Rhyme And Reason Of 'One Nation, One Election': A Constitutional Inquiry

Chakshu Jain & Rhythm Garg

2 Aug 2025 11:37 AM IST

  • Rhyme And Reason Of One Nation, One Election: A Constitutional Inquiry
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    Over the past few months, the idea of 'One Nation One Election'(ONOE) which means the simultaneous elections of Lok Sabha and the State Legislative Assemblies on the same date has drawn widespread attention. The 129th Constitutional Amendment Bill, introduced in 2024, aims to lay the foundation stone for implementing simultaneous elections across India. On the face of the proposal, it looks cost effective, administratively efficient and fancy as one can vote for the House of People and State legislative assemblies on one day but the more you read between the lines, the more it feels like there's more to the story. The bill is questioned on diminishing the State's autonomy which hampers the idea of 'Federalism'.

    Clause (1) of Article 82A empowers the President of India to bring into force the provision of this article on the date of the first sitting of Lok Sabha following a general election. This date becomes the “Appointed Date”. Clause (2) builds on this by stating any State Legislative Assembly constituted after this Appointed Date, but before the expiry of the full term of the Lok Sabha, shall come to an end on the expiry of full term of house of people.

    This clause is most consequential, overriding Article 83 and 172 (Prescribing five year term to Parliament and State Assemblies, respectively) forcing all State Assemblies elected post-appointment date to end with full term of Lok Sabha, regardless of when they were constituted. A significant violation of electoral mandate by allowing a duly elected state government to be dissolved before completing its full five year term. It means if a State holds elections in 2027 and the Lok Sabha's term ends in 2029, then that Assembly gets just a 2-year term not due to Emergency or Constitutional breakdown, but solely for the sake of electoral synchronisation. It will not only dilute the value of voter's vote that elect a state government for a full five year term but will also deprive the State Government the adequate time to deliver on its promise before contesting the elections again in 2029.

    Clause (3) of Article 82A empowers the Election Commission of India 'Notwithstanding' anything contained in the Constitution to conduct elections for Lok Sabha and all legislative assemblies before the expiry of the full term of the House of the People marking a jurisprudential departure from the statutory mandate under Section 14(1) of Representation of People Act, 1951 which clearly provides that a general election is to be held only upon the expiration or dissolution of the existing House of the People. The proposed constitutional provision would thus override this safeguard, permitting elections even without dissolution creating the possibility for the ruling party at the Centre to time elections strategically, based on favourable political conditions, rather than constitutional necessity. This undermines the spirit of representative democracy, potentially transforming elections from instruments of accountability into tactic tools. Moreover, Clause (3) introduces Latin expression 'mutatis mutandis' which stands for “with the necessary changes” allowing Election Commission of India to modify the electoral procedures to apply the provisions of Part XV of the Constitution governing elections with necessary alterations through mere executive instructions bypassing legislative scrutiny. While administrative flexibility may be needed to manage simultaneous election, granting excessive discretionary power to Election Commission to modify electoral procedure risks serious threat to principles of electoral democracy.

    Clause (4) of Article 82A defines “Simultaneous Elections” codifying the concept of ONOE (One Nation, One Election) within the Constitution. Clause (5) however introduces an important exception to this framework. It states that if the Election Commission is of the opinion that the election to any Legislative Assembly cannot be conducted along with general election to house of people then it will be conducted on a later date. While on the surface, it appear to provide necessary flexibility.

    It raises serious constitutional concerns. The use of the phrase “if the Election Commission is of the opinion” is strikingly vague. Failing to define what specific conditions makes simultaneous elections “not feasible” which opens door to arbitrariness and executive overreach and a political misuse. For instance if ruling party at centre feels that may not do well in a particular state, the Election Commission using the vague powers under Clause (5) could claim that holding simultaneous elections is “not feasible” and postpone the State polls. This extra time could help the ruling party regain public support, and improve its chances. Such delays turn elections into tools for political advantage not a fair chance for people to choose their leader. Moreover this clause is direct violation of Article 172 which prescribes a fixed five year term for every state legislative assembly unless dissolved earlier. Also raising a threat to federalism, as holding elections at end of their term is right of states and an essential aspect of sovereignty. Allowing the central authority (through the ECI) to delay elections reduce State autonomy disrupting Federal equilibrium.

    Clause (6) of the Article 82A also poses a serious concern it states that if elections in state assemblies are postponed under Clause 5 then notwithstanding anything contains in Article 172 of the constitution the term of state assembly will end its term with the House of People. The term 'Notwithstanding' gives the parliament an absolute power to go beyond what the Constitution guarantees. This provision clearly overrides the 5 year term guaranteed by the Article 172 of the Constitution of India. The main intent of the constituent assembly behind allocating the term 5 years was that it is enough time for a ruling party to deliver its promises and also for people to judge the party's performance. If the term of the State assembly gets reduced then it will reduce democratic continuity.

    Let's say the elections for the House of People are held in April 2029, and its 5 year term is scheduled to end in April 2034, now as per the 'One Nation One Election' elections of State Legislative Assembly should also be conducted simultaneously, but According to Clause (6) if due to instability or any other reason State's elections are held in August 2029, then that Assembly will end its term in April 2034 and will not extend till August 2034. This means the ruling party will rule only for 4 years and 8 months and will not complete its full 5 year term.

    Clause (7) of the Article 82A empowers the Election Commission that while notifying about the elections to a Legislative Assembly it will also specify the date on which the term of that Assembly will come to an end. This provision may help in maintaining Administrative uniformity but it is also concerning in a way that the term of the Legislative Assembly was fixed under Article 172 but this provision shifts the power to the Election Commission, the body that is responsible for conducting free and fair elections not determining the lifespan of elected Government. If Election Commission is given power to determine the end date of the elected Government it will not only undermine the fixed term of that government guaranteed by the Constitution but will also reduce the states autonomy. It will reduce the state's autonomy in a way that when elections are deferred or postponed under Clause (6) Election Commission will announce the date on which the ruling party will end its term to match the elections with the House of People. In any scenario State Assembly will not be able to complete its full 5 year tenure which breaks its constitutional protection.

    After amendments in Article 82A the 129th Constitutional Amendment made changes pertaining functioning and term of Lok Sabha and State Assemblies by introducing new clauses in Article 83 ( for Lok Sabha) and Article 172 ( for State Assemblies).

    Clause (3) of Article 83 defines the “full term” of the Lok Sabha as five years from the date of its first sitting and Clause (4) introduce “ unexpired term” which means the leftover period in case the house of people is dissolved earlier. Mirror amendments were introduced in Article 172 for State assemblies.

    The Fundamental shift is in Clause (5) of Article 83 and Clause (4) of Article 172 the move away from the standard practice where new governments get five full years even if elected mid-way or after dissolution but under this new bill if the Lok Sabha or a State Assembly is dissolved and reconstituted before the completion of its full term, the newly elected house will serve the remaining ( unexpired term) of that term not a fresh five year tenure. Suppose the first simultaneous elections are held in January 2026, and all Houses are constituted in February 2026. The full term would end in February 2031.

    Now imagine the Lok Sabha is dissolved in May 2028, and fresh elections are held. The new House would serve only till February 2031( 2 years and 9 months). Similarly, say a State Assembly is dissolved in April 2028 and re-elected. Under Clause (4) of Article 172, that Assembly too will last only till February 2031 not a full term.

    This undermines democracy and voter's vote as people vote in a fresh election to choose for 5 years. The newly elected government too will face challenges in implementing long term policies lacking time. Ironically, this may result in more frequent elections, contrary to the stated objective as argued by constitutional expert V. Sudhish Pai, who noted: "It is likely that we will have more elections than at present."

    Beyond Constitutional flaws and legal uncertainties. Another overlooked consequence of ONOE is the distortion of political discourse. State elections are typically fought on regional and local issues like farming policies, roads, schools and welfare schemes etc reflecting local voices. If both the elections are held together, there is a serious risk that state specific issues will be overshadowed by Centralised campaign themes. This compromise the voter's ability to vote based on issues that matter in their everyday lives. Elections are the core mechanism of public accountability, and reducing their frequency or quality in the name of “efficiency” sets a dangerous precedent.

    Further, the repeated invocation of “ double engine sarkar” referring to the same party being in power at both the Central and in a Particular state often used by current ruling government often used in support of ONOE, where voters are encouraged to align their state choice with the ruling party at the Centre goes against the foundational logic of India's federal democracy where states are meant to function independently and focus on specific needs and concerns of their own people.

    Equally weak is the Financial argument made for Simultaneous elections. While saving money is important but it cannot come at the cost of Democratic values. As many Constitutional scholar observed, Democracy is like food for a human being- essential, non-negotiable and not a luxury that can be compromised.

    Moreover, key parts of the 129th Constitutional Amendment risk violating the Basic Structure Doctrine, laid down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). By weakening federalism, limiting fair elections, and cutting short elected governments, the amendment touches core constitutional values that even Parliament cannot change, not even through an official constitutional amendment under Article 368.

    One of the most critical and unanswered question surrounding 129th Constitutional Amendment is how will the first cycle of synchronised elections will actually begin? Let's say the first synchronised elections are to be held in 2029, but a particular State Assembly is set to end its term in 2027. In such scenario, 2 practical options emerge both of which raise serious constitutional concerns.

    The first one is to impose President's Rule in that State for nearly two years, just to delay election until the Lok Sabha cycle. This would be a clear misuse of Article 356, violating the principle laid down in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) that President's rule must remain an extraordinary measure, not a political tool. The second option is that fresh elections are conducted in that State in 2027 knowing that newly elected government would serve only until 2029 to match the synchronised schedule. In both cases, synchronisation begins not with clarity or consent, but with a choice that weakens democracy and burden institutions.

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