Supreme Court Weekly Digest September [15 - 23, 2025]

Update: 2025-10-11 11:30 GMT
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Airports Authorities of India (AAI) - levy of service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo – Held, service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo, ruling that such services fall within the ambit of 'taxable services' under the Finance Act, 1994 - While 'handling of export cargo' is excluded from the definition of 'cargo handling service' under Section 65(23) of...

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Airports Authorities of India (AAI) - levy of service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo – Held, service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo, ruling that such services fall within the ambit of 'taxable services' under the Finance Act, 1994 - While 'handling of export cargo' is excluded from the definition of 'cargo handling service' under Section 65(23) of the Act, cargo handling service nonetheless qualifies as a 'taxable service' in terms of sub-clause (zzm) of section 65(105) was introduced with effect from September 10, 2024 - Definition of the taxable service is very wide and takes into its fold any kind of service that may be provided to any person by the Airports Authority in any airport - All kinds of services rendered by the Airports Authority in any airport are taxable services and are chargeable to service tax under Section 66 of the Act - Court distinguished between a 'definitional' section and a 'charging' section, stating that mere exclusion in the definitional section, does not preclude liability under charging section - If the service otherwise falls within the sweep of the taxing provision - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 9, 10, 13-21] Airports Authority of India v. Commissioner of Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2025 INSC 1141

All India Football Federation (AIFF) - Disqualification Events - Supreme Court examined 3 main grounds - i. Criminal charges - Disqualification based on framing of charges was diluted, only conviction with a sentence of 2 years or more will disqualify a person; ii. Public servant status - Modified the provision to restrict disqualification to Ministers and Government servants; iii. Tenure in other NSFs - Upheld mandatory cooling-off and term limits as per good governance practices - Directed AIFF to convene a special general body meeting for adoption of the finalized Constitution within 4 weeks - Supreme Court set boundaries for private partnerships, particularly regarding the master rights agreement (MRA), requiring AIFF to maintain ultimate accountability - Commercial arrangements exceeding 4 years or 5 crores requires 75% majority approval - Constitution once adopted shall mark a new beginning for Indian Football. [Relied on BCCI V. Cricket Association of Bihar 2018 9 SCC 624; Para 51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 77-78, 122] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131

All India Football Federation (AIFF) - Eligibility Criteria for Eminent Players - Fixing eligibility, Supreme Court reduced the threshold suggested by Justice L.N. Rao from 7 to 5 matches for men and from 3 to 2 matches for women, noting the limited pool of retired players - Rejected AIFF's suggestion to include domestic matches, favouring only internationally sanctioned matches. [Paras 40] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131

All India Football Federation (AIFF) - Supreme Court upheld inclusion of 15 Eminent Players (minimum 5 women) as voting members in the General Body of AIFF - Held that NSC 2011 provides a carve-out for prominent sportspersons of outstanding merit to have voting rights, overriding the general exclusion under clauses 3.9 and 3.10 - Supreme Court relied on FIFA Statutes 2022 and 2024, Article 111 & standard Statute and an International Centre for Sport Studies report to affirm best practices globally for including various stakeholders. [Paras 25, 30-33] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131

Anand Marriage Act, 1909 - Section 6 - Registration of Ananad Karaj - Supreme Court directs States/UTs (17 states and 7 UTs) to register Sikh marriages, make Rules under Anand Marriage Act within 4 months - Held that decades of non-implementation created unequal treatment of Sikh citizens across India and violated the principle of equality - The fidelity of a constitutional promise is measured not only by the rights it proclaims, but by the institutions that make those rights usable - In a secular republic, the State must not turn a citizen's faith into either a privilege or a handicap - When the law recognises Anand Karaj as a valid form of marriage yet leaves no machinery to register it, the promise is only half kept. [Para 8-10] Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920 : 2025 INSC 1127

Anand Marriage Act, 1909 - Section 6 - Registration of Ananad Karaj - The Supreme Court passed following directions for implementation of Rules regarding the registration of Sikh marriages - i. Every respondent that has not yet notified rules under Section 6 of the Act shall do so within 4 months from today - Rules shall be published in Official Gazette and laid before the State Legislature in terms of Section 6(4) of the Act; ii. With immediate effect and until such rules are notified, each respondent shall ensure that marriages solemnised by Anand Karaj are received for registration under the prevailing marriage registration framework without discrimination; if parties so request, the registering authority shall record in the certificate that the marriage was solemnized by the Anand Karaj rite - iii. No authority shall insist on an additional or duplicative registration under any other law once registration under the Act is granted, in view of Section 6(5) of the Act; iv. Every respondent, shall within 2 months, designate a Secretary-level Nodal officer to oversee compliance with this order; v. Union of India shall act as the coordinating authority and shall circulate model rules compiled from jurisdictions that have already notified; vi. No application for registration of an Anand Karaj marriage or for a certified extract shall be refused on the sole ground that rules under Section 6 of the Act have not yet been notified. [Para 12] Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920 : 2025 INSC 1127

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) – Held, execution of an arbitral award cannot be stalled merely on the ground that an appeal under Section 37 of A&C Act is pending - Pendency of Section 37 appeal does not by itself, operate as a stay against execution of an arbitral award - Unless there is an express interim order staying enforcement the award-holder retains the right to proceed with execution - Execution Court should address objections to executability of the award as raised but cannot defer consideration of the execution application solely because of a pending appeal without any stay order. Chakardhari Sureka v. Prem Lata Sureka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 919

Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 - Sections 19, 21 - Reassessment after time - barred assessment - Scope and limitation – Held, on Tax matters, strict letter of law must be followed - No tax can be imposed by inference or analogy - Where initial assessments for the relevant years were held to be time-barred under Section 19, subsequent reassessment with prior sanction under Section 21 is not permissible - Section 21 applies only where no assessment has been made within the time limits specified under Section 19, not where time-barred assessments have already occurred - High Court erred in its interpretation by permitting reassessment post time-barred determination merely on the basis of Commissioner's sanction - Strict construction must be applied for fiscal statutes, and tax liability can be imposed only if the case falls strictly within the statutory provisions - No tax can be imposed by inference, analogy or presumed legislative intent - Appeal allowed. [Para 12-15] Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2025 INSC 1126

Central Excise Act, 1944 (1944 Act) - Section 2(f)(i) – Held, converting imported gas-generating sets (Gensets) into containerized 'Power Packs' by placing them in stell containers and fitting them with essential components amounts to 'manufacture' under the 1944 Act, making the final product liable to excise duty - the process of placing the Genset within steel container and fitting that container with additional, integral components brings into existence a new, distinct and marketable commodity - This process would thus amount to 'manufacture' under Section 2(f)(i) of the 1944 Act - Appellant is liable to pay excise duty on the goods manufactured - Two-fold test is laid down by Supreme Court for the purpose of determining whether an activity amounts to 'manufacture' - i. Transformation test (Whether a distinct product with a new name, identity, character or use emerges) and ii. Marketability Test (Whether the transformed product is marketable as such) - the transformation test and marketability test were fulfilled as the imported product was transformed into a new product with a distinct identity, name and character and is capable of being brought and sold in the market - Both the tests must be cumulatively satisfied for a process to constitute manufacture - Distinction between 'parts' and accessories' was discussed and additional components were held to be 'parts' necessary for the product's functioning, not mere accessories - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 24-25, 33, 41, 45, 46, 50, 52] Quippo Energy Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Ahmedabad – II, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2025 INSC 1130

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 6A – Held, defendant cannot file counter claim against co-defendant solely - Such a counter claim is not maintainable - Counter claim filed well after the framing of issues is barred - Order VIII Rule 6A does not stipulate an express time limit, the outer limit for filing a counter claim is pegged as 'till the issues are framed' - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 26] Rajul Manoj Shah v. Kiranbhai Shakrabhai Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 912

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLVII Rule 7(1) - Doctrine of Merger and Review Jurisdiction – Held, doctrine of merger does not apply when an SLP is dismissed without reasons, permitting a review petition to be filed before the High Court - This principle does not extend to cases where the SLP is withdrawn rather than dismissed, as withdrawal constitutes abandonment of the remedy - An order rejecting a review petition does not merge the original decree and thus cannot be independently appealed under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the CPC - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 18, 29, 31] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Supreme Court questioned the timing and motive behind FIR, stating it appeared to be a retaliatory counterblast after losing in foreign courts - Conduct of respondent was found questionable and inconsistent with the claim of social integration in Austria - Noted that period of alleged cruelty extended beyond the marriage duration, creating further doubt – Held, for quashing FIRs under Section 482 CrPC, Court should look for prima facie disclosure of offence - FIR was quashed as retaliatory after divorce notice- Supreme Court cautioned High Courts against mechanically dismissing quashing petitions based solely on the contents of FIR, stressing that the surrounding context and circumstances of its filing must also take into account whether the FIR was a result of a counterblast or a retaliatory measure filed with an oblique motive just to harass the litigant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-14] Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2025 INSC 1128

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 165 – Held, for search warrant under Special enactments, recording of reasons is mandatory - Inspection and seizure under Section 15 of the legal Metrology Act, 2009 require prior recording of reasons to believe and compliance with the provisions of the CrPC, including the necessity of a search warrant unless exigent circumstances under section 165 CrPC are satisfied - Presence of two independent and respectable witnesses during search under section 104 CrPC is mandatory - Premises for search include warehouses or godowns used for business, irrespective of whether they are open or closed to the public, and such premises are not deemed public places merely because they are accessible during business hours - Simultaneous issuance of seizure and compounding notices without recorded reasons negates the application of mind of the authority and violates principles of natural justice - Violation of procedural safeguards under section 15 of the legal Metrology Act and sections 104, 105 and 165 of the CrPC vitiates the search and seizure and renders subsequent action unsustainable - Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is maintainable in cases of jurisdictional errors and violation of natural justice in exercise of statutory powers. [Para 2, 3, 6, 11, 14-17, 19-21, 23, 24] ITC Limited v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 910 : 2025 INSC 1111

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Cancellation of bail - Whether High Court can entertain a second application for cancellation of bail after rejection by the Sessions Judge – Held, there is no bar on the High Court exercising inherent powers under Section 482 r/w. 439(2) CrPC to entertain such application, even if one was rejected by the Sessions Judge - No restriction arises if the application is moved under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. [Para 14, 15] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Distinction between Cancellation and Revocation of Bail – Held, cancellation of bail is distinct from revocation of an order granting bail - Bail may be cancelled when the accused violates any of the conditions imposed - an order granting bail can be revoked if such an order is found to be perverse or illegal. [Para 17] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Role of Criminal antecedents – Held, mere criminal antecedents are not sufficient ground for denial or cancellation of bail absent other incriminating circumstances - antecedents may be a consideration but not sole ground to cancel bail, if the accused has long incarceration or satisfies other conditions for bail - Set aside order by High Court and restored bail to appellants - Appeal allowed. [Para 23] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Held, High Court cannot grant anticipatory bail by recalling initial order of dismissal - Such restoration is impermissible and contrary to law - the Court emphasized that once an application for anticipatory bail is rejected with reasons, proceedings for recall / restoration is not permissible in law - Supreme Court set aside the recall order and left it open for parties to avail remedies available in law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4 - 7] Gurvinder Singh v. Jasbir Singh @ Jasvir Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 924

Customs Act, 1962 - Section 110 – Held, provisional release of seized object won't extend time limit for issuing show cause notice in Pre-2018 cases - Where goods are seized under Section 110 of Customs Act and no notice under Section 124(a) is issued within prescribed or extended period, the consequence mandated by Section 110(2) is unconditional release to the person from whom the goods were seized - the existence or exercise of provisional release under Section 110A does not affect the statutory consequence mandated under Section 110(2) - when the statutory period for issue of show-cause notice under Section 124 of Customs Act lapses and extension is neither granted nor the conditions for further extension met, unconditional release of seized goods is mandatory under Section 110(2) - Provisional release orders under Section 110A do not override this consequence - Section 110A functions as an interim arrangement to allow release of goods, including perishable or fast-moving items, but does not in any way impede or limit the mandatory time limit in Section 110(2) - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11, 20-24] Union of India v. Jatin Ahuja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 922

Customs Act, 1962 - Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, 2005 - Whether export duty can be imposed on goods supplied from the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) to SEZ units under the provisions of the Customs Act or SEZ Act – Held, export duty on goods moved from DTA to SEZ units is not justified under the prevailing law, such goods are not subjected to export duty - It is a domestic supply and not an export outside India - SEZ Act creates a self-contained legal framework where the movement of goods from the DTA to an SEZ is defined as a form of 'export' for the purposes of entitlements and benefits under that Act, but it is not an export that would trigger a levy under the Customs Act - Section 12 of Customs Act is a charging provision which levies duty only on goods physically exported out of India - Section 26 of the SEZ Act, power is reserved to grant an exemption or a concession if under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, a duty is leviable as per the charging sections. [Paras 4, 6, 7] Union of India v. Adani Power, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 932

Customs Act, 1962 - Whether LG watch W7 imported by the appellant is classifiable under CTH 9102 19 00 (as claimed by appellant) or under CTH 8517 62 90 (as affirmed by department), eligibility for concessional basic customs duty and confiscation/ penalty liability - Supreme Court allows customs duty exemption to LG Electronics for Smart watch import from Korea - Held that the goods imported- smart watches- are classifiable under CTH 8517 62 90 and not under CTH 9102 19 00 - Tribunal erred denying the benefit of exemption notification no. 152/2009- on ground of lack of Certificate of Origin; Certificate of Origin as per notification requirements - There was no mala fide or dishonest intent by the appellant in making the customs declaration - Mere wrong classification or claim of exemption does not attract Section 111 or penalty provisions - Appeal allowed. [Paras 20-22, 28] L.G. Electronics v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 916

East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Validity of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 upheld (paras 128-129). Lands reserved for common purposes including utilized and unutilized, vest in Gram Panchayat and are to be used for village needs - Bachat land, which has not been reserved for common use under the scheme, remains the proprietary land of the contributors and must be redistributed among them per their share - Compensation is not payable where acquisition is for common purposes and the beneficiary is not the State but the proprietors themselves via Gram Panchayat management - distinctions between acquisition by the State and modification of rights benefiting proprietors through Panchayat management of common land - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 24-43, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58-62-64] State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2025 INSC 1122

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of Proof – Held, onus to prove legal necessity lies on the alienee-purchaser of the joint family property - The purchaser is not required to prove facts exclusively within Special knowledge of the coparceners or HUF, consistent with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Onus of proof on the stranger-purchaser cannot run counter to the principle of reverse burden enshrined in Section 106 of the Evidence Act and saddle him with the liability to prove facts which are within the special knowledge of the coparceners of the HUF. [Paras 16-19] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Held, for joint disclosure statements, made by multiple accused simultaneously, to become admissible under Section 27 of the Act, high scrutiny is needed to rule out the possibilities of tutoring of the accused - Courts must exercise heightened caution, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the disclosures were genuine, independent and corroborated by other evidence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 26 - 31] Nagamma @ Nagarathna v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2025 INSC 1135

Hindu Law - Power of Karta to alienate Joint Family Property - Legal necessity - Onus to proof - Supreme Court reiterated that the Karta of a Hindu undivided Family (HUF) has the power to alienate joint family property for legal necessity or benefit of estate, and such sale binds the interests of all undivided members, including minors and widows - The discretion of the Karta in determining legal necessity is wide and each case turns into its facts - Noted that family necessities may include payment of government revenue, marriage expenses (of male coparceners or daughters), maintenance, necessary litigation to recover property, funeral expenses, and debts for family business - The existence of legal necessity must be judged on the facts and circumstances of each case - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11, 20, 21] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120

Judicial Service Recruitment - Supreme Court Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in exercise of review jurisdiction by reopening settled issues regarding cut-off marks and eligibility- Re-computation of cut-off marks and conducting a fresh main examination for candidates scoring below the original cut-off was impermissible exercise of review jurisdiction - Preliminary exam cut-off marks are sacrosanct once declared, and candidates failing to meet them cannot be considered in main examination - Conduct of second main exam for physically impaired candidates was a distinct case and could not justify a third main exam - Affidavit by High Court Registrar confirmed no ineligible candidate would be considered for appointment, allaying apprehension of respondents. [Para 9, 11-14] High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Jyotsna Dohalia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 936 : 2025 INSC 1137

Judicial Service Recruitment - Under the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1994 (as amended), the eligibility criteria for the Civil Judge Entry Level post were revised by an amendment to Rule 7 on 23/06/2023 - The amendment stipulated that only advocates who have been practising continuously for at least three years, or those who have secured the specified minimum marks in their first attempt without any ATKT (Allowed To Keep Terms), are eligible to apply - The validity of these restrictions was challenged but ultimately upheld - A recruitment advertisement dated 17/11/2023 was issued for 199 posts - Following the preliminary examination, results were declared based on cut-off marks, and candidates who scored below the cut-off were not permitted to appear for the main examination - A review petition was allowed by the High Court, which directed a re-computation of the cut-off marks and a fresh main examination for eligible candidates who had previously scored below the earlier cut-off - This order was appealed by the High Court Registrar. High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Jyotsna Dohalia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 936 : 2025 INSC 1137

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) - Section 52A - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 65B(4) – Held, non-production of contraband in trial not fatal if seizure, sample-drawing duly recorded as per Section 52A NDPS Act - Retrial may be ordered only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and that non-production of contraband cannot justify such a course where electronic evidence, duly certified under Section 65B of Evidence Act, along with records - Once an electronic evidence was certified under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, it is admissible in evidence and there's no requirement that the evidence must be supplied to each witness - If clarification was needed, Appellate Court could have recalled witnesses or admitted further evidence under Section 391 CrPC, instead of ordering a fresh trial - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21, 25, 29, 31 - 33] Kailas Bajirao Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2025 INSC 1117

Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Section 138 Proviso (b) - Principle of strict construction of penal statutes - Whether notice is valid where demanded amount differs from the cheque amount – Held, compliant under Section 138 is not maintainable if demand notice didn't mention exact cheque amount and typo error cannot be a defence - If the amount mentioned in the demand notice varies from the cheque amount, then the complaint is not maintainable - The notice in terms of proviso being a provision in penal statute and a condition for the offence, it has to be precise while mentioning of the amount of the cheque which is dishonoured - Quashed complaint filed under Section 138 of NI Act on the above ground as the amount mentioned in the notice was not same as per the cheque - Even if the cheque number mentioned in the notice was correct but amount was different, it created an ambiguity and differentiation about the 'said amount' - Notice stood bad in law - Section 138 being penal, must be strictly construed, no leniency allowed for errors in amount mentioned in legal notice as the offence is technical and procedural compliance is mandatory. [Paras 5-8] Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahruden Noorul, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 927 : 2025 INSC 1133

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Section 6 - Conviction and Sentence - Judicial Caution against Re-Traumatization – Held, appellant was convicted and sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act - The prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to be detailed, coherent, and free from exaggeration or inconsistency - Her testimony was reiterated before the Trial Court and corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence, which confirmed signs of recent forcible sexual intercourse - The victim's age was established through her birth certificate, placing her unambiguously below 12 years at the time of the incident - Courts must remain vigilant against procedural submissions being used as harassment tactics, particularly in cases involving child sexual abuse - Reiterated that requests to recall a child victim after trial conclusion and concurrent findings of guilt raise serious concerns about secondary victimization - Such attempts must be discouraged to protect the integrity of the victim's testimony and public confidence in justice delivery - the Supreme Court expressed anguish that no compensation had been awarded to the victim by either the Trial Court or the High Court - In exercise of its constitutional duty to provide meaningful redress Supreme Court directed the State of Arunachal Pradesh to pay Rs. 10,50,000 as compensation. [Paras 7-12] Arjun Sonar v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 935

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, merely touching the private parts of a minor girl will not constitute the offence of rape under Section 375, 376 AB of IPC or penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act - Such conduct would instead amount to offence of 'aggravated sexual assault' as defined under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act as well as the offence of 'outraging the modesty of a woman' under Section 354 IPC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Laxman Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 928

Search and Inspection - Supreme Court distinguished between search and inspection – Held, inspection refers to the verification of the books, records or documents at the premises of a person, which is generally permissible under the respective law upon compliance with the pre-requisites of authorization, recording of reasons to believe, and permission from competent authority under law - A search, on the other hand, has a wider connotation - It implies the power to look in any place for any materials, goods, books or documents believed to be secreted or concealed, which may evidence a violation and may be liable to seizure or confiscation. [Para 19] ITC Limited v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 910 : 2025 INSC 1111

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 - Retrospective application of amended Section 13(8) – Held, the amended provisions apply to all cases where auction notice was issued after 01.09.2016, regardless of the loan sanction date - the amended restriction and its procedural nature render it applicable to pending actions, aligning with principles outlined in precedents - Supreme Court summarised principles on retrospective application of legislations - i. Presumption against retrospectively is not applicable to enactments which merely affect procedure or change forum or are declaratory; ii. Retroactive/retrospective operation can be implicit in a provision construed in the context where it occurs; iii. A provision can be held to apply to cause of action after such provision comes into force, even though the claim on which the action may be based may be of anterior date and; iv. A remedial statute applies to pending proceedings and such application may not be taken to be retrospective if application is to be in future with reference to appending cause of action; v. SARFAESI Act is a remedial statute intended to dela with problem of pre-existing loan transactions which need speedy recovery. [Paras 179-183] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 - Section 13(8) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 60 – Issue of Right of Redemption under SARFAESI Act - Held, mortgagor's right of redemption survives until the completion of sale by way of a registered conveyance and mere auction or issuance of sale certificate does not extinguish this right - The amended provision extinguishes the right of redemption of the borrower in the event he fails to repay his dues and redeem the asset before publication of the Auction Notice - This unambiguous language used in the amended provision of Section 13(8) furthers the object and reasons of the SARFAESI Act for which it was enacted i.e., to ensure that the lender is able to enforce his security interest at the earliest and with least possible intervention of the courts - The right of redemption is a statutory right and not a contractual one, and it is subject to modification by special Laws like SARFEASI Act - Supreme Court flags inconsistency between Section 1398) of Act and Rules on borrower's redemption right, urges government to amend - Appeal allowed. [Paras 51-55, 68, 75-76, 115] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - One Time Settlement Scheme (OTS) - Eligibility criteria and conditions - Failure to comply with up-front payment requirement under OTS Scheme - Principle of natural justice and eligibility considered – Held, defaulting borrower cannot claim OTS benefit without fulfilling bank's conditions - The High Court erred in directing reconsideration without considering the mandatory up-front payment clause, which disentitled the respondent's application from processing - Respondent did not make the mandatory upfront payment if 5% of the OTS amount as required under Clause 4(i) of the Scheme - The rejection letter did not mention this ground, but courts can uphold administrative orders on alternative grounds found in the record if fairness is maintained - Principle that invalid orders cannot be later validated by additional grounds unless fairness and notice are ensured was emphasized - Supreme Court granted respondent liberty to make fresh OTS proposal, not under 2020 Scheme - Appeal allowed. [Paras 25-29, 40, 44, 45] State Bank of India v. Tanya Energy Enterprises, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2025 INSC 1119

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (SARFAESI Rules) - Held, i. Rules 8(6), the proviso thereto, Rule 8(7) and Rule 9(1) of the SARFAESI Rules do not speak of any separate or distinct notice of sale that is required to be issued by the secured creditor for the transfer of the secured asset by way of lease, assignment or sale in accordance with any of the methods enumerated in Rule 8(5); ii. The different manner in which the notice of sale has to be served, cased, published, affixed, uploaded as stipulated in Rules 8(6) and 8(7) of the SARFAESI Rules, do not constitute separate notices of sale by themselves, they are part and parcel of one single composite intended 'notice of sale' of the secured asset by the secured creditor, by any of the mode of sale listed in Rule 8(5); iii. Similarly, the stipulation under Rule 9(1) of a third-days gap between the date of publication of notice of sale and the date of actual sale does not impute a distinct characteristic to the public notice in the newspaper in contrast to the notice of sale that is served to the borrower; iv. The embargo enshrined under Rule 9(1), that no sale, in the 1st instance shall take place before the expiry of 30 days, would be reckoned from the date of issuance of the 'notice of sale', which would include both the public notice of sale in the newspaper and the service thereof to the borrower; v. Under Rule 8(6) read with Rule 9(1) both the notice of sale can be served as well as published in the newspaper, simultaneously on the same date; All that is required under Rule 9(1) is that 30 day gap is maintained between when the notice of sale is served, affixed and published. [Paras 116-118, 161, 162] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144

Special Leave Petition - Maintainability of Second Special Leave Petition – Held, withdrawal of a special leave petition (SLP) without obtaining liberty to file a fresh petition bars a subsequent challenge to the same order, as the principle of public policy embodied in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to SLPs under Article 136 of the Constitution - Second SLP is not maintainable when the earlier petition was unconditionally withdrawn, particularly where no liberty was granted to approach the Court again, and the litigant seeks to re-agitate the same issue after exhausting review remedies. [Paras 19-21] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140

Tender - Rectification of financial bid after opening - Inadvertent mistake – Permissibility - Judicial Interference - Whether a bidder, after the financial bids have been opened and the bidder declared as lowest, can be allowed to rectify its financial bid by treating a per day rate quoted erroneously as the total contract period rate, thus potentially becoming the highest bidder – Held, financial bids in public tenders can't be altered after opening - Sanctity of process can't be compromised for more revenue - The Division Bench erred in allowing rectification of the bid after opening the financial bids, holding that the tendering authority had the discretionary power under Clause 5B(v) of Instructions to Bidders to seek clarifications at any stage of the tender evaluation process, which when extended to allow rectification of BOQ rates, unsettles the tender process - The principle that rectification of financial bids is impermissible post-opening is fortified by the facts that the bidder filled both figures and words pertaining to 1095 days, and the alleged mistake was not a bona fide inadvertent error but indicates negligence - Judicial interference in tender processes warrants utmost restraint and is only justified when there is mala fide, arbitrariness, or public interest is adversely affected. Mere error or procedural irregularity does not justify interference, especially if it affects the sanctity and finality of the tender - Non-joinder of the highest bidder (appellant) during the High Court proceedings, whose interests were adversely affected due to the rectification allowed to the respondent, vitiated the impugned order, violating principles of natural justice - The public interest in contractual commercial transactions is not confined to the quantum of revenue but also includes adherence to tender conditions and ensuring finality in the tendering process - Appeal allowed. [Paras 20, 30, 32-34, 40, 41. 43-44, 50] Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways v. Mandeepa Enterprises, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 911 : 2025 INSC 1108

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Constitutional validity of the Act - Amendments were challenged primarily on the grounds of violation of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 300A of the Constitution - Composition of the Central Waqf Council and State Boards allowing non-Muslim majorities, and scrutiny on discriminatory provisions such as those requiring demonstrable practice of Islam for 5 years - Supreme Court upheld the legislative competence of Parliament and found no manifest arbitrariness warranting interim relief, underscoring protections for government properties from wrongful Waqf declarations, the secular nature of Board and Council functions, and wider remedies available under the Amended Waqf Act - Supreme Court stayed this provision till the State Governments frame rules for providing a mechanism to determine the question as to whether a person has been practising Islam for 5 years or more - Without such a mechanism, the provision will lead to an 'arbitrary exercise of power - Held that objections to inclusion of non-Muslims in statutory councils did not transgress religious freedoms as the functions are secular and advisory - Held no prima facie ground for interim stay and upheld the Act's constitutionality, emphasizing the need to respect legislative intent and due process in safeguarding Waqf properties. [Paras 34, 35, 38-41, 43-54, 72-80, 111-124, 182-186] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Exclusion of rights of STs and restricted applicability in tribal areas - Government properties Exemption - Held that it was justified on constitutional protections under Article 244 and special legislative measures recognized in judgement of Amrendra Pratap Singh Case and 5th and 6th Schedules - Held that registration provisions are not arbitrary and registration is necessary to check misuse - Upheld provisions excluding government properties declared as Waqf, allowing inquiry by designated officers - This protects government interests - Appointment of CEO not necessarily Muslim was allowed as the CEO functions under Board Control, which retains Muslim majority - Deletion of provisions permitting non-Muslims to create Waqf- supporting trusts was upheld as consistent with Islamic nature Waqf and availability of alternative trust forms - Upheld the provision that waqf can be created only by a person showing or demonstrating that he is practicing Islam for at least 5 years - Upheld that deletion of section 104 of the original Waqf Act is not arbitrary - Supreme Court stops government from denotifying Waqf Lands disputed as encroachments till Tribunal's decision on Title. [Paras 51-53, 102, 131-136, 177-179, 189-190, 194-197] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Waqf by user - Section 3(r)(i) - Waqf Act, 1995 - Deletion of this section - Supreme Court upheld deletion of 'waqf by user' concept - Held that if Mutawallis for a period of 102 years could not get the waqf registered, as required under the earlier provisions, they cannot claim that they be allowed to continue with the waqf even if they are not registered - Now they cannot be heard to say that the provision which now requires the application to be accompanied by a copy of the waqf deed is arbitrary - Held that if the legislature in 2025 finds that on account of the concept of 'Waqf by User', huge governments properties have been encroached upon and to stop the menace, it takes steps for deletion of the said provision, the said amendment, prima facie, cannot be said to be arbitrary - Registration of Waqfs was upheld - ample time of 6 months was provided. [Paras 107, 143, 145, 150-152] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116

Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 (WP Act, 1972) - Recognition of Zoo Rules, 2009 (Rules 2009) - Central Zoo Authority Guidelines – Held, Vantara's acquisition of animals in Green Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre run by Reliance Foundation at Jamnagar, Gujarat is as per regulations - SIT was constituted including retired judges and senior officials - As per SIT Report - all animal acquisitions, imports and welfare practices strictly confirmed to statutory requirements under the WP Act, 1972, Rules 2009, CITES, Customs Act, 1962, and PMLA, 2002 - SIT noted that specific animal transfers like that of 'Madhuri' elephant and held that such transfers were effected in compliance with High Court and Supreme Court orders and were found lawful - Import permits and statutory documentation were held to be conclusive - Neither Courts not authorities could re-examine underlying foreign legal compliance after valid CITES and Indian permits were issued - Noted that facilities exceeded statutory and international benchmarks, mortality rates were consistent with global averages, and allegations of cruelty, trafficking, misuse of funds or commercial trade were dismissed as baseless - Supreme Court directed closure of all complaints or proceedings on the same set of allegations, barring further judicial or administrative scrutiny on issues for furnishing the full SIT report to Vantara - Petitions dismissed. [Paras 4-7, 9-12, 14, 17] C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 913

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