the surviving executor and the death of others, requiring a fresh suit would be unjust. The appellants (Defendant Nos. 3 to 6) were not prejudiced, as they fully contested the title issue. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that moulding relief was appropriate to implement Padmini's testamentary intent without prolonging litigation. (Para 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353

Service Law

Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (Karnataka); Rule 16(a)(iii) – Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (Karnataka); Rule 6 – Cadre Change at Employee's Request – Effect on Seniority - the Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error in directing the appellant to grant seniority to the respondent in the cadre of First Division Assistant with effect from the date in which the said respondent has entered service in the cadre of Staff Nurse from 05.01.1979, instead of 19.04.1989, when she was appointed in the new cadre of First Division Assistant. (Para 24) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350

Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (Subordinate Service Rules) and Kerala Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (Special Rules) govern completely separate cadres. Rule 4(b) of the Special Rules applies only after appointment as Assistant Engineer, and cannot be applied for lower promotions. (Para 24) Sajithabhai v. Kerala Water Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 358

Seniority – If a government employee holding a particular post is transferred on public interest, he carries with him his existing status including seniority to the transferred post. However, if an officer is transferred at his own request, such a transferred employee will have to be accommodated in the transferred post, subject to the claims and status of the other employees at the transferred place, as their interests cannot be varied without there being any public interest in the transfer. Subject to specific provision of the Rules governing the services, such transferees are generally placed at the bottom, below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. (Para 19) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Gift, Settlement Deed and Will - Distinction Between – Explained. (Para 11 - 14) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345

Section 41 and 122 - When a property transfer involves considerations such as love and affection while the donor retains a life interest, it qualifies as a settlement deed in the form of a gift. Once the donee accepts the gift through the settlement deed, the donor cannot unilaterally revoke it. Mere reservation of life interest of the donor and the postponement of the delivery of the possession to the donee would not make the document a Will. Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Upon the retention of the life interest, the donor will continue only as an ostensible owner of the property. Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345

Section 122 - Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father also, is invalid. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345

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