Coercion By Design: The U.S. Strike On Iran And Strategic Silence Of International Law

On June 21, 2025, the United States conducted targeted airstrikes on nuclear facilities in Iran, including the Natanz and Arak sites. According to media reports, stealth B-2 bombers deployed bunker-busting munitions designed to cripple uranium enrichment infrastructure. U.S. and Israeli officials cited national security and non-proliferation concerns, while world leaders expressed deep unease. The United Nations Secretary-General described the attacks as “a dangerous escalation,” warning of “a potential breach of international peace.” Yet, history suggests this is not unprecedented. The normalization of such strikes despite the catastrophic potential of radioactive fallout is rooted in a longstanding loophole in international law.

Loopholes in Law and the Limits of Protection

In the case of an armed conflict, States are bound by the principles of International Humanitarian Law which is codified into four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional Protocols of 1977. In the case of attacks on nuclear facilities, Protocol I and II are governing provisions. Article 56 of Protocol I and Article 15 of Protocol II provides the following common provision:

“Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population”.

Since the present dispute is between two countries and Protocol I deals with International armed conflicts, our focus shall be on this protocol. If we closely read this provision, it legalises the attack on nuclear sites unless “such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population”. Hence the validity of attack on a nuclear facility depends on whether the same effects civilian population or not. Infact Article 56(2)(b) goes further, stating that nuclear facility shall “cease” to be protected if the electricity provided by it in “regular, significant, and direct support of military operations and if such an attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support”. Another problem with these Protocols is that they are not ratified by the countries which have been majorly responsible for attacks on nuclear facilities. For example US and Iran have signed but not ratified Protocol I. Israel has not even signed the Protocol. This limited adherence, combined with the narrow scope of the protocols, renders them ineffective in restricting state-led attacks on nuclear facilities.

States were aware with this structural loophole and some of them tried to bridge the gap by introducing draft proposals of various conventions. For instance, a Joint USSR-USA Draft proposal named “Radiological Weapon Convention” on prohibiting the stockpiling, production and development of radioactive weapons as well as governing the practices of States while there is an attack on a nuclear facility, was introduced at the Conference of Disarmament in 1979. Though various countries agreed with the idea, it never saw the light of the day because of various loopholes in the definition and procedural loopholes [United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 7 (New York, 1982), p. 354) (hereinafter UNDY)]. In 1979, an international treaty Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was adopted, which specifies the obligations of the parties regarding the protection and criminalisation of acts with respect to nuclear material. In 2005 an Amendment was adopted (hereinafter A/CPPNM), which outlawed explicitly attacks on nuclear facilities. Article 1A of the Amendment reads,

“The purposes of this Convention are to achieve and maintain worldwide effective physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes; to prevent and combat offences relating to such material and facilities worldwide; as well as to facilitate co-operation among States Parties to those ends.”

At the same time, this amendment also creates a loophole via Article 2(4)(b) which states that this Convention shall not be applicable during armed conflicts, which are governed via International Humanitarian Law. This failure is not incidental but strategic, the ambiguity sustains the utility of military options against nuclear programs, especially those perceived as violating non-proliferation norms.

A Pattern of Selective Condemnation

The world's uneven response to such attacks further exposes the political calculus at play. Furthermore, because the concerned States were either not party to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or Protocol I of 1977, they justified these attacks on nuclear establishments. For instance, during 1980s 4 Iranian jets attacked Iraq's Tuwaitha nuclear research centre, which caused damaged to laboratories and research centre. However, Osirak reactor which was under construction at the time of the attack, did not suffered much damage. It is important to note that Protocol I came into force in 1978 and neither of the concerned States were parties to it. This attack did not receive any major international condemnation, majorly because this attack did not result in radioactive fallout.

The same nuclear reactor was then attacked by Israel in 1981, during Iraq-Iran war, justifying that “Iraq was on the verge of going operational, with a view to producing nuclear weapons, the principal target of which would have been Israel.” (UNDY 1981 p. 174) This attack received major International condemnation (UNDY 1981 p. 170) both at IAEA and UN but because of interference by United States, no resolution was passed against Israel in either of the institutes [L Castelli and O Samuel, 'Justifying Attacks on Nuclear Facilities' (2023) 30 (1–3) The Non-proliferation Review 83, 91 (hereinafter Castelli and Samuel) ]. The then President Regan justified these attacks in a press conference as well. During 1984-88, there was a series of bombing by Iraq on Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactors, causing major damage to the facility. In contrast to Israel's attack on Osirak, attack on Bushehr didn't receive much international attention and just a resolution was passed at UNSC, condemning the ongoing conflict between the two nations, without specifying the specific attack on the nuclear reactors (Castelli and Samuel, pg. 93-94). Even when Iran expressed concerns that this attack might lead to some radioactive leak, it wasn't taken with much seriousness (Castelli and Samuel, pg. 93). During the Gulf War (1991-93), United States damaged nuclear reactors of Iraq and justified these attacks by stating UNSC resolution 678, which stated that States are free to use “all necessary means” to force Iraq's invasion from Kuwait. US refrained from discussing details regarding these attacks at IAEA (Castelli and Samuel, pg. 95) and also no complaints were filed against USA at United Nations (Castelli and Samuel, pg. 95). In-fact USA argued that since it's not a party to Protocol-1 and it never stated officially that it will never attack any nuclear reactor (Castelli and Samuel, pg. 95), hence these attacks are not subject to any international law.

The double standards in response reflect strategic interests rather than normative clarity. States are more likely to condemn attacks when they perceive the target as an ally or the attacker as a rival. When the attacker is a powerful state advancing the objectives of the non-proliferation regime, often as defined by the P5 powers, international silence or tepid response follows. The recent U.S. bombing of Iranian sites seems to follow this trend, with muted condemnation from Western states and no immediate punitive response from the Security Council.

A Structural Flaw, Not a Legal Accident

On June 1, 2002, during a commencement address at West Point Military Academy, then U.S. President George W. Bush stated that Cold War strategies of deterrence and containment were outdated, emphasizing instead the need to “take the battle to the enemy, disrupt their plans, and confront the gravest threats before they materialize.” The repeated targeting of nuclear facilities, despite humanitarian and environmental risks, is symptomatic of a structural flaw in international law and echoes the words of George Bush. The ambiguity in the Geneva Protocols in addition to the universalisation of weak treaty's principles and selective enforcement of it, make sures that powerful countries can easily strike any nuclear facility without being held responsible.

These developments clearly reflect the urgent need for the international community to redefine the rules of engagement around nuclear infrastructure with clarity, consensus, and enforceability. In this regard, there is a clear need that International Community should clearly define the boundary of “pre-emptive self-defence” and “anticipatory self-defence” under international treaty. The history of attacks on nuclear facilities, is borne out of the argument that these facilities might be used against the victim state. Hence, to make sure that such attacks do not happen, they take the route of targeting these facilities. Unless these grounds are not defined, we may continue to witness more blatant violation of International Law.

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