Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) And Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) Monthly Digest: September 2025
SUPREME COURT Article 226 Can't Be Invoked To Quash Chargesheet If Cognizance Has Been Taken; Remedy Available Under S.528 BNSS: Supreme Court Cause Title: PRADNYA PRANJAL KULKARNI VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875 The Supreme Court observed that FIRs or charge-sheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognisance is taken, but...
SUPREME COURT
Cause Title: PRADNYA PRANJAL KULKARNI VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875
The Supreme Court observed that FIRs or charge-sheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognisance is taken, but once cognisance is taken, the remedy lies under Section 528 BNSS (S. 482 CrPC) to challenge both the FIR/charge-sheet and even the cognisance order, if duly pleaded.
“So long cognisance of the offence is not taken, a writ or order to quash the FIR/charge-sheet could be issued under Article 226; however, once a judicial order of taking cognisance intervenes, the power under Article 226 though not available to be exercised, power under Section 528, BNSS was available to be exercised to quash not only the FIR/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognisance, provided the same is placed on record along with the requisite pleadings to assail the same and a strong case for such quashing is set up.”, the Court observed.
Cause Title: PRADEEP KUMAR KESARWANI VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880
The Supreme Court laid down the steps to be considered by the High Court while hearing quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 BNSS).
The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.: -
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the 13 prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
Case Title: MOHAMMED RASAL.C & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF KERALA & ANR., SLP (Crl.) No. 6588/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 884
The Supreme Court has expressed disapproval of the practice of High Courts directly entertaining applications for anticipatory bail, bypassing the Sessions Court.
The Court has decided to consider the appropriateness of this practice and issued notice to the Kerala High Court, which passed the order under challenge. The Court also appointed Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra, assisted by Adv. G. Arudhra Rao, as amicus curiae in the matter.
The bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta acknowledged that the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita conferred concurrent jurisdiction to both the Sessions Court and the High Court to deal with an anticipatory bail application. However, the bench opined that the High Court can directly entertain such matters only in exceptional cases, that too for special reasons to be recorded.
S. 223 CrPC/S. 243 BNSS |Supreme Court Lays Down Principles For Joint Trial In Criminal Cases
Cause Title: MAMMAN KHAN VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904
Interpreting Section 223 Cr.P.C (now Section 243 BNSS), the Supreme Court held that a joint trial is permissible where multiple accused are involved in offences arising out of the same transaction and a separate trial would be warranted only if the acts attributed to each accused are distinct and severable.
The Court laid down the following propositions regarding the joint trial:-
(i) Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 Cr.P.C; a joint trial may be permissible where the offences form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Sections 219 – 223 Cr.P.C. are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion;
(ii) The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons;
(iii) The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time;
(iv) Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated; and
(v) An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible; interference is justified only where prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown.
Cause Title: NITIN AHLUWALIA Versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 923
The Supreme Court on Thursday (Sep. 18) cautioned High Courts against mechanically dismissing quashing petitions based solely on the contents of the FIR, stressing that the surrounding context and circumstances of its filing must also be taken into account in some cases. The Court added that the High Courts must also take into account whether the FIR was a result of a counterblast or a retaliatory measure filed with an oblique motive just to harass the litigant.
While referring to judgments such as CBI v. Aryan Singh and Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, the Court observed that at the S.482 CrPC stage, the High Court is only expected to look at the prima facie possibility of the offence. However, in some cases, the background also must be appreciated.
A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra criticized the Punjab & Haryana High Court for mechanically refusing to quash the FIR without applying its judicial mind to the surrounding circumstances. The High Court overlooked the context of the filing of the FIR and only relied upon the FIR content, stating that since allegations had been made and the investigation was at a preliminary stage, it was “too premature” to interfere.
Cause Title: ARSHAD NEYAZ KHAN VERSUS STATE OF JHARKHAND & ANOTHER
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 950
The Supreme Court observed that the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating cannot co-exist on the basis of same allegations. The Court said that the offence of cheating (S.420 IPC/S.318 BNS) involves criminal intention from inception; however, for criminal breach of trust (S.406 IPC/S.316 BNS), there is lawful entrustment at the beginning, which is later misappropriated.
So, both these offences cannot exist simultaneously on same facts, as they are "antithetical" to each other.
“For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.”, the Court observed.
Case : SANJABIJ TARI v. KISHORE S. BORCAR & ANR
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court held that an accused need not be heard at the pre-cognizance stage of complaints filed for dishonour of cheque as per Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The Court agreed with the Karnataka High Court's judgment in Ashok Vs. Fayaz Aahmad, that there is no requirement to issue summons to the accused at the pre-cognizance stage under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita for NI Act complaints.
The Supreme Court also issued a detailed set of directions aimed at ensuring the speedy disposal of cheque bounce cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, stressing the need for efficiency, technology integration, and early settlement.
A Bench comprising Justice Manmohan and Justice NV Anjaria noted that Section 138 cases constitute a significant portion of criminal dockets, particularly in metropolitan courts, and therefore require systemic reforms to avoid delays.
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 348
The Allahabad High Court recently granted bail to an accused booked under the UAPA and serious offences under BNS for allegedly circulating on his WhatsApp status, a Pakistan-manufactured video containing adverse comments against the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi.
A bench of Justice Santosh Rai granted bail to Savej, booked for grave offences including 'waging war against the Government of India' and 'acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India'. He was arrested on May 10 this year.
The bench took into account factors including uncertainty regarding the conclusion of the trial, overcrowding in prisons, and the fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Case Title: V D MOORTHY v. THE STATE OF AP and others
Case Number: WRIT PETITION NO: 22577/2025
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that the power of a police officer under Section 179(1) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to secure the attendance of “any person”, is territorially restricted to persons residing within the limits of his own police station or any adjoining station, and the power, therefore, does not extend to persons residing beyond his jurisdiction. It further added that a policeman cannot secure the presence of such a person “as a matter of right.”
At the outset the Court observed that the power of a Police Officer to secure presence of “any person” under Section 179 is not untrammelled and is restricted to “any person” residing within the limits of his own Police Station or adjoining station.
The Court thus concluded that a Police Officer has no power to issue notice under Section 179(1) to any person who is not residing within the limits of his own station or any adjoining station. However, the same does not preclude him from making an investigation to examine such a person by approaching him at his place.
Case Title: KEYUR AKKIRAJU v. UNION OF INDIA and others
Case Number: WP 26143/2025
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has admitted a writ petition filed by one Keyur Akkiraju, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 20(8) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
Section 20(8), which is a new provision added in the BNSS, provides that the powers and functions of the Deputy Director of Prosecution (DDP) shall be to examine and scrutinise police reports and monitor the cases in which offences are punishable for seven years or more, but less than ten years, for ensuring their expeditious disposal.
Thus, the petition prayed before the Court to declare the phrase "examine and scrutinize the police reports" in Section 20(8) as being intrusive and bad in law, opposed to the fundamental principle of investigation which is to be carried out only by the police, and subsequently requested setting aside of the same as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Case: Swami Vivekananda University & Anr. -versus- The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Case No: W.P.A. No. 17617 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court has held that the objective of Section 94 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is to confer power to seek production of evidence deemed relevant for conducting of investigation, and which are not already on record.
Justice Tirthankar Ghosh held: "The ultimate object behind Section 94 of BNSS is to confer power in the hands of the Court or in case of pending investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings to produce document or other thing which the Court or the police authorities deems relevant and cogent for conducting of investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings and which are not already on record or are required for the purposes of investigation. Thus, it is a supplementary power available for unearthing truth in course of investigation/inquiry/trial or other proceedings for preventing failure of justice."
Case: In Re : XXX
Case No: C.R.M.(M) 1148 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court has suspended the bail granted to a man accused under the POCSO Act, by the trial court, after finding that the bail had been granted without hearing the victim in the case.
Justice Bivas Pattanayak held: "In the present case, undisputedly, the informant/victim was not notified about the bail application filed by the opposite party no.2 and, therefore, there is factually a denial of right to the informant/victim to participate in the proceedings which is recognised under Section 483(2) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (in short, 'BNSS'). In view of the circumstances as enumerated above, since while considering the bail application of the accused opposite party no.2 by the learned trial court, the participatory right of the informant/victim was not secured, as mandated under law, the arguments advanced on behalf of the opposite party no.2 does not hold good."
CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
Case Title: Dinesh Kumar Sahu and another v. State of Chhattisgarh
Case Number: CRMP No. 2714 of 2025
The Chhattisgarh High Court has refused to quash FIR against employees of Elastic Run– a logistics company providing delivery services to Flipkart, which delivered a prohibited knife that was subsequently used as a weapon for committing robbery and murder.
Accordingly, offences under Section 125(b) (act endangering life or personal safety of others) and Section 3(5) (criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 were registered against the employees of ElasticRun.
Refusing to quash the FIR, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru observed,
“…we are of the considered opinion that the allegations contained in the impugned FIR, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The FIR specifically alleges that the knives ordered by the accused persons through Flipkart, which were prohibited under the Arms Act, were delivered through the logistics chain of ElasticRun where the petitioners were employed, despite prior communications and warnings from the police authorities to e-commerce platforms to desist from supplying such prohibited items.”
DELHI HIGH COURT
Magistrate Not Empowered To Take Recognisance Of Offence U/S 358 BNSS: Delhi High Court
Case title: Amrita Jain v. State
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1117
The Delhi High Court has made it clear that Section 358 of the Bhartiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita (~319 CrPC) does not empower a Magistrate to take re-cognisance of an offence.
So far as Section 358 BNSS is concerned, the High Court said it only comes into play in the course of any inquiry into or trial of an offence.
“After taking cognizance, in a case such as this one where no further investigation was directed and no supplementary chargesheet came to be filed on any new material coming forth, the Court will have to wait till the stage of Section 358 of BNSS for summoning a person as an accused who has not been charge sheeted,” it held.
GAUHATI HIGH COURT
The Gauhati High Court today extended the interim protection granted earlier to journalist Abhisar Sharma in connection with an FIR registered against him over his alleged remarks accusing Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma of pursuing communal politics.
Sharma moved the HC days after the Supreme Court refused to entertain his challenge to the FIR registered by Assam police under Sections 152 (endangering the sovereignty of the nation), 196 (promoting enmity between different groups), and 197 (imputations prejudicial to national integration and security) BNS.
HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Case Name: Bhutto Ram V/s State of H.P.
Case No.: Cr.M.P. (M) No. 1933 of 2025
The Himachal Pradesh High Court held that an accidental shooting of a person, believing him to be a wild animal, amounts to death caused by negligence under Section 106 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita and not the offence of murder under Section 103 BNS.
Justice Rakesh Kainthla remarked that: “…they did not intend to cause the death of Som Dutt and cannot be prima facie held liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103 of BNS, but would be liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 106 of the BNS, which is bailable in nature.”
JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Case Title: Kapil Kak & Ors v. Government Of J&K, 2025
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh will constitute a Special Bench of three judges to hear a petition challenging a government notification that declared 25 books on Kashmir's political and social history as “forfeited” under Section 98 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
The Chief Justice Arun Palli indicated that orders would be passed shortly for constituting the Special Bench of 3 Judges required to hear such applications under the statute.
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Case Title: G Satyanarayana Varma AND State of Karnataka & Others
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 295
The Karnataka High Court has said that a second quashing plea under Section 482 CrPC/ BNSS 528 is neither maintainable nor entertainable unless founded upon demonstrable change in circumstance and the grounds which were manifestly available at the time of first plea cannot be exhumed later to prop up a second petition.
Justice M Nagaprasanna said:
"The second petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS is neither maintainable nor entertainable, unless founded upon demonstrable change in circumstance. Grounds that were manifestly available at the time of first petition, cannot be exhumed later, to prop up a second petition...Law cannot bend to repeated challenges, devoid of new substance nor it can ignore the gravity of allegations that undoubtedly wants an adjudication in a full blown trial.”
KERALA HIGH COURT
Case Title: Venu Gopalakrishnan and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 559
The Kerala High Court has recently clarified that anticipatory bail applications can be entertained by the High Courts and there is no need for parties to first approach the Sessions Court in light of the precedents in the case.
Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas made the observation while considering an anticipatory bail plea preferred by an IT-firm owner in an alleged case of rape and sexual harassment of his female employee.
The Court had considered the maintainability of the bail application before proceeding to decide the case in light of the recent observation made by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Rasal. C & Another v. State of Kerala, expressing concern regarding anticipatory bail applications being filed directly before the High Court before approaching the Sessions Court. The Apex Court had issued notice to the High Court in the case.
Case Title: Shaji @ Shaiju v. State of Kerala
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 566
The Kerala High Court recently permitted the withdrawal of two criminal appeals filed by convicts by exercising the inherent power available to it under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (corresponding to Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure).
Justice Gopinath P. clarified that such power to permit withdrawal of appeals is available only to the High Courts and not to subordinate courts entertaining appeals. He observed:
“…in cases like these where the appellants have served the entire sentence (of imprisonment), have already paid the entire fine and or served the default sentence, and are not interested in removing any stigma of conviction, it would be a proper exercise of inherent jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C/528 of the BNSS to allow the appeal to be withdrawn. Since such inherent power is not available to Courts subordinate to the High Court, a request for withdrawal cannot be entertained by any appellate court subordinate to the High Court.”
Kerala High Court Grants Bail To Man Accused U/S 69 BNS, Cites Consensual Relationship With Victim
Case Title: Vishnu v State of Kerala
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 578
The Kerala High Court granted bail to a man booked for engaging in sexual relations with a divorced woman on the pretext of marriage, observing that prima facie there seemed to be a consensual relationship between the two.
The case arose from allegations against the petitioner, accused under Sections 69(Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc), 74(Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), and 115(2) (Voluntarily causing hurt) of the BNS.
Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas, while granting bail, emphasized that the willing participation in a two-year relationship indicated a consensual relationship between the two.
Referring to the complainant's statement the court said:
“A reading of the above statement prima facie indicates that there was a consensual relationship between the petitioner and the victim for almost two years. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the marriage of the victim is still subsisting, her statement mentions that she is a divorcee. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner is a divorced lady, taking note of the long relationship between the petitioner and the victim, and that she had willingly gone with him to his house and other places and engaged in sexual intercourse, I am of the view that there is an indication of a consensual relationship. Of course, that is a matter to be concluded after the investigation".
MADRAS HIGH COURT
Case Title: K Balachenniappan v. Jeyakrishnan
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 328
The Madras High Court recently observed that the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act would override the provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita since the former was a special law.
Justice Shamim Ahmed added that the offences under Section 138 of the Act read with Section 147 of the Act were compoundable at any stage, even after the dismissal of the revision/appeal. The court noted that even a convict undergoing imprisonment could compound the offence.
The court noted that Section 147 of the NI Act began with a non obstante clause and as such, a dispute in the nature of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act could be compromised irrespective of any other legislation, including the BNSS. The court noted that though BNSS laid down procedures, it crystallised some enforceable rights and obligations and hence, could be given the status of a general law of procedure. Thus, as per the accepted proposition of law, the court reiterated that a special law would prevail over a general law, and the provisions of the NI Act would prevail over the provisions of the BNSS.
ORISSA HIGH COURT
Case Title: Harsha C v. State of Orissa
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 116
The Orissa High Court has waived a bail condition imposed by a Sessions Court requiring the accused to furnish two sureties, one of whom must be his 'kin/relative', on the ground that putting such 'onerous' condition defeats the purpose of bail.
A single bench of Justice Gourishankar Satapathy also held that putting such conditions which are impossible to comply is against the intention of the legislature. It also observed –
“After granting bail, imposing excessive and onerous conditions, which are impossible for compliance by the accused for his release from custody is not the spirit of law and would be considered depriving the accused of his personal liberty without the sanction of law.”
The petitioner filed this miscellaneous application under Section 483(1)(a)/(b) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) challenging a peculiar condition imposed by the Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Kalahandi whereby he asked the accused-petitioner to furnish two solvent sureties, one of whom must be his relative/kin.
Case Title: Narottam Prusty v. State of Odisha & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 123
Filling a legislative gap concerning interplay of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ('BNSS') and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act ('POCSO Act') regarding limitation period for filing a 'discharge application', the Orissa High Court has held that an accused under the latter enactment can prefer an application seeking discharge under Section 250(1) of the BNSS within sixty days from the date on which he is furnished with the police papers, as provided under Section 231, BNSS.
Addressing the issue, which arose due to the absence of a specific 'committal provision' under the POCSO Act, the Bench of Justice Aditya Kumar Mohapatra held –
“…this Court is persuaded to take the considerate view that in cases before Special Courts instituted under special statutes like the POCSO Act, as in the present matter, where there is no contemplation for committal of the case to the Sessions Court, the time period of 60 days for preferring a discharge application under Section 250(1) BNSS may be so interpreted as commencing from the date of supply of documents and police papers to the accused.”