High Court's Interference Under Article 226/227 Permissible Only If Arbitral Tribunal's Order Is Patently Perverse : Supreme Court

Case Title: SEROSOFT SOLUTIONS PVT. LTD. VERSUS DEXTER CAPITAL ADVISORS PVT. LTD.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14

The Supreme Court today criticized the High Court's intervention under its Writ Jurisdiction in the Arbitral Proceedings, where it had directed the Arbitral Tribunal to grant additional time for one party to cross-examine another, despite the Tribunal already having provided ample time for cross-examination. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra observed that the High Court can interfere with the impugned order under its Writ Jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances when the impugned order suffers from perversity.

“It is evident from the above that even as per the quote hereinabove interference under Article 226/227 is 'permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.”, the court said.

Observing that the High Court failed to point out any perversity in the tribunal's order, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha deprecated the practice of interfering with the arbitral process when full opportunity was granted to the parties to present their case in the proceedings governed under Section 18 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”).

Supreme Court Sets Aside Awards Of Over Rs 46 Lakhs Passed Against UP Govt In Sham Arbitration Proceedings

Case Details : STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER VERSUS R.K. PANDEY AND ANOTHER | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10212 OF 2014

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 45

The Supreme Court on Thursday (January 9) set aside two ex-parte arbitration awards on grounds of fraud played by the litigant who appointed sole arbitrators and conducted 'sham' arbitration proceedings in a service dispute against U.P. Government and Government Hospital where he was employed.

The bench of CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar was hearing an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh challenging the veracity of the ex parte awards and the arbitration agreement relied by the respondent on the basis of which such arbitration proceedings were conducted.

The Court observed : "It was not the case of Respondent No. 1, R.K. Pandey that the Municipal and Development Board, Kanpur, or the Governor of Uttar Pradesh has invoked the arbitration clause. The unilateral appointment of the arbitrator by Respondent No. 1, R.K. Pandey is, therefore, contrary to the arbitration clause as propounded by him."

The Court placed reliance on the recent decision in Central Organisation of Railway Electrification v. ECI PIC SMO MCPL (JV), a Joint Venture Company which held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators.

Supreme Court Flags Stringent Limitation Provisions Curtailing Arbitration Appeal Remedies, Urges Parliament To Address Issue

Case no. – My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M/S Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49

The Supreme Court raised concerns about the interpretation of limitation statutes in arbitration cases and observed that the rigid application of the law could curtail the limited remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge arbitral awards.

“In our view, the above construction of limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails a remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award. This must be addressed by the Parliament”, the Court observed.

A bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Pankaj Mithal dismissed an appeal filed by a company against a Delhi High Court judgment rejecting its challenge to an arbitral award as barred by limitation under Section 34.

While the Court concluded that the appellant's delay in filing the petition was not condonable under the prevailing legal framework, Justice Narasimha, in his opinion, with which Justice Mithal agreed, highlighted concerns with the strict interpretation of limitation provisions.

Can HC Appoint Sole Arbitrator When Arbitration Clause Provides For Unilateral Appointment Of Arbitrator ? Supreme Court To Consider

Case Detail : M/S R.S. CONSTRUCTION vs. BUILDING CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT

SLP(C) No. 000979 - / 2025

The Supreme Court on Monday ( January 20) agreed to consider the issue of whether the High Court can appoint a sole arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 if the arbitration agreement between parties provides for unilateral appointment in violation of the decision in CORE v. M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML.

The bench of CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar was hearing the challenge to the order of the Patna High Court which refused to appoint an arbitrator under S. 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 in a tender-related dispute. Here, the petitioner who is a private party entered into a work contract with the Building Construction Department of Govt. of Bihar. The High Court ultimately rejected the request of appointing a sole arbitrator.

Arbitration Act | Courts' Jurisdiction Under Sections 34 and 37 Do Not Extend To Modifying Arbitral Award: Supreme Court Reiterates

Case Title: S. JAYALAKSHMI VERSUS THE SPECIAL DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER & ORS.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 98

Recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle laid down in National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem & Another that the jurisdiction of the Courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) will not extend to modifying an arbitral award.

The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra was hearing the case dealing with the land acquisition compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956. Dissatisfied with the Arbitral Tribunal's decision to award land acquisition compensation @ ₹495/sq.m, the Appellant preferred application before the District Court under Section 34, which had modified the award and enhanced the compensation to be payable @ ₹4,500/sq.m with 9% interest.

Can Arbitral Awards Be Modified Under S. 34 & S.37 Of Arbitration Act? Supreme Court Refers To 5 Judge Bench

The Supreme Court today (January 23) referred to a 5 judge constitution bench the issue of whether Courts have the power to modify an arbitral award under S. 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The bench of CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justices Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan directed that while considering the scope of powers of the Court to modify arbitral awards, an examination of the scope and contours of S. 34 and 37 will also be needed. The Court would also need to see the extent to which modification powers can be given if such modification is allowed.

Notably, in February 2024, a bench of Justices Dipankar Dutta, K.V. Viswanathan, and Sandeep Mehta referred to the larger bench the question of whether the courts have the power to modify the arbitral award under Sections 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

S. 16 Arbitration Act | Challenge To Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction Impermissible After Submitting Statement Of Defence : Supreme Court

Case Title: M/S VIDYAWATI CONSTRUCTION COMPANY VERSUS UNION OF INDIA

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 105

The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged after the submission of the statement of defence.

A bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing a case in which the respondent had objected to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal after submitting its statement of defence. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected the objection and subsequently passed an award. However, the District Judge set aside this award, and this decision was upheld by the Allahabad High Court. Taking reference to Section 16(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act"), the Appellant argued that the High Court erred in affirming the District Judge's decision to set aside the arbitral award. The Appellant contended that by accepting the appointment of the sole arbitrator and being allowed to modify its statement of defence, the Respondent waived its right to challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction after the statement of defence had been filed.

Arbitration Act | Appellate Courts Can't Reassess Awards, Must Limit Enquiry On Public Policy Breach : Supreme Court

Case Title: SOMDATT BUILDERS –NCC – NEC(JV) VERSUS NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA & ORS.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 115

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that arbitral awards should only be interfered with in cases of perversity, violation of public policy, or patent illegality. It emphasized that appellate courts cannot reassess the merits of awards and must limit their inquiry to whether the award breaches Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act i.e., if the award is against the public policy of India.

The bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing the case where the dispute arose concerning increased quantities of geogrid required for constructing a reinforced earth (RE) wall as part of a road construction project. NHAI claimed that increased quantities beyond those stated in the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) warranted renegotiation of rates.

'Oral Undertaking Falls Within Scope Of Arbitration Clause' : Supreme Court Upholds Award Against Husband For Operation In Wife's Demat Account

Case Title: AC CHOKSHI SHARE BROKER PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS JATIN PRATAP DESAI & ANR.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 178

The Supreme Court today (February 10) held that an oral contract undertaking joint and several liability falls within the scope of an arbitration clause.

Holding so , the Court affirmed an arbitral award against a husband, finding him jointly liable for the award due to a debit balance in a joint demat account registered in his wife's name.

The Court rejected the contention that the husband's liability constituted a "private transaction" beyond the scope of arbitration. Instead, it held that the arbitration clause, applicable to non-signatories, in conjunction with the husband's active participation in transactions within his wife's account, gave rise to an implied oral agreement establishing joint and several liabilities for both parties.

Supreme Court Reiterates Narrow Scope Of Interference Under Section 37 Arbitration Act

Case Name: M/s. C & C Constructions Ltd. vs. IRCON International Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6657 OF 2023

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 148

The Supreme Court reiterated that in appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Court has a narrower scope to review the arbitral award if the award has already been upheld under Section 34 (application for setting aside arbitral awards). Reliance was placed on the recent decision in Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs Union of India.

At the outset, the Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan pointed out that the appellants have challenged the validity of clause 49.5 of the Contract that barred the appellant's present claim. However, given that this issue was not raised before the High Court, the appellant could not have raised this in the present appeal for the first time.

“Careful perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that the contention that the validity of clause 49.5 ought to be decided in the light of Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act was not raised before the learned Single Judge in a petition under Section 34. The said contention was not raised even before the Division Bench in appeal under Section 37. Therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise the said contention in this appeal for the first time.”

Arbitration Agreement Enforceable Against Legal Representatives Of Deceased Party : Supreme Court

Case : Rahul Verma and others vs Rampat Lal Verma and others

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 269

The Supreme Court has reiterated that an arbitration agreement is enforceable against the legal representatives of a deceased partner of a partnership firm. The bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan also referred to the Delhi High Court's judgment in Jyoti Gupta v. Kewalsons & Ors., reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7942 which held that an arbitration agreement does not stand discharged on the death of a partner and it can be enforced by the legal heirs of the deceased-partner. The Court was deciding an appeal against a judgment of the Gauhati High Court which referred the legal heirs of a deceased partner to arbitration. The appellants contended that the arbitration clause cannot be enforced against them as they are non-signatories of the agreement.

International Commercial Arbitration | How To Determine Law Governing Arbitration Agreement? Supreme Court Discusses Tests

Case Title: DISORTHO S.A.S. VERSUS MERIL LIFE SCIENCES PRIVATE LIMITED

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 317

In a significant judgment relating to International Commercial Arbitration, the Supreme Court today (March 18) ruled that in the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contractus).

The bench comprising Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar, and Justice KV Viswanathan heard the case where the plea was made for an appointment of an arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration where the Petitioner was a foreign-Columbia-based entity, whereas the Respondent was an Indian-Gujarat based entity.

In this case, because there was no express choice for the law governing the arbitration agreement, the Court then applied the implied choice test and inferred that the parties intended Indian law to govern the arbitration agreement, given that Clause 16.5 designates Indian law as governing the contract. Further, the court found that Indian law had the closest connection to the arbitration agreement satisfying the third test.

Sec 34(3) Arbitration Act | Application Filed On Next Working Day After 90 Day Period Is Within Limitation : Supreme Court

Case Title: M/S R. K. TRANSPORT COMPANY VERSUS M/S BHARAT ALUMINUM COMPANY LTD. (BALCO)

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 391

A bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Prashant Kumar Mishra held that the three-month limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) for challenging an arbitral award should not be rigidly interpreted as exactly 90 days, rather it should be interpreted as three calendar months. The Court upheld the filing of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on 11.07.2022 to set aside an arbitral award passed on 09.04.2022, despite it being beyond the 90-day period. It noted that the limitation period ended on 09.07.2022, which was a court holiday (second Saturday), followed by Sunday. Therefore, the application filed on the next working day, Monday (11.07.2022), was held to be within limitation.
Relying on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 and applying Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Court reiterated that for calculating limitation under Section 34(3), the date on which the arbitral award is passed must be excluded. Accordingly, the limitation period begins from the day following the date of the award.

Supreme Court Holds Chandigarh Authorities Liable For Delay In Film City Project, Directs Refund Of 47.75 Crores To Successful Bidder

Case Title: M/s. PARSVNATH FILM CITY LTD. VERSUS CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & OTHERS, CIVIL APPEAL NO.6162 OF 2016 (and connected case)

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 422

In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court largely upheld an arbitral award passed in favor of a company engaged by the Chandigarh Administration to establish a Multimedia-cum-Film City in the Union Territory, holding the authorities liable to refund a forfeited bid amount of Rs.47.75 crores. A bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma delivered the verdict, being of the view that the Punjab and Haryana High Court wrongly set aside the arbitral award. It opined that though time was of the essence to the project sought to be developed, there was a clear and unreasonable delay (of over 16 months) attributable to the authorities in handing over encumbrance-free land to the appellant-Company.

High Courts

Allahabad High Court

[S.16 Arbitration Act] Jurisdiction Of Tribunal Cannot Be Challenged After Submission Of Defence: Allahabad High Court

Case Title: M/S. Arya Rice Mill v. State Of U.P. And 6 Others 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 42 [WRIT - C No. - 41517 of 2024]

Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 42

The Allahabad High Court has held that as per Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged after submission of defence and that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to adjudicate on its own jurisdiction.

The bench of Justice Siddhartha Varma and Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava held

“Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for challenge to the jurisdictional authority of the Arbitral Tribunal. In terms of sub-section (2) thereof, a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction should be raised not later than the submission of the defence. If the excess of jurisdiction crops up during the proceedings, the objection should be made at that very time. In any case, objection on the question of jurisdiction has to be made before the arbitral tribunal itself, and the arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction.”

Section 36 Of Arbitration Act As Amended Applies To Pre-Amendment S.34 Applications: Allahabad High Court Reiterates

Case Title: U.P. Jal Nigam (Urban) And Another vs. Spml Infra Ltd.

Neutral Citation No.: 2025:AHC:20224

The Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Piyush Agrawal, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Kochi Cricket Private Limited & Others (2018), held that the amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies prospectively to court proceedings initiated on or after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act.

Andra Pradesh High Court

Limitation For Appointment Of Arbitrator Commences From Date Of Failure To Comply With Requirements In Notice Invoking Arbitration: AP High Court

Case Title: Alliance Enterprises v. Andhra Pradesh State Fiber Net Limited (APSFL)

Case Number: Arbitration Application No. 48 of 2023

The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Chief Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur has held that the limitation period for filing an application seeking appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, commences only after a notice invoking arbitration has been issued by one of the parties and there has been either a failure or refusal on the part of the opposite party to make an appointment as per the procedure agreed upon between the parties. The Court referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd. wherein the court had observed that the “limitation period for making an application seeking appointment of arbitrator must not be conflated with the limitation period for raising the substantive claims which are sought to be referred to an arbitral tribunal.”

Applying the law laid down in these precedents to the facts of the present case, the Court observed that the notice invoking arbitration clause was issued by the Applicant only on 17.10.2022. Assuming that three years were to be calculated from the said date itself, the present application which was filed on 31.08.2023 was well within the period of limitation of three years as prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Named Arbitrator Cannot Be Replaced Unless There Is Evidence Of Partiality Or Bias Against Them: Andhra Pradesh HC

Case Title: M/s. Kranthi Grand DKNV Hospitalities and another Vs. M/s. Manasa Estates and Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and 2 others

Case Number:ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO: 62 of 2023

The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur has held that the request for seeking appointment of an independent arbitrator other than the named arbitrator cannot be entertained if there is no evidence to show that the named arbitrator would act in a partial or biased manner. The court observed that the explanation given by the applicant as to why the arbitrator other than the nominated arbitrator is required to be appointed is very casual. No reasons have been furnished whether the named arbitrator falls any of the ineligibilities prescribed under section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.

The Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Limited and others vs. Raja Transport Private Limited (2009) held that the appointment of the named arbitrator in the agreement is a rule and appointment of the arbitrator other than the named arbitrator should be treated as an exception.

[A&C Act] Non-Payment Of Part Of Mutually Agreed Amount After Settlement Of Dispute Not An Arbitrable Issue Under Arbitration Agreement: Andhra Pradesh HC

Case Name: M/s.Brothers Engineering and Erectors Ltd. Vs. M/s. Zorin Infrastructure, LLP

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has upheld the dismissal of an application filed under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, holding that once an amount has been mutually decided by the parties, the dispute itself is resolved and no arbitrable issue remains for consideration.

A Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice V. Srinivas pointed out that non-payment of part amount of the mutually agreed amount cannot be said to give rise to an arbitrable dispute. When an arbitration clause stipulates that 'any dispute' is arbitrable, it should be understood in line with section 8 of the Act, to mean 'any dispute' arising out of a contractual agreement. Giving credence to the judgement rendered in Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP, the Bench noted that ideally, jurisdiction lies with the Tribunal to decide whether a matter is arbitrable or not and the High Court is only granted the power to have a 'second look'. However, the bench pointed out, that there is one exception to this rule. When the issues are manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable, the Court may interfere and reject the application at the threshold.

Bombay High Court

Substantive Objections On Validity Or Existence Of Arbitration Agreement Can Be Adjudicated By Tribunal U/S 16 Of Act: Bombay HC

Case Title: Shreegopal Barasia Versus M/s. Creative Homes & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 17

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that substantive objections concerning the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement can be adjudicated by the Arbitral Tribunal and not by the court under section 11 of the Arbitration Act.

It further added that towards such purpose of ruling on its own jurisdiction, and dealing with objections as to existence and validity, two specific sub-clauses have been inserted in Section 16(1) of the Act. The arbitration clause in a contract is treated as an independent agreement that is distinct from the other terms of the contract. Besides, a decision that the contract containing the arbitration clause is void, would not entail the legal outcome that the arbitration clause is invalid.

Serving Signed Copy Of Award To Employee Of Party Does Not Constitute Valid Service U/S 31(5) Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Health Care, Medical & General Stores Versus Amulya Investment,Through Proprietor Mr. Sameer G. Narvekar

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 23

The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh S. Patil has held that service of a signed copy of an award on an employee of a party to an arbitration agreement is not a valid service under section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act. The court at the outset noted that section 2(h) of the Arbitration Act defines the term party as a party to an arbitration agreement and referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Benarsi Krishna Committee & Ors. Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd.(2012) where it was held that a party under section 2(h) means only party to an arbitration agreement and not any agent or advocate acting on behalf of the party.

Court Cannot Assume Jurisdiction To Appoint Arbitrator Unless Request For Reference Of Dispute Is Received By Respondent: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Sri Sathe Infracon Private Limited v. M/s Rudranee Infrastructure Ltd. & another (ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 9 OF 2024)

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 36

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice R. M. Joshi has held that compliance with Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is mandatory and that the court cannot assume jurisdiction to appoint an Arbitrator under Section 11 unless a request for a reference of dispute is received by the respondent.

Here in this case, parties have agreed that before referring the dispute to arbitration, an amicable settlement must be attempted. In light of the agreement between parties, it is necessary to see whether there is compliance with this provision. Additionally, the court noted that it was specifically stated in the notice dated 28.03.2023 that the applicant had no intention of going into uncalled arbitration and had asked for an amicable settlement. It was also stated that if the date for amicable settlement is not communicated in 15 days, it shall be presumed that there is no possibility of settlement and in this situation, the Arbitrator came to be appointed. After this communication, there were settlement talks between the parties to resolve disputes between them amicably.

While Commercial Speech Falls Within Free Speech, Contract Prohibit Adverse Remarks: Bombay HC Imposes 90-Day Injunction On Wonderchef's Distributor

Case Title: Wonderchef Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. vs Shree Swaminarayanan Pty Ltd. (Commercial Arbitration Petition 791 of 2024)

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 40

Observing that commercial speech is a part of 'free speech' guaranteed by the Constitution of India, the Bombay High Court imposed a 90-day injunction against an Australia-based distributor of Wonderchef Home Appliances, owned by Celebrity Chef Sanjeev Kapoor, from making any comments or communications which could harm the reputation of the company, due to a contractual clause preventing them from doing so.

Single-judge Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan while imposing the injunction, also ordered Wonderchef to invoke Arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

"It would be necessary for me to record that commercial speech is eminently part of free speech. It is not easy for a Court to prohibit a party from expressing itself about its grievances about a product acquired in the course of commerce, since the factors to be borne in mind when considering a request for a gag order, is to see if such expression is truthful and warranted. Merely because speech is made in a commercial context, it would not cease to have the ingredients of free expression," the judge said in the order passed on January 27.

Mandate Of Facilitation Council Is Not Terminated Even If It Fails To Render Award Within 90 Days U/S 18(5) Of MSME Act: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Maharashtra Public Service Commission Versus Vast India Pvt. Ltd.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 56

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the mandate of the MSME Facilitation Council (Council) cannot be terminated merely on the ground that it failed to render an award within 90 days under section 18(5) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“MSME Act”) from the date of entering reference as this time period is directory in nature.

Additionally, the court observed that although the time period under the MSME Act is directory, once the arbitration is undertaken by the Council, the timeline prescribed under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act becomes applicable. Accordingly, the award must be rendered within 12 months from the completion of pleadings. However, the court noted that in this case, a counterclaim was also filed by the MPSC, which reset the 12-month deadline as provided under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the award rendered by the Council was within the prescribed timeframe and could not be said to be in violation of Section 29A.

When There Is Ambiguity In Arbitration Agreement, Business Efficacy Test Can Applied To Discern Intent Of Parties To Arbitrate: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Lords Inn Hotels and Resorts Versus Pushpam Resorts LLP and 3 Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 60

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that when there is an ambiguity in the agreement with respect to arbitration related provisions, the business efficacy test can be applied to discern true intent of the parties to arbitrate.

The court observed that as per section 7(4) of the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement would be considered in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in exchange of letters or other means of communication which includes electronic communication. Furthermore, the court observed that under Section 7(5), a reference in a contract, to a document containing an arbitration clause would constitute an arbitration agreement, if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause a part of the contract.Limitation For Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act Is Governed By Article 116 Of Limitation Act, Delay Not To Be Condoned In Mechanical Manner: Bombay HC

Case Title: Executive Engineer National Highway Division Versus Sanjay Shankar Surve & Ors

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 61

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the delay in filing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 (“Arbitration Act”) should not be condoned in a mechanical manner as it would defeat the very objective of the Arbitration Act which is to provide a speedy resolution of disputes.

It also held that as per judgment of the Supreme Court in Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (2021), the limitation period under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is governed by Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”) which provides for a 90 days time period. The delay in filing the appeal beyond 90 days can be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act but only when sufficient cause is demonstrated.

Court At Designated Venue In Arbitration Agreement Can Entertain Application U/S 11 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court

Case Number: Keller Ground Engineering India Private Limited Versus Archon Powerinfra India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 62

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the court having supervisory over designated venue of the Arbitration proceedings would have jurisdiction to entertain application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) in absence of any contrary indicia indicating any other place to be the seat of arbitration.

The court rejected the submission that the court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present application under section 11 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the parties have chosen consciously in their agreement that the venue for the arbitration proceedings shall be Mumbai. It also observed that whether the document executed is a valid document is a matter to be decided by the Arbitrator and not by the court under section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, whether the work that has been carried out is with respect to one work or both requires adjudication on merits which can be decided by the Arbitrator.

LLP Can Be Bound By Arbitration Clause Despite Not Being Signatory To LLP Agreement: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Kartik Radia vs. M/s. BDO India LLP and Anr.COMM. ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 31 OF 2022

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 85

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the mere fact that an LLP is not a signatory to an LLP Agreement does not, by itself, preclude it from being a party to arbitration proceedings initiated between Partners under the arbitration clause of such an agreement.

The Court observed that an LLP is not a “third party” to its LLP Agreement but an entity with rights and obligations vis-à-vis its partners as per the statutory scheme of the LLP Act. The Arbitral Tribunal, and not the Section 11 Court, has the jurisdiction to determine whether a party is a necessary or proper party to the arbitration.

Arbitration Clause In Invoices Can Be Binding On Parties When They Acted Upon The Invoices And No Objections Were Raised: Bombay HC

Case Title: Sanjiv Mohan Gupta v. Sai Estate Consultants Chembur Pvt. Ltd.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 94

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has observed that where the correspondence between the parties included invoices which contained an arbitration clause and the parties acted upon those invoices without protesting, then it could be deemed that the party had accepted the arbitration clause.

The Court relied on its previous judgment in Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. MAD (India) Pvt. Ltd. – 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 7807, that where the parties had acted upon the invoices and there was no denial of invoices raised by the applicant, the clause contained in the invoices which clearly stipulated a reference to arbitration, deserved to be construed as an arbitration clause. The Court observed that in view of the settled position of law with respect to the scope of inquiry under Section 11, its examination was limited to a prima facie existence of a formal arbitration agreement which was satisfied in the present case.

Setting Aside Of Arbitral Award Leaves It Open To Parties To Choose To Arbitrate Again: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Batliboi Environmental Engineering Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 100

The Bombay High Court Bench of Justice Somsekhar Sundaresan has observed that once an arbitral award has been set aside by the court in the exercise of its powers under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the parties would be restored to the original position and a fresh arbitration in such circumstances would not amount to the proverbial “second bite at the cherry”.

The court observed that the jurisdiction of limited review under Section 37 read with Section 34 could not assume the character of a full- blown appellate review. While exercising its power under Section 34 and Section 37, the Court does not have the power to consider the case on merits and substitute the judgment in the arbitral award with its own judgment. The Court noted that when the Supreme Court judgment ruled that the Section 37 Judgment was right, it was essentially exercising the same jurisdiction as flowing from Section 37 of the Act read with Section 34 of the Act.Bombay High Court Injuncts Owner Of Kapani Resorts From Alienating Any Interest In Properties Until Conclusion Of Arbitral Proceedings

Case Title: Manmohan Kapani Through Special Power of Attorney Chandani Sood Versus Kapani Resorts Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 106

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has injuncted the owner of Kapani Resorts and Greater Kailash Property from alienating any interest in the Resorts and the property under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), until the conclusion of arbitral proceedings

The Court noted that under section 9(1)(ii)(c) of the Arbitration Act, the court can grant interim protection for the detention or preservation of property involved in arbitration. The Greater Kailash Property and fetter on its marketable title is subject matter of the dispute. The title became available to Virendra only because the Kapani Resorts, a company controlled by Virendra and Vaibhav was funded by Manmohan to pay the debt of SIDBI while the reciprocal promise of issuing shares remained unfulfilled.

Court Must Assign Reasons For Accepting Or Rejecting Grounds Of Challenge U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court

Case Title: National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Limited (NAFED) Versus Roj Enterprises (P) Limited and Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 110

The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh Patil has held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be dismissed merely by stating that the scope of interference is limited; the court must address each ground of challenge and provide reasoned findings.

The Supreme Court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. Vs. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. (2024) jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and is restricted to the same grounds of challenge as Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Benefit Of S.14 Of Limitation Act Extends To Delayed Filing Of Petition U/S 34 Of A&C Act Due To Prosecution In Good Faith In Another Court: Bombay HC

Case Title: NTPC BHEL Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. Versus Shree Electricals & Engineers (India) Pvt. Ltd

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 112

The Bombay High Court bench of Justices G. S. Kulkarni and Advait M. Sethna has held that the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) can be extended to the petitioner who committed delay in filing an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) due to the prevailing legal position at the time of filing, which was subsequently changed.

After referring to relevant materials, the court observed that It clearly appears that the appellant was pursuing the writ petition considering the legal position as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. vs. Micro and Mine Enterprises Facilitation Council (2018) that the Facilitation Council would not have jurisdiction to enter

Arbitrator's Decision To Postpone Issue Of Partnership Firm's Dissolution To Stage Of Final Hearing Not Perverse: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Suresh Raithatha Adult and Anr. VERSUS Bharti Navnit Raithatha

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 114

The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh S. Patil has held that the decision of the Arbitrator to postpone the issue of determining the date of dissolution of the partnership firm to the stage of final hearing cannot be considered perverse for the purpose of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), as it requires evidence to be presented, which is necessary for such an issue to be decided.

The Supreme Court in Wander Limited v Antox India Pvt Ltd. (1990) held that “Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material.” The court concluded that since the Arbitrator's view was plausible and not arbitrary, capricious, or perverse, it could not substitute its own view for that of the Arbitrator, given the limited scope of interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Invocation Of Section 9 & Section 11 Of Arbitration Act Does Not Constitute Parallel Proceedings: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Fab Tech Works & Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs Savvology Games Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 121

The Bombay High Court single bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan held that the mere invocation of Section 9 and Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not amount to parallel proceedings. Further, the High Court noted that Section 9 is intended to provide interim relief to safeguard the subject matter of arbitration. On the other hand, Section 11 is limited to the appointment of an arbitrator when there is a dispute regarding the arbitration agreement.

Acquiescence To Termination Notice Of Agreement Bars Interim Relief U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Jupicos Entertainment Private Limited Versus Probability Sports (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Case Number: Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 12967 Of 2025

The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice M.S. Karnik has held that when a party is aware of a termination notice issued by the other party and conducts itself on the assumption that the termination has taken effect, it cannot later seek interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) on the ground that the other party is proceeding to assign the subject matter of the contract to a third party and should therefore be restrained.

The court at the outset noted that prima facie, there is merit in the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for MCA that the agreement between Jupicos and Probability Sports does not suggest an agency relationship with MCA. Instead, it appears to be an independent, principal-to-principal contract.

Interim Relief U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Must Be Sought With 'Reasonable Expedition': Bombay High Court

Case Title: Ashoka Buildcon Ltd. vs. Maha Active Engineers India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 192

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice A. S. Chandurkar and Justice Rajesh Patil have held that an applicant under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) must approach the court with reasonable expedition. Delay of several years without adequate explanation is a material factor that militates against the grant of such relief.

The court observed that relief under Section 9 of the Act is discretionary and must be guided by the settled principles of interim relief, namely the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. An appellate court can interfere with the discretionary order of the trial court only if such discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or in ignorance of settled legal principles.

Calcutta High Court

Section 8 Application Must Be Filed Before Or Simultaneously With Written Statement: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: Smt. Gitarani Maity -vs- 1A. Mrs. Krishna Chakraborty and others

Case Number: FAT No. 308 of 2023

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Subhendu Samanta held that when no application for reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is made by either party, the civil court may very well entertain the suit and proceed with the adjudication of the same on merits in accordance with law.

Also, the court held that the Trial Judge committed a patent error of law on both counts: first, the suit could not have been dismissed under Section 8. And secondly, the Section 8 application, having not been filed before or even simultaneously with the written statement of the defendant, could not have been entertained at all by the trial Judge.

[Seat vs. Venue] Designated “Seat” Of Arbitration Has Exclusive Jurisdiction: Calcutta High Court Reiterates

Case Title: Versatile Construction vs. Tata Motors Finance Ltd.

Case Number: APOT/389/2024 with AP.COM/822/2024 IA No.: GA-COM/1/2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that once the “seat” of arbitration is designated in an agreement, it is to be treated as the exclusive jurisdiction for all arbitration proceedings. The Court referred to the 'Shashoua Principle', which propounds that when there is an express designation of a "venue" and no alternative seat is specified, the venue is considered the juridical seat of arbitration.

The court noted that the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Company v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO) opined that the legislature had intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as the agreement may have provided for a seat of arbitration at a place which was neutral to both the parties.

Power To Correct Computation Error U/S 33 Of Arbitration Act Can Be Exercised Suo Moto If No Application Is Filed Within 30 Days: Calcutta HC

Case Title: Haldia Development Authority Vs M/s. Konarak Enterprise

Case Number:AP-COM No.229 and 255 of 2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya has held that power to correct computation error in the award under section 33 of the Arbitration Act can be exercised suo moto by the Arbitral Tribunal when no application is filed to this effect within 30 days. The court at the outset rejected the contention with respect to claims barred by limitation on the ground that the final bill was prepared on May 18, 2016 based on which the claim was made on November 11, 2016 which was within the limitation period.

The court also noted that clause 3(a) of the contract allowed the forfeiture of security deposit only when the contract was rescinded but in the present case there was no material on record indicating that the contract was rescinded.

Calcutta High Court Directs South Eastern Railway To Refund Additional 20% Surcharge Levied On Consignment

Case Title: Indian Oil Corporation Vs. Union of India

Case Number: F.M.A.T. No. 237 of 2017

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Uday Kumar has held that an impugned judgment passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Kolkata whereby the appellant's claim for refund of 20% surcharge was refused is erroneous in law and perverse.

Court said that the tribunal overlooked the obvious legal effect of the Circulars and Goods Tariff documents before it, which were the only documents which would have any bearing on the adjudication. Thus the court allowed the claim for relaxation regarding an additional 20% surcharge incorporated by the Circular.

[S.12A Commercial Courts Act] Pre-Institution Mediation Is Intended To Encourage Parties To Use Litigation As Last Resort: Calcutta HC

Case Title: Asa International India Microfinance Ltd. v. Northern ARC Capital Ltd. & Anr.

Case Number: FMAT 3 of 2025 with IA No. CAN 1 of 2025 CAN 2 of 2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that the clear intent of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is to encourage parties to use litigation as a last resort and to resolve commercial disputes amicably, informally, cheaply and quickly under the process of mediation. Additionally, the court modified the interim relief to the effect that upon the appellant making payment of Rs.2 crores and filing an affidavit of assets and schedule of payments respectively for other creditors. The appellant shall be permitted to utilize the rest of the amounts injuncted by the impugned order.

Plaint Cannot Be Rejected Even If No Satisfaction Is Recorded By Court On Bypassing Pre-Institution Mediation U/S 12A Of Commercial Courts Act: Calcutta HC

Case Title: Haldibari Tea Manufacturers LLP & Anr. Versus Mahindra Tubes Limited & Ors.

Case Number: CO 204 of 2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Raja Basu Chowdhury has held that admission of the plaint by the Commercial Court without recording satisfaction as to whether the requirement of pre-institution mediation under section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”) can be bypassed and a case for urgent relief is established, cannot be said to be fatal and the plaint cannot be rejected on this ground alone.

The court observed that accepting the plaint without recording the satisfaction as to the urgency of relief cannot be said to be fatal. The court at the time of scrutinizing the plaint has to see whether the case for the urgent relief is established. It need not go into the question whether the plaintiff will succeed in obtaining the same. Even if interim relief is denied or the case is weak, the plaint cannot be rejected on this ground alone

Calcutta High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Directing KMDA To Refund Amount Deposited By South City Projects Under MoU

Case Title: KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. SOUTH CITY PROJECTS (KOLKATA) & ANR.

Case Number: APO/205/2023 WITH AP/351/2020 IA No. GA/1/2023

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Harish Tandon and Madhuresh Prasad has held that findings of the Arbitrator based material cannot be interfered with within the limited scope of proceedings under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).

The court noted that as per Article XX the remedy of requiring the defaulting shareholder to sell its shares to the non-defaulting shareholder is not absolute and is without prejudice to other rights. Article XX does not contain a clause ousting remedies legally available otherwise to the parties. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the arbitrator and decided against the appellant. It further added that the submission that there was no obligation on the KMDA to create any right or obligation in favour of the claimants in respect of the immovable property was rightly rejected. It further noted that a factual finding had been recorded based on his evidence that without encroachments being removed the development of even the reduced lands measuring 83.52 Kottahs of land was not possible.

[Arbitration Act] Referral Courts Can't Indulge In Enquiry Into Whether Claims Are Time-Barred: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: Kalpataru Projects International Limited vs. Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited (BHEL)

Case Number: AP-COM/94/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that in an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it would not be proper for the referral court to indulge in an intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question of whether the claims raised by the petitioner were time-barred or not.

“Courts, at the referral stage, can interfere only when it is manifest that the claims are expressly time barred and dead or when there are no subsisting disputes. In all other cases, the matter should be referred to the arbitral tribunal for decision on merits.”, the court observed.

The court referred to the decision in 'Aslam Isamil Khan Deshmukh vs. ASAP Fluids Private Limited and anr.' which clarified that the referral court must only conduct a limited enquiry to examine whether the application under section 11(6) had been filed within three years or not.

Govt Authority Must Furnish Security Before Getting Stay On Award U/S 36(3) Of A&C Act, No Special Treatment Can Be Given: Calcutta High Court

Case Title:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL LIBRARY, MINISTRY OF CULTURE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA VS EXPRESSION 360 SERVICES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED (NOW KNOWN AS EXPRESSION AD AGENCY PVT. LTD.)

Case Number:AP-COM/860/2024, AP-COM/644/2024 and EC-COM/245/2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that special treatment cannot be given to the government while hearing a petition seeking stay on the enforcement of the award under section 36(3) of the Arbitration Act. Every petitioner including the government will have to furnish security or deposit the awarded amount before a stay on the enforcement of the award can be granted.

The court noted that the Supreme Court in Pam Development (Supra) held that Arbitration is essentially an alternate dispute resolution mechanism curated to provide a swift and quick resolution of disputes therefore if money decree award passed against the government is allowed to be stayed unconditionally, it would defeat the very purpose of the Arbitration Act as the award holder would be deprived of the fruits of the award on mere filming an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Pre-Referral Jurisdiction Of Court U/S 11(6) Includes Inquiry On Whether Claims Are Ex-Facie & Hopelessly Time Barred: Calcutta HC

Case Title: M/s N.C. Construction v. Union of India

Case Number: AP-COM/144/2025

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that while the scope of adjudication by referral court is limited and entails a mere examination of whether the arbitration agreement exists or not, the referral court is not precluded from examining whether the claim is deadwood or ex facie barred.

The Court referred to the decision of the Apex Court in SBI General Insurance v. Krish Spinning 2024 SCC Online SC 1754 wherein the court clarified the dictum laid down in Arif Azim to prevent any conflict between the decision in Arif Azim and Aslam Ismail. Applying the settled position of law to the facts of the case, the court found that the claim of the Petitioner is ex-facie barred. The bill was submitted on October 12, 2007 and the certificate of completion was issued in 2007. From the record it was evident that some the letters issued by the Petitioner disclosed the intention to go for arbitration yet the Petitioner waited upto 2025, to approach the Court.

Referral Court Can Reject Arbitration Only In Exceptional Cases Where Plea Of Fraud Appears To Be Ex Facie Devoid Of Merit: Calcutta HC

Case Title: SREI Equipment Finance Limited v. Whitefield Papermills Ltd.

Case Number: AP-COM/368/2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar observed that unless the arbitration agreement prima facie appeared to be inoperative on account of fraud, the referral Court should not indulge in a roving inquiry as such an inquiry is within the domain of the arbitrator. The fact whether the agreement was induced by fraud would entail a detailed consideration of the evidence lead by the parties and these issues cannot be decided by the referral court.

The Court referred to the decision in A Ayyasamy, where the Apex Court had held that an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act can be rejected only when the allegation of forgery and fabrication of documents in support of the plea of fraud permeated through the entire contract, including the arbitration agreement, thereby raising a serious question with regard to the validity of the contract itself. Such issues required elaborate evidence to be adduced by the parties and the civil court should reject such application and proceed with the suit. However, the reverse position was also discussed in the said decision which stated that where there were simple allegations of fraud touching upon the internal affairs of the parties, inter se and it had no implication in the public domain, the arbitration clause need not be avoided and the parties should be relegated to arbitration.

To Prove Corruption Of The Arbitrator, It Should Be Evident From The Award Itself That He Tried To Curb The Course Of Justice

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has observed that if the subject matter of the arbitral proceedings or making of the award was affected or induced by fraud or corruption, then an unconditional stay of award can be granted. However, such corruption must be prima facie evident from the award itself and an honest mistake or erroneous application of law by the arbitrator would not amount to corruption.

The Court observed that the expression “making of the award” would mean that the award must have been obtained by a party to the arbitration upon suppressing material evidence or by making false statements before the arbitrator in order to take an unfair advantage over the other party. In the present case, the petitioners have not been able to, prima facie; establish that any of these situations had arisen in the making of the award. There was nothing on record to show that vital documents had been either concealed or that false statements had been made before the Arbitrator, which had a causative link with the facts constituting and culminating in the award.

Arbitration Agreement Valid Without Specifying 'Applicable Law', 'Seat' Or 'Venue' If Intent To Refer Dispute To Private Tribunal Is Clear: Calcutta HC

Case Title: ILEAD FOUNDATION Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Case Number: AP-COM/152/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that for an arbitration agreement to be binding, neither the applicable law nor the seat or venue needs to be mentioned. As long as the clause indicates that the parties had agreed and there was a meeting of minds to refer any dispute to a private tribunal for adjudication of the disputes, the clause would constitute an arbitration clause.

Threshold To Prove Fraud & Corruption In Arbitral Award Is Much Higher Than Merely Criticising Findings Of Arbitrator: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: Karur Vyasa Bank v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited

Case Number: AP-COM 947/2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has observed that in order to prove that the making of the award was vitiated by fraud, the petitioner would have to demonstrate that the unethical behaviour of the arbitrator surpassed all moral standards. The Court reiterated that an honest mistake or incorrect appreciation of the terms of the contract cannot be either fraud or corruption.

The Court observed that the second proviso to Section 36(3) required a primary satisfaction on the part of the court that the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. The award-debtor could seek stay of operation of the award upon discharging the burden of at least, prima facie, showing that the award was induced by fraud or corruption. The Court made reference to Venture Global Engineering LLP v. Tech Mahindra Limited (2018) 1 SCC 656 to discuss the meaning of fraud. The Court further observed that the threshold to prove fraud and corruption on the part of the learned Arbitrator in the making of the award would be much higher than a criticism of the findings of the learned Arbitrator.

Loss Of Profit In Works Contracts Can Be Awarded Upon Illegal Termination, Even In Absence Of Direct Proof: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. M/s. S.K. Maji

Case Number: FMA 573 of 2024

The Calcutta High Court division bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that once a contractor establishes an illegal and unjustified termination of the contract by the employer, there is no need to prove the actual loss suffered. A reasonable expectation of profit is implicit in a works contract, and compensation must be awarded accordingly. The court distinguished between claims for 'loss of profit' (resulting from unexecuted work due to illegal or premature termination) and 'loss of profitability' (arising from the reduced profit margin due to contract prolongation). The court held that while claims for 'loss of profitability' generally require evidence, 'loss of profit' from unexecuted works does not require proof of actual loss.

Writ Petition Is Not Maintainable When Effective And Efficacious Remedy In Form Of Arbitration Is Available: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS VERSUS SAUMAJIT ROY CHOWDHURY

Case Number: MAT NO. 1735 OF 2023 WITH I.A. NO. CAN 1 OF 2023

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya held that it cannot entertain a writ petition if an effective and efficacious remedy, in the form of arbitration, is available. It said that the High Court would normally exercise its jurisdiction in 3 contingencies namely (i) when the writ petition was filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights, (ii) where there has been violation of principle of natural justice, or (iii) where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of an Act is challenged.

the court observed that the appellant's case doesn't not fall in any other contingencies which have been carved out in Whirlpool Corporation Versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others (1998). Also, the court noted that there was a binding arbitration agreement between the parties. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable, more particularly when the agreement provides for efficacious alternate remedy.

Tendering Authority Is Best Judge To Decide T&C Of Tender, Judicial Interference Permissible Only When Terms Are Arbitrary: Calcutta HC

Case Title: BISWAS ENTERPRISES AND ANOTHER VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

Case Number: 2025:CHC-AS:508-DB

The Calcutta High Court bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Chaitali Chatterjee (Das) has held that tender issuing authority is the best judge to decide terms and conditions of a tender. Such terms and conditions cannot be tinkered with by the Judicial Authority unless they are found to be arbitrary or whimsical.

The court noted that the Supreme Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Versus State of Karnataka and Others (2002) held that fixation of value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the court hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. While applying the above ratio to the facts of the present case, the court rejected the contention of the Appellant that the tender value was set above one crore to favor select bidders and encourage cartelization. The Appellant had previously participated in the tender issued by the State Fisheries Department in May 2023. Given the narrow margin between the amounts of previous tender in which the Appellant participated and the present tender, no valid case for interference is made out.

Non-Signatories To Arbitration Agreement Can Be Made Party To Dispute If Reliefs Sought Against Them Align With Those Sought Against Signatories: Calcutta HC

Case Title: M/s Exchange and Others v. Pradip Kumar Ganeriwala and Another

Case Number: A.P.O.T. No.338 of 2024 arising out of GA (COM) 4 of 2024 In CS (COM) 544 of 2024 with GA (COM) 1 of 2024, GA (COM) 2 of 2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Uday Kumar has observed that if the reliefs against the non-signatories to the arbitration agreement are in harmony with the reliefs sought against the signatories, particularly when the legal relationship between the signatories and non-signatories are on the same platform vis-a-vis the cause of action of the suit and the reliefs claimed, then the non-signatories could very well be brought within the purview of the arbitration agreement. The Court placed reliance on Ajay Madhusudan wherein it was observed that for determining whether non-signatory parties would be bound by the arbitration agreement, the court has to assess whether such parties or entities intended or consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract. The requirement of a written arbitration agreement did not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties if there was a defined legal relationship between the signatory and non-signatory parties.

Prescribing Pre-Qualification Criteria By Authority In Tender Document Cannot Be Considered Arbitrary If Conditions Are Reasonable: Calcutta HC

Case Title: BLACK DIAMOND RESOURCES AND ANR. VS INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED AND ORS.

Case Number: MAT/2470/2023x

The Calcutta High Court bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Chaitali Chatterjee Das has held that the imposition of pre-qualification conditions by the tender-inviting authority cannot be interfered with by the courts when sufficient guidelines have been provided in the tender documents on how the authority's discretion shall be exercised.

The court noted that Rule 173(i) General Financial Rules, 2017 uses the word may granting the tendering authority discretion to relax turnover/expense criteria for startups. The Appellant cannot claim such relaxation as mandatory. Given that the tendered product is an explosive substance, IOCL had the authority to impose conditions ensuring public safety. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance's OM date September 20 2016 excludes sensitive departments from the relaxed norms.
The Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Limited (supra) held that a constitutional court will not interfere merely due to disagreement with an administrative decision or its process. The interference of the court is justified only when mala fides, favoritism, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity is established.

Arbitrator Can't Be Impleaded In Application U/S 36(2) Of A&C Act Unless Prima Facie Case Of Fraud Or Corruption Is Established: Calcutta HC

Case Title:WEST BENGAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS. TATA MOTORS LIMITED

Case Number: AP-COM/88/2024 IA No. GA No. 1 of 2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Aniruddha Roy has held that when an application under Section 36(2) seeking unconditional stay of the award on the ground of fraud or corruption is pending adjudication, the question of impleading the person who delivered the award does not arise at such a premature stage. Unless the court, upon examining the application, arrives at a prima facie finding that the award was indeed procured by fraud or corruption, impleadment is neither necessary nor maintainable.

The court noted that at the outset, it appears that the instant application is premised on the Supreme Court's judgments in Vinod Bhaiyalal Jain and Microsoft Corporation, both of which were rendered in the context of Section 34 proceedings. While a Section 34 court may review the award in detail within its limited jurisdiction, the grounds of fraud, corruption, or bias must be adjudicated at that stage. For an unconditional stay under Section 36(2), the applicant must clearly establish fraud or corruption by the tribunal as defined under Section 36(3); mere allegations of bias do not suffice.

Professional Engagement With Law Firm Does Not Disqualify Advocate From Acting As Arbitrator: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: DAMODAR VALLEY CORPORATION VS AKA LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED

Case Number: AP-COM/178/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that an Advocate who has accepted briefs from a law firm for unrelated clients cannot, by that fact alone, be deemed ineligible to act as an Arbitrator in disputes involving parties not personally known to or represented by him, even if the same law firm appears in the arbitration.

The Court noted that Section 12(5) of the said Act provides that, notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel or the subject matter of the dispute falls under any of the categories specified in the VIIth schedule, shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator.

It further observed that Schedule VII deals with the arbitrator's relationship with parties or counsel. Category 3 of the VIIth Schedule, provides that the arbitrator shall not represent the lawyer or the law firm, acting as counsel for one of the parties. Which means that the learned Arbitrator should not have represented the law firm as its Advocate or counsel in any legal proceeding.

Arbitration Clause Mandates Reference, Question Of Appropriateness Can't Be Considered U/S 8 Of A&C Act: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: M/S. CHOLAMANDALAM INVESTMENT AND FINANCE COMPANY LIMITED Versus SUJAN SEIKH

Case Number: FMA/251/2025 IA No: CAN/1/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Arijit Banerjee and Rai Chattopadhyay has held that where an agreement between the parties contains a clear arbitration clause and disputes arise under that agreement, the Trial Court is bound to refer the parties to arbitration. The question of whether such reference is appropriate or not does not arise, as Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is mandatory in nature.

The court observed that the impugned order must be set aside. Since the agreement contains a valid arbitration clause and disputes have arisen under it, the Trial Court was bound to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act. The question of it being appropriate or inappropriate does not arise in view of the language of Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act, which is mandatory. Once a party applies before filing the first substantive statement, the Court must refer the matter to arbitration unless it finds that no valid arbitration agreement exists.

Chhattisgarh High Court

Additional Evidence Can Only Be Allowed In Exceptional Circumstances While Deciding Plea U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Chhattisgarh HC

Case Title: M/s Hira Carbonics Private Limited versus Kunwar Virendra Singh Patel and Anr.

Case Number: WP227 No. 8 of 2025

The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey has held that additional evidence not forming part of the arbitral record can be allowed to be given only in exceptional circumstances while hearing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The court noted that in Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd.(supra) the Supreme Court held that ordinarily additional documents which are not part of the arbitration record cannot be permitted to be given by the court hearing the application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The proceedings under section 34 are summary proceedings and if additional evidence are permitted, the purpose of speedily disposing of the petition would be defeated.

Execution Proceedings Can't Be Quashed Solely Due To Non-Supply Of Signed Arbitral Award: Chhattisgarh High Court

Case Title: Amit Kumar Jain vs. Induslnd Bank Limited Through Its Director & Anr.

Case Number: WP227 No. 39 of 2025

The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey has held that non-supply of the signed arbitral award may be a ground for setting aside an award, but on this ground alone, the execution proceedings cannot be quashed.

The court noted that the petitioner did not take any steps to obtain a certified copy of the award. “Non-supply of the signed arbitral award may be a ground for setting aside an award, but on this count alone, the execution proceedings cannot be quashed”, the court observed. The court observed that an award can only be challenged under section 34(2) and not otherwise. It dismissed the petition.

Delhi High Court

No Bar To Avail Remedy U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Even Against Non-Parties To Subject Matter Of Dispute: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna has held that the Plaintiffs are not barred from availing the remedy under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 even against individual(s)/entities who are not party to the Family Settlement out of which the dispute arose.

The application for ad interim injunction was held to be not maintainable due to pending Arbitration proceedings in regard to the Family Settlement and a pending Application under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.

The court noted that the Application under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is yet to be adjudicated. It noted that the cause of action reflected that there was no immediate urgency. The issue of whether the suit was only maintainable under the Companies Act before the NCLT was also raised.

Date Of Receipt Of Corrected Award Would Be Taken As Disposal Date U/S 34(3) Of Arbitration Act, Even When Application U/S 33 Has Been Filed: Delhi HC

Case Title: TEFCIL BREWERIES LIMITED v. ALFA LAVAL (INDIA) LIMITED

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 18

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that taking the date of receipt of the corrected award as the starting point and not as the date of disposal would actually go contrary to the plain reading of Section 34(3) of the Act. This will apply even in cases where an application under Section 33 of the Act has been filed.

The court held that the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Act give two timelines. One, where an application under Section 33 of the Act has not been filed in which case the legislature was conscious enough to state that it would be the date of receipt of the award. Whereas, in the case where an application under Section 33 of the Act has been filed, the legislation was conscious enough to lay down that the date of disposal would be the starting point for calculation of limitation.

Expert Tribunal's Award Did Not Suffer From Patent Illegality, Cannot Be Set Aside U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Center For Research Planning And Action v. National Medicinal Plants Board Ministry Of Ayush Government Of India

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 42

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Yashwant Varma and Justice Dharmesh Sharma has held that the scope of interference by the Court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited, and the Court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to determine whether the award is good or bad.

In the present case, the court held that the expert tribunals award did not suffer from patent illegality, and thus could not be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Arbitral Award Cannot Be Challenged In Writ Petition, Party Must Use Remedy U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LTD v. MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISE FACILITATION COUNCIL AND OTHERS

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 44

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that it cannot entertain a writ petition challenging an arbitral award, and the petitioner should challenge the award by taking recourse to appropriate remedies under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The court observed it is impermissible for the petitioner to agitate these issues in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned award having been rendered by the sole arbitrator, and the objections as regards (lack of) jurisdiction having been rejected by the sole arbitrator, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to assail the same by taking recourse to the remedies under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Arbitrator's Order Determining Substantive Rights Of Parties Constitutes “Award”, Amenable To Challenge U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi HC

Case Title: Aptec Advanced Protective Technologies AG vs. Union of India

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 48

The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has held that orders passed by the Arbitrator during the pendency of Arbitral proceedings, which finally determines any substantive rights of the parties, constitutes an interim Arbitral Award, and can be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

At the outset, the court noted that the A&C Act does not define “interim award”. The court referred to IFFCO Ltd. v. Bhadra Products which held that the Arbitral Tribunal can make an interim arbitral Award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final Award; and the term “matter” in Section 31(6) of the A&C Act includes any point of dispute between the parties which has to be answered by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Supreme court had held that while the arbitration proceedings can be terminated only by way of a final Award, there can be one or more interim Awards before the final Award, which conclusively and finally determine some of the issues between the parties, finally leading upto the final Award.

Section 13 Of Commercial Courts Act Doesn't Provide Any Independent Right To Appeal In Arbitration Matters: Delhi High Court Reiterates

Case Title: Synergies Casting Ltd. vs. National Research Development Corporation & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 64

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has held that an order which neither sets aside nor refuses to set aside the arbitral award, does not fall under the ambit of Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and is not appealable.

The court observed that appeals in arbitration matters are maintainable only if expressly provided for in section 37/ 50 of the A&C Act. Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not confer an independent right to appeal.

Referral Courts At Post-Award Stage Must Protect Parties From Being Forced To Arbitrate Non-Arbitrable Claims: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/s Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. M/s NHPC Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 66

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad, while refusing to appoint an arbitrator in a Section 11 petition, has held that the referral court in a post-award stage must protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when, after prime facie scrutiny of the facts the claims are found to be non-arbitrable. The court applied the 'eye of the needle' test, which allows the referral court to reject arbitration in exceptional circumstances where the claims are deadwood.

Issue Related To Existence Of Arbitration Agreement Cannot Be Decided Ex-Parte, Without Hearing Respondent: Delhi High Court

Case Title: WTC NOIDA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY PVT. LTD V. MS. ARTI KHATTAR & ORS.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 83

A Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur held that the District Judge should not have decided the issue related to the existence of an arbitration agreement ex-parte, without calling upon the respondent to give its stand on the same.

The court observed that the arbitration agreement, by virtue of the presumption of separability, survives the principal contract in which it was contained. The Arbitration Agreement forming part of a contract is treated as an agreement independent of other terms of the contract. The question of whether the underlying agreement stands discharged itself may be a dispute arising out of or in relation to or under the substantive contract and would not be precluded from reference to arbitration.

[Arbitration Act] Application U/S 34 Without Award Copy Or Vakalatnama Is Merely A 'Stack Of Papers' Filed To Save Limitation: Delhi HC

Case Title: KGF COTTONS PVT LTD v. HALDIRAM SNACKS PVT LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 94

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, filed without the award itself, would not be a valid filing.

Justice Prasad stated that without the Award, the challenge would become meaningless because unless the award is perused by the court, it cannot adjudicate upon the appropriateness and correctness of the award. An application under Section 34 of the Act, filed without an award and admittedly without a vakalatmana, can only be a stack of papers filed only to save the limitation, he said.

When Counter-Claim Is Related To Primary Dispute, It Can Be Filed Before Tribunal U/S 23 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/S. Akn Developers Private Limited v. M/S. Premsons Southend

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 96

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Jain has held that while any counter-claim may relate to a different cause of action, it can still stem from a primary dispute between the parties. Thus, the court held that the governing factor would be to see whether it has any connection with the original dispute or is isolated and separable. For all purposes, the court observed that the counter-claim in this case was, directly or indirectly, related to the primary dispute between the parties and the claim in question. Additionally, the court held that if there is a strong interconnectivity or linkage between the two i.e. claim and counter-claim, these can be assumed to be a part of the same transaction.

Appointment Of Arbitrator In International Commercial Arbitration By HC Does Not Vitiate Award: Delhi High Court

Case Title: HALA KAMEL ZABAL versus ARYA TRADING LTD. & ORS.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 102

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar has held that the appointment of the Arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration (“ICA”) by the Chief Justice of the High Court, does not vitiate the impugned award.The bench held that the objection to the appointment of the arbitrator should have been raised during the arbitration proceedings. Since the parties failed to do so, they were deemed to have waived their right to object.

The examination of the impugned award hinges on whether the award is vitiated due to the alleged illegality in the appointment of the arbitrator, particularly concerning Issue (3), which would only be pertinent if the award is already compromised due to such illegality. Regarding Issue (1), the appointment of the arbitrator, it was determined that it was not in accordance with the 1996 Act, as Section 11(6) clearly mandates that in the case of an ICA, the arbitrator must be appointed by the Supreme Court. However, in this instance, the appointment was made by the Chief Justice of the High Court, rendering the appointment technically flawed.

Award Cannot Be Set Aside When No Objections Were Raised Before Arbitrator Or Court U/S 12(5) Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: BHADRA INTERNATIONAL INDIA PVT LTD AND ORS. versus AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 173

The Delhi High Court bench of Justices C. Hari Shankar and Ajay Digpaul held that the award cannot be set aside solely on the ground that the appointment of the Arbitrator was illegal in view of section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Arbitration Act) when no such objections were raised before the Arbitrator or the court under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The court noted that if the arbitrator was legally incompetent to act as an arbitrator, mere acquiescence of the appellants would not render him competent. However, the court while setting aside the award solely on this ground must also consider the broader objective of the Arbitration Act that is to promote Arbitration as the preferred mode of dispute resolution mechanism. It also observed that despite the introduction of section 12(5), the arbitration continued for two more years and the award came to be passed. But the appellants never raised a whisper before the Arbitrator or the court under section 34 that the arbitrator was incompetent to act as an arbitrator based on section 12(5).

Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Against IRCTC In Dispute Over Reimbursement For Catering Services, Sets Aside Interest As 'Patently Illegal'

Case Title: Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corp. Ltd. (IRCTC) vs. M/s. Brandavan Food Products

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 179

The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has reiterated the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”). The court upheld the arbitral award granted in favour of M/s Brandavan Food Products Ltd. (“Claimant”) in a dispute regarding the reimbursement of differential costs for meals and beverages supplied under a catering contract with the Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. (IRCTC) (“Respondent”). The court set aside the interest award as 'patently illegal' as interest could not be granted on amounts not due as of a particular date.

Delhi High Court Re-Affirms Discretion Of Arbitral Tribunal To Implead 'Non-Signatory' As 'Necessary Party' In Arbitration Proceedings

Case Title: Dixon Technologies (India) Limited vs. M/s Jaiico & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 194

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has reaffirmed that an Arbitral Tribunal has the authority to implead non-signatories to an arbitration, provided they are deemed 'necessary parties' to the proceedings.

The court was hearing an application u/s. 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for the appointment of Arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising under a Standard Transportation agreement and Customs Clearing Agent agreement. The petitioner had impleaded Respondent no.2, a non-signatory to the agreements.

Violates Public Trust Doctrine: Delhi HC Sets Aside Tribunal's Award Allowing RIL To Explore 'Migrated Gas' Without Express Permission

Case Title: Union of India v. Reliance Industries Limited & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 202

A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising of Justice Rekha Palli and Justice Saurabh Banerjee, while hearing an appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act, set aside an arbitral award in favour of Reliance Industries Limited(RIL). The Court invoked the doctrine of 'public policy in India', 'public law' and 'Public Trust Doctrine' and observed that the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) which held that the RIL's breach of Production Sharing Contract (PSC) was not a material breach of the PSC and 1959 PNG Rules, was in violation of fundamental law of India and the award was patently erroneous.

The Court observed that the issue of 'patent illegality' involves Article 297 of the Constitution, and 'public policy in India', 'public law' and 'Public Trust Doctrine', being all intertwined, are to be considered. By Article 297 of the Constitution, UOI is a depository holding the natural resources of India as a Trustee, and without the explicit and express permission of the UOI, there can be no extraction of the said resources by anyone. The findings of AT pertaining to the implicit permission of the UOI of the 'migrated gas' require consideration. The UOI entered into a PSC with RIL since RIL had the 'technical know-how.' RIL was appointed for a specific and limited purpose of exploring/extracting the natural resources for and on behalf of the UOI.

Failure To Attach Impugned Arbitral Award Along With Section 34 Application Would Render Filing Non-Est: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India and Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 210

A full bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Rekha Palli, Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Saurabh Banerjee while hearing a reference made by a single judge bench in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India [FAO(OS)(COMM) 70/2024] held that if the party challenging an award u/s 34 of the A&C Act does not attach the impugned arbitral award with the Section 34 application, the filing will be considered "non-est." The Court further held that the filing of the arbitral award along with the Section 34 application is an essential requirement.

The bench observed that the arbitral award can be set aside by the Court u/s 34(2)(a) of the A&C Act, if the applicant establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that any of the grounds mentioned in the said section were violated during arbitral proceedings. An award can also be set aside u/s 34(2)(b) of the A&C Act, if the subject matter of the dispute was not capable of being settled by arbitration, or if the award was in conflict with the public policy. Furthermore, an award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court u/s 34(2A) of the A&C Act, if the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It would be impossible to satisfy the conditions given u/s 34 of the A&C Act, if the arbitral award is not placed on record.

Delhi High Court Dismisses Challenge Against Arbitral Award Rejecting Counterclaim For Failure To Raise Timely Objections On Quality Of Goods

Case Name: Unison Hotels Pvt Ltd v. KNM Chemicals Pvt Ltd

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 219

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has upheld an Arbitral award stating that objections regarding the quality of goods must be raised within a reasonable time as per section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The court concurred with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal that since the Petitioner failed to dispute the quality of supplies within a reasonable time, its counterclaims were rightly dismissed.

The court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal observed that the petitioner ought to have aired its objections with regard to the quality of the goods within 15 days of receipt of the same. As per the admitted case of the parties, the goods were last supplied on 12.06.2019; however, the objections for the first time were put on record after nearly four and a half months.

MSMED Act Will Prevail Over Arbitration Act In Disputes Pertaining To A Party Which Is An MSME: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Idemia Syscom India Private Limited v. M/s Conjoinix Total Solutions Private Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 231

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has reiterated that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a general law governing the field of arbitration whereas the MSMED Act, 2006 governing a very specific nature of disputes concerning MSMEs, is a specific law and being a specific law would prevail over Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The Court observed that while Arbitration & Conciliation Act is a general law governing the field of arbitration, MSMED Act governs a very specific nature of disputes concerning MSMEs and it sets out a statutory mechanism for the payment of interest on delayed payments. Thus, MSMED Act being the specific law and Arbitration and Conciliation Act being the general law, it would prevail over the general law. The Court noted that in view of Section 18 and Section 24 of the MSMED Act which provide non obstante clauses which have the effect of overriding any other law for the time being in force, the legislative intent is clear that MSMED Act would have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. The Court relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Silpi Industries and Ors. v. Kerala SRTC and Anr. (2021) and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods (P) Ltd. (2023).

Arbitral Award Not Signed By All Members Of Tribunal Can Be Set Aside If Reasons For Omission Of Missing Signature Are Not Stated: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/s Isc Projects Private Limited v. Steel Authority of India Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 249

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Prateek Jalan has observed that the signature of all members of the arbitral tribunal should be available on the award as the signing of an award is not a ministerial act but a substantive requirement. It was further observed that if the signature of any member of the tribunal is omitted, then the reasons should be stated as this requirement is referable to the need to ensure that all members of the tribunal have has an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

Construction Of Terms Of Contract Must Be Primarily Decided By Arbitrator, Not Court U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: 'DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD versus VOESTALPINE SCHIENEN GMBH, AUSTRIA

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 137

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Dinesh Kumar Sharma has held that Construction of the terms of the contract is primarily for the arbitrator to decide, unless it is found that such a construction is not at all possible.

The court at the outset traced the jurisprudence with respect section 34 of the Arbitration Act.It referred to the Supreme Court judgment in MMTC Ltd. V.JM. Combine (2019) where it was held that an arbitral award can be set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, perverse or shocks the conscience of the court. The award passed by the arbitrator can also be set aside when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. An arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible view based on facts. Similarly, the Apex Court in K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2020) held that there is the highly constricted power of the court to interfere with an arbitral award for the reason that if parties have chosen to avail an alternate mechanism for dispute resolution, they must be left to reconcile themselves to the wisdom of the decision of the arbitrator and the role of the court should be restricted to the bare minimum.

Award Passed By Improperly Appointed Arbitrator Is Non-Est In Law And Invalid: Delhi High Court

Case Title: ISAR ENGINEERS PRIVATE LTD. versus NTPC-SAIL POWER COMPANY LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 140

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that it is settled law that the Arbitrator is a creature of the contract and has to function within four corners of contract. If a particular mechanism is contemplated for his appointment, the same must be followed in its true letter, spirit and intent, failing which the Arbitrator is without jurisdiction and the appointment is non-est and invalid.

The court noted that as per arbitration clause, the general manager/unit head was empowered to act as an arbitrator and in the absence of the general manager/unit head, managing director or chairman of the respondent company was empowered to appoint any other person as an arbitrator. It further added that prior to amendment act of 2015, appointment of an employee as an arbitrator was not by itself a ground for bias as held by the Supreme Court in Aravali Power Co. (P) Ltd. v. Era Infra Engg. Ltd., (2017) . However, justifiable doubts could be raised if the person was a controlling or dealing authority with respect to subject matter in dispute.

When Application U/S 33 Of A&C Act Is 'Disguised Review', Limitation For Challenging Award U/S 34 Cannot Be Extended: Delhi HC

Case Title: DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. Vs. HCC SAMSUNG JV

Case Number: O.M.P. (COMM) 381/2024 & I.A. 38567/2024

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that if the application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is purely an application for review, then the person seeking to challenge the award cannot avail of the time taken between the filing of the application under Section 33 and the date of disposal for calculating the period to challenge the award. The court stated that Section 33 cannot be allowed to be used as a tool to prolong limitation under Section 34, as it would undermine the legislative intent behind Section 33.

The court referred to the case of Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd. (2023), wherein the Respondent had moved an application under Section 33 seeking an increment in the valuation of gold based on the prevailing market value, which the Petitioner was required to pay under the award. The Supreme Court while setting aside the order of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Section 33 application, observed that "only in a case of arithmetical and/or clerical error, the award can be modified and such errors only can be corrected”.

Time Spent Before 'Wrong' Court Excluded U/S 14 Of Limitation Act While Calculating Limitation Period U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: INCITE HOMECARE PRODUCTS PVT LTD versus R K SWAMY PVT LTD ERSTWHILE RK SWAMY BBDO PVT LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 279

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Dharmesh Sharma has held that during the calculation of the limitation period of three months for the application under Section 34(1) of the Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is excluded. Court noted that the proceedings in the wrong court should be bona fide, with due diligence.

The court observed that the District Judge had failed to consider the aspect of exclusion of time in accordance with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Further, the court also relied on the judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt., wherein the Supreme Court distinguished the scope and ambit of Section 5 vis-a-vis Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Limitation Does Not Stop If Initial Filing Is Non Est, Date Of Filing Must Be Reckoned From Date Of Refiling: Delhi HC

Case Title: Sudesh Hans v. Gian Chand Hans and Another

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 281

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has reiterated that the filing of the arbitral award under challenge along with application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement and non-filing of the same would make the application non est in the eyes of law. The Court further observed that such a non est filing would not stop the limitation and the date of filing would be reckoned from the date of refilling.

The Court relied on its recent full bench decision in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India and Another 2025 SCC OnLine Del 636, wherein it was observed that an initial filing is considered to be non est if the application under Section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act is so deficient so as not to be considered as a filing at all. Even if such a deficient filing is made within the period of limitation, the Court will not consider the same to have been filed in law and the period of limitation for filing the same shall not stop and shall continue to run. It was further observed that filing of the Arbitral Award under challenge along with the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement and non filing of the same would make the application non est in the eyes of law.

Delhi HC Grants Interim Relief U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act By Attaching TMT Steel Bars Worth ₹69.5 Crores Made Using Coal Whose Quality Was Disputed

Case Title: RESCOM MINERAL TRADING FZE versus RASHTRIYA ISPAT NIGAM LIMITED RINL AND ANR

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 282

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has granted interim relief to a petitioner under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the extent of 50% of the balance outstanding claimed i.e., Rs. 69.50 Crores by attaching TMT Steel bars (finished product) of the equivalent amount in a dispute over the quality of coal delivered, which was used to manufacture the steel bars.

Arbitral Awards Can Be Granted On The Basis Of Evidentiary Admissions: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Rattan India Power Ltd. v. BHEL

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 299

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Prateek Jalan has observed that the power to pass an award on admissions is wide, and evidentiary admissions (admissions contained outside pleadings) can also form the basis of an arbitral award. The Court observed that while it is true that admissions in pleadings are placed on a higher footing to the extent that they may require nothing more for a decree to follow, those outside of pleadings must be considered contextually. However, to hold that there is a bar on granting an award of admissions in the case of evidentiary admissions would be inconsistent with the text of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.

The Court observed that the argument of the Petitioner that an award cannot be made on evidentiary admissions i.e. admissions beyond pleadings was liable to be rejected in view of the use of the phrase “pleadings or otherwise” used in Order XII Rule 6. The Court observed that while it is true that admissions in pleadings are placed on a higher footing to the extent that they may require nothing more for a decree to follow, whereas those outside of pleadings must be considered contextually. However, to hold that there is a bar on granting an award of admissions in the case of evidentiary admissions, would be inconsistent with the text of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.

Veracity Of Allegations Against Settlement Agreement Cannot Be Looked Into By Court In Application U/S 11 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/s ARSS Infrastructure Projects Ltd. v. National Highway Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 313

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has reiterated that the scope of inquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is limited to examining the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement. It was further observed that if either party contests a prior settlement agreement, then such allegations cannot be looked into by the Court under an application for appointment of arbitrator and would have to take recourse under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

The Court observed that the Petitioner had alleged that the settlement proceedings were vitiated because at that time the Petitioner was in financial duress. The veracity of the allegations of the Petitioner qua the settlement agreement could not be looked into by the Court in a petition under Section 11 of the Act. As per Section 74 of the A&C Act, the settlement agreement entered shall have the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by an arbitral tribunal under section 30. If the Petitioner wished to challenge the settlement agreement, they would have to take recourse under Section 34 of the A&C Act, subject to the rules of limitation.

Withdrawal Of MSMED Council Application Does Not Preclude Arbitration U/S 11, Even Without Council's Response: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/S Smartschool Education Private Limited Vs M/S Bada Business Pvt. Ltd And Ors

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 320

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad held that withdrawal of an application before the MSMED Council does not bar a party from seeking the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, even in the absence of any corresponding response from the MSMED Council.

The Court observed that Clause 11.2.2 of the agreement contains an arbitration clause which provides that the seat of arbitration shall be at New Delhi. The Petitioner issued notice dated 02.03.2023 followed by another notice dated 30.05.2024 invoking arbitration. The Respondent has chosen to deny its liability and therefore there is no question of making any attempt to settle the disputes amicably. The Petitioner has therefore approached this Court for appointment of arbitration and this Court has issued notice in the matter on 05.08.2024.

Serious Allegations Of Fraud Constituting Criminal Offense Are Non-Arbitrable: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Bentwood Seating System (P) Ltd. vs Airport Authority Of India & Anr

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 321

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad held that the allegations of fraud which are extremely serious and potentially constitute a criminal offense are non-arbitrable. The court noted that the plea of fraud is of such a nature that it impacts the entire contract, including the arbitration agreement. Consequently, the court held that such a dispute is not arbitrable in nature.

The High Court referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors [(2016) 10 SCC 386] and Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation [(2021) 2 SCC 1]. The Supreme Court in these cases clarified the distinction between arbitrable and non-arbitrable disputes involving fraud. The Supreme Court held that while allegations of fraud simpliciter could be adjudicated by an Arbitral Tribunal, serious allegations of fraud should be best left to the Civil Courts. The High Court noted that in this case the allegations of fraud were not simple but involved complex issues. It noted that this included the fabrication of documents from foreign entities and the involvement of international witnesses. The court further held that the Civil Court is better equipped to handle such matters, given the need to summon witnesses from outside the country and the involvement of governmental authorities.

Party Entering Settlement Agreement, Agreeing To Consent Award Cannot Later Object To Its Enforcement On Grounds Of Lack Of Knowledge: Delhi HC

Case Title: Mercedes Benz Group AG v. Minda Corporation Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 322

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Anish Dayal has rejected an objection raised by the Award Debtor against the enforcement of an Award on the ground that it was contrary to public policy since it was not informed by the Award Holder about a previous settlement with the Judgment Debtor's subsidiary. The Court deprecated the stance taken by the Award Debtor, as in view of the facts of the case, it found the objections to be unjust, unfair and nothing but an attempt to obstruct the enforcement of the Award.

Order Passed U/S 23(3) Of Arbitration Act Is Procedural & Not An Interim Award, Cannot Be Challenged U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: NTPC LIMITED versus STARCON INFRA PROJECTS INDIA PVT LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 32

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that an order dismissing an application under Section 23(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is only a procedural order and does not qualify as an 'interim award' amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. The court relied on the judgment in Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1999) and held that for any order to be termed as an interim award, it must finally determine the rights of the parties and any order which does not give any imprimatur on the rights of the parties cannot be termed as an interim award.

Application U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act Not Maintainable If Not Filed With Copy Of Arbitral Award: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Ircon International Limited vs M/S Pnc-Jain Construction Co (Jv)

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 332

The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Yashwant Varma and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan has held that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is non-maintainable if it is not accompanied by a copy of the impugned award. The court held that the filing of the award is not a mere procedural requirement but a mandatory prerequisite for invoking the court's jurisdiction under Section 34. The Division Bench referred to its decision in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India. The Full Bench in this case noted that a challenge to an arbitral award is maintainable only on limited grounds. The Full Bench held that none of these conditions can be assessed unless the arbitral award itself is placed before the court. It held that the filing of the award along with the application under Section 34 is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement.

Arbitral Tribunal Is Sole Judge Of Evidence, Court Not Required To Re-Evaluate Evidence U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: DIRECT NEWS PVT. LTD versus DTS TRAVELS PVT. LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 333

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Tejas Karia held that the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. An award would not be held invalid merely because the award is based on little evidence or on evidence which does not meet the quality of a trained legal mind. Also, the Court held that it is not required to reappreciate or reevaluate the evidence and reagitate the disputes under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause Prevails Over Seat Of Arbitration Clause If It Expressly Covers Proceedings Relating To Arbitration: Delhi HC

Case Title: Precitech Enclosures Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Rudrapur Precision Industries

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 347

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar has observed that generally if an agreement contains both exclusive jurisdiction clause and seat of arbitration clause, then judicial proceedings relating to arbitration would lie only before the court having territorial jurisdiction over the arbitral seat/venue. However, as in the instant case, if the exclusive jurisdiction clause also covers proceedings relating to arbitration then it would prevail over the seat of arbitration clause.

The Court observed that where the agreement between the parties had contractually conferred jurisdiction for appointment of the arbitrator on competent courts in a particular territorial jurisdiction by exclusive jurisdiction clause, such court and no other would have the jurisdiction to entertain a Section 11 application. Thus, where an exclusive jurisdiction clause covered and included applications relating to the arbitral proceedings it would predominate over the seat of arbitration clause.

Participation In Arbitral Proceedings Does Not Imply Acceptance Of Unilateral Appointment Of Arbitrator Unless Objections Are Waived In Writing: Delhi HC

Case Title: SHAKTI PUMP INDIA LTD versus APEX BUILDSYS LTD and Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 351

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that the mandate of the Arbitrator can be terminated under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) if the Arbitrator was appointed unilaterally, which is explicitly prohibited under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act unless the ineligibility is expressly waived through a written agreement. It also held that mere participation in the arbitration proceedings without expressly waiving any objections in writing cannot tantamount to acceptance of unilateral appointment of Arbitrator.

The court observed that a person's ineligibility to act as an Arbitrator strikes at the very root of the appointment. If the Arbitrator was ineligible to be appointed, anything and everything that flows from such illegal appointment is also non est in law. It further added that the essence of Section 12(5) and the proviso thereto is that there must be an explicit agreement in writing which should be obtained after the dispute has arisen. For the proviso to apply, in this case there has been no such waiver on the part of either of the petitioners.

Court Can Appoint Arbitrator U/S 11(6) Of Arbitration Act If MSME Council Fails To Initiate Mediation U/S 18 Of MSMED Act: Delhi HC

Case Title: M/S VALLABH CORPORATION versus SMS INDIA PVT LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 352

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that When the Facilitation Council under the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Development Act (MSMED Act) fails to initiate the mediation process under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, the court can appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).

The Supreme Court in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods (P) Ltd., (2023) held that the MSME Act will prevail over the Arbitration Act as the object of MSME Act is to ensure timely and smooth payment to the suppliers who are the micro and small enterprises, and to provide a legal framework for resolving the dispute with regard to the recovery of dues between the parties under the MSME Act. The court held that the Arbitration Act is not inconsistent with the provisions of the MSMED Act as the only provision for appointing an Arbitrator under the MSMED Act is section 18. If the Facilitation Council fails to appoint the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator can be appointed by the Supreme Court or the High Court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

Court's Jurisdiction U/S 11(6) Of A&C Act Is Decided Under CPC When No Seat Or Venue Is Specified In Arbitration Agreement: Delhi High Court

Case Title: FAITH CONSTRUCTIONS versus N.W.G.E.L CHURCH

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 353

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that in the absence of a specified seat or venue in the Arbitration Agreement, the court's jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) is determined by Sections 16 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). The relevant factors include where the respondent resides or conducts business and where the cause of action arose.

The court held that when the arbitration clause lacks clarity on the seat/venue, jurisdiction under section 11 of the Arbitration Act must be determined on the basis of sections 16 to 20 of the CPC. In such a case, two factors are important- where the respondent resides or conducts business and where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The court further observed that the cause of action consists of material and integral facts that establish rights, obligations and the right to sue. Insignificant facts do not form part of the cause of action and only those facts which have a direct nexus with lis between the parties are considered relevant.

Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitrator's Refusal Of Injunction Against Use Of Tagline "Jeeto Har DinZo" By Winzo Games

Case Title: CREATIVELAND ADVERTISING PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. WINZO GAMES PRIVATE LIMITED

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 355

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has upheld the findings of the Arbitrator, who refused to grant an injunction restraining Winzo Games Private Limited (“Respondent”) from using the tagline “Jeeto Har DinZo” developed by Creativeland Advertising Private Limited (“Appellant”). Since there was no formal agreement fixing a price for the tagline and no claim of copyright infringement, the Appellant's claim was based solely on an alleged breach of confidentiality. The court observed that its jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was limited. It held that the view taken by the Arbitrator in the Section 17 application was not so erroneous so as to shock the conscience of the Court.

Execution Of Gift Deed After Arbitral Award Was Passed Indicates Attempt To Frustrate Rights Of Decree Holder, Not Bona Fide Conduct: Delhi HC

Case Title: SIDDHARTH SOOD versus MUNISH KUMAR AGGARWAL

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 356

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Jain has held that the execution of the Gift Deed by the petitioner after an arbitral award is passed suggests an attempt to frustrate the rights of the decree-holder. The court observed that when the arbitration proceedings were invoked, there was no prohibition and embargo on any kind of attachment with respect to the said property. Admittedly, even when the Award was passed, there was no such prohibition or attachment, but the Court cannot be unmindful of attendant facts and the relationship between judgment debtors and objectors. The objector is the son of the judgment debtors and there is an apparent attempt to frustrate the rights of the decree holder.

Court Cannot Interfere In Arbitration Proceedings At Final Stage, When Sufficient Opportunity Has Been Given To Claimant To Inspect Documents: Delhi HC

Case Title: SUNEHRI BAGH BUILDERS PVT LTD versus DELHI TOURISM AND TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 367

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Jain has upheld the order passed by the Arbitrator whereby an application seeking production of certain documents has been dismissed. The court held that sufficient opportunity had been given to the claimant, but he didn't avail that opportunity. Thus, the court cannot interfere with the order of the arbitrator at the final stage. Additionally, it said that the case is at the stage of final arguments and, therefore, the Court did not find any requirement of interfering with the abovesaid order, particularly, when the scope of interference in such type of arbitral proceedings is very limited.

Force Majeure Clause 'Eclipses' Contractual Terms, Existence And Duration Of Force Majeure Event To Be Determined By Arbitral Tribunal: Delhi HC

Case Title: AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA versus DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED & ANR.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 380

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Dinesh Kumar Sharma has held that while deciding a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, courts cannot adopt the approach of one-size-fit-for-all. Courts can interfere into the award only if it shocks the conscience of the court and is prone to adversely affect the administration of justice. The court held that a force majeure clause' in a contract is generally an exception or an eclipse provision, meaning thereby if a force majeure is enforced the performance as mandated in the other terms of the contract will remain eclipsed till the force majeure event persists. Whether the force majeure has taken place or not or it exists or not or the time till when it exists is a question of fact to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Unconditional Withdrawal Of Prior Petition Filed U/S 11 Of A&C Act Bars Subsequent Petition On Same Cause Of Action: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/s Dewan Chand v. Chairman cum Managing Director and Another

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 389

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has observed that if a petition for appointment of arbitrator is withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh petition, then by application of Order 23 Rule 1(4), CPC, a subsequent petition on the same cause of action would be barred. The Court held that though Order 23 Rule 1 mentions the words, “plaintiff” and “Suit”, the Courts have extended the same principles to writ petitions, SLPs and even petitions such as the present one, filed under Section 11 of the A&C Act. In this regard court placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190.

Writ Petition Is Not An Appropriate Remedy To Seek Enforcement Of Arbitral Award: Delhi High Court

Case Title: RAMCHANDER versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 390

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The court found merit in the preliminary objection of the Railways that a writ is not the appropriate remedy for the petitioner to seek enforcement of the arbitral award. Further, the court held that it is prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the procedure under the enactment and this power under Article 226 needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under the Statute, or a clear 'bad faith' is shown by one of the parties.

Arbitration Clause Allowing MD To Appoint Sole Arbitrator After Failure Of Appointment By Mutual Consent Violates SC's Order: Delhi High Court

Case Title: BALLARPUR INDUSTRIES LIMITED versus SG ENTERPRISES & ORS.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 693

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has held that the clause in question indeed contemplates the appointment of an Arbitrator by mutual consent; however, in the event of failure, it vests the power of appointing a Sole Arbitrator with the Managing Director of Respondent No. 1.

It further held that the Company acting through its Managing Director will have interest in the outcome of the dispute and therefore, appointment of Sole Arbitrator will be directly hit by the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Party autonomy as also impartiality and independence of the Arbitrator appointed to adjudicate inter se disputes between the parties are the foundational pillars of arbitration.

'File Movement' & 'Change In Counsel' Not Sufficient Cause For Condonation Of Delay In Filing S.37 Arbitral Appeals: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Union of India v. M/s Rajiv Aggarwal (Engineers and Contractors)

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 695

The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta has held that mere movement of file and change in counsel due to administrative issues does not constitute “sufficient cause” to condone inordinate delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The court reiterated that for appeals under Section 37 that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule.

Dispute Review Board's Recommendations Are Arbitral Awards, Enforceable U/S 36 Of A&C Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/S. Jaiprakash Hyundai Consortium v. M/S. SJVN Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 679

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Tejas Karia has held that the recommendations of the Dispute Review Board (DRB) rendered under a contract constitute an arbitral award which is enforceable as a decree under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court further held that the limitation for enforcement begins from the date of the award, not from the date of the judgment declaring it as an 'award'.

The Court relied on the case of Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited v. M/s Nathpa Jhakri Joint Venture where the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that a decision rendered by the DRB in respect of disputes of a value less than ₹5 crores is required to be construed as an arbitral award under the A&C Act and the same cannot be challenged by an aggrieved party by filing a suit. The only remedy available to such a party would be to file an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act to set aside the award.

Inconsequential Errors Cannot Be Grounds To Challenge Judicious & Reasoned Award U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: HINDUSTAN HYDRAULICS PVT. LTD versus UNION OF INDIA

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 681

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kunar Ohri has held that the petitioner cannot take advantage of apparent inconsequential errors and fumbles to challenge the award. Inconsequential errors in the award cannot be a ground to challenge otherwise judicious and reasoned award.

The court observed that the respondent did not outrightly reject the machine, when it discovered the basic design deviation, which was pointed out by the RCF in its earliest deficiency list. However, the said deviation was called out consistently in several letters, over the trial run of the machine. Also, the court noted that the respondent expected the petitioner to rectify the defects raised, including the basic design deviation mentioned above, but the same could not be achieved.

Gauhati High Court

Mere Existence Of Arbitration Clause In Agreement Does Not Oust Jurisdiction Of Civil Court To Entertain Suit: Gauhati High Court

Case Title: M/S J.M.B. CONSTRUCTION AND 2 ORS. VERSUS DR. SOMESH DHAR AND 3 ORS.

Case Number:Arb.A./8/2024

The Gauhati High Court bench of Justice Malasri Nandi has held that merely because there is an arbitration clause providing for referring the dispute and the claim to the arbitration, the civil court's jurisdiction is not barred but the same is subject to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

The court noted that in S.Vanathan Muthuraja vs. Ramalingam @ Krishnamurthy Gurukkal & Ors., (1997) the Supreme Court held that when a legal right is infringed, a civil suit would lie unless entertainment of such suit is specifically barred. The normal rule is that a civil court would have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance is either explicitly or by implication is barred. It also relied on the Supreme Court judgment in ITI Ltd. vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., (2002) where it was held that application of the code is not specifically prohibited when it comes to proceedings arising out of the Act before the court.

Gujarat High Court

Court's Jurisdiction U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act Against Award Under MSMED Act Is Determined By Agreement Between Parties: Gujarat HC

Case Title: UTTAR GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LIMITED Versus GUPTA POWER INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED

Case Number: R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1728 of 2022 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2022 In R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1728 of 2022

The Gujarat High Court bench of Mrs. Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Mr.Justice Pranav Trivedi of has held that the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act' 1996 as to challenge the award passed under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act' 2006, would be governed by the agreement between the parties which has conferred exclusive jurisdiction to a particular Court.

The court at the outset while noting the interplay between the MSMED Act and the Arbitration Act observed that the overriding effect has been given by virtue of Section 18(4) read with Section 24 of the MSMED Act' 2006 over any agreement between the parties in relation to the dispute covered by the MSMED Act' 2006 and in so far as the claim under Section 17, where it has been kept open to the parties to refer the dispute to the MSME Facilitation Council. It further added that by virtue of Section 2(4) read with Section 7, in so far as the arbitration proceedings are concerned, they shall be governed by the statutory enactment, which would result in replacing the mode and manner of appointment of arbitral tribunal under the Arbitration Act' 1996. The provisions of the Arbitration Act' 1996 which are inconsistent with the statutory enactment shall not apply.

Plea That Signed Copy Of Award Was Not Received Cannot Be Raised For First Time In Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act: Gujarat High Court

Case Title: NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA Versus KISHORBHAI VALJIBHAI JETHANI & ORS.

Case Number: C/FA/4705/2023

The Gujarat High Court bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav Trivedi has held that the plea that limitation period for challenging the award under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) did not start as the signed copy of the award was not received by the party, cannot be raised for the first time in appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

It fwas urther observed that if the applicant/ NHAI was aware of the fact that the provisions of Section 31(5) had not been complied with and signed copy of the award had not been delivered to the NHAI, it was required to make the said plea before the Court by making a declaration of the fact about the non-delivery or improper delivery of the award in the application under Section 34, itself.

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Award Passed On Consent Cannot Be Held To Be Patently Illegal Or Contrary To Public Policy: Himachal Pradesh HC

Case Title: The Executive Engineer, I & PH Division, Bilaspur Versus Ramesh Khaneja

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (HP) 1

The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justices Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Satyen Vaidya held that the award being primarily based on consent cannot also be held to be patently illegal or in conflict with the public policy of India.

High Court Which Appointed Arbitrator U/S 11(6) Of Arbitration Act Cannot Be Classified As “Court” U/S 42: Himachal Pradesh HC

Case Title: The Chief General Manager H.P. Telecom Circle & ors. Versus Sh. Kashmir Singh (Government Contractor)

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (HP) 2

The Himachal High Court bench of Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua has held that the High Court which exercises original civil jurisdiction cannot be classified as 'Court' for the purpose of Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act when it merely appointed arbitrators under Section 11(6) of the Act. Section 42 of the Act will not be attracted where High Court having original civil jurisdiction has only appointed the arbitrator and has not undertaken any other exercise.

The court observed that Section 42 starts with a non-obstante clause i.e. 'notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force'. The words 'this Part' refers to Part-I which encompasses Sections 1 – 43. As per Section 42, where an application with respect to an arbitration agreement under Part-I has been made to a Court then that Court alone will have the jurisdiction over (a) arbitral proceedings & (b) all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.

Application For Extension Of Time Cannot Be Dismissed Due To Mentioning S.151 Of CPC Instead Of S. 29A Of Arbitration Act: Himachal Pradesh HC

Case Title: Mangal Chand and ors vs. LAC NHAI and ors.

Case Number:Arb. Case No. 799 of 2023

The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Kainthla has held that it is well-settled law that mere mentioning of an incorrect provision is not fatal to the application if the power to pass such an order is available with the court.

The court noted that a specific section in the form of section 29A exists in the Arbitration Act for the same purpose for which this application has been filed.

In My Palace Mutually Aided Coop. Society v. B. Mahesh, 2022 the Supreme Court held that “Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if there is no alternate remedy available in accordance with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code.”

Based on the above, the court observed that the application under Section 151 CPC would not be maintainable when specific provision under Section 29 A (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act exists to extend the time.

Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

Irregularity & Curable Defect Cannot Be Grounds For Dismissal Of Application U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: J&K High Court

Case Title: Union of India v. M/s Des Raj Nagpal Engineers & Contractors

Case Number: Arb App No.1/2022

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court bench of Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Puneet Gupta has held that the failure of the Chief Engineer to sign the pleadings, which were signed by the Garrison Engineer would only be an irregularity and a curable defect and would not entail dismissal of the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act without providing opportunity to the appellants to correct the irregularity.

The court noted that Order XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with suits by or against the Government. Rule 1 provides that in any suit by or against the Government, the plaint or written statement shall be signed by such person as the Government may by general or special order appoint in this behalf. The Government of India has, in the exercise of powers conferred by Rule 1 of Order XXVII aforesaid, issued notification authorizing different officers to sign the pleadings on behalf of Government of India in any suit by or against the Government. The Garrison Engineer is one of those officers. That being the clear position emerging from reading of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India and, it cannot be said that the Garrison Engineer was not an officer authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of the Government of India.

Contract Which Is Renewable Based On 'Criteria Of Performance' Is Deemed Renewed Unilaterally After Criteria Is Met, Cannot Be Terminated: J&K HC

Case-Title: Zaffar Abbas Din vs Nasir Hamid Khan, 2025

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 37

The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that where renewal of contract is based on the criteria of performance, the contract is deemed to have to been extended, if the said criteria is met. It also held that courts cannot interfere with the interpretation given by an Arbitrator if the same is reasonable and not opposed to logic.

In this case, the Arbitrator was to determine legality of breach of agreement by interpreting the agreement-clause which said that “the agreement between the parties was compulsorily renewable after the expiry of first five years, if the sales remained satisfactory.”

Party Cannot Be Forced To Accept Arbitrator Who Has Conflict Of Interest, Violates Principles Of Natural Justice And Fair Trial: J&K High Court

Case-title: Meena Kumari vs Sainik Cooperative House Society Ltd,

Citation: 2025 Livelaw (JKL) 70

The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that a party could not be forced to accept an arbitrator who has a conflict of interest, as the same would violate the principles of a fair trial. The court held that the Perpetual Lease Deed, as well as the Byelaws, which provide for the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to be the sole arbitrator for adjudicating disputes between the petitioner and the department, would be against the law.

Chief Justice Tashi Rabstan observed that the Registrar, who was appointed as the sole arbitrator under the lease deed, was the head of the respondent cooperative society, and the possibility of bias on his part could not be ruled out. The petitioner had, by virtue of the present petition, requested the appointment of an independent arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act for adjudicating the dispute, claiming that the Registrar was disqualified due to a conflict of interest.

Jharkhand High Court

Arbitral Tribunal Not Bound By Strict Rigors Of CPC, Amendment Permissible At Any Stage Of Proceedings: Jharkhand High Court

Case Title: Rites Ltd v. M/s Supreme BKB DECO JV

Case Number: W. P. (C) No. 311 of 2025

The Jharkhand High Court Bench of Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary has held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked for interfering with an interim order only in exceptionally rare cases. Additionally, the court held that Arbitral Tribunals are not bound by the strict rigours of CPC and an amendment is permissible at any stage of the proceedings for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.

The court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Serosoft Solutions Private Ltd. Vs. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. (2022), wherein the court held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked for interfering with an interim order only in exceptional rarity. Nevertheless, power exists and in exceptional circumstances, the said power can be invoked. However, an aperture and avenue for interference is a limited one.

Court Having Jurisdiction Over Seat Of Arbitration Would Be Entitled To Entertain Petition U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Jharkhand High Court

Case Title:M/s MECON Limited Versus M/s K.C.S. Pvt. Ltd.

LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 15

The Jharkhand High Court bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi has held that the court having jurisdiction over the seat of Arbitration would be entitled to entertain a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The court noted that the Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited,(2020) held that whenever any designation of a place of arbitration is mentioned in the agreement as an arbitration clause being the “venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the expression “arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the “venue” is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings.

Karnataka High Court

Double Payment For Same Claim Violates Public Policy U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Karnataka High Court

Case Title: BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE v. M/S ASHOKA BIOGREEN PVT. LTD.

Case Number: COMMERCIAL APPEAL No. 427 OF 2024

The Karnataka High Court Bench of Chief Justice N. V. Anjaria and Justice K. V. Aravind held that the issue of double payment for the same claim would undoubtedly be in direct conflict with the Public Policy of India and would violate the Fundamental Policy of Indian Law, as well as the basic principles of morality and justice.

The court relied on the judgment in MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Limited (2019), wherein the court held that jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 of the Act. While entertaining an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, the interference is restricted and subject to the grounds enumerated in Section 34 of the Act.

Arbitration Clause Cannot Be Invoked Again Over Matters Which Have Already Been Adjudicated: Karnataka High Court

Case Title: Starlog Enterprises Limited Board of Trustees of New Mangalore Port Trust

Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 90

The Karnataka High Court has said the Arbitration clause in the lease agreement cannot be invoked for matters that have already been adjudicated upon and concluded by both the Arbitral Tribunal and the competent courts.

Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum held thus while dismissing a petition filed by Starlog Enterprises Limited, who had approached the court praying for the appointment of a sole arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes that had arisen between him and New Mangalore Port Trust.

On going through the records, the bench noted that the primary relief sought by the petitioner, which involved challenging the termination of the contract, was decisively negated by the Arbitrator. This adverse finding against the petitioner was not contested by initiating proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Consequently, the Section 34 proceedings were confined solely to the issue of refund of the statutory deposit and the amount expended on the construction of the perimeter wall and these limited reliefs were also set aside by the court.

MSME Council Cannot Pass Award On Account Of Failure Of Conciliation Proceedings, Has To Refer Matter To Arbitration: Karnataka HC

Case Title: M/S ENMAS GB POWER SYSTEMS PROJECTS LTD AND MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES FACILITATION COUNCIL & ANR

Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 123

The Karnataka High Court has held that the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council cannot pass an award on account of conciliation having failed without referring the matter to arbitration.

Justice Suraj Govindaraj held thus while allowing the petition filed by M/s Enmas GB Power Systems Projects Ltd. It said, “The matter is remitted to the Karnataka Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, to formally terminate the conciliation proceedings and thereafter take a decision whether it intends to conduct the arbitration proceedings by itself or refer the matter for arbitration to be held by an institution.”

Whether Rights In Favor Of Third Party Are Created In Property Which Is Subject Matter Of Arbitration Cannot Be Decided Under Writ Jurisdiction: Karnataka HC

Case Title: Mr. Ramu Nagabathini Versus Developer Group India Private Limited

Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 125

The Karnataka High Court bench of Mr Justice Krishna S Dixit and Mr Justice Ramachandra D. Huddar has held that whether rights in favor of a third party based on sale deeds have been created in the property, which is the subject matter of arbitration, cannot be decided by the court under writ jurisdiction.

The court observed that the petitioner's challenge to arbitration proceedings is not maintainable under Articles 226 or 227 of the constitution as it involves disputed facts which require in depth evidence cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. Additionally, the petitioner has not demonstrated any statutory or constitutional rights to maintain the writ and his claims are based upon so called sale deeds executed between himself and third parties which are yet to be verified.

Kerala High Court

'Arbitrator Can Only Decide On Point Which Is Referred To Tribunal, Not Entire Dispute': Kerala High Court

Case Title: M/S.BHAGEERATHA ENGINEERING LTD. V. STATE OF KERALA

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 41

The Kerala High Court Bench of Justice Dr A. K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Easwaran S. held that if the parties choose to refer to a singular point for arbitration, then the arbitral tribunal cannot proceed to decide on all disputes. On the contrary, if the parties agree to arbitrate on the entire disputes, then the arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to decide the entire dispute and not a specific dispute.

The court noted that clause (b) of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, reveals that any agreement which extinguishes a right of a party in respect of a contract on expiry of a specified period to restrict the other party from enforcing the right, is void to that extent. Therefore, ex-facie Clause 25.2 of the Contract offends the provisions of Section 28(b) of the Contract Act, 1872. Additionally, the court relied on the judgment in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2018) and held that clause 25.2 provided in the agreement is void and cannot operate as a restraint for the initiation of the dispute between the parties.

Notice To Appoint Another Arbitrator To Continue Arbitration Proceedings Satisfies Mandate Of S.21Of A&C Act: Kerala High Court

Case Title: Unnimoidu v. Muhammad Iqbal

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 67

The Kerala High Court bench of Justice Syam Kumar V.M., while hearing a Section 11 petition, has held that a notice to revive a stalled arbitration proceedings by appointing another arbitrator satisfies the mandate of Section 21 of the A&C Act.

The court observed that the questions relating to the validity of the partnership agreement cannot be looked into by a referral court. The Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024) has limited the scope of the referral court to ascertain whether a Section 11 application has been filed within three years. The court cannot go into the arbitrability of the dispute, and such questions are for the tribunal to adjudicate.

Writ Petition Maintainable If Arbitrator Refuses To Entertain Application U/S 3G(5) Of National Highways Act: Kerala High Court

Case Title: P.V. George v. National Highway Authority of India And Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 70

The Kerala High Court bench of A. Muhamed Mustaque and S. Manu JJ. while hearing a writ petition has held that when an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government refuses to entertain an application u/s 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, the Courts can entertain a petition under Article 226 to the limited extent of referring the dispute to arbitration.

Court noted that the arbitral proceedings commenced on the date on which a Section 21 notice requesting the dispute to be referred to arbitration was received by the respondent. Any decision made prior to the commencement of the proceedings cannot be treated as an award. The definition of decree under the Code of Civil Procedure provides guidance to the types of decisions that can be qualified as an award.

Section 3G(5) places a statutory obligation upon the District Collector, who acts as an arbitrator, to receive applications for adjudication of disputes relating to the determination of compensation.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Arbitrator Empowered To Pass Order For Dissolution Of Partnership Firm Once Dispute Is Referred: Madhya Pradesh HC

Case Title: MAHESH PATEL Vs YASHWANT NETRAM AND OTHERS

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (MP) 8

The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar has held that the Arbitrator is empowered to pass an order for dissolution of the partnership firm once the matter is referred.

The court observed that the grievance of the applicant is that the firm is being managed by Ashok Patel, who happens to be the father of non-applicant No.3, it is a grievance against the non-applicants only, which is also apparent from the notice for appointment of Arbitrator, in which the dispute has been raised against the present non-applicants only and not against Ashok Patel, and in such circumstances, the said Ashok Patel was not a necessary party to be impleaded in the lis, and thus, there is no question of bifurcation of dispute, hence, the decisions relied upon by Shri Phadke in the case of Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.Matter Relating To Partnership Act & Partnership Deed Where Third-Party Rights Are Involved Cannot Be Referred To Arbitration: Madhya Pradesh HC

Case Title: GOKUL BANSAL Vs. VIPIN GOYAL & ORS.

Case Number: ARBITRATION CASE NO. 44 of 2021

The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Anand Pathak held that when matter relates to Partnership Act and partnership deed and third-party rights are also involved then it cannot be referred to arbitration.

The court held that the relief of partition of subject property as sought by the applicant during subsistence of partnership firm is barred by law. Therefore, the matter is non-arbitrable. Additionally, the court noted that scope of enquiry having the trappings of adjudication is limited at the stage of application under Section 11 of the Act, but the Court can certainly determine existence of arbitration agreement and also to enquire whether there is prima facie arbitration dispute or not.

Appointing Arbitrator U/S 3(G)(5) Of National Highways Act Does Not Constitute Seat Of Arbitration, Is Rather A Convenient Venue: MP High Court
Case Title – National Highways Authority of India v. Dinesh Singh & Others

Case No. – Arbitration Appeal Nos. 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107 of 2021

The Madhya Pradesh High Court Bench at Gwalior of Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke has observed that appointment of arbitrator under Section 3(G)(5), National Highways Act, 1956 (“NH Act”) will not amount to the seat of the arbitrator rather it would be a convenient venue and therefore courts where a part of cause of action had arisen will also have jurisdiction over such arbitral proceedings.

While holding so the Court highlighted the difference between ordinary arbitral proceedings arising out of a commercial contractual agreement where parties normally agree to a seat as opposed to statutory arbitrations such as the one mandated by NH Act where there is no contractual agreement and no seat or venue has been decided by the parties.

Madras High Court

No Bar On Court To Entertain More Than One Application U/S 29A Of Arbitration Act: Madras High Court

Case Title: M/s.Powergear Limited, Chennai. Vs. M/s.Anu Consultants, Hyderabad

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 48

The Madras High Court bench of Justice Abdul Quddhose has held that there is no prohibition for the Court to entertain more than one application under Section 29A of the Act seeking extension of time for the arbitrator to pronounce arbitral award provided sufficient cause is demonstrated.

The court noted that 'section 29A' of the Arbitration Act does not prohibit multiple applications for extending the mandate of the Arbitrator. The only requirement is that sufficient cause must be demonstrated for seeking extension of the mandate of the tribunal.

It further added that when there are no restrictions as to the number of times an application seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal can be filed, the court cannot prohibit parties from filing such applications provided sufficient cause is demonstrated.

Arbitral Award Can't Have Specific Format; Reasoning Must Be 'Proper', 'Intelligible' And 'Adequate' : Madras High Court

Case Title: Gopal Krishan Rathi vs. Dr. R. Palani

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 51

The Madras High Court bench comprising Justice K. .R. Shriram (Chief Justice) and Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy have observed that an arbitral award does not have to follow any specific format; just as every judge writes their judgment in a particular style, arbitrators also write in different styles.

The court also held that any ground which was not raised in a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be raised at the stage of appeal under Section 37 of the Act. The court further observed that reasoning of the award must be 'proper', 'intelligible' and 'adequate'.

Party Nominating Arbitrator In Response To Notice U/S 21 Of Arbitration Act Is Prohibited From Raising Plea Of Limitation In Petition U/S 11: Madras HC

Case Title: South Ganga Waters Technologies (P) Ltd., Rep. By its Authorized Signatory Mr.Vijay Ramesh, Chennai vs Vedanta Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 118

The Madras High Court bench of Justice Abdul Quddhose has held that once a party nominates an arbitrator in response to a notice issued under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), it cannot later argue in a petition under Section 11 of the Act that the claim for which the notice was issued is time-barred. The court observed that while deciding a petition filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the law is now well settled that the referral court will have to look only into the prima-facie existence of the arbitration clause and once the court is satisfied that there exists an arbitration clause, necessarily, the court will have to refer the dispute to arbitration.

Orissa High Court

Violation Of Provisions Of Arbitration Act Or MSMED Act Can Be Adjudicated By Court U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Orissa High Court

Case Title: Rajdhani Coir V. Micro, Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Nagpur, Maharashtra

Case Number: W.P.(C) No.22514 of 2022

An Orissa High Court bench of Justice K.R. Mohapatra has dismissed a writ petition upon holding that the petitioner, without availing the efficacious statutory remedy u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act had approached the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for which the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretionary power to entertain it.

Additionally, the court held that violation of any provisions of the Arbitration Act and/or the MSMED Act can be effectively adjudicated by the competent Court in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act read with Section 19 of the MSMED Act.

Appeal In Commercial Dispute Arising From Arbitration Act Must Be Filed Before Commercial Appellate Court, Not HC: Orissa High Court

Case Title: M/s. Jaycee Housing Private v. Neelachal Buildtech & Resorts Pvt.

Case Number: ARBA No.7 of 2024

The Orissa High Court bench of Justice S.K. Panigrahi has held that a plain reading of Sections 6 and 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, leads to the conclusion that the appropriate 'court' to consider a commercial dispute, even if it arises under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, would be the commercial court and an appeal would, therefore, lie only before the Commercial Appellate Court being the District Court.

Patna High Court

Procedural Impediments In Govt Machinery Not 'Sufficient Cause' For Condoning Delay In Filing Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act: Patna High Court

Case Title: The State of Bihar V. M/s Baba Hans Construction Pvt. Ltd.

Case Number: Miscellaneous Appeal No.679 of 2023

The Patna High Court Bench of Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya has held that procedural impediments in the government machinery are not a 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay in filing the appeal.

The court observed that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on the facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if based on the facts of the case it is evident that there has been negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the petitioner. The term 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on the part of the petitioner in view of the facts and circumstances of the case.

Punjab and Haryana High Court

Pendency Of Civil Or Criminal Litigation Between Partners Cannot Estop Either Partner From Invoking Arbitration Clause: Punjab and Haryana HC

Case Title: PRIKSHIT WADHWA AND ORS VERSUS VINOD K WADHWA

Case Number:ARB-241-2022 (O&M)

The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justice Suvir Sehgal has held that pendency of a civil and criminal litigation inter se partners, cannot estop one of the partners from invoking the arbitration clause or bar the reference of dispute for adjudication to an arbitrator for determination.

The court after referring to section 21 of the Arbitration Act observed that the provision has been incorporated primarily with the objective of determining the date of the commencement of the arbitral proceedings. The proceedings are deemed to have been initiated from the date the notice invoking the arbitration clause “is received by the respondent”. While coming to the facts of the present case, the court said that the clause does not require the notice to be served by all the parties to the agreement. Notice by one of the parties to the agreement would be a sufficient compliance of the statutory provision. The giving of such a notice is purely procedural and not a decisive step.

In Absence Of Separate 'Seat' Clause In Arbitral Agreement, Court Mentioned In 'Venue' Clause Has Exclusive Jurisdiction: Patna HC

Case Title: M/s Pramila Motors Pvt. Ltd. versus M/s Okinawa Autotech International Pvt. Ltd.

LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 21

The Patna High Court bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar has held that in the absence of any clause in the agreement apart from Clause 36.3, which speaks of the “venue” being Delhi, there cannot be any other inference or intention of the parties for the “venue” and the “seat” being different.

Additionally, the court noted that the agreement in question does not mention the “seat” of arbitration but only mentions the “venue” for arbitration, which shall be at New Delhi. Thus, Delhi High Court only shall have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the present request.

Rajasthan High Court

Commercial Court Committed Jurisdictional Error By Imposing Pre-Condition To Deposit 50% Of Amount For Stay Against Arbitral Award: Rajasthan HC

Case Title: Jaipur Development Authority v. TPl-Sucg Consortium

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 20

The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Sudesh Bansal has held that the Commercial Court has committed jurisdictional error in exercising its discretion arbitrarily, mechanically and injudiciously, while putting the condition to deposit 50% of the awarded amount, for operating stay against arbitral award without assigned justified and sound reasonings.

Additionally, the court modified the order in the manner that the stay order will become operative only after furnishing security in the form of FDR of a nationalised bank, equivalent to the 50% of the awarded amount, before the Commercial Court.

Executing Court Erred In Seeking Transfer Certificate To Execute Award When It Had Jurisidiction To Entertain Application: Rajasthan HC Sets Aside Order

Case Title: Gas Authority of India Limited versus M/s Mahima Real Estate (P) Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 128

The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Narendra Singh Dhaddha has held that the Executing Court had committed an error in directing to furnish the transfer certificate for executing an award when it already had jurisdiction to hear the application.

Court said that when the property was situated in Jaipur, the executing court had jurisdiction to entertain the execution application. So, the orders dated 12.10.2018 and 13.03.2019 passed by the Executing Court deserve to be set aside, the court added.

Telangana High Court

S.17 Of Arbitration Act Casts Weighty Burden On Party To Persuade Court To Hold Onto S.9 Proceedings After Formation Of Tribunal: Telangana HC

M/s. Corvine Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Private Limited vs. Srinivasulu Kanday

The Telangana High Court has held that the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act grants a bouquet of protections to a party during the course of arbitral proceedings. It clarified that section 9 (3) restricts a party from seeking interim protection before a Court, once a tribunal has been constituted. After the amendment, once the Tribunal has been constituted, the parties can avail of the protection under section 17 by applying to the Tribunal.

Going further, the Division Bench, comprising Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, relying on Lakshmi Rattan Engg. Works Ltd. Vs. CST and Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs Punnu Sahu explained that the word 'entertain' does not mean only admitting the matter, but it should be read to mean 'considering the matter on merits' or to 'proceed on merits.' The Bench elucidated that the onus was cast on the applicant to prove that the trial court had entertained the claim on merits. Only then, could the company file for protection before the trial court after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.

Anti-Arbitration Suit Giving Short-Shrift To Sec 16 A&C Act Is Hit By Order 7 Rule 11(d) Of CPC: Telangana High Court Reiterates

The Telangana High Court has reiterated and clarified that suits initiated before Civil Courts to curb arbitration proceedings ignore section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, and deserve to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) as being barred by statute. The order was passed in a commercial court appeal by a Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R.Madhusudhan Rao.

The Court further held that the unimpeachable conclusion is that any question as to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or a doubt as to the invocation of the arbitration clause must inevitably be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. The parties cannot approach the Civil Courts for thwarting the arbitral process, particularly where the arbitration agreement has not been disputed. The case sought to be made out by the appellant is contrary to the position under the 1996 Act and the decisions referred to above.

Order Rejecting Jurisdictional Objections U/S 16 Of Arbitration Act Can Be Challenged U/S 34, Not Under Writ Jurisdiction: Telangana HC

Case Title: The State Of Telangana vs Ihhr Hospitality Private Limited

Case Title: WRIT PETITION No.1013 of 2025

The Telangana High Court bench of Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao has held that an order rejecting jurisdictional objections under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) can only be challenged under section 34 of the Arbitration Act after an award is passed, and no writ petition against such an order can be entertained. The court held that since the Sole Arbitrator provided justification for the conclusion, there was no perversity in the order. However, this does not mean that the conclusion on limitation is correct on merits. The Petitioners may challenge the limitation objection if the Arbitral Award is rendered against them in a petition under section 34 and further in appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Uttarakhand High Court

Concept Of Appointing Named Arbitrator Who Is An Interested Party Is No Longer Sustainable: Uttarakhand High Court

Case Title: M/s SPDD VDPPL JV and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others

Case Number: ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 78 OF 2023

The Uttarakhand High Court bench of Chief Justice G. Narendar has held that the concept of appointing a named Arbitrator, who himself is an interested party, is no longer sustainable. The court relied on the judgment in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and another vs. HSCC (India) Limited (2020) and held that in the light of the law declared by the Apex Court, the concept of named Arbitrator, who himself is an interested party, is no more sustainable. Thus, the court allowed the application and appointed an arbitrator.