The Speaker's Dilemma In Telangana: Defections, Partisanship, And The Erosion Of Constitutional Integrity

I have been following Indian legislative politics for long enough to know that the story of defections is not new. It is as old as the very idea of party democracy in India. Yet, what continues to surprise me is not the act of defection itself—but how routinely the Speaker of a legislative house becomes a partisan actor in what ought to be a strictly constitutional function. The recent Supreme Court judgment directing the Telangana Legislative Assembly Speaker to decide within three months on disqualification petitions of 10 Bhartitya Rashtra Samithi (BRS) MLAs who defected to Congress in 2024 has once again placed the spotlight on the institutional credibility of the Speaker's office in dealing with defections.

As most are aware, the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, added through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act in 1985, is often referred to as the anti-defection law. Its core aim is simple: to curb political defections that destabilize elected governments and betray the voter mandate. Under Paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Schedule, a member of a House belonging to a political party is liable to be disqualified if they voluntarily give up the membership of that party or vote/abstain contrary to party directions without prior permission. More crucially, Paragraph 6 of the Schedule grants the Speaker or Chairman of the House the authority to decide on disqualification cases. On the surface, this seems to respect the principle of legislative autonomy. In practice, it has led to one of the most chronic forms of constitutional abuse in Indian politics—because the Speaker, an elected representative from a ruling or dominant party, is also given the powers of a tribunal in disqualification cases. This inherent conflict of interest casts a shadow over the impartiality of decisions.

The Telangana Case: A Clear Example of Delayed Action

The recent defection in Telangana offers a glaring example of this abuse. After Congress won the 2023 Assembly elections, 10 MLAs from the then-ruling BRS defected to Congress. These defections were driven by both strategic and symbolic motives, as the BRS faced internal disillusionment and low morale in the lead-up to the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. Disqualification petitions were filed promptly under the Tenth Schedule, but for over a year, the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly remained silent on the issue.

This inaction forced the petitioners to approach the Supreme Court, which, on July 31, 2025, ordered the Speaker to dispose of the disqualification petitions within three months. The intervention of the Court is vital, but it also raises essential questions. Why was such a directive necessary in the first place? Why do Speakers so often delay disqualification decisions? And most critically, does this delay indicate that the Speaker's constitutional role is being reduced to a mere political shield?

The Larger Pattern: Partisan Speakers Across India

Telangana is not alone in experiencing these issues. The state has witnessed similar episodes of defection and partisan Speaker decisions in the past. In 2019, for example, 12 Congress MLAs defected to the ruling TRS, citing a two-thirds merger, which was quickly recognized by the then Speaker. This move effectively crippled the Congress, reducing it to a marginal political force. Despite the controversy, the Speaker swiftly approved the merger, a decision that drew criticism from Congress, leading them to approach the courts. The issue, however, was already settled, and the damage had been done. Once again, the anti-defection law was exploited as a backdoor for defection rather than a deterrent.

More broadly, the Telangana case reflects a nationwide pattern in which Speakers act in a manner that reflects the political interests of the ruling party, rather than following constitutional objectivity. Last year, in Himachal Pradesh, the Speaker disqualified six Congress MLAs almost overnight for cross-voting in Rajya Sabha polls. In Andhra Pradesh, eight MLAs from the TDP and YSRCP switched parties, raising similar concerns. However, in Maharashtra, despite the Shiv Sena split, the Speaker has not acted against the 40 MLAs in the Eknath Shinde faction or the 12 from the Uddhav Thackeray group. Even in Rajasthan (2019), when six BSP MLAs merged with the Congress, no disqualification was issued. The inconsistency and erratic application of the law show that Speaker decisions often depend on the political convenience of the ruling party.

Judicial Interventions: Upholding the Constitutional Mandate

Time and again, the judiciary has had to step in to uphold the sanctity of the Constitution. In the Telangana case, the Supreme Court rightly pointed out that the delay in disqualification petitions undermines democracy, likening it to “operation successful, patient dead.” This judgment reiterates earlier rulings, such as the 2020 case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker of Manipur, which recommended that disqualification petitions be decided within three months to preserve the integrity of the Tenth Schedule. The Supreme Court has consistently intervened in cases where Speakers have failed to act impartially, reflecting a broader problem of political interference in legislative processes.

For instance, in the 2019 case of Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka, the Speaker disqualified rebel MLAs but also barred them from contesting elections. The Court upheld the disqualification but struck down the restriction on contesting elections, emphasizing that the Speaker's powers are not absolute. In the 2020 Madhya Pradesh crisis, 22 Congress MLAs resigned, prompting the Governor to direct Chief Minister Kamal Nath to prove his majority through a floor test. The Speaker and CM delayed action, leading to a Supreme Court case, Shivraj Singh Chouhan & Ors v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly & Ors. The Court upheld the Governor's power to call a floor test in a running Assembly if majority is in doubt. It directed the Speaker to act swiftly on resignations and held that resignations must be voluntary and genuine. Judicial intervention was deemed valid to protect constitutional integrity. The Court ordered a floor test, reaffirming the need for neutrality and prompt action by constitutional authorities. In Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra (2023), the Court clarified the role of party Whips during party splits, underscoring that the Whip must be appointed by the party and not by the legislature party. In Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007), the Court censured the Speaker for failing to disqualify 13 BSP MLAs who had joined the ruling party. These rulings illustrate a clear pattern: when the Speaker fails to discharge their constitutional duty impartially, the judiciary must intervene.

The Need for Reform: Reclaiming the Speaker's Constitutional Role

The recurring theme of partisan Speakers and unpunished defections points to two interconnected issues. First, the Speaker's position as a political appointee makes it difficult for them to separate political loyalty from constitutional responsibility. Second, the anti-defection law's loopholes, especially the two-thirds merger clause, are frequently exploited, undermining the integrity of the electoral mandate. It is high time for comprehensive reforms. The authority to decide defections should be transferred to an independent tribunal, ideally headed by a retired judge. This would ensure impartiality and remove the potential for political influence. Additionally, the law should introduce a concrete timeline for decisions on disqualification petitions—ideally within 60–90 days—by amending the Tenth Schedule. Defectors should also be barred from holding public office or contesting elections for a minimum of five years to serve as a deterrent against opportunistic defections.

A Test of Democratic Morality

The Telangana case transcends a mere legal battle; it is a test of democratic morality. The Speaker's constitutional duty is to safeguard the sanctity of the legislature, not to act as a political tool for the ruling party. When the Speaker fails to uphold this responsibility, the very spirit of parliamentary democracy is jeopardized. The Supreme Court's intervention is a necessary corrective, but the fact that such a directive was required speaks volumes about the erosion of constitutional norms. Without insulating critical offices like the Speaker's from political partisanship and reforming the anti-defection framework, India will continue to witness the subversion of electoral mandates in the shadows of legislative houses.

Author is a Professor of Political Science, Maulana Azad National Urdu University, Hyderabad

Views Are Personal.