Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest 2025 -Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Multiple Causes of Action – Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC solely because one of the reliefs sought is legally untenable, when other reliefs are maintainable and arise from independent causes of action. Held, a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely because one relief is barred by law, provided other reliefs are maintainable and supported by distinct causes of action. Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible when multiple causes of action are pleaded, as rejecting the entire plaint would unjustly deny the plaintiff access to justice. The examination under Order VII Rule 11 must be confined to the plaint's averments, without delving into the merits or veracity of the claims. If triable issues arise, the suit cannot be summarily dismissed. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, which erroneously rejected the plaint by treating multiple reliefs as a single claim, and restored the trial court's finding that the issues were triable. (Para 8, 9, 13) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 – The appellant filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that sale deeds executed by the respondent after the revocation of a power of attorney were void, along with possession and injunction reliefs. The High Court dismissed the suit, finding one relief invalid, without considering the triable issue arising from the other reliefs. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court's approach was contrary to the settled law on Order VII Rule 11 CPC. (Para 8 & 9) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 – Partial Rejection Impermissible – Partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible, and no adverse observations should be made against any relief in an Order VII Rule 11 application if other reliefs remain valid. (Para 4.8 & 9.6) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order I Rule 10 & Order XXII Rule 5 - Whether a subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to delete a party, after rejection of an objection to their impleadment, is barred by res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata applies to impleadment proceedings under Order I Rule 10 CPC. Once an impleadment order attains finality without objection or challenge, a subsequent application to delete the impleaded party is barred by constructive res judicata. Permitting repeated objections after conclusive determination violates principles of fairness and justice, causing uncertainty. The appellant, having failed to challenge his impleadment as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 5 at the relevant stage, could not later seek deletion under Order I Rule 10. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Trial Court and High Court's rejection of the deletion application. (Para 51, 54 & 60) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764

Order VII Rule 11 - Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 - Partition Suit - Exception Pleaded - A partition suit seeking division of joint family property cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the preliminary stage when the plaintiff invokes an exception to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) requires the suit to be manifestly barred by law without requiring evidence. However, determining whether properties are benami or joint family assets involves factual inquiries, such as the source of funds and family arrangements, necessitating a trial. When an exception to the Benami Act is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected at the pleading stage, as it raises disputed questions of fact requiring evidence-based adjudication. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' challenge to the trial court and High Court's refusal to reject the plaint, upholding the continuation of the partition suit for trial to resolve factual disputes regarding the nature of the property. Appeal dismissed; plaint upheld for trial. (Para 28) Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2025 INSC 739

Order XXI - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 136 - Execution of Permanent Injunction Decree - Satisfaction recorded in an Execution Petition (EP) for a prior breach of a permanent injunction does not bar subsequent EPs for new breaches. A permanent injunction, being perpetual, remains enforceable against future violations without being barred by res judicata. Each fresh breach constitutes a new cause of action, and no limitation period applies under Article 136 for enforcing such decrees. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of a subsequent EP based on prior "full satisfaction," allowing the appeal and affirming the perpetual enforceability of permanent injunctions against judgment debtors, their assignees, and successors. (Paras 6 & 7) Saraswati Devi v. Santosh Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2025 INSC 715

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Section 12A - Pre-Institution Mediation - Mandatory as per Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, but applies prospectively from 20.08.2022 - Held, for commercial suits filed before 20.08.2022 without Section 12A compliance, courts shall stay the suit and refer parties to time-bound mediation if an objection is raised under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or parties express intent to mediate, unless exceptional circumstances apply (e.g., plaints rejected and not re-filed within limitation, or filed after jurisdictional High Court declared Section 12A mandatory). Suits filed on or after 20.08.2022 without pre-institution mediation must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court upheld the High Court's order staying the 2019 suit and directing mediation within three months, extendable by two months, as per Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018. Appeal dismissed. (Paras 62 - 65) Dhanbad Fuels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2025 INSC 696 : [2025] 6 SCR 431

Section 96(2), Order IX Rule 13 - Delay Condonation - Bona Fides Essential - Held, repeating previously rejected grounds for condonation constitutes an abuse of process. Courts must first evaluate the bona fides of the explanation for delay before examining the merits of the case. Substantial justice cannot override the prejudice to the opposing party without reasonable grounds for delay. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order condoning a 1,116-day delay in filing an appeal against an ex-parte decree, emphasizing that condonation cannot be granted merely as an act of generosity. Condonation under Order IX Rule 13 CPC requires a bona fide explanation, such as non-service of summons or sufficient cause for non-appearance. The Respondents' attempt to re-agitate grounds previously rejected under Order IX Rule 13 CPC in an appeal under Section 96(2) CPC was impermissible and an abuse of process. Condonation applications must establish genuine reasons, with merits of the main matter considered only if sufficient cause is shown and balanced against prejudice to the opposing party. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside. (Paras 30 - 32) Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2025 INSC 672 : [2025] 6 SCR 253

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on Admissions - Under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, a court may pass a decree in favor of the plaintiff based on the defendant's admissions or dismiss a suit if the plaintiff's admissions negate the claim. The court can exercise this power suo motu at any stage of the proceedings without requiring a formal application. The discretionary power allows dismissal of a suit based on the plaintiff's admissions that reveal no cause of action, independent of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court and High Court's findings. (Paras 36, 37) Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2025 INSC 632 : [2025] 6 SCR 210

Order XVIII Rule 17 – Power to recall a witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC vests solely with the court and is limited to seeking clarifications to remove ambiguities or clarify a witness's statement. Parties have no inherent right to recall witnesses for further examination, cross-examination, or re-examination without the court's leave. Such recall cannot be used to fill gaps in a party's case or introduce additional evidence. The court may, in exceptional circumstances, permit recall for examination or cross-examination under its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The decision of the High Court, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's application to recall a witness, was affirmed. (Para 8 - 13) Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2025 INSC 628 : [2025] 6 SCR 601

Order VII Rule 6 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 17 - Exemption from Limitation - Fraud - Sale Deed - Knowledge of Right to Sue - To claim exemption from the limitation period under Section 17, a plaintiff must establish that fraud actively concealed their right to sue, not merely that the sale deed was fraudulently executed. The limitation period for suits involving fraud under Article 59 commences upon discovery of the fraud. The plaintiff's claim of fraud in a 2008 sale deed was rejected, as she was present during its execution and failed to demonstrate that fraud prevented her from knowing her legal remedy. The absence of specific pleadings regarding fraud, as required under Order VII Rule 6 CPC, further undermined the claim. The appeal was dismissed, as the suit filed in 2012 was time-barred under the 3-year limitation period prescribed by Article 59.(Para 21) Santosh Devi v. Sunder, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2025 INSC 627 : [2025] 6 SCR 156

Order 1 Rule 10 (2) - Whether a subsequent purchaser can be impleaded as a party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. Held, a subsequent purchaser, though not a necessary party, can be impleaded as a proper party in a specific performance suit if their rights are affected by the adjudication. A necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be passed, while a proper party is one whose presence aids the court in effectively and comprehensively adjudicating all issues in dispute. (Para 32) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

Order 1 Rule 10 (2) - The appellant, a stranger to the suit, sought impleadment in a specific performance suit, claiming rights to the suit property based on a registered sale deed. The plaintiff did not oppose the impleadment, but the High Court, under Article 227, overturned the trial court's order allowing the appellant's inclusion. Held, the genuineness of the transaction involving the appellant was disputed and required determination at trial. Impleading the appellant as a proper party would not prejudice the case and would enable effective adjudication. Relying on Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co., (2007) 10 SCC 82, the Court affirmed that a third party showing a semblance of title or interest can seek impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC, subject to the court's discretion. Appeal allowed; trial court's order permitting impleadment of the appellant as a proper party restored. (Para 33) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

Order VII Rule 11, Section 96 - Constitution of India; Article 227 - Supervisory Jurisdiction - Rejection of Plaint - High Court cannot reject a plaint while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as this power is limited to ensuring courts/tribunals act within their jurisdiction - The Court set aside the High Court's decision to reject a plaint as barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, emphasizing that such rejection is a function of the trial court under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), appealable under Section 96 - Article 227 cannot be used to usurp the trial court's original jurisdiction or bypass statutory remedies under the CPC - The Court criticized procedural shortcuts by an overburdened judiciary, stating they undermine the rule of law and procedural safeguards. (Paras 8 - 10) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606

Procedural Law - Short-circuiting of procedure cannot be allowed - Procedural law provides the necessary legal infrastructure on which edifice of rule of law is built. Short-circuiting of procedure to reach hasty outcomes is an undesirable propensity of an overburdened judiciary. Such impulses rendering procedural safeguards and substantive rights otiose, subvert certainty and consistency in law and need to be discouraged. (Para 14) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint - A plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as time-barred when the issue of limitation involves a mixed question of law and fact, requiring evidence to determine the date of knowledge of the cause of action. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit at the threshold, emphasizing that disputed facts, such as the plaintiff's claimed discovery of fraud in 2011, must be assumed true at this stage and cannot be summarily decided without evidence. The trial court's order dismissing the application to reject the plaint was restored. (Para 13) P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2025 INSC 598

Order XI Rule 14 - Production of documents - Appellate Court's power to direct document production under Order XI Rule 14 CPC limited to pending suits - An Appellate Court cannot direct the production of documents under Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11. The power to order document production is confined to the pendency of a suit and does not extend to appeals after dismissal. The Appellate Court's role is limited to reviewing the validity of the rejection order without assessing the case's merits or admitting new evidence not part of the original proceedings. The High Court's decision affirming the First Appellate Court's order to produce a mutation deed was set aside as it exceeded jurisdictional scope. (Para 9) Shrikanth N.S. v. K. Munivenkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2025 INSC 557

Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Section 13(1A) - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 - Limitation Period for Filing Appeal - Commencement from Date of Judgment Pronouncement - Held, the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, begins on the date of judgment pronouncement, not the date of receiving its certified copy. The Court clarified that while Order XX Rule 1 CPC mandates providing judgment copies, litigants must diligently procure them. A party cannot claim the limitation period starts only upon receiving the copy unless they demonstrate reasonable efforts to obtain it. Interpreting otherwise would defeat the Commercial Courts Act's objective of timely case disposal and the diligence required under limitation laws. The appellants' appeal was dismissed for failing to justify a 301-day delay, as they made no efforts to obtain the judgment copy within the 60-day statutory period. (Para 13, 14, 16) Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2025 INSC 533

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XX Rule 1 - Procedural requirements under Order XX Rule 1 CPC do not override the principle of diligence in limitation laws. Parties cannot indefinitely delay appeals by citing non-delivery of judgment copies without proactive efforts to procure them. (Para 14, 15, 18) Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2025 INSC 533

Hindu Law – Partition of Joint Family Property – Self-Acquired Property – Whether the suit property, acquired by Defendant No. 1 post-partition, was ancestral (joint family) or self-acquired property. Held, upon partition of joint Hindu family property, shares allotted to coparceners become their self-acquired property, with absolute rights to sell, transfer, or bequeath. No presumption exists that property is joint family property merely due to the existence of a joint Hindu family; the claimant must prove it is joint family property, typically by showing a joint family nucleus used for its acquisition. Ancestral property is limited to that inherited from paternal ancestors within three generations. The doctrine of blending requires clear intention by the owner to relinquish self-acquired property into the joint family pool; mere use by family members or acts of generosity do not suffice. Here, Defendant No. 1's purchase of his brother's share post-partition, using a loan and not joint family funds, established the property as self-acquired. The subsequent sale to the Appellants was valid. The High Court's judgment, invalidating the sale by misapplying the doctrine of blending and overlooking evidence of independent acquisition, was set aside. Appeal allowed; suit property held to be self-acquired by Defendant No. 1, and sale to Appellants upheld. (Paras 13 - 20) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 100 to 103 – High Court's Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Scope of Substantial Question of Law – Re-appreciation of evidence by High Court impermissible unless First Appellate Court's findings are perverse or lack evidentiary support – Section 103 CPC allows High Court to examine facts only when lower courts fail to determine critical facts or when a substantial question of law necessitates fact re-determination – Plausible findings of First Appellate Court, based on thorough analysis of oral and documentary evidence, cannot be disturbed merely because an alternative view is possible – High Court's interference by re-appreciating evidence without framing a substantial question of law held erroneous – Judgment and decree of First Appellate Court restored. (Para 12) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Section 47 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 - An arbitral award for claims not included in an approved IBC resolution plan is unenforceable, as such claims are extinguished upon approval under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court allowed Electrosteel Steels Ltd.'s appeal against the enforcement of an Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) arbitral award, ruling it non-executable due to the approved resolution plan settling operational creditors' claims at nil. The Court clarified that objections to an award's execution under Section 47 CPC are permissible if the award is a nullity, independent of a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and that the MSEFC lacked jurisdiction to pass the award post-approval. (Para 50 - 52) Electrosteel Steel v. Ispat Carrier, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2025 INSC 525

Section 96, Order XXIII Rule 3 & Order XLIII Rule 1A - Compromise Decree - Held, a party to a compromise decree cannot directly appeal to the Appellate Court under Order XLIII Rule 1A of the CPC without first challenging the compromise's validity before the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3. Order XLIII Rule 1A does not create an independent right of appeal but allows challenges to a compromise only within an existing appeal under Section 96(1) CPC, after the Trial Court decides the objection. A party bound by the compromise is barred from appealing under Section 96(3) CPC, and non-parties affected by a consent decree may appeal under Section 96 with leave. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's Larger Bench decision. (Paras 8 & 15) Sakina Sultanali Sunesara v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2025 INSC 570

Order IX, Rules 2 or 3 - Dismissal of a suit for default does not bar a fresh suit on the same cause of action, as it is neither a decree nor a judgment, and the principle of res judicata does not apply. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing a fresh suit under Rule 4, as the dismissal for default lacks adjudication on merits and is not an appealable order under Order XLIII of the CPC. (Para 26) Amruddin Ansari v. Afajal Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2025 INSC 566

Order IX Rule 13 - Setting aside ex-parte decree - Once a defendant is set ex parte, they are not entitled to present evidence in their defence; their only available recourse is to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness in an attempt to disprove the plaintiff's case. If a legal issue is raised in the written statement such as one relating to limitation or jurisdiction, the court may frame and decide that issue based on the pleadings alone, without requiring the defendant to present evidence. However, this exception does not apply when the defendant fails to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness, as the absence of cross-examination undermines the basis for setting aside the ex parte decree. (Para 19 & 20) Kanchhu v. Prakash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2025 INSC 542

Order 41 Rule 31 - Appellate Court not bound to frame points of determination when not raised in appeal. Appellate Court's failure to frame points of determination does not invalidate judgment if substantially compliant with rule and appellant raises no specific issues for reconsideration - High Court erred in setting aside Appellate Court's decision for non-compliance with Rule 31 when no points were urged by appellant - Rule 31 requirements apply only when specific points are raised - Substantial compliance suffices, and technical interpretation should not compromise substantial justice - Appeal allowed. (Paras 7, 10, 12 & 14) Nafees Ahmad v. Soinuddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 458 : 2025 INSC 520

Order 23 Rule 3 - A suit by legal heirs to set aside a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is not maintainable if the original party did not file a recall application. The Court reaffirmed that the only remedy against a compromise decree is a recall application, as per Order 23 Rule 3A CPC, which bars suits to challenge the legality of such decrees. Appeal dismissed where appellants failed to show that their father, the original party, challenged the decree. (Paras 11 & 12) Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi v. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 446 : 2025 INSC 517

Order VII Rule 11 - Locus Standi of Proposed Purchaser under Agreement to Sell in Suit for Permanent Injunction against Third Party - Held, a proposed purchaser under an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to file a suit for a permanent injunction against a third party claiming independent title and possession of the property, as such an agreement does not confer proprietary rights. The rights under an agreement to sell are personal, enforceable only against the vendor or, in limited cases under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, against a subsequent transferee with notice, but not against third parties with no privity of contract. The suit by the respondent (proposed purchaser) was not maintainable due to the absence of the vendor as a party and lack of enforceable rights against the appellant (third party). The Supreme Court set aside the trial court and High Court's dismissal of the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 11, allowed the appeal, and held the suit for permanent injunction unsustainable due to the respondent's lack of locus standi and absence of privity with the appellant. (Paras 15, 16) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490 : [2025] 5 SCR 94

Order VII Rule 11(d) - When the primary relief in the suit becomes time-barred then the ancillary relief claimed therein also becomes unenforceable. (Para 28) Nikhila Divyang Mehta v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2025 INSC 485

Section 100 - Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3 and Article 59 - The High Court in a second appeal, without adjudicating the substantial question of law, had remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration after 25 years of prolonged litigation just because no specific issue of limitation was framed by the trial court. Held, the High Court's approach erroneous; no error was committed by the trial court and first appellate court in dismissing the suit on grounds of limitation by exercising their powers under Section 3 of the Limitation Act regardless of the fact that no issue of limitation was framed by them. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's dismissal restored. (Para 23) R. Nagaraj v. Rajmani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416 : 2025 INSC 478

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on admission can be passed by court's by exercising their suo-moto powers. A 'judgment on admission' may be delivered at any stage of the suit, relying on oral or written admissions even those made outside the pleadings and without the need for a separate application to invoke the provision. The Supreme Court directed the Registry to circulate the order to all High Courts for further dissemination to District Judiciaries. (Para 37-48) Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2025 INSC 467 : [2025] 5 SCR 458

Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : [2025] 4 SCR 521

Section 34 - Interest on Delayed Payment - Commercial Transaction - Courts have the authority to determine the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded for decree amounts. The Court also have the discretion to decide from which date the interest is payable- whether from the date of the filing of the suit, from any date prior to it, or the date of decree. In the absence of an agreement between the parties regarding the rate of interest on delayed payment of amount in a commercial transaction, the interest may exceed 6% p.a. as per Section 34 CPC after taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances in accordance with law. (Para 13 - 17) I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 377

Moulding of relief - The concept of moulding of relief refers to the ability of a court to modify or shape a relief sought by a party in a legal proceeding based on the circumstances of the case and the facts established after a full-fledged trial. The principle enables the court to grant appropriate remedies even if the relief requested in the pleading is not exact or could not be considered by the court or changed circumstances have rendered the relief obsolete. The court aims that justice is served while taking into account the evolving nature of a case. The above road map is pursued by a court based on the notion of flexibility in relief, equitable jurisdiction, and is tempered by judicial discretion. When moulding the relief, the court considers the issues and circumstances established during the full-fledged trial, looks at shortening the litigation, and then in its perspective, renders complete justice to the issue at hand. The converse of the above is that the moulded relief should not take the aggrieved party by surprise or cause prejudice. The relief is moulded as an exception and not as a matter of course. (Para 20) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Property Law - Title through Court Auction - Validity of Subsequent Sale –The court auction sale on 04.05.1962, conducted while Somasundaram was alive, and the subsequent sale deed on 25.09.1963 vested absolute title in Padmini. Somasundaram's will (30.05.1962) could not override this, as he no longer held title at his death on 14.06.1962. Since the property was sold via court auction before the will's execution took effect, Defendant No. 1 inherited no rights, making the 1992 sale deeds to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 void. Padmini's will (30.09.1975) explicitly bequeathed the Plaint Schedule to Vinayagamurthy and his children, not the Trust. Thus, the Trust had no claim to the property. The court justified moulding relief in favor of the executor (H.B.N. Shetty) to execute Padmini's will, citing judicial discretion to shorten litigation and ensure justice. Given the age of the surviving executor and the death of others, requiring a fresh suit would be unjust. The appellants (Defendant Nos. 3 to 6) were not prejudiced, as they fully contested the title issue. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that moulding relief was appropriate to implement Padmini's testamentary intent without prolonging litigation. (Para 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Moulding of relief - Shortening Litigation - It would not be in the interest of justice to make the executor-HBN Shetty (80 years) to file another suit to oblige the terms of the Will of the testatrix, who was found as a real owner of the property. Therefore, instead of asking him to file another suit, the High Court was justified in moulding the relief in favor of the executor so that the fruits of the Will could be reaped by the beneficiary- Vinayagamurthy and his children. (Para 22 & 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Section 80 - Mandatory Notice - State's failure to respond to appellants' notice criticized - Public authorities must address statutory notices seriously to promote justice and avoid litigation – non-response may invite adverse inference - Judgment copies to be circulated to all High Courts and State Chief Secretaries, emphasizing Section 80 CPC compliance. (Para 113 & 129) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Execution of Decree - Extension of Time - Limitation - Doctrine of Merger - Executing Court's extension for depositing the advance payment cannot be interfered with. Since the Appellate Court's ruling, which lacked a time limit, superseded the Trial Court's decision under the doctrine of merger, the Executing Court was not bound by the Trial Court's timeline. (Para 10) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368

Execution Proceedings – Delay in Execution of Decree – Directions - Execution proceedings should not be used to re-litigate issues already decided in the suit. The executing court's role is limited to ensuring the decree is executed, not to question its validity. The judgment underscores the importance of timely execution of decrees and prevents parties from frustrating decrees through collusive claims raised during execution proceedings. It reaffirms the principle that executing courts cannot go behind the decree or re-adjudicate issues already decided in the suit. The Court issued directions to all High Courts to monitor and expedite the disposal of pending execution petitions, emphasizing the need to avoid delays in the execution of decrees. The Court reiterated the need for expeditious disposal of execution proceedings, directing all High Courts to ensure pending execution petitions are decided within six months. (Para 75) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540

Section 47, Order XXI Rule 97 & 101 - Execution of Decree for Possession - Scope and Applicability - Section 47 of the CPC provides for the determination of questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree between the parties to the suit. Order XXI Rule 97 r/w 101, addresses specific situations where a decree-holder for possession of immovable property faces resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession. While Section 47 is a general provision applicable to all executions, Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 deal specifically with the execution of decrees for possession. Order XXI Rule 97, empowers the executing court to adjudicate on obstructions by "any person," including judgment-debtors and third parties and Rule 101 mandates the determination of all questions, including those related to right, title, or interest, arising in such proceedings. An application filed under Section 47, if pertaining to resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession, can be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 and adjudicated under Rule 98. The executing court has a duty to consider the substance of the application and apply the relevant rule, even if the application is incorrectly labeled. Dispossession is not a prerequisite for entertaining an application under Order XXI Rule 97. The procedure under order 21 rule 97 and 101 is a specific procedure, and supercedes the general procedure of section 47, when dealing with execution of a decree of possession. (Para 51 - 54) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540

Section 47 - Collusion and Delay in Execution - Whether the courts below erred in upholding objections raised by the respondents (claiming possession as cultivating tenants) against the execution of a decree for specific performance and possession. Whether the respondents are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, and whether the executing court could decide the validity of the decree on this ground. The appellants sought specific performance of a 1980 sale agreement for immovable property. The trial court decreed in their favor in 1986, directing the vendors to execute the sale deed and deliver possession. The decree was upheld by the High Court in 2004 and the Supreme Court in 2006. During execution, the respondents (nephews of the vendors) obstructed possession, claiming to be 2 cultivating tenants in possession since 1967. They filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC, which was allowed by the executing court and upheld by the High Court. The appellants challenged the orders, arguing that the respondents' claims were collusive and aimed at frustrating the decree. Held, the respondents' claims of being cultivating tenants were raised belatedly during execution proceedings, despite being aware of the litigation since 1983. The respondents' actions, supported by the vendors, were collusive and aimed at delaying the execution of the decree. The Court rejected the respondents' claim of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, as they were only registered as tenants in 2008, long after the decree was passed. The certificate of possession granted in 2008 was based on a “no objection” from the vendors, who no longer held title to the property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the executing court. The executing court was directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the appellants within two months, with police assistance if necessary. (Para 70) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Subsequent setting aside of an injunction order does not absolve a party from liability for disobedience committed during its pendency. (Para 7.4) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : [2025] 3 SCR 450

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Rule 2A provides for punishment by attachment of property or imprisonment for up to three months for violating injunction orders issued under Rules 1 and 2. This Rule applies to disobedience of injunctions during the pendency of a suit, while violations of a decree should be addressed through execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32. (Para 7.3 & 8) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : [2025] 3 SCR 450

Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2025 INSC 301

Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Effect of Non-Challenge to Validity of Documents - The appellants' argument that the respondent did not challenge the validity of the General Power of Attorney (GPA) and agreement to sell dated 04.04.1986 or the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 does not alter the legal position of the parties. In a suit for injunction simpliciter, the absence of a specific challenge to the validity of these documents or a separate prayer for declaration of title does not impact the legal standing of the parties when no direct challenge to the instruments' validity is raised. (Para 57) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Section 11 - Res Judicata and Findings on Title in Injunction Suits - In a suit for injunction, where the question of title is directly and substantially in issue and a finding on title is necessary to grant the injunction, with a specific issue on title framed, a separate prayer for declaration of title is not mandatory. A subsequent suit on title will be barred by res judicata if title-related facts were pleaded and adjudicated by the Trial Court, as findings on possession may depend solely on title. However, if a finding on title is not essential for deciding possession or granting an injunction, or no specific issue on title is framed, any observations on title are incidental and do not attract res judicata. Findings on title in an earlier suit will operate as res judicata in a later suit only if title was directly and substantially in issue. (Para 58, 59) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Section 114 and Order XLVII - Review of Judgment - A court may consider a document not previously produced, despite due diligence, if it is relevant to the issues decided and has significant intrinsic value that could potentially alter the case's outcome. (Para 35) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : [2025] 3 SCR 100

Section 34 - Denial of Interest - Abuse of Judicial Process - Forum Shopping - Commercial Disputes - Discretionary Relief - Contractual Obligations - In commercial disputes, interest under Section 34 CPC is typically awarded to compensate for the time value of money. However, such discretionary relief may be denied if a party abuses the judicial process. The appellant, found guilty of forum shopping, non-compliance with court orders, and approaching the court with unclean hands, was disentitled to interest despite HUDCO's breach of contractual obligations warranting a refund of the forfeited amount. The Court directed HUDCO to refund the principal sum within three months, with 6% per annum interest applicable only in case of delayed payment. (Paras 58, 59) Tomorrowland v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2025 INSC 207

Order XXII Rule 4 - An application for substitution of legal heirs under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC inherently includes a prayer to set aside abatement, obviating the need for a separate application. A request to bring legal representatives on record implicitly encompasses a prayer to set aside abatement. The High Court's requirement for a separate application was overruled, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the abatement in the interest of justice. (Paras 9, 23, 32) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXII, Rules 1, 3, 4 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5, Articles 120, 121 - Abatement of Suit/Appeal - Under Order XXII Rule 1 CPC, a suit or appeal does not abate upon the death of a party if the right to sue survives. Rules 3 and 4 prescribe procedures for substituting legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff/appellant or defendant/respondent, respectively. As per Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, an application for substitution must be filed within 90 days from the date of death, failing which the suit/appeal abates automatically. Lack of knowledge of the death does not exempt abatement. Post-abatement, an application to set aside the abatement must be filed within 60 days, i.e., between the 91st and 150th day from the date of death (Article 121). If filed beyond 150 days, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must accompany the application to set aside abatement. The procedural sequence is: (1) file for substitution within 90 days; (2) if not filed, apply to set aside abatement within 60 days; (3) if delayed beyond 150 days, file applications for substitution, setting aside abatement, and condonation of delay. Upon showing sufficient cause, the court may condone the delay, set aside the abatement, and allow substitution, enabling the suit/appeal to proceed on merits. (Para 11) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXII, Rule 10A - Rule 10A mandates that a pleader inform the court of a party's death, and the court is generally required to notify the opposing party. However, this notification is not mandatory if the opposing party's pleader is present when the death is reported or if the court records the death in the order sheet. In such cases, further notice serves no substantial purpose and its absence does not violate Rule 10A. (Para 29) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order 21, Rules 32 and 11A - Imprisonment of Judgment Debtor – Drastic Measure Requiring Proof of Wilful Disobedience - Imprisonment under Order 21 Rule 32 for violating an injunction decree is a severe measure requiring clear evidence of wilful disobedience. The court must establish that the judgment debtor had knowledge of the decree, opportunity to comply, and deliberately disobeyed. The decree-holder must prove these elements, supported by an affidavit as required under Order 21 Rule 11-A. Non-compliance with this procedural mandate invalidates detention orders. The executing court erred in ordering detention and attachment without verifying wilful disobedience or conducting a proper inquiry. The High Court, under Article 227, failed to rectify this error, narrowly limiting its review to jurisdictional issues and overlooking procedural fairness. Courts must ensure a fair hearing before ordering detention. The Trial Court's dismissal of written objections without granting a hearing was improper, and the High Court's affirmation was inadequate. Impugned orders set aside. Decree-holders may file fresh applications for future violations. Judgment to be circulated to all High Courts and District Courts for guidance. (Paras 35 - 59) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order 21 Rule 32 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 136 - Execution of Decree Granting Perpetual Injunction – No Limitation Period - A decree granting a perpetual injunction is not subject to limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court dismissed objections to executing a 40-year-old decree, holding that such a decree remains enforceable whenever the judgment debtor violates it by disturbing the decree holder's peaceful possession, dispossessing them, or obstructing their enjoyment of property over which they hold a declared title. Each violation constitutes a fresh cause of action, not barred by res judicata, empowering courts to take strict action against successive breaches. (Paras 41, 46) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order 21 Rule 32 - Scope of - Courts must exercise caution in ordering detention, ensuring strict compliance with procedural safeguards to uphold judicial integrity. Failure to enforce injunction decrees appropriately may undermine public respect for judicial institutions. (Para 44) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 - Transferee Pendente Lite - Discretionary Impleadment - No Automatic Right to Join or Appeal - Binding Effect of Decree - Leave to Appeal - Alternative Remedies - Whether a transferee pendente lite has an automatic right to be impleaded in a suit or to appeal a decree. Held, a transferee pendente lite (purchaser of suit property during litigation) has no automatic right to be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 CPC or to appeal a decree, except in exceptional circumstances where their rights are demonstrably prejudiced. Impleadment is discretionary, based on the suit's nature and evidence, and not a matter of right. Under Section 52 TPA, pendente lite transfers are subject to the suit's outcome, binding transferees to the decree, even if unrepresented. Failure to seek impleadment risks improper suit conduct by the plaintiff, but the decree remains binding. Transferees may seek leave to appeal only if they prove adverse impact as aggrieved parties. Separate legal remedies are available for recovery of consideration if cheated, but this does not confer impleadment rights. Respondents No. 1 and 2, pendente lite transferees, purchased suit property during a specific performance suit but were denied impleadment by the trial court, a decision that attained finality. The High Court erroneously allowed their appeal, citing adverse impact. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that the transferees, bound by Section 52 TPA and purchasing during an active injunction, had no right to appeal without impleadment. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Paras 57 - 61) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Right to Appeal - Scope of Leave to Appeal - Aggrieved Person - Lis Pendens Transferee - Principles Governing Third-Party Appeals - Appeal by Lis Pendens Transferee Against Refusal of Leave to Appeal in a Specific Performance Decree. Held, Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC govern appeals from original and appellate decrees, respectively, without specifying eligible appellants. Only an "aggrieved person" may appeal, excluding strangers to the suit suffering only psychological or indirect harm. A third party, including a lis pendens transferee, may seek leave to appeal if the decree directly affects their rights, despite not being a party to the suit. Leave is granted at the court's discretion to non-parties bound by the decree who cannot challenge it in other proceedings. A lis pendens transferee, though not impleaded under Order XXII Rule 10, may seek leave to appeal a final decree against their transferor, subject to judicious exercise of discretion based on case-specific facts. (Paras 43, 58) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Law governing the grant of leave to appeal - Only an aggrieved person, whose rights are prejudicially affected by a judgment or decree, can file an appeal, even if they are not a party to the proceedings, provided they obtain leave from the appellate court. The expression "person aggrieved" was clarified to exclude those suffering from psychological or imaginary injuries, and it was held that leave to appeal should not be granted to those remotely or indirectly affected by a decree. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of 586 days in filing a regular first appeal and granting leave to appeal. The High Court had allowed the condonation of delay, considering factors such as the appellants' advanced age (75 and 66 years), their residence abroad, and their purchase of 4 acres of land from the suit property, while noting that their vendor had failed to protect their interests. Held, the High Court committed an egregious error in condoning the delay, as the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and were not vigilant in pursuing their rights. The Court also addressed the issue of granting leave to appeal, noting that the rejection of the appellants' impleadment application by the Trial Court, which had attained finality, precluded them from seeking leave to appeal against the final decree of specific performance. The findings of the Trial Court in rejecting the impleadment application would operate as res judicata in any appeal filed by the transferee pendente lite. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Order VII Rule 11 - A plaint containing multiple reliefs cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because one relief is barred by law, provided other reliefs are valid and within the civil court's jurisdiction. Partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible, and the court must refrain from making adverse observations on barred reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. (Paras 24, 25) Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR 263 : (2025) 4 SCC 38

Order VII Rule 11 - Partial Rejection of Plaint - Whether a plaint can be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if some reliefs are barred by law while others are not. Held, a plaint cannot be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. If even one relief sought in the plaint is maintainable, the entire plaint must proceed to trial. The Court emphasized that civil courts should not make observations on the maintainability of specific reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR 263 : (2025) 4 SCC 38

Sections 100 and 151 - High Courts lack the jurisdiction to pass interim orders in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first framing a substantial question of law. The Court set aside an interim order of the High Court that directed maintenance of status quo in a second appeal without formulating such a question. The High Court's jurisdiction in a second appeal is invoked only upon framing a substantial question of law as mandated under Section 100 CPC. Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to grant interim relief in violation of this mandate. The practice of issuing a Notice of Motion before admitting an appeal does not exempt the requirement to frame a substantial question of law. If no such question arises, the second appeal must be dismissed. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's interim order was set aside. (Para 10, 11) U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2025 INSC 80 : [2025] 2 SCR 92 : (2025) 4 SCC 215

Section 100 - Legal Principles - Interim Orders - Whether the High Court can grant an interim order (status quo) in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first formulating a substantial question of law. The appellants challenged an interim order passed by the High Court in a second appeal which directed the parties to maintain status quo without framing any substantial question of law. The dispute involved a suit for permanent injunction over a property, where the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiff could not maintain a suit for injunction without seeking a declaration of title. The High Court granted interim relief (status quo) without formulating a substantial question of law, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. Held, A second appeal lies to the High Court only if a substantial question of law is involved. The High Court must formulate such a question before proceeding with the appeal. The High Court cannot grant interim relief in a second appeal without first framing a substantial question of law, as this violates the mandate of Section 100 CPC. The High Court erred in granting interim relief without formulating a substantial question of law, as required under Section 100 CPC. The interim order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2025 INSC 80 : [2025] 2 SCR 92 : (2025) 4 SCC 215

Order II Rule 2 - A subsequent suit filed on a different cause of action would not be subject to the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The Court justified the filing of a subsequent suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, following the institution of an earlier suit seeking a permanent injunction, noting that both suits were based on distinct causes of action. Order II Rule 2 CPC mandates that a plaintiff include the whole claim he is entitled to, arising from the same cause of action, in a single suit. The rule seeks to prevent the splitting of claims and multiplicity of suits based on the same cause of action. However, the Court said that the Rule would not be applicable when the subsequent suit was filed on a different cause of action than that of the cause of action for the first suit. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2025 INSC 73 : [2025] 2 SCR 123 : AIR 2025 SC 849

Order II Rule 2 of the CPC mandates including the entire claim arising from the same cause of action in one suit, it should not be misconstrued to require combining all different causes of action stemming from the same transaction into a single suit. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit. It must not be misunderstood to mean that all the different causes of action arising from the same transaction must be included in a single suit. In other words, a number of causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall include the “whole of the claim” arising out of “one and the same cause of action”. A defendant objecting to a subsequent suit must demonstrate that it was based on the same cause of action and that the plaintiff could have sought the reliefs in the first suit without any impossibility. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2025 INSC 73 : [2025] 2 SCR 123 : AIR 2025 SC 849

Injunction Suit – Requirement for Declaration of Title - The appellants (original plaintiffs) filed a Title Suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from entering or interfering with the suit land. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal filed by the defendants on the ground that the suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title. Whether a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the plaintiffs' title. Held, A suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the title of the plaintiffs. The High Court failed to properly consider relevant issues, including the fact that the defendants did not dispute the plaintiffs' title. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Second Appeal in accordance with the law. Krushna Chandra Behera v. Narayan Nayak, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Order 9 Rule 13, Order 43 Rule 1(d) - Delay Condonation - Courts must not condone delays in filing applications based solely on the merits of the main matter without a sufficient and bona fide explanation for the delay. The court must first verify the genuineness of the explanation provided for condonation. Limitation rules are designed to prevent dilatory tactics, not to extinguish rights, and terms like “liberal approach” or “substantial justice” cannot override the substantive law of limitation. The Court set aside a High Court order condoning an approximately 2200-day (six-year) delay in filing a recall application, criticizing the High Court for disregarding judicial restraint and the prescribed limitation period. Limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, and courts must not permit indefinite delays that prejudice litigants. (Paras 13, 16) H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2025 INSC 53

Amendment of Plaint - Continuous Cause of Action - Debarment orders - Limitation Period - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing the respondent to amend its plaint in a civil suit challenging debarment orders. The Court held that the subsequent debarment orders and related events constituted a continuous cause of action, arising from the original memo dated 08.03.2016, and did not change the nature or character of the suit. Thus, a fresh suit was not required. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the amendment application was time-barred. It held that the cause of action was continuous, and the limitation period did not expire, especially considering the COVID-19 exclusion and the High Court's order dated 24.01.2020, which kept the issue of the debarment's legality open. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' challenge to the High Court's order allowing the amendment of the plaint. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Section 80 - When an application seeking an amendment to plaint is filed due to subsequent developments intrinsically linked to the main cause of action, it constitutes a continuous cause of action, and no notice to the government is required under Section 80 CPC. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Section 80 - Amendments to a plaint are permissible when they pertain to a continuous cause of action, and such amendments do not necessitate a fresh suit or a Section 80 CPC notice to the government. The requirement of issuing a notice under Section 80 of the CPC was irrelevant in this case, as the amendment sought was part of a continuous cause of action and did not alter the suit's nature. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Order XXIII Rule 1 - Abandonment of Claim - Res Judicata - The dismissal of the respondent's first amendment application as "not pressed" did not amount to an abandonment of the claim under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The subsequent amendment application was filed at a different stage and was based on new facts, making it legally sustainable. The dismissal of an earlier amendment application as "not pressed" does not bar subsequent amendment applications based on new facts. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Order VII Rule 11(d) - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Whether the plaint in the subsequent suit for specific performance is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. The dispute pertains to a 5.05-acre portion of a 6.48-acre property in Kodaikanal, originally purchased by American missionaries in 1912 and later transferred to the appellant (Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association) in 1975. In 1991, the appellant entered into an agreement to sell the property to the respondent (Sri Bala & Co.) for ₹3.02 crores, with an advance payment of ₹10 lakhs. The respondent filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for specific performance, which was rejected in 1998 due to non-payment of court fees. A second suit was filed in 2007 for the same relief, which the appellant sought to reject under Order VII Rule 11(d), arguing it was barred by limitation and res judicata. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's application, holding that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law to be decided after evidence. Held, the second suit was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action for the second suit arose on the rejection of the plaint in the first suit (12.01.1998), and the limitation period expired on 12.01.2001. The suit filed in 2007 was thus barred by limitation. The reliance on a letter dated 15.07.1991 to extend the limitation period was untenable, as it was not referenced in the first suit and contradicted the respondent's earlier stance. The plaint in 2007 was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the suit was barred by law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, and rejected the plaint in 2007 as barred by limitation. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

Order VII Rule 11(d) and 13 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Second suit on same cause of action must be filed within 3 years of rejection of earlier plaint. Plaint can be rejected if the suit appears to be barred by any law, including limitation. Article 113 of the Limitation Act provides a three-year limitation period for suits not covered by specific articles, starting from the date the right to sue accrues. Rejection of a plaint does not preclude filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, provided it is within the limitation period. Once limitation begins to run, it continues unless expressly suspended or interrupted by law. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

Section 21 - Principles of - Objections regarding the place of suing must be raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance. Punjab National Bank v. Atin Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27