'No Moral Turpitude Involved': Allahabad High Court Quashes Removal Of Gram Pradhan Over Cow Slaughter Allegations

With this, a bench of Justice Pankaj Bhatia allowed the plea of the petitioner (Raj Kishor Yadav), challenging his removal as a 'Gram Pradhan' on June 28 in exercise of powers under Section 95(1)(g)(ii) & (iii) of the UP Panchayat Raj Act 1947.

For context, this provision of the 1947 Act permits the State Government to remove a Gram Pradhan if he “refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude,” and has “abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest”.

Background

Briefly put, the removal order was based on an FIR lodged under Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1960 and Sections 3/5A/8 of the UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act 1955.

The FIR alleged that 11 bovines were found tied with a rope, and three persons, including the petitioner, confessed to planning to slaughter them once they could gather resources.

The Additional Advocate General argued that the cow and its progeny are intrinsically linked with the religious and cultural feelings of India. He submitted that the petitioner, instead of protecting cows, was planning their illegal slaughter, and hence, he was not fit to hold the office.

He further submitted that the cow and its slaughter have huge significance for the majority community in the country and considering the fact that the petitioner being a Gram Pradhan, was found to be accused of the offence, he was rightly removed.

However, the Court found this insufficient to attract the drastic consequence of removal. Justice Bhatia observed thus:

"...from the FIR, no material exists prima-facie to prosecute the petitioner under Section 3 as there is no allegation of slaughter of any cow; at worst, the allegations in the FIR, even if treated to be gospel truth, make allegations which are traceable to Section 5A of the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act".

For context, Section 5A of the UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act 1955 regulates rather than prohibits cow transport. The Court noted that at best, the FIR discloses a procedural irregularity, not an illegality of the kind that reflects 'depravity' or 'vileness' which is a necessary standard for invoking moral turpitude.

The Court stressed that the office of the Gram Pradhan, though statutory, has a constitutional flavour due to the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, and the same must be protected from arbitrary expropriatory action.

The single judge cautioned thus:

"The provisions for removal of a statutory authority having constitutional flavour is essentially an expropriatory action…and thus has to be strictly interpreted".

The Court rejected the State's argument that mere accusation under the Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act was sufficient to remove the Pradhan, as it observed thus:

"…(it) will lead to catastrophic results as mere accusations on the Gram Pradhan of an offence, would vest power in the hands of the executive to remove an elected representative which is not in furtherance of the scheme of the Constitution as well as the statutory enactment through which the Gram Pradhan is elected".

The Court did not find any material to justify the removal of the petitioner under Clause (iii) of Section 95(1)(g), which relates to abuse of office or actions contrary to public interest.

"…there is no allegation that the petitioner has abused his position or has persistently failed to perform the duties or his continuance, as such, is not desirable in public interest; no material exists either in the impugned order or otherwise enabling the State to form an opinion that it is not desirable in public interest that the petitioner continues as a Gram Pradhan".

Thus, the invocation of both Clauses (ii) and (iii) was found to be unsustainable by the single judge.

The Court also noted that though Section 95(1)(g) uses the word 'may', indicating discretionary power, the Court held that such discretion must be exercised rationally and not mechanically.

The single judge also underlined that not every allegation can be equated with moral turpitude, and such an act must involve an act that is inherently 'base', 'vile', or 'depraved'.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the June 28, 2025, removal order and restored the petitioner to his elected post. The petition was thus allowed.