Defaulter Can't Escape Liability Citing Term End: Rajasthan HC Upholds Inquiry Against Official Initiated After Village Became Municipality

The Rajasthan High Court quashed the suspension of the Chairperson of a Municipal Board accused of misconduct, however it continued an inquiry initiated against her under Rajasthan Municipalities Act 2009 instituted after the concerned area was converted from a gram panchayat to a municipality. 

The court observed that inquiry initiated under either provisions of the Panchyati Raj Act or the Municipalities Act may continue even after expiry of the elected member's term against whom misconduct is alleged, as the member cannot escape accountability merely because their term has ended. 

The petitioner was serving as the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Napasar when following certain allegations, inquiry was initiated against her under Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (“1994 Act”).

Before this inquiry could be concluded, the Gram Panchayat was declared as a Municipality, and the petitioner assumed the position of Chairperson of the Municipal Board. Upon assuming this charge, another inquiry was initiated against her on same charges, under Section 39 of Rajasthan Municipalities Act 2009.

She was accused of appointing contractual personnel without mandatory prior approval from the Panchayat Samiti which amounted to misconduct and caused financial loss of around 5 lakhs to the State.

Justice Sunil Beniwal in his order compared inquiry provisions of Panchyati Raj Act and Municipalities Act and said:

"A comparative reading of Section 38 of the Act of 1994 and Section 40 of the Act of 2009 clearly indicates that an inquiry initiated under either provision may continue even after the expiry of the term of the elected member against whom the misconduct is alleged. What emerges from a plain reading of both provisions is that a person accused of misconduct cannot escape his/her accountability merely because his/her term has ended". 

It was argued by the petitioner that, firstly, since the allegations pertained to petitioner's charge as a Sarpanch, inquiry could not have been initiated under the 2009 Act. The petitioner could not be subjected to two concurrent inquires since that would amount to double jeopardy.

Secondly, it was submitted that when the authorities did not consider it necessary to suspend her under the 1994 Act, suspending her now, after nearly three years, under 2009 Act was unjustified.

The court also observed that once Gram Panchayat Napasar was declared a Municipal Board, the provisions of the Panchayati Raj Act no longer applied hence the earlier inquiry no longer survives. 

"The operation of Section 3(8) (f) of the Act of 2009 necessitates a suitable mechanism to ensure that any pending inquiry, such as the one in the present case, reaches its logical conclusion. If the argument of the petitioner that proceedings cannot be continued under Section 39 of the Act of 2009 is accepted, it would leave the State Government with no legal recourse to conclude the inquiry.This would result in an untenable situation where neither the Act of 1994 nor the Act of 2009 could be invoked, effectively allowing the misconduct to go unaddressed."

It further said that there was no parallel proceedings or issue of double jeopardy since the earlier act no longer applied and the authorities could not proceed under it. 

In relation to the second argument, the Court opined that if the respondent, despite having sufficient time and material, chose not to suspend the petitioner during trial under the 1994 Act, possibly due to limited seriousness of the charge, it was unjustified to suspend her in the subsequent inquiry under 2009 Act based on identical charges.

“Panchayati Raj Department was fully aware of the appointments in question and, based on two inquiry reports, decided to proceed with formal inquiry under Section 38 of the Act of 1994. However, no decision to place the petitioner under suspension was taken at that stage, perhaps indicating that the nature of the charge was not considered sufficiently grave or that there was a lack of material justifying such action. Given this context, there appears to be no valid reason for invoking the power of suspension while initiating a subsequent inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009, especially when the charge remained unchanged.”

Accordingly, the petition was partly allowed wherein while the proceeding under the Municipalities Act was allowed to be continued, while the suspension of the petitioner was set aside allowing her to assumer her charge again.

Title: Sarla Devi v State of Rajasthan & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 266

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