"We Worship Game, But Does It Mourn Us?” Chinnaswamy Stadium Tragedy Through A Legal Lens

The legal response was swift. The Bengaluru Police filed an FIR under Section 304A of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (formerly IPC) against unnamed officials for causing death by negligence. Within 24 hours, the city police commissioner was suspended for alleged lapses, and top RCB officials faced arrest. A judicial commission was announced, and the Karnataka High Court promptly took suo motu cognisance of the matter. In a strongly worded order, the High Court questioned the state's failure to implement crowd management plans, sought status reports from the BBMP, Bengaluru Police, and Disaster Management Authority, and asked why the NDMA Guidelines of 2014 had not been followed.

Even as these developments offer a glimmer of legal traction, the tragedy reveals a deeper crisis. India's sports venues remain chronically under-regulated when it comes to crowd control. Our statutory frameworks are inadequate, our guidelines are unenforced, and our accountability mechanisms activate only after lives are lost. The contrast with how similar incidents were handled in the United Kingdom, particularly in the wake of the Hillsborough disaster, highlights how law, when structured purposefully, can transform safety from an afterthought into a precondition for public events.

From Hillsborough to Legal Reform: Lessons in Law and Accountability

The UK's turning point came with the 1989 Hillsborough disaster, where 97 Liverpool fans were crushed to death. Lord Taylor's subsequent report concluded unequivocally that the fault lay with poor crowd management by the police, not the behaviour of the fans. The Lord Justice Taylor Report catalysed significant statutory and institutional reform, leading to the Football Spectators Act 1989 and the establishment of the Football Licensing Authority (now the Sports Grounds Safety Authority or SGSA).

Under the Football Spectators Act 1989, it became mandatory for stadiums to hold a valid safety certificate issued by local authorities, with terms and conditions drafted in consultation with police, fire, and medical services. This system, based on statutory consultation, empowered regulatory bodies to withhold or revoke licences where safety was compromised.

This was complemented by the Safety at Sports Grounds Act 1975 (SSGA), which mandates that no spectator may be admitted to a stadium without a valid safety certificate, as provided under section 1 of the act. Enforcement mechanisms under Section 12 of the SSGA made it a criminal offence to admit spectators without certification, with powers of inspection and prohibition provided to local authorities.

The Chinnaswamy Failure: Law Without Implementation

In contrast, India does not have any stadium-specific safety legislation akin to the UK's SSGA or FSA. The primary legal instruments in play are the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the NDMA's Guidelines on Crowd Management (2014). Section 34 of the Disaster Management Act gives district authorities the power to coordinate responses to mass gatherings and ensure public safety. However, the enforcement mechanism is weak and fragmented, especially when private organisations, state police, and municipal bodies point fingers at each other, as seen in the aftermath of the Chinnaswamy tragedy.

The NDMA guidelines, while detailed, remain non-binding. They recommend safety audits, real-time crowd monitoring, trained personnel, zonal segregation, and emergency medical support—but these are not codified into law, nor is there any penalty for non-compliance. Unlike the UK's system, India has no provision requiring stadiums to be certified for crowd safety by an independent authority.

Pitch Invasion, Disorder, and Law: UK's Criminal Provisions

Another gap in Indian law is the absence of specific criminal offences related to disorderly conduct within sports venues. The UK addressed this through the Football (Offences) Act 1991, which criminalised:

• Indecent or racialist chanting (Section 3)
• Throwing missiles (Section 2)
• Pitch invasions (Section 4)

These offences were crafted to be football-specific and intended to prevent the kind of volatility that perimeter fencing, which exacerbated the Hillsborough crush, had tried but failed to control.

The UK judiciary, too, played a role in refining these laws. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Stoke on Trent Magistrates' Court [2003] EWHC 1593 Admin, the court clarified the interpretation of "racialist" under Section 3, confirming the offence's broad applicability to hate speech within stadiums. These laws interact with broader protections under the Human Rights Act 1998, which means that fans' rights to assembly and expression are balanced with the duty to protect life and prevent public disorder.

In contrast, India lacks any such venue-specific criminalisation. The Bhartiya Nyay Sahinta 2023 (BNS) or the erstwhile Indian Penal Code and Public Order statutes are too generic to address the unique challenges posed by sport-related mass gatherings. Nor are there any equivalent mechanisms like Football Banning Orders (FBOs), which prohibit individuals with a record of stadium disorder from attending matches.

The Role of Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) and Police

UK has Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) that consist of police, fire services, medical staff, and at times even fan representatives. They have the responsibility to sanction safety certificates and impose conditions on matches. The SGSA regulates their operations and has a mandate of enforcing standards across all football grounds. Even though they are not legally empowered to enforce any decision or advice, they are strongly advised to be present wherever there is mass gathering.

In India, such institutionalized coordination does not exist. Safety planning is left to local police and private event managers without required cross-functional review or oversight. The police force, which is frequently under-equipped and overworked, is concerned with law enforcement, not proactive crowd safety planning.

Towards a Legal Architecture for Sport Safety in India

India does require a well codified legal framework, specifically dealing with spectator safety issues in sports venues. Taking inspiration from the United Kingdom's model, where there are legislations like Safety at Sports Grounds Act, 1975 and the Football Spectators Act, 1989 which focuses on crowd control, India also needs to draft a dedicated “National Sports Spectator Safety Act”. Under this law, it should be a mandate for all stadiums and venues hosting large-scale public sporting events to obtain safety certifications from an independent authority. Such events shouldn't be organised at last minute, under any circumstances. Furthermore, these grant of certificates must be conditioned on compliance with crowd risk assessments, capacity regulations, emergency preparedness, and safe infrastructure audits, like the safety certification process enforced by Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) in the UK.

Along with the compliance of structural framework, India also needs to introduce a venue-specific criminal provisions to deter negligent or reckless behaviour. Following the UK's Football (Offences) Act, 1991, under which pitch invasion, missile throwing, and racist or hateful chanting are criminalised, Indian law should formulate a schedule of offence specific to sporting venues. These offenses may include unauthorized gate-crashing, instigation to panic, overbooking, or interference with safety devices like exits and barricades. In the absence of such legal deterrents, stadium management and event organizers perform in a vacuum of accountability.

Additionally, the current guidelines of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) on crowd management at mass gathering events, while being detailed in nature, are not legally enforceable. To rectify this, such guidelines can either be legislated by being made statutory rules under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, or integrated into the draft sports safety bill itself. Non-compliance must invoke penal sanctions, such as revocation of event permissions, monetary fines, and criminal liability in cases where negligence results in loss of life or injury.

Judiciary also have to play a pivotal role. Drawing on precedents like the Uphaar Cinema case, where the Supreme Court established the principle of joint liability between Delhi Vidyut Board (a public authority) and private operators, courts should be willing to entertain public interest litigation (PIL) on stadium safety issues. Judicial directives can compel government agencies and private sports bodies to adopt statutory norms, conduct safety audits, and implement structural reforms. In this way, the legal system can move beyond post-disaster compensation to active, enforceable prevention.

Conclusion: It's Not About the Numbers

Whether it was 97 at Hillsborough, 11 at Chinnaswamy, or 39 at Heysel, the lessons are not in the death toll—they lie in what followed. The UK used law to build resilience; India continues to offer condolence. Until we embed safety in our statutes, accountability in our institutions, and preparedness in our practices, we will remain vulnerable.

The law must do more than mourn. It must protect.

The authors are Assistant Professors at  Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat. Views are personal.