For Limitation Under S.468 CrPC, Date Of Filing Complaint Is Relevant & Not Date Of Taking Cognizance : Supreme Court
In a recent judgment (Ghanshyam Soni v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr), the Supreme Court reiterated that the relevant date for computing the limitation period under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the date of filing of the complaint or the institution of prosecution, not the date when the Magistrate takes cognizance."It is a settled position of law that for...
In a recent judgment (Ghanshyam Soni v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr), the Supreme Court reiterated that the relevant date for computing the limitation period under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the date of filing of the complaint or the institution of prosecution, not the date when the Magistrate takes cognizance.
"It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance," observed the bench comprising Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma.
The case arose from a complaint of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years, thereby attracting a limitation period of three years as per Section 468(2)(c) CrPC. The alleged incidents occurred in 1999. The complainant filed the complaint on 3 July 2002, but the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 27 July 2004, well beyond the three-year period.
The appellant argued that the prosecution was time-barred as the Magistrate took cognizance after the expiration of the limitation period. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, relying on established precedent.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC begins from the date of filing of the complaint or institution of the prosecution, not from the date on which the Magistrate actually takes cognizance.
The Court relied on the decisions in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2003) 8 SCC 559] and Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases [(2014) 2 SCC 62], which held that it would be unjust to penalize a complainant for delays attributable to the court's administrative processes.
Quoting Bharat Damodar Kale, the Court emphasized that once the complainant has filed the complaint within the statutory period, they have complied with the procedural requirements under the CrPC. The delay in the court's taking cognizance, often due to administrative or scheduling reasons, is not attributable to the complainant and therefore cannot be held against them.
The Court quoted the decision:
“The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the period provided by law and once he takes such action, it would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had not taken an action within the period of limitation. Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law.”
The Court in that decision also emphasized that once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process, and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence.
Then the Court added that:
“If he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable.”
Thus, the Court reiterated the decision that it overruled all decisions in which it had been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/court and not the filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.
The Court also observed the decision in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan [(2022) 15 SCC 50] and re-emphasised the said position, and further held that simply because the cognizance is taken at a later stage, but the complaint was filed within the specified period from the commission of the offence, the complainant cannot be put to prejudice and her complaint cannot be discarded as time-barred.
Also from the judgment - Supreme Court Quashes S.498A IPC Case Against Husband & In-Laws, Cautions Against Misuse Of Law
Case Title: Ghanshyam Soni v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 676