Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code^[1] and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DPA), were enacted were introduced to combat systemic exploitation and violence against women in marital homes.^[2] Alarming figures - surge from approximately 400 dowry deaths annually in the early 1980s to nearly 5,800 annually by the mid-1990s - prompted these stringent measures.^[3] However, recent years have seen mounting judicial and societal scrutiny due to alleged misuse of these provisions. NCRB data from 2018 showed only about 13% conviction rates under Section 498A, with over 90% of cases pending.^[4] A Delhi District Court study (2021–25) revealed that of 9,950 trials, only 0.2% ended in convictions, with nearly half quashed before trial.^[5] This has fueled concerns about misuse for personal vendetta, especially when allegations are vague, omnibus, or filed as counter-blasts after divorce or property disputes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that these criminal provisions must not become instruments of matrimonial vendetta.

Section 498-A IPC: A precision offence, not a catch-all remedy

Section 498A provides a statutory “Two-Pocket” Test, punishing only two categories of conduct: (i) cruelty likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave physical or mental injury; and (ii) harassment with a view to coercing dowry.^[6]

The Supreme Court has underscored that “every harassment does not amount to 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498-A”. In State of A.P. v M. Madhusudhan Rao the Court drew the controlling line: “harassment simpliciter is not 'cruelty'; it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property, etc., that it amounts to 'cruelty' punishable under Section 498-A.”^[7] The statutory explanation confines criminal liability to:

• • Explanation (a) — wilful conduct so grave that it could drive the woman to suicide or cause serious injury; and
  • Explanation (b) — harassment specifically intended to extract an unlawful demand. Anything outside these two silos—routine quarrels, isolated taunts or general rudeness— falls beyond the section.

Modern benches have tightened the gate even further. In Digambar v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that cruelty' simpliciter is not enough - establishing an offence under Section 498A IPC requires proving either: 1. Cruelty severe enough to drive the victim to suicide or cause grave injury to life, limb, or health; or 2. Harassment specifically aimed at coercing unlawful demands for property or valuable security. This strict interpretation prevents misuse by requiring concrete evidence of life-threatening conduct or dowry-linked coercion.^[8]

Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat repeats the point almost verbatim, insisting on proof that the conduct was aimed “either at driving her to commit suicide or at coercing her to meet unlawful demands.”^[9] Similarly, in Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682], the Court went further, stressing that vague, omnibus allegations—even if couched in the language of cruelty—“must be nipped in the bud” because Section 498-A is meant for precise, demand-linked, grave misconduct, not for settling scores in matrimonial feuds.^[10]

These rulings establish Section 498-A as a precision offence: mens rea of coercion (or actus reus of life-endangering cruelty) is non-negotiable. Unless the prosecution can show either life-threatening wilful conduct or harassment directed at an unlawful monetary demand, the charge collapses. Generic unhappiness, isolated quarrels, or belated, retaliatory accusations, however worded, lie outside the statute's limited reach.

Sections 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Equally Tight Contours

Sections 3 and 4 of the DPA also operate within sharply-defined boundaries.

Section 3 criminalises the actual giving or taking of dowry (or abetment thereof). The offence is complete only when a dowry article or money changes hands. Voluntary presents are exempt if listed and not excessive.^[11]

Section 4 punishes a specific, unlawful “demand” for dowry—direct or indirect—made to the bride's side. The demand must (a) precede or accompany the marriage alliance, (b) relate to property or valuable security, and (c) possess the necessary coercive flavour.^[12]

Because both sections hinge on tangible proof—either an actual transfer (s. 3) or an identifiable demand (s. 4)—courts have been quick to weed out cases built on vague or belated allegations.

In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. [(2012) 10 SCC 741], the Supreme Court quashed proceedings where the complainant sought to implicate her sister-in-law under Sections 498-A and 4 DPA on the basis of bald and omnibus assertions, clarifying that the DPA punishes only clear, coercive demands and cannot criminalise every familial dispute involving money or property. This precedent has become foundational for quashing cases where the FIR lacks specific dates, details, or documentary support.^[13]

Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207] while dealing with a dowry-death prosecution, emphasized that“a proximate and live link must exist between the cruelty or harassment and the alleged dowry demand”. Courts apply this principle to limit the prosecutorial reach of Sections 3 and 4, rejecting stale, exaggerated, or vague claims not directly flowing from marriage negotiations or cohabitation.^[14]

In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram [(1995) 6 SCC 219], the Supreme Court again cautioned against expansive readings of dowry laws, holding that an unsubstantiated allegation of dowry demand—without any supporting evidence—cannot sustain a conviction under the Act. The burden lies on the prosecution to show not only that a demand was made, but also that it fits the statutory contours of the Act.^[15]

Recent case law such as Digambar and Dara Lakshmi Narayan reinforce that in the absence of timely, detailed, and credible evidence of a dowry demand, courts must not allow prosecution to proceed.

The DPA is not a residual remedy for every post-marriage financial fallout. These judgments collectively emphasise that in the absence of timely, detailed, and credible evidence of a dowry demand, courts must not allow prosecution to proceed. The Courts have drawn a decisive line: these provisions must not become tools of vengeance, but remain guardrails against serious and demonstrable matrimonial extortion.

Thus, for a case under Section 498A to stand, the prosecution must demonstrate - A) Specific and grave instances of cruelty as defined above; B) A link between the alleged acts and coercion for dowry or grave injury.

New Judicial Filters Further Narrowing Liability

Indian courts have introduced a second tier of judicial safeguards since 2010, including four key filters: residence, evidentiary support, temporal proximity, and civil overlap. These ensure criminal prosecution is grounded in clear, cogent, and contemporaneous evidence.

1. Residence Test – “Cohabitation or Quit the Dock”

The Supreme Court now treats spatial and relational proximity as a jurisdictional fact: if an accused relative neither lived with the complainant nor took part in her day-to-day life, the criminal process must end at the threshold.

In Digambar, charges against non-resident in-laws were quashed due to lack of evidence of shared residence. Spatial proximity is thus a jurisdictional fact—mere kinship, without living under the same roof, cannot sustain prosecution.

In Neelu Chopra v. Bharti it was held that what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars of the offence and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence.^[16]

Similarly, in Dara Lakshmi Narayan, charges were dismissed against relatives in different cities, stressing that only those sharing the household or routine face trial.

Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207] and Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam [(2009) 13 SCC 330] further clarified that for liability under 498-A, harassment must be continuous and participatory, thus distant relatives cannot be convicted on conjectures.

These rulings shield families from vendetta-driven litigation and ensure only those spatially and relationally embedded in the alleged cruelty remain in the dock.

Evidentiary Threshold – Presumption Cannot Substitute Proof

Courts now require a firm evidentiary threshold—material proof, corroboration, and specific attribution of acts to each accused. Mere accusations, without independent substantiation, no longer suffice.

In Geddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana [2025 SCC OnLine SC 263] the Supreme Court warned warned that emotional volatility often leads to exaggerated claims, but only genuine, specific criminal roles are actionable :

What needs to be assessed is whether such allegations are genuine with specific criminal role assigned to such members of the family or whether it is merely a spill over and side-effect of a matrimonial discord and allegations made by an emotionally disturbed person. Each and every case of domestic violence will thus depend on the peculiar facts obtaining in each case."^[17]

In Digambar, the wife alleged forced miscarriage, but the Court noted that no evidence linked them to the alleged forced abortion and held that absent spatial proximity, mere familial ties cannot sustain charges under Section 498-A IPC. This insistence on a contemporaneous proof standard—requiring both actus reus (wrongful act) and mens rea (culpable intent) to be demonstrated through clear evidence—has become foundational. The mere fact of being a relative or emotionally unsupportive is no longer actionable under Section 498-A IPC.

In Dara Lakshmi Narayan, the Court examined the timeline and motivation behind the complaint and held that that vague, omnibus allegations lacking date, place, or manner of occurrence should be “nipped in the bud.”

Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667] held that the courts must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases.^[18]

In Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2023) 16 SCC 666] charges were quashed against non-resident in-laws due to vague, unsubstantiated allegations. The Court held that the wife's allegations are so far-fetched and improbable that no prudent person can conclude there are sufficient grounds to proceed.

In Smt. Raj Rani v. State (Delhi Administration) [(2010) 10 SCC 662], the Supreme Court held that while considering the case of cruelty the court must examine that allegations/ accusations must be of a very grave nature and should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.^[19]

The doctrinal shift is clear: only allegations supported by concrete evidence of time, place, manner, and participants can sustain criminal prosecution.

Temporal Proximity – Timeliness as a Truth Test

Another emerging judicial filter is timeliness. A prolonged delay between separation and complaint, especially when such complaints emerge alongside or after civil proceedings (like divorce or property disputes), casts serious doubt on the veracity of allegations. Courts now insist on chronological coherence, where cruelty must be contemporaneous with cohabitation, not a retrospective accusation triggered by hostility or legal strategy.

In Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh,, a four-year delay between separation and filing of the FIR coupled with initiation of divorce proceedings by the husband, led to quashing of charges.^[20]

Similarly, in Digambar, the Court noted that the five-year gap between separation and the FIR, with no contemporaneous evidence, renders the allegations stale and implausible.

In Dara Lakshmi Narayan, the Supreme Court quashed charges confirming the complaint as a counter-blast since the wife left the matrimonial home in 2021 and filed the FIR in 2023 after her husband sought divorce.

Even in Preeti Gupta , the Supreme Court noted the pattern of belated, omnibus FIRs and observed that long and protracted criminal trials are often set in motion by exaggerated versions of small incidents, filed after considerable lapse.^[21]

Collectively, these rulings shield families from litigation driven by vendetta and ensure that only complaints rooted in timely, factually supported allegations proceed, while those marred by unexplained delays or strategic timing are dismissed at the outset.

Civil Overlap Doctrine – When Criminal Law Must Recede

Courts caution that not every post-marital dispute warrants criminal prosecution— particularly when the core allegations concern financial disagreements, maintenance claims, or property disputes. In such cases, where coercion or grave cruelty is not clearly established, criminal charges under Section 498-A IPC or Sections 3 and 4 DPA are increasingly seen as inappropriate.

In Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P. [(2018) 10 SCC 472], the Supreme Court reminded magistrates that FIRs under Section 498-A or the DPA “should not be registered in a routine manner.” Prosecution is warranted only where the complaint discloses a coercive dowry

demand or life-endangering cruelty—not where the parties are locked in an acrimonious but civilly resolvable conflict over assets or marital breakdown.^[22]

Even in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 736], the Court warned that “There is a growing tendency in family disputes to convert purely civil claims into criminal complaints” since civil remedies are slow and inadequate, whereas criminal prosecution applies immediate pressure. Such practices were condemned as an abuse of process: “Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.”^[23]

In Kahkashan Kausar v. The State of Bihar the Court echoed this stance, observing that indiscriminate criminalisation of familial conflicts undermines both justice and the legislative intent behind Section 498-A. It stressed that allegations must be scrutinised for genuineness, and the criminal process must not be invoked where the substratum is essentially civil or retaliatory in nature. It reiterated that prosecution under Section 498-A is not sustainable in the absence of specific, credible, and proximate evidence linking the accused to dowry-related cruelty.^[24]

In Dara Lakshmi Narayan, the Supreme Court observed that Section 498A was introduced to protect women from cruelty by their husbands and in-laws, but it has often been misused as a tool for personal vendetta, often through vague or generalized allegations.

Further, in Geddam Jhansi, the Court categorically held that mere familial ties are not sufficient to sustain prosecution and clarified that when allegations relate to claims over stridhan, household contributions, or disputes over living arrangements—issues which can be resolved through civil mechanisms—the criminal process must take a back seat. The domain of criminal law begins only when coercion, cruelty, or unlawful demand is evidenced beyond civil entitlement.

Together, these rulings reflect a settled judicial position: Where the substance of a complaint lies in civil entitlements, and there is no proximate, coercive, and unlawful demand with supporting evidence, the invocation of Sections 498-A, IPC or 3, 4 DPA amounts to overreach.

Doctrine of Filters for Prosecutorial Fairness

The prosecutorial framework under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3–4 DPA now requires:

1. Cohabitation: Was the accused physically and relationally proximate?
2. Proof: Is there corroboration via documents, messages, or witnesses?
3. Timeliness: Is the complaint proximate to the incidents, not a belated counter-blast?
4. Criminality: Is the dispute truly criminal in nature, not a civil contest over maintenance or property?

This layered jurisprudence ensures that Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3–4 DPA remain precise tools of justice, not blunt instruments of vengeance. While genuine victims continue to receive legal protection, families are increasingly shielded from baseless, omnibus litigation—a balance the Court has cautiously strived to achieve.

Ms. Shambhavi Singh is a practicing advocate in the Delhi High Court & Supreme Court of India. Mr Rudra Singh Krishna is a 4th Year Law student at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences.

Views Are Personal. 

1. Indian Penal Code 1860 §498A (India) ↑

2. Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 §§3 & 4 (India) ↑

3. Peter Mayer, 'Dowry murders: Lingering tragedy, emerging hope' (The India Forum, February 7, 2025), accessed June 22, 2025 ↑

4. Vineet Upadhyay, 'Debate over 498A Misuse grows louder' (The Times of India, June 15, 2022) accessed June 22, 2025 ↑

5. Id ↑

6. Indian Penal Code 1860 §498A (India) ↑

7. State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 15 SCC 582 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

8. Digambar v. State of Maharashtra 2024 INSC 1019 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

9. Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat 2024 INSC 960 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

10. Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

11. The Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 §3 (India) ↑

12. The Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 §4 (India) ↑

13. Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

14. Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207, (Supreme Court of India) ↑

15. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku Ram (1995) 6 SCC 219 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

16. Neelu Chopra v. Bharti (2009) 10 SCC 184 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

17. Geddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

18. Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

19. Smt. Raj Rani v. State (Delhi Administration) (2010) 10 SCC 662 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

20. Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

21. Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand 2010 (7) SCC 667 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

22. Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P. (2018) 10 SCC 472 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

23. Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 (Supreme Court of India) ↑

24. Kahkashan Kausar v. The State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599 (Supreme Court of India) ↑