Constitutional Analysis Of Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024

The recently enacted Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024, by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, aims to address the threats being posed by allegedly "Left Wing Extremist organisations or similar organisations." The aim of maintaining public security and defending against extremism is constitutionally legitimate. But the means adopted here in this act are seriously constitutionally and legally questionable. Legally, more so in the view of constitutional law as well as of civil rights, the Bill is objectionable. It is characterized by vagueness, overbreadth, excessive limitation on fundamental rights, lack of procedural protection, and undue vesting of power in the executive.

1. Vagueness and the Principle of Legal Certainty

One of the characteristics of a minimal requirement of a just criminal justice system is that the law itself should be clear and not ambiguous. The Maharashtra Bill, however, employs the undefined and vague words which leave so much to the whim of the interpreter. The expression "similar groups" as a criterion for test of Left Wing Extremist organisations is neither defined nor elaborated in the Bill. Such imprecise language grants law enforcement agencies too much leeway and invites arbitrary and subjective application.

Indian constitutional law, most notably in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), has stressed that imprecise legislation violates Article 14 of the Constitution, which promises equality before the law. In Shreya Singhal, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act was held down by the Supreme Court on grounds of vagueness as well as misuse. Laws need to be reasonably specific so that citizens know what is criminalised. Failure to define terms in this Bill enables individuals to be criminalised for the doing of acts which they could not reasonably have known to do something illegal.

2. Unjustifiably Disproportionate Impact on Article 19 Freedoms

The Bill seriously imperils the freedoms enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, the freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom of association. The Bill assumes that the individual may be punished for membership of, or sympathy towards a group that the State considers dangerous, without the individual ever having participated in, incited violence or illegal activities. This amounts to criminalization of association, thought or belief and is much wider than what is allowed under Article 19(2).

The Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) opined that criticism of the government or articulation of political ideologies, however radical or dissenting, will not constitute sedition or illegal action unless there is incitement to violence or intent to create disorder. Criminal responsibility has to be founded on actual action rather than ideological leaning. The Maharashtra Bill reduces this threshold by enabling punishment on the basis of perceived sympathies or association.

Secondly, in Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016), the Court restated the doctrine of proportionality, by which limitations on fundamental rights have to be necessary and least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate object. The Maharashtra Bill does not pass the test. Its general language and sweeping powers intrude into constitutionally protected freedoms in ways that are not narrowly tailored to address the particular evil that it seeks to cure.

3. Violation of Article 21 and Procedural Fairness

The Bill is also suspect under Article 21 of the Constitution, which upholds the right to life and personal liberty. The Bill criminalises offenses under the Act as cognisable and non-bailable offences, and gives the government the power to confiscate property allegedly belonging to the "unlawful" organisation. What is alarming is that such severe penalties can pile up without judicial precedents or independent inquiry.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that a law encroaching upon individual freedom shall have to be "just, fair and reasonable" and not arbitrary or oppressive. The Maharashtra Bill provides absolute discretion to the executive to act without scrutiny and hence deprives the people of the safeguard of the due process protections. Lacking court supervision and procedure safeguards such as prior hearings or appellate forum, this bill permits punishment on suspicion.

Moreover, confiscation of property without warrant of judicial approval is a serious violation of the right of property under Article 300A. Although the right of property is no longer considered basic, it is still protected by the Constitution and cannot be violated arbitrarily.

4. Lack of Independent Monitoring Mechanism

The other serious fault is the total absence of independent or judicial oversight of declaring organisations illegal or extremist. It is purely the executive machinery's discretion whether a group should be proscribed or individuals investigated for membership or association with such a group. Not only does this contravene the doctrine of separation of powers—a fundamental ingredient of the Constitution—but also deprives such individuals of a fair chance to challenge or appeal against the designation.

Constitutional democracy requires where individual liberty is restricted, such a determination be subjected to independent and impartial adjudication. Granting the executive unreviewable discretion to determine who poses a threat to public safety increases the likelihood of politically motivated abuse, especially against dissident opinion, student activism, or ideological minorities. Even the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), which is otherwise criticized as being stringent, has a provision for a Tribunal to consider prohibition of organizations. That such a provision is absent in this Bill makes it constitutionally weaker.

5. Overbreadth and Chilling Effect

The overbreadth doctrine is invoked where a statute not only criminalizes illegal activity but, in its reach, encompasses constitutionally protected activity. This Bill threatens to do just that. In criminalizing membership of, communication with, or sympathy towards certain organisations—without evidence of violence or intent—it chills political discussion, academic debate, and free speech.

For instance, a university student in the context of social justice principles, or an individual duplicating a news report on a WhatsApp group quoting controversial political opinions, would be "linked" to illicit ideas or ideology. This excess in a sound democracy cannot be tolerated. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court ruled that public order legislation must never be utilized to suppress genuine criticism or debate.

6. Analogy to Preventive Detention Without Guarantees

Even though the Bill is not technically preventive detention legislation, it has the same features like pre-emptive arrest ahead of bail, exemption from normal legal process, and penalty on suspicion and not evidence. Preventive detention laws under Article 22 like the National Security Act (NSA) are themselves contentious and allowed only under strict constitutional standards. But at least those legislations have protection in the form of an Advisory Board and periodic review.

The Maharashtra Bill fails to provide such protection. It prescribes punishment in the form of preventive detention loss of liberty, confiscation of property, refusal of bail without following the protection procedure under Article 22. It lowers the character of due process as also the faith which citizens have in the judicial system.

The Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024, albeit enacted under the guise of public and national security, cannot discern a constitutionally required equilibrium among freedom and security. It runs counter to elementary provisions of the Indian Constitution certainty of law (Article 14), proportionality and freedom of speech and association (Article 19), and procedural fairness and freedom (Article 21). In allowing general and vague powers with inadequate safeguards or checks, the Bill is an actual threat to abuse and the suppression of dissent.

Laws designed to maintain the State must themselves comply with the rule of law. If enacted and enforced in its current state, the Bill will likely be challenged in constitutional courts. Parliamentarians must go back to the draft, be serious, have independent mechanisms of oversight for examination and impose strict limitations on its scope to activities that immediately threaten public order or national integrity. Otherwise, the law will turn into an instrument of repression instead of protection.

Author is 5th Year Law Student, Vishwakarma University, Pune. Views Are Personal.