A Legal Cheshire Cat Named 'Honorable Acquittal'

On 9th May this year, the Supreme Court of India in Renuka Prasad v. The State represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559) acquitted six individuals accused of murder, expressing deep disappointment over the mishandling of the case by the police and prosecution, as well as the alarming number of witnesses who turned hostile. The case pertained to the 2011 murder of Ramakrishna in Karnataka, which remained unresolved after most witnesses, including the victim's own son, retracted their statements during the trial. "With a heavy heart for the unsolved crime, but with absolutely no misgivings on the issue of lack of evidence against the accused arrayed, we acquit the accused, reversing the judgment of the high court… Witnesses mount the box to disown prior statements, deny recoveries made, feign ignorance of aggravating circumstances spoken of during investigation, and eyewitnesses turn blind," the Court observed.

This episode underscores a grim reality: acquittals often stem from procedural collapses rather than vindication of innocence. In legal parlance, there is a dichotomy of acquittals- standard acquittal and honorable acquittal. The former signifies the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, leaving room for lingering suspicion. The later, however, is a judicial declaration that the accused is factually innocent, with the court discrediting the prosecution's case entirely. This distinction, though recognized in service law (Union of India v. Methu Meda, 2021), remains absent in criminal statutes, reducing exoneration to a technicality rather than a moral victory.

As the Supreme Court rightly pointed out, truth is often a chimera, and the illusion surrounding it can only be dispelled by valid evidence. An acquittal based on insufficient evidence—where guilt cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt—is fundamentally different from an 'honorable acquittal,' which vindicates the innocence of the accused. The socio-legal ramifications of these two forms of acquittal—standard and honorable—are starkly different. Yet, astonishingly, major jurisdictions, including India, fail to distinguish between them in criminal jurisprudence.

Still a Blasphemer?

The infamous blasphemy case against Prof. T.J. Joseph in 2010 serves as a textbook example of an honorable acquittal. The Kerala police charged him with inciting communal hatred over a question he set in a Malayalam examination at Newman College, Thodupuzha. The question asked students to punctuate a dialogue between an imaginary character named Muhammed and God. In his memoir, A Thousand Cuts: An Innocent Question and Deadly Answers (2019), Prof. Joseph recounts: "The Thodupuzha police filed the charge for crime No. 327/2010 at the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court in 2013… The court ruled that the case against me under Sections 153A, 295A, and 502(2) of the IPC was baseless and acquitted me. The order stated that the controversy arose from a misunderstanding by some individuals who conflated the fictional 'Muhammed' with the Prophet. An act cannot be deemed criminal merely because fanatics protest against it."

Yet, between the FIR and his acquittal, extremists chopped off his right hand and stabbed him in the left thigh. His college terminated his services, and his wife, unable to bear the trauma, committed suicide. Can a judicially sound mind equate a standard acquittal (due to lack of evidence) with an honorable acquittal that unequivocally establishes innocence? Had criminal law recognized this distinction, the lingering social stigma haunting Prof. Joseph might have been mitigated. Despite his vindication, he is still branded a blasphemer in certain quarters.

Statutory Vacuum

The Supreme Court, in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994), observed: "Expressions like 'honorable acquittal,' 'acquitted of blame,' and 'fully exonerated' are alien to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are judicial constructs. Defining 'honorable acquittal' is challenging, but when an accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution's case, and the prosecution fails miserably to prove the charges, it can be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."

Bhopal Singh Panchal, a Coin/Note Examiner with the RBI, was suspended and dismissed after being convicted under Section 304 of the IPC. Upon his acquittal by the High Court, the dispute centered on whether he was entitled to reinstatement with full pay. The Supreme Court upheld the RBI's decision, noting that his acquittal was not 'honorable.' In Union of India & Ors v. Methu Meda (2021), the Court clarified that an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt or due to hostile witnesses does not constitute an honorable acquittal and does not automatically entitle one to public employment. In Deputy Inspector of Police v. S. Samuthiram (2013), the Supreme Court linked honorable acquittal to eligibility for reinstatement in public service, emphasizing that exoneration must be “clean and honorable” . However, such precedents are inconsistently applied, leaving lower courts to navigate a jurisprudential maze. Moreover, the concept remains confined to service law and has yet to permeate the core of criminal jurisprudence.

Clear the cobwebs

The right to a fair trial is a fundamental human right enshrined in international covenants and Indian constitutional law. A fair trial must culminate in either a declaration of guilt or a proclamation of innocence. Every accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. If declared innocent, they deserve not just an acquittal but a formal vindication—a legal fanfare affirming their exoneration. Without such recognition, the promise of a fair trial remains hollow, reducing justice to a theater of the absurd.

The concept of 'honorable acquittal' is akin to the Cheshire Cat in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland—its grin flickers occasionally in courtrooms but remains absent from legal texts. This judicial surrealism is incongruent with our constitutional ethos. It is high time the ideal of 'honorable acquittal' is codified into substantive and procedural criminal law, ensuring that justice is not just done but seen to be done—with clarity, dignity, and finality.

The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023 and Sections 271 and 273 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 must be amended to define 'honorable acquittal' as a verdict where the prosecution's evidence is wholly discredited, establishing the accused's innocence. Provisions must be incorporated to enable the courts to issue certificates of innocence, akin to the UK's “innocence declarations”. This would empower individuals like Prof. Joseph to legally rebut societal stigma. Honorable acquittals must be linked to automatic reinstatement in employment while excluding benefit-of-doubt acquittals. This would prevent arbitrary dismissals by employers citing “moral turpitude.” Acquitted individuals must be permitted to seek upgradation of their acquittal status through revision petitions and judges must be sensitized to explicitly state in rulings whether an acquittal is honorable, ensuring consistency and transparency.

(Faisal C. K. is Deputy Law Secretary to the Government of Kerala. Views are personal.)