Supreme Court Weekly Digest July 14 - 20, 2025

Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 693 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730

Advocates Act, 1961 - High Court of Orissa (Designation of Senior Advocate) Rules, 2019- Rule 6(9)- Suo moto power to the full court of High Court to designate an advocate as 'Senior Advocate'- the 2019 Rules were formulated in the backdrop of the Indira Jaising v Supreme Court of India (2017)- High Court held Rule 6(9) to be ultra vires and not in lines with the Indira Jaisingh judgement- Held- that suo moto designations by Full court are upheld as they adhere to the constitutional principles of fairness, transparency and objectivity- Courts are not expected to grant this status arbitrarily or as favour- process for designation must be merit based, transparent and fair- conferment of Senior Advocate status is a privilege, not an entitlement- Set aside order passed by the High Court on its judicial side is set aside and designation as senior advocates is held to be valid. [Concur with Jitender @Kalla v. State (Govt.) NCT of Delhi & Anr. (2025); Para 17, 18] Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2025 INSC 839

Advocates Act, 1961 - Section 16(2) - Senior and other advocates - this provision recognizes power of a High Court to confer the distinction of Senior Advocate, by virtue of his ability, standing at the Bar, or special knowledge or experience in law- standards of designation of Senior Advocates must be significantly higher than those applicable to other advocates. [Para 9] Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2025 INSC 839

Central Bank of India (Employers') Pension Regulations, 1995 - Regulation 33 - Compulsory Retirement Pension - Interpretation of 'may' in Regulation 33(1) and conjoint reading of Regulation 33(1) and 33(2) - Issue - the disciplinary inquiry against appellant was continued under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Central Bank of India (Officer's) Service Regulations, 1979 even after his superannuation on November 30, 2014 and pension was reduced without consultation - the Supreme Court clarified that the word “may” in Regulation 33(1) does not grant discretion to superior authority to award less than two-third of full pension - It signifies that a compulsorily retired employees is not entitled to pension if they are not otherwise eligible for it on superannuation (e.g. not completing “qualifying service”). The Court held that Regulation 33(1) and 33(2) must be read conjointly - In all cases where the full pension is admissible to a compulsorily retired employee is reduced, prior consultation with Board of Directors is directory - Prior consultation with the Board of Directors, the highest authority of the Bank is a mandatory safeguard before an employee's constitutional right to pension is curtailed - a post-facto approval cannot substitute the requirement of prior consultation. [Relied Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Association, U.P. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 730; Paras 16, 18, 19, 21] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

Central Bank of India (Employers') Pension Regulations, 1995 - Regulation 33 - Compulsory Retirement Pension - 'Competent Authority' - must be superior to the delinquent and not an officer holding rank lower than scale IV officer - Competent authority can award pension in exercise of not only original but also appellate or reviewing powers - Term 'competent authority' cannot be restricted to disciplinary authority alone. [Paras 15] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

Child Custody - Welfare of child – Issue - Permanent Child custody - Respondent became aware of Petitioner's remarriage and her intention to relocate the child to Malaysia and also the child's religion had been changed from Hindu to Christian, respondent filed for permanent custody of child - Trial Court granted permanent custody to the mother and extended visitation rights to father - High Court reversed Trial Court order and granted permanent custody to father-respondent citing that relocation to Malaysia would not be in the child's best interest - Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, confirming custody with the father - Petitioner filed review petitions on ground that the new of the child's imminent separation from his mother caused immense negative impact on his health – Held - that Clinical Psychologist's Report was filed revealing the minor child was exhibiting anxiety and fears, with a high risk for separation anxiety disorder - Report recommended avoiding separation from his current family and conducting regular psychotherapy session – Held - that child's deteriorating mental health and the psychological assessment reports constituted new evidence, which was a post-decision development and not known at the time of appeal - child's custody is paramount in custody matters and changing permanent custody would disrupt child's stable environment - child has been with mother since he was 11 months and is comfortable with his step-father and sibling, and now, sending him with father who is akin to a stranger in an alien household would be harsh and insensitive - Stability and security of child is an essential ingredient for full development of child's talent and personality - Court restored permanent custody to Petitioner-mother with virtual and in-person visitation rights. Review petition allowed. [Paras 25-30, 34] N v. R, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 714 : 2025 INSC 853

Circumstantial Evidence – Murder – Motive - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120B, 302, 201 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 27, 65B – Held - Upheld conviction of appellant relying on - i. motive of appellant was proved by statement of her close friend who clearly stated that appellant confessed her unwillingness to marry the deceased; ii. Call Record Details (CDR) were proven to be admissible under Section 65-B(4) of Indian Evidence Act (IEA) considering certificates furnished by Airtel and Reliance; iii. CDR proved communications between the accused persons during engagement ceremony of appellant, at the time of incident and even immediately after the incident; iv. Recovery of scooter and iron steel used for attacking the deceased was upheld and separate 'voluntary' statements of the two appellants were also recorded; v. delay in sending steel rod for FSL analysis was rejected as a ground to discard the evidence (Relying on State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal and anr. (2019) 12 SCC 326) vi. Absence of messages on phones, coupled with the failure of accused to offer a sufficient explanation for their exhaustive communications right before incident, would establish the offence under section 201 IPC - Held chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, leading to confirmation of conviction. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 3 SCC 760; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 54, 56-59, 83-86, 96] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXII Rules 3, 4, 9, 11 - Applicability of Order XLI Rule 4 - Abatement of appeal - Joint and inseverable decrees – Issue - Whether appeal abates wholly or partially or not at all on account of non-substitution of LRs of deceased defendant-appellant in joint decree – Held - Appeal fully abates if LRs of deceased party in joint decree not substituted - Order XLI Rule 4 does not apply at the stage of institution of the appeal by some parties on behalf of all - It does not apply when an appeal has been jointly filed by all appellants and subsequently one of them dies and their LRs are not substituted - In such a case, appeal by the deceased abates and Order XLI Rule 4 cannot revive it or continue the appeal for the benefit of the deceased's LRs when the decree against them has become final - Proceeding against the surviving party or parties may give rise to inconsistent or contradictory decrees - Court cannot proceed further if a reversal or modification of the decree under appeal would result in conflicting or inconsistent decrees, i.e. one in favour of plaintiff against the deceased defendant appellant and other in favour of surviving defendant appellant, even though both defendants claimed joint interest in suit properties - Upheld order passed by High Court. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra by LRs and Ors. V. Pramod Gupta and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 272; State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram AIR 1962 SC 89; Paras 14, 15, 17, 20, 25-27, 31] Suresh Chandra v. Parasram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 728 : 2025 INSC 873

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXII Rule 10A, Order XXII Rule 4 - Duty of pleader to intimate death of party - Abatement of appeal - High Court set aside First Appellate Court's judgment solely on ground of abatement – Held, obligatory / statutory duty of pleader to inform the court about the death of their client and a failure to comply with this obligation by defendants, it should be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in seeking substitution - If defendants despite being aware of the death, remained silent and raised the issue of abatement only at the second appeal stage, it constitutes as a wrongful act - then High Court erred in not considering that Order XXII Rule 10A is not complied with by the pleader of deceased party - that procedural technicalities should not override substantial justice, especially when there is a clear statutory duty - that a party should not benefit from their own lapse in fulfilling a statutory obligation - Set aside High Court's judgment and remanded matter to High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Gangadhar v. Raj Kumar, (1984) 1 SCC 121; Paras 4-15, 29-44] Binod Pathak v. Shankar Choudhary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2025 INSC 842

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXII Rule 10A - Duty of pleader to intimate death of party - Doctrine of 'clean hands'- Difference between ex injuria ius non oritur - from wrong no right arises - Principle governing general spirit of jurisprudence of rights and nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia - no one can take advantage of their own wrong - General rule of equity and prudence - Order XII Rule 10A is a manifestation of nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia and not other because of procedural nature of provision - Object of this provision is to ensure complete justice on one hand and the contrasting patent absence of any penalty for non-compliance on the other. [Relied on: Kushehswar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Paras 45-54] Binod Pathak v. Shankar Choudhary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2025 INSC 842

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 11, Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Res Judicata - Whether an objection of Res Judicata could be taken to bar the suit under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Held, plea of res judicata cannot be a ground to reject Plaint - Under Order VII rule 11(d), only the averments in the plaint are to be considered and the defendant's defence cannot be looked into - Adjudication of plea of res judicata requires consideration of pleadings, issues and decisions from previous suit, which is beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11(d) - Res judicata is to be decided in trial and cannot be summarily decided in an application for rejection of plaint. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Keshav Sood v. Kirti Pradeep Sood (2023); V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava (2004) 1 SCC 551; Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat & Ors. (2021) 9 SCC 99; Paras 8, 9] Pandurangan v. T. Jayarama Chettiar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 698 : 2025 INSC 825

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872 - Section 482 - Inherent Power - Quashing of FIR - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) - Section 318 -Cheating - Criminal breach of trust - High Court directed accused-appellant to deposit Rs. 25 lakhs for referring the matter to mediation in plea for FIR quashing- Supreme Court quashed FIR and set aside order of High Court - Held that High Court's role in a petition for quashing an FIR is to examine the averments and allegations in FIR and other materials on record to determine if an offence is disclosed and not to facilitate recovery of money - Supreme Court criticized approach of High Court and held that it should either allow the petition for quashing saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out - Supreme Court noted that to constitute an offence of cheating under Section 318 BNS, there must be prima facie evidence to indicate an intention to cheat from the inception and a mere civil dispute cannot be converted to a criminal case - Held that the case appeared to be a civil dispute arising from an oral agreement and no civil suit is filed for recovery - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Delhi Race Club Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 10 SCC 690; State of Haryana & ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335; Paras 9-15] Shailesh Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2025 INSC 869

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972 - Section 482 - Inherent power - Quashing of FIR – Held - Supreme Court imposed exemplary costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on Complainant, citing misusing process of criminal law by filing a false and baseless FIR stemming from a purely civil dispute - Supreme Court expressed shock over the fact that appellant, a 70 year old lady was arrested and humiliated in police custody for 8 days - Held that bare reading of FIR, it is clear that a plain and simple dispute involving non-execution of a registered sale deed in terms of oral agreement to sell has been given cloak of criminal machinery - Supreme court condemned High Court's approach in casually disposing of the petition filed by appellants, without addressing the merits of the matter to be absolutely laconic and perfunctory - Quashed FIR and Set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Paras 12, 13,15-17, 21] Mala Choudhary v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 725 : 2025 INSC 870

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999 (Rules of 1999) - Appellant filed petition for quashing criminal proceedings under section 120B IPC read with section 13(1)(d), 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (allegation of raising commercial building in a prohibited zone under the guise of 'internal renovation', upon obtaining permit from municipal officials in conspiracy and by paying bribe) - Trial Court directed framing of charges against appellant-accused and officials of Corporation - High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings against appellant. Held- that appellant-accused attempted to legitimise his fraudulent criminal actions by seeking an order for regularization of the patently illegal construction - the appellant-accused and officials of Municipal Corporation were acting hands in glove right from beginning - Commercial structure was not permissible as it fell within a prohibited zone - necessary ingredients of the offence alleged are clearly established from allegations set out in the prosecution's case. Noted - that officials of Municipal Corporation have not challenged criminal proceedings which acts as prima facie validity of allegations - Directed concerned authorities to take suitable action against illegal construction raised by appellant. Upheld judgment passed by High Court. Appeal dismissed. [Para 13, 15-17] G. Mohandas v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 704 : 2025 INSC 854

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent power of High Court - Quashing of criminal proceedings – Held, the pendency of a civil suit on the same subject matter, involving the same parties, does not justify quashing of criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused persons - the criminal law and civil law remedies are not mutually exclusive but co-extensive, different in content and consequence - the object of criminal law is to punish an offender, which does not affect civil remedies - Civil remedy available does not bar criminal prosecution - Court concluded that criminal trial is necessary to ensure justice to the appellant considering chain of events including exclusion of daughters from family tree and partition deed and misappropriating Rs. 33 crore compensation for ancestral land acquired by Bengaluru metro - Prima facie case for conspiracy and cheating exists against respondents - Set aside order passed by High court to quash criminal proceeding. Appeal allowed. [Relied on K. Jagdish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. and another (2020) 14 SCC 552; Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another (1985) 2 SCC 370; Paras 18, 19, 23]. Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 712 : 2025 INSC 818

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent powers of High Court - Quashing of FIR - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 376 – Rape – Issue - Whether an offence under Section 376 IPC can be quashed upon an application filed by accused citing amicable settlement between victim and accused - Appellantaccused contended that the Complainant filed an affidavit in 2nd FIR expressing her unwillingness to pursue prosecution, stating that matter has been amicably resolved and that Complainant received Rs. 5 lakhs towards marriage related expenses - High Court dismissed the application on ground that an offence under section 376 IPC is serious and non-compoundable and could not be quashed based on a settlement or monetary compensation – Held - that criminal proceedings related to rape offences can be quashed based on settlement between parties in exceptional circumstances - Offence under section 376 IPC is grave and heinous nature and quashing of proceedings involving such offences on ground of settlement between parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly - the power of courts under section 482 CrPC to secure ends of justice is not constrained by rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case - Court noted that Complainant is married and settled in her personal life and continuing with criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability - Complainant maintained her stand that she does not support prosecution and wants the matter to end - in this situation if matter is continued then it would only prolong distress - Considering peculiar facts of this case and nature of settlement, order of High Court is set aside. Appeals allowed. [Paras 3, 5-9] Madhukar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 710 : 2025 INSC 819

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 54A- Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Circumstantial Evidence - Appellant-accused was sentenced to death for murder and rape of the victim under section 302, 376 and 397 of the IPC - Faulty Investigation - i. identity of accused could not be sufficiently protected leading to its disclosure before the TIP; ii. 9-day delay in TIP is unexplained; iii. Lack of coordination between investigating agencies and not arraying person having direct link to deceased person as witness; iv. Care requisite not taken regarding DNA evidence and large gaps in chain of custody of DNA evidence is unexplained; v. Post mortem of deceased was conducted at the spot of crime without due regard to contamination - Chain of circumstantial evidence does not point towards guilt of accused, ruling out his innocence – Held, Appellant-accused was acquitted and judgement of High Court was set aside. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Hanumant v. State of M.P. (1952) 2 SCC 71; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Para 11, 38, 42, 45] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 2 (wa), 372, 374, 378 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 11, 120B, 420 – Copyright Act, 1957 – Sections 63, 65 - Victim - Appeal from convictions - Appeal in case of acquittal - Interpretation of 'victim' under Section 2 (wa) read with proviso to Section 372 CrPC - Whether Section 378 CrPC would prevail in cases where a company whose IPR were infringed, sought to appeal against acquittal - High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, stating that appellant was neither a complainant nor a victim before Trial Court – Held, 'victim' shall not necessarily be the 'complainant' or 'informant' in a given case - High Court erred in holding that appellant cannot be a victim as it is only complainant who can maintain such appeal - Only in cases instituted upon private complaint, leave to appeal under section 378(4) of CrPC is maintainable - Hence, leave to appeal against order of acquittal in appeal is not maintainable in the instant case. Company suffered loss due to offence can file an appeal as 'victim' against acquittal under section 372 CrPC. [Relied on: Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, (Para 42, 44)] Asian Paints v. Ram Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 697 : 2025 INSC 828

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Victim's Right to Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of Section 372 CrPC Vis-à-vis Section 378 CrPC – Maintainability of Appeal by Corporate Victim - The Court emphasized that Section 372 CrPC is a self-contained and independent provision, not regulated by other provisions of Chapter XXIX of the CrPC, including Section 378. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC grants a victim the right to prefer an appeal against any order of acquittal, regardless of whether it's from the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court. Since the acquittal in this case was by the First Appellate Court, the victim's right of appeal would lie to the next higher level in the judicial hierarchy, i.e., the High Court. The Court held that the High Court's reasoning, that allowing the appeal would amount to an appeal under Section 378 CrPC, was legally erroneous. Appeal Allowed. [Relied on Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 (Paras 38,43, 46, 47, 50)] Asian Paints v. Ram Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 697 : 2025 INSC 828

Constitution of India; Article 21 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act); Sections 40, 45; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017; Rule 15 - United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006; Articles 31 - Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021 - Constitutional and Statutory Obligations – Accessibility and Reasonable Accommodation in Prisons - Whether the State has a constitutional and moral obligation to ensure the rights of prisoners with disabilities, including non-discriminatory treatment, reasonable accommodation, and effective rehabilitation - Compliance of Tamil Nadu prison infrastructure and policies with the RPwD Act and the UNCRPD - Adequacy of prison facilities, including accessible infrastructure, healthcare, and rehabilitation services for prisoners with disabilities. Held: The Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines to uphold the rights of prisoners with disabilities in Tamil Nadu, emphasizing the State's constitutional and moral obligation under Article 21 to ensure dignity, equality, and non-discrimination. The Court directed: 1. Identification and Accessibility: Prison authorities to identify prisoners with disabilities upon admission and provide rules and information in accessible formats (e.g., Braille, sign language). 2. Infrastructure Upgrades: All prisons to be equipped with wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments within six months, with periodic audits per the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India (2021). 3. Healthcare and Rehabilitation: Provision of equivalent community-level healthcare, including physiotherapy, psychotherapy, and assistive devices, with trained medical officers and tailored nutrition. 4. Training and Sensitization: Mandatory training for prison staff on disability rights, non-discrimination, and appropriate handling of disability-related challenges. 5. Policy Reforms: Amendment of the Tamil Nadu State Prison Manual within six months to align with the RPwD Act, 2016, and UNCRPD, incorporating provisions against discrimination and for reasonable accommodation. 6. Monitoring and Data: Establishment of a monitoring committee for periodic inspections, maintenance of disaggregated disability data, and public disclosure with privacy safeguards. 7. Compliance Reporting: Director General of Prisons to file a compliance report with the State Human Rights Commission within three months. The Court underscored that reasonable accommodations are integral to a humane and just carceral system, and systemic transformation is required to prevent further deprivation or suffering of prisoners with disabilities. The petition arose from a case involving an advocate with Becker Muscular Dystrophy and Autism Spectrum Disorder, who faced inadequate facilities during incarceration, leading to compensation of ₹1 lakh by the Tamil Nadu Government. [Referred: Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2017), Paras 34, 35] L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 702 :2025 INSC 844

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 137 – Review – Held - General principle is that a judgment is usually final, but departure is justified by substantial and compelling circumstances or to manifest wrong - the power of review under article 137 of the Constitution is limited, with grounds including the discovery of new and important matter of evidence, or a mistake apparent of the record - In child custody matters, orders are considered interlocutory and can be altered in the child's best interest, which is the paramount consideration. [Relied on Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Kamal Sengupta & Ors.; Para 11-14, 16] N v. R, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 714 : 2025 INSC 853

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 161 - Power of Governor to grant pardons - Difference between Constitutional power and Statutory power - Scope and purpose of reformation – Held - appellants are allowed to seek pardon from Karnataka Governor under Article 161, considering that appellant committed crime out of frustration of being forced to marry against her will citing that 22 years have lapsed since the incident - Court noted that power under Article 161 is sovereign and wider than statutory powers in sections 473, 474 of BNSS - While statutory powers are derived from laws enacted by legislatures and remain subject to amendment or repeal, constitutional powers originate from the constitution itself - Constitutional powers under Article 161 embodies State's commitment to humanity and equity, even in the administration of punishment - Court acknowledged the significance of reformation and rehabilitation, especially when the offender is not entirely responsible for the causes leading to crime, and society also has its role in shaping criminal behaviour - Held that Article 161 powers remain inviolable and exercisable when statutory mechanisms exist, ensuring justice is not constrained by procedural norms. [Relied on Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 107; Shatrughan Chauhan and An r. v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 1; Paras 13, 15, 16] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Land Acquisition – Rehabilitation - Right to livelihood - Whether Respondents are entitled to rehabilitation or alternative plots in addition to monetary compensation as per Scheme of 1992 or revised scheme of 2016 – Held, it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must - Any beneficial measures taken by the government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners - Rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition - In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable - Respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in Policy. [Relied on Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, Para 78, 84] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 320 (3) (a) - deals with recruitment in service – Held - Consultation with Commission is directory but once Regulations are framed these are framed these are to be followed - State's regulations are subservient to UGC Act and Regulations - UGC Act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII - State Government exercise powers under Entry 25 of List III of Schedule VII to make laws relating to “education”- Entry 25 of List III is subject to Entry 66 of List I - Court emphasized on importance of Regulations framed under Article 320(3) of the Constitution and cautioned against casual bypassing of Regulations – Held - that in present case Regulations were already in existence in Punjab known as Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 1955 - so posts advertised were within purview of the Commission, making it mandatory to consult commission – Held - State of Punjab itself adopted the standards and process laid down by the UGC, therefore it was bound to follow these regulations - Upheld order passed by High Court Single Judge citing that there is total arbitrariness in present selection. Relied on State of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4; Paras 18-24, 47, 48] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 320 - University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations of 2010 - Functions of Public Service Commissions – Facts - State wanted to recruit 1091 posts of Assistant Professors and 67 posts of Librarians through departmental selection committee on an urgent basis - 45-day deadline was set for commencement and conclusion of whole recruitment process and selection on basis of single written test. [Para 3] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 - Writ Petition filed by petitioner alleging that the administrative requirement of Allahabad High Court that mandates personal appearance of litigants at High Court for issuance of photo affidavits was arbitrary, lacked statutory backing and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution -Petitioner alleged that this is causing hardship and harassment to litigants - This Court held that administrative decisions taken by High Court are not to be interfered with by this Court under Article 32 - Court granted liberty to Petitioner to file representation before Chief Justice of the High Court in accordance with law - Writ Petition dismissed. [Paras 3-5] Biswajit Chowdhury v. Registrar General, Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 719

Constitution of India, 1950 – Issue - Whether recruitment process was made in violation of UGC Regulations and whether selection ought to have been made through Commission as these posts were under purview of Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution – Held - UGC Regulations binding on State once adopted - Purpose of formation of Public Service commission at both Union and State level - was to have an impartial and autonomous body to select the best possible persons for government posts and to have fairness and transparency in procedure – Held - elimination of viva-voce which is vital component in overall appreciation of merit of a candidate and replacing well considered selection parameters prescribed by UGC with single MCQ based written test, establish the arbitrary nature of exercise which cannot pass the test of reasonableness - State and its instrumentalities have a duty and responsibility to act fairly and reasonably in terms of mandate of Article 14 of Constitution - when a thing is done in haste, mala fide would be presumed - A State is entitled to change its policy, yet a sudden change without valid reasons will always be seen with suspicion – Held - State-respondent did not adhere to UGC Regulations and took posts out of purview of Commission without following due procedure under law, amounting to arbitrariness - no valid reason given by State for not adopting UGC Regulations and avoiding Public Service Commissions, set aside and quash entire recruitment process. Appeals allowed. [Relied Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Para 51, 52, 56] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 439 - Bail Applications - Criminal Antecedents - disclosure by accused - Supreme Court suggested that all High Courts should consider incorporating a rule similar to Rule 5 of Chapter 1-A(b) Volume-V of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules, which mandates that petitioners in bail applications disclose their involvement in any other criminal cases previously registered and any similar bail applications made and result thereon - This would impose an obligation on the accused to make such disclosures. Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-24] Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2025 INSC 871

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 439 - Bail Applications - Strictures against Judicial Officer - Supreme Court expunged strictures issued passed by High Court against a judicial officer who had granted bail to an accused - Supreme Court reiterated that High Courts ordinarily refrain from passing strictures against judicial officers while deciding matters on judicial side - Adverse comments on the personal conduct and Caliber of a judicial officer should be avoided, especially without providing an opportunity to be heard. [Relied on Re: 'K', A Judicial Officer (2001) 3 SCC 54; Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar & Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3382; Paras 18-21] Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2025 INSC 871

Death Penalty - Commutation of sentence - The Court converted death penalty of life imprisonment without remission, extending to natural life of the appellant convicted for sexually assaulting and strangling to death a 10 year old girl – Held - that crime is of course of brutal nature but death penalty cannot be sustained because the trial court and the High Court both considered the brutality of the crime as the sole criterion for awarding such punishment - that Trial Court and High Court did not consider mitigating factors for determining whether the case fell into 'rarest of rare' category - Brutality can't be sole criterion for determining 'rarest of rare' - Held - Prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, this Court upheld order of conviction while modifying the sentence awarded. Appeals are partly allowed. [Relied on Gudda v. State of M.P. (2013) 16 SCC 596; [Paras 15, 16] Jai Prakash v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 720 : 2025 INSC 861

Determination of 'rarest of rare' case - The Court laid down two step criteria for uniform application of this doctrine - i. the courts have to determine the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; ii. Then the Court has to consider whether the option of awarding life imprisonment has been completely foreclosed or not - The court in this case called for the report of Probation Officer and psychological evaluation to determine mitigating circumstances and found that condition of appellants family is 'very pathetic' and they earn their livelihood by doing labour work - appellant started working at the age of 12 and has good relations with his inmates. [Relied on Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023) 2 SCC 353; Paras 17, 18, 20-22] Jai Prakash v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 720 : 2025 INSC 861

DNA Evidence handling Guidelines - directions to be followed - 1. DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift packaging including - a. FIR number and date; b. section and statute involved; c. details of Investigating Officer (I.O.), police station; and d. serial number shall be duly documented. Document recording selection shall have signatures and designations of medical professional, I.O. and independent witness - Absence of medical witness shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of evidence - 2. I.O. shall be responsible for transportation of DNA evidence to police station or hospital or forensic laboratory not later than 48 hours - If in any case 48-hour timeline cannot be complied with then reason for delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary - 3. DNA samples are stored pending trial, appeal etc, no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without authorization of Trial Court - 4. From the point of collection to the logical end i.e. conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be annexed as part of Trial Court record- failure to do the same, I.O. shall be responsible for lapse. Directed Director General of Police of all states to prepare sample forms of Chain of Custody Register. [Para 43, 44] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

Electricity Act, 2003 (2003 Act) - Section 128 - Investigation of certain matters - Respondent 4 sought investigation under section 128 of the Act – Held, A petition under section 128 is not maintainable - investigation is limited in only two cases - i. if the licensee fails to abide by the terms of license and ii. If licensee acts in contravention to the provisions of the Act, 2003 - the threshold of “satisfaction” required to order an investigation under section 128 was not met in this case- Held, 2003 Act does not provide for direct regulatory oversight over distribution franchisees and same can be regulated only through distribution licensee- hence, under section 128, it is the distribution licensee which can be investigated, not its franchisee- this is in line with the Principle of agency - any action of franchisee is equivalent to such action having been committed by a distribution licensee satisfactory grounds are to be given for initiating an investigation – Held, U.P. ERC and Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) could not have micromanaged the distribution franchisee transaction or questioned the various aspects of franchisee's/Appellant's functioning. [Paras 57, 68, 75] Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Electricity Act, 2003 (2003 Act) - Section 79 - Jurisdiction of Central Electricity Regulatory Commission ('ERC') - Section 86 - Functions of State ERCs – Facts - Respondent 4 filed petition questioning legality and validity and propriety of Distribution Franchisee Agreement entered between appellant (distribution franchisee) and respondent 3 (distribution licensee) and prayed for investigation of conduct of respondent 2 and 3 in appointing the appellant as franchisee for distribution of electricity in Agra. Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Electricity Act, 2003 - Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2019 (CERC Regulations) - Regulation 55 - Implementation agreement between Petitioner-State and Respondent, obligating latter to supply 18% of net generation free of cost to the petitioner-State - Respondent sought to align contractual obligations with the CERC Regulations i.e. 13% free of cost supply - High Court allowed the same - This Court held that CERC Regulations, 2019 does not prohibit supply of free power beyond 13% - that Note 3 of Regulation 55 of CERC Regulations which specifies 13% cap for free power supply, is solely for the purposes of calculation and fixation of tariff and does not operate as a prohibition or restriction on a generating company from supplying beyond 13% as per its contractual obligation - Implementation Agreement does not stand overridden by the operation of CERC Regulations - Contractual obligation of respondent can be understood as a form of “royalty” payable to State as compensation, in lieu of being allowed to use river water, which is public resource for undertaking its commercial activity of power generation. Upheld Petitioner- State's right to 18% free power. [Paras 15-21] State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2025 INSC 857

Electricity Act, 2003 - Sections 18, 19 - Power of ERC's to amend/alter the terms of any license - Section 20 - Sale of a utility, in public interest – Issue - Whether ERCs have jurisdiction to review the functioning of a distribution licensee to supply electricity through a franchisee – Held, ERC may not directly regulate a franchise but it exercises regulatory oversight over the distribution licensee's functions and duties, including process of a distribution licensee delegating some of its functions and activities to a franchisee- Sections 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the 2003 Act prescribes 2 that ERC can stipulate/review the terms and conditions under which a distribution licensee may delegate its electricity distribution responsibilities to a franchisee - Sections 12-24 deals with licensing and all these stipulations are to regulate distribution licensee - there is no such stipulation to control or regulate relationship between a licensee and franchisee - contractual terms and conditions of authorization by the distribution licensee provided to the franchisee are privy to the said parties. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Global Feeds Feedback Energy Distribution Company Private Ltd. v. Govt. of Odisha 2019 SCC OnLine Ori 205; Paras 71, 72] Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Electricity Act, 2003 - Whether any individual can invoke jurisdiction of a State ERC on the plea of Public interest – Held, State ERC's have broader jurisdiction under Section 86, to adjudicate upon all disputes between licensees and generating companies - even when the jurisdiction of State ERC is enlarged, it does not include within it the power to adjudicate disputes involving consumers and their grievances, irrespective whether such issue is raised in furtherance of public interest - ERCs are not competent to entertain a matter on singular ground of public interest - ERCs are required to entertain matters in public interest wherever mandated by the Act, 2003 i.e. in matters related to tariff, procurement of power processes etc. which requires safeguarding of consumer interest alongside commercial interest - ERCs are creatures of a statute, derive their jurisdiction and powers from provisions of 2003 Act- they cannot exercise powers not expressly vested in them. [Rajeev Hitendra Pathak v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar (2011) 9 SCC 541; Para 43] Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 122 - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37 (Para 8, 8.8, 12)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 68 - Succession Act, 1925 - Section 63 – Will - Proof of Will - Suspicious circumstances – Issue - whether the will executed by deceased husband wherein he excluded his wife and did not even mention her status as his wife was valid - High Court held that the will was a suspicious document and had not been executed of his free will - This Court Held - The onus is upon the propounder to prove due execution of the will and dispel all suspicious circumstances that cast doubt on testator's mind - Exclusion of natural heirs without reasons raises doubt about genuineness of Will - Court noted that will is completely silent with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir or any reason for disinheritance, whereas husband and wife lived together till last days and wife was nominated to accept his pension, showing acceptance as legally wedded wife - there was no evidence of bitterness in the relationship - Court noted that such unusual erasure of marital status and existence of his wife raises serious doubt that will was executed as per the dictates of appellant and is not the free will of the testator - Upheld order of High Court. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur & Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 369; Ram Piari vs. Bhagwant & Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 364; Paras 11-13, 18-20] Gurdial Singh v. Jagir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2025 INSC 866

Evidence Act, 1872 - Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. [Relied on R. M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCR 417 (Para 10)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Finance Act, 1994 - Section 73(1) - Extended Period of Limitation - A show-cause notice must ordinarily be issued within 1 year from relevant date - Whether show cause notices issued by Respondent are barred by limitation and can extension under Section 73 Finance Act be invoked – Held, to invoke extended period of limitation, there must be an active and deliberate act on part of assesses to evade payment of tax - There is absence of fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement of facts on part of assesses - mere non-payment of service tax does not justify the invocation of the extended limitation period - The show cause notice issued by Respondent-department is set aside. Set aside order of CESTAT. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Padmini Products v. CCE (1989) 4 SCC 275; Paras 8, 9, 9.3, 9.4] Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : 2025 INSC 841

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 2(2) - Applicability to Scheduled Tribes (ST) - Customary Law - Justice, Equity and Good conscience - Article 14, 15, 38, 46 of the Constitution of India – Issue - Whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property - Trial Court and High Court dismissed the suit filed by appellant (heirs of a tribal woman) citing that mother had no right in her father's property as members of Scheduled Tribe are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as per section 2(2) and nothing proved by custom - This Court Held - Exclusion of female from inheritance is unreasonable and discriminatory - that Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the Scheduled Tribes, it does not mean that tribal women are automatically excluded from inheritance - it needs to be seen by Court whether there exists any prevailing custom restricting the female tribal right to share in the ancestral property - In this case parties could not establish the existence of any custom which excluded women from inheritance - Customs are too like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others - Held in absence of any specific tribal custom or codified law prohibiting women's right, courts must apply “justice, equity and good conscience” - Where there is no custom prohibiting succession to women, still denying them succession is in violation of Article 14, 15 read with Articles 38 and 46, ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. Held legal heirs of tribal woman entitled to share in the property, set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. ltd. v. State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCC 817; Para 13, 19, 20, 21] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865

Interpretation - Legislation by incorporation and Legislation by Reference - Legislation by incorporation - the provisions of the original act, once specified become an integral and independent part of the subsequent act, meaning only the provisions as they existed on the date of incorporation are applicable and subsequent amendments are not automatically carried - Legislation by reference - applying the law as it exists on the date of application, including any subsequent modification - Court applied the principle of “legislation by incorporation” for section 28A of the SEBI Act, thereby considering the provisions of Income Tax Act as they stood at the time of incorporation. [Paras 9.6, 9.9] Jaykishor Chaturvedi v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730 : 2025 INSC 846

Inversion Test - Ratio decidendi - propositions of law that were necessary to decide on the issues between the parties are binding - to determine whether a particular proposition of law is part of the ratio decidendi of the case, the proposition is to be inversed - it means that proposition is hypothetically removed from judgment or it is assumed that proposition is hypothetically removed or reversed - if after that reversal or removal, if the decision of the Court would remain the same, then the observations cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Association (2018) 6 SCC 21; Para 47,50-52, 58] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Maintainability of Writ Petition - Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2019 (CERC Regulations) - Held that writ petition for modifying contractual agreement and aligning the Implementation Agreement with CERC's order is not maintainable - the interpretation of CERC Regulations falls within the exclusive domain of CERC and State Commissions as an expert and specialized regulator - Since CERC rejected respondent's prayer for modification and held that only Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Power Sale Agreements (PSAs) stood overridden - then Writ Petition by Respondent was not maintainable - Constitutional Courts while interpreting statutes, rules that fall within regulator's domain, must bear in mind the need to enable the regulator to exercise comprehensive jurisdiction - High Court's order set aside. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.) Ltd. (2024) 8 SCC 513; Paras 7, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 40] State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2025 INSC 857

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Motor Accident Claim - Future Prospects - Awarding Interest - Appellant-Insurance Company assailed the award and amount of interest granted at rate of 9% to be paid to claimant – Held, no illegality in awarding interest on future prospects in motor accident compensation claim cases - Due to pendency of matter before Tribunal or in appeal before higher forums, claimants are deprived of compensation for future prospects - Compensation is not paid in time, so claimants are forced to source their livelihood from somewhere else - This delay is sought to be compensated at least by award of interest which is generally only simple interest - If amounts are disbursed to claimants on a rough calculation by Insurance companies, upon intimation of the accident, subject to award of the Tribunal, then there would not have been any interest liability at least to the extent of amount already paid - Directed to pay entire award amount with 9% interest from date of filing of the claim till date of disbursement - Appeal dismissed. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Niru @ Niharika, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2025 INSC 822

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 32B - Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher than the minimum punishment - Appellant was convicted under Section 21(c) of NDPS Act and was sentenced to 12 years of rigorous imprisonment - High Court reduced the sentence to 10 years and held that without keeping aggravating factors as provided in clause (a) to (f) of Section 32B, Trial Court can't impose a higher sentence than prescribed minimum – Held - that Section 32B does not restrict Trial Court's power in awarding a sentence higher than the minimum of ten years - that in addition to various relevant factors, Court may also take into account the factors prescribed in Section 32B and consider quantity of contraband, nature of the narcotic or psychotropic substance, the antecedents etc, it may deem fit to impose punishment which can be more than the minimum - Held that in Rafi Qureshi vs. Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal Unit (2019) 6 SCC 492, it was held that section 32B inherently preserves the Court's discretion to consider other relevant factors beyond those listed warranting a sentence higher than the statutory minimum, despite the absence of any aggravating factors - Held High Court did not correctly interpret Section 32B, still Court did not interfere with the order of High Court reducing sentence - Petition dismissed. [Relied Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558; Para 13-15, 17-19] Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2025 INSC 872

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Section138 - dishonour of cheque - 141- offence by companies - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Quashing of an FIR – Issue - Whether compliant under section 138 NI Act maintainable if only partners of firm are arrayed as accused and partnership firm itself is not arrayed - High Court quashed complaint citing non arraignment of partnership firm as an accused – Held, Section 141 is a deeming provision and a firm without reference to its partners has no juristic identity by law - Partnership firm is not distinct from partners who comprise partnership - if the complainant had proceeded only against partnership firm and not the partners it possibly could have been held that the partnership firm in absence of its partner is not a complete juristic entity and cannot be proceeded against. [Para 6.9] Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 708 : 2025 INSC 831

Partnership Act, 1932 - Section 42 - Dissolution of firm on death of partner - Held, partnership firm with more than two partners does not dissolve upon death of one partner, provided the partnership deed contains a clause allowing firm's continuity - that principle of dissolution under section 42 is applicable where there are two partners in a partnership firm and would not apply in cases of more than two partners - In present case, there are three partners and the dealership agreement itself recognises that in the event of death of one of the partners, IOCL - appellant may continue the dealership with the said firm, without terminating its dealership- the partnership deed contains a clause that in an event of death of one of the partners, the surviving partners may admit any of the competent heirs of the deceased partner so as to reconstitute partnership – Held, the IOCL-appellant cannot insist on joining all legal heirs of the deceased partner as appellant has no role to play in determining as to who is competent heir of deceased partner - appellant is supposed to act in a beneficial manner for continuance of business and not to adopt arbitrary approach - Upheld order passed by High Court. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s Wazid Ali Abid Ali vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow 1988 (Supp) SCC 193; Para 19-23, 24- 27] Indian Oil Corporation v. Shree Niwas Ramgopal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 709 : 2025 INSC 832

Partnership Act, 1932 - Section 4 - 'Partnership', 'partner' 'firm'- Partnership is not separate juristic entity- Section 25 - partner is liable jointly and severally relation between persons acting for all - Partners are personally liable in law along with the firm- partners are jointly and severally liable - the partnership firm is a compendious term not distinct of the individuals who compose the firmPartnership is different from Company which is a separate juristic entity from its directors, having perpetual succession and limited liability of its Directors - Notice to partners could have been construed as notice to the partnership firm also - Even in absence of making a partnership firm an accused would be sufficient to make them liable - Thus, debt of the firm is the personal debt of a partner and the debt of the firm has to be incurred by each partner as a financial personal liability - There is no concept of vicarious liability of the partners - Held, no defect; complaint maintainable and permission is granted to complainant to arraign partnership firm also as an accused. Order of High Court is set aside and Appeal allowed. Held Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 not applicable to partnership firm. [Relied on Salomon vs. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1987] AC 22 (hl); Para 6.10, 7.3, 7.5, 7.9, 7.16, 7.17, 7.19, 9.8] Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 708 : 2025 INSC 831

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Rules of 1982 - Comparison between - Beneficial Legislation - Under the Act of 1972, gratuity is payable at the rate of 15 days wages based on last wages drawn for every completed year of service or part in excess of 6 months and there should be a continuous service for not less than 5 years - in Rules of 1982 - gratuity is payable equal to 1/4th of last pay drawn of each completed 6 monthly period, subject to a maximum of 16.5 years and the minimum limit of 5 years is not applicable to the Rules of 1982 - Gratuity payable under the Rules of 1982 is far more than that applicable under the Act of 1972 - Employees are also entitled to pension under Rules of 1982. [Para 8, 9] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension Rules), 1982 - Death cum Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) - Appellant's mother was a teacher in Maharashtra Government's aided school and upon her death, appellant claimed gratuity under the 1972 Act - High Court rejected the claim. Whether legal heirs of a deceased teacher in aided school would be entitled to gratuity under the Act of 1972 or under the Rules of 1982 – Held, Aided School Teacher's post akin to post under State Govt. and gratuity governed by State Rules - Payment of gratuity would not be governed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Court directed to grant benefits under Rules of 1982 - Appellant's mother served in a government aided school and was not a state government employee, her post is equivalent to a post under the State Government - as service conditions and monetary benefits of pay and allowances were governed by State framed rules under Article 309 of Constitution of India. Court permitted appellant to approach respondent with an application for payment as per Rules of 1982. Appeal allowed. [Para 7, 12] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Murder - Section 302 - death sentence - Circumstantial Evidence - Eye-witness testimony – Recovery – Motive - Plea of Alibi - standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt - Allegation of murder of 4 persons upon appellant - High Court upheld order passed by Trial Court convicting accused and awarding death sentence citing 'rarest of rare cases' – Held that there are deficiencies in investigation including evidentiary value of recoveries (blood stained clothes, gandasi and bicycle) made two months after the incident without independent witnesses - Prosecution was also unable to establish motive and disprove the plea of alibi - That the standard of proof in criminal cases is an “absolutely strict one” and held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt- that in order to record conviction based on ocular evidence, testimonies have to be completely credible and trustworthy - there are different versions of same set of events which are being told by these witnesses at different points of time, which are not considered by Trial Court and High Court – Held - contradictions in prosecution witnesses' testimonies are major ones and carve a gaping hole in prosecution story. Order of High Court set aside and appellant was acquitted. Appeals allowed. [Paras 3, 26, 31, 36, 42-44] Baljinder Kumar @ Kala v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 711 : 2025 INSC 856

Pension - Right to Property - Constitutional Protection - Court reiterated that pension is not a bounty but a valuable right to property, constitutionally protected under Article 300A - It can only be denied or reduced by clear prescription of law and with strict adherence to all procedural safeguards – Held - set aside order of High Court citing that High Court failed to read the regulation in its proper perspective and wrongly held that a compulsorily retired employee would not be entitled to any pension unless order is passed under Regulation 33(1) - Appellant was also not given opportunity of hearing prior to reducing his pension - Appeal allowed. [Para 17] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

Principles of Equity, Justice and good conscience - Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 (Act of 1875) - Section 6 – Held - that the term “justice, equity and good conscience” finds statutory recognition in section 6 of 1875 Act - The Repeal Act of 2018 includes a saving clause in section 4 which preserves rights accrued prior to repeal - hence, section 6 of 1875 Act applies in present case since the parties are governed neither by Hindu nor Muslim laws – Held, justice, equity and good conscience applied where there is a void or absence of governing law. [Relied on Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal, 10 1957 SCC Online SC 64; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corpn. Of Calcutta, 1966 SCC Online SC 42; Paras 15-19] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865

Registration Act, 1908 - Sections 32(a), 32(c) - Persons to present documents for registration - Section 33 - POA recognizable for purposes of section 32 - Section 34 - enquiry before registration by registering officer - Section 35 – Issue - Whether a person executing a document under a Power of Attorney (POA) is considered the “executant' under section 32(a), enabling direct presentation for registration. Held - Court disagreed with finding given in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar and another (2009) 14 SCC 782 that a power of attorney holder authorized to execute a document becomes the “executant” under section 32(a) of the Act - that POA holder executes and signs a document on behalf of the Principal and not in their own capacity and thus the principal remains the true 'executant' - POA holder acts as an 'agent' under section 32(c) of the Act, not as the “person executing” under section 32(a) - 'person executing' means a person actually executing the document and includes a principal who executes by means of an agent - Registering officers have a duty under section 34(3) to inquire whether the document was truly executed by purported persons, verify identities and confirm the agent's authority - noted that allowing a notarized or unregistered POA to bypass these stringent checks treating the agent as the 'executant' would create an “incongruous situation” - POA holder does not lose his status as an agent of that principal and become 'executant' in his own right - such an agent would therefore, continue to be covered by section 32(c) of the Act and must necessarily satisfy the requirements of sections 32(c), 33, 34, 35 of the Act. Court referred matter to a larger bench. [Para 8-10, 12-15, 17] G. Kalawathi Bai v. G. Shashikala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2025 INSC 851

SEBI Act, 1992 - Section 28A - Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 220-227 - Section 28A of the SEBI Act - effective from July 18, 2013, incorporates sections 220-227 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the recovery of amounts due, including penalties - This means that section 220(2) of the Income Tax Act which imposes simple interest at 1% per month (12% p.a.) on unpaid amounts, applies to SEBI dues - Under Section 220(1) of IT Act read with section 28A of SEBI Act, interest becomes due upon failure to meet demand and then appellants are rendered as 'defaulters' under section 220(4) of IT Act - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. and Another v. Commercial Tax Officer 1997 106 (STC) 433; Paras 9.4, 11.2, 11.3] Jaykishor Chaturvedi v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730 : 2025 INSC 846

Securities Law - Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act) - Section 28A - Recovery of amounts - Interest on penalty - Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) – Issue - Whether the interest on the unpaid penalty should accrue from the expiry of 45 day period stipulated in Adjudicating Officer's order or from expiry of 30 days following the SEBI's notices – Held - Supreme Court affirmed that interest on penalties imposed by the SEBI's Adjudicating officer is payable from the expiry of 45 day-compliance period following the adjudication order, not from a subsequent demand notice - Section 220(1) of IT Act does not envisage the issuance of demand notice - notice is served under section 156 of IT Act, requiring payment within 30 days - Since section 156 IT Act is not incorporated into section 28A of SEBI Act, the expression 'notice of demand' for recovery under SEBI Act must be understood to include adjudication orders issued under chapter VIA of the SEBI Act - That subsequent demand notices issued by the Recovery Officers are merely reminders and liability for interest accrues from initial period stipulated for compliance in the adjudication order itself - Held that interest on unpaid penalty applicable retrospectively, liability accrues from adjudication order. [Para 11, 11.5] Jaykishor Chaturvedi v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730 : 2025 INSC 846

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 - Section 13 - Procedure for secured creditors to enforce their security interests when a borrower defaults on loan payment – Supreme Court expressed strong disapproval that despite previous cautions in judgments United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 110, regarding judicious exercise of writ jurisdiction in SARFAESI Act matters, some High Courts continue to grant interim relief “on the mere asking” and “without just and sufficient reason being recorded” causing great disservice to institutional credibility - High Court in present case interfered with the proceedings initiated under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act by petitioner-secured creditor and restrained it from proceeding further on condition of payment of Rs. 5 crore only by the defaulting borrower - Court expressed disappointment on the fact that the writ petition has been pending for more than 30 months and defaulting borrower is reaping the benefit of such interim orders - Court directed High court to give precedence to the Writ Petition of defaulting borrower and decide the same by end of September, 2025. This Court also issued notice returnable on 10 October, 2025. [Paras 1, 2, 4] LIC Housing Finance Ltd v. Nagson and Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 722

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 13(2) - Demand notice - Rights of Tenant in Secured Asset - Unregistered Tenancy Agreement - Interplay between SARFAESI Act, TP Act and rent control laws – Held, Onus lies on tenant claiming through an oral/unregistered agreement to produce rent receipts, property/water taxes receipts, electricity charges etc. to establish creation of valid tenancy - Held that the tenant cannot resist eviction without establishing tenancy was created before mortgage - Even if such tenancies are created through an oral/unregistered agreement, it would not continue beyond 1 year from issuance of notice under section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act and tenant upon expiry of said period shall be deemed to be a 'tenant in sufferance' - Held that tenant in present case failed to prove tenancy. Set aside order passed by High Court and directed status quo in respect of secured asset till disposal of securitization application. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal v. Central Bank of India & Anr. (2019) 9 SCC 94; Para 17, 18, 23, 24] PNB Housing Finance v. Sh. Manoj Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 723 : 2025 INSC 847

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Sections 17(4A), 18- Securitization application - Constitution of India - Article 227- Supreme Court examined rights of a tenant claiming possession of a secured asset under an unregistered tenancy agreement against measures initiated by a financial institution under SARFAESI Act - High Court entertained application of tenant under Article 227 and directed restoration of possession - Supreme Court held that the High Court wrongly entertained application under Article 227, as alternate remedies exists under section 18 of SARFAESI Act - After 2016 amendment, Section 17(4A) enables lessees/tenants to approach DRT against measures under Section 13(4) and DRT orders are appealable under Section 18 - Supreme Court noted that it has always disapproved interference of High Courts under Article 226/227 in matters of SARFAESI Act - Held High Court wrongly relied on Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 1, to entertain such application, which was applicable prior to amendment. [Para 12, 13] PNB Housing Finance v. Sh. Manoj Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 723 : 2025 INSC 847

Service Tax – Exemption - Ministry of Finance in 2012 Notification - Clause 2(t) - Healthcare services - Cord blood Banking Services – Whether stem cell banking services constitute 'Health care Services” and are exempted from service tax – Held, stem banking service including enrolment, collection, processing and storage of umbilical cord blood cells, constitute “healthcare services” which are exempted from service tax as per notification issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2012 and 2014 under the Finance Act, 1994 - Appellant is involved in post-transplant monitoring, clinical trials and collaborations with international medical experts, these services are preventive and curative in nature - Healthcare services include preventive services - Demand for service tax, interest and penalties was unsustainable and arbitrary, as appellant's conduct was bonafide. [Relied on M. Satyanarayana Raju Charitable Trust v. UOI, 2017 SCC Online Hyd. 168; Para 10-13] Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : 2025 INSC 841

Specific Relief Act, 1973 - Section 39 - Mandatory Injunction - High Court granted relief to respondents by allowing their suit for mandatory injunction – Held, a grant of mandatory injunction under Section 39 of SRA is discretionary and can be granted only upon the breach of an enforceable legal obligation - It cannot be granted unless there exists a legal right and there's a breach of that legal right - Plaintiff in a suit instituted by him under Section 39 of SRA is obliged to satisfy the court with appropriate evidence that the defendant is committing breach of a particular obligation which is binding on him - If a scheme specifically provides that an oustee shall file an application in a specified format with certain deposit towards earnest money then it is obligation of allottee to do so - Conditions for granting a mandatory injunction - Obligation, breach, necessity, enforceability, balance of convenience, irreparable injury - Respondents instituted suit for mandatory injunction under section 39 SRA after 14-20 years, hence, suit is not maintainable on ground of limitation. Appeal allowed. [Para 74-76, 92, 93, 95] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Tax Law - Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976 (M.P. Entry Tax Act, 1976) - Sections 2(1)(aa), 2(1)(b), 2(3), 3(1)(a) - Liability of Manufacturer - M.P. VAT Act, 2002 - Section 2(i) – Dealer - Entry tax on IMFL – Issue - Liability of payment of 'entry tax' lies on the Manufacturer or the State - Appellant contended that goods are transported to State government warehouse and transportation pass is issued in name of warehouse, sales are made by the State warehouse, making state warehouse also a dealer - Supreme Court Held that Manufacturers are liable for payment of 'entry tax' on beer and IMFL for transporting goods into local areas for sale - the term “has effected entry of goods” shall be construed as including a reference to “has caused to be effected entry of goods” - the liquor manufacturers 'cause entry' of goods into local areas, making them liable for tax under section 2(3) of M.P. Entry Tax Act, even if sales occurred through state - controlled warehouses - Held that tax incidence attaches at the point of immediate causation and it was the manufacturers who triggered the entry into local areas - that procedural or supervisory role of the state warehouses did not shift the point of tax incidence. [Relied on K. Gopinathan Nair & Ors. v. State of Kerala (1997) 10 SCC 1; Coffee Board, Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras & Anr. (1969) 3 SCC 349; Paras 24, 28, 30, 31] United Spirits v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 727 : 2025 INSC 833

Wrongful Prosecution Miscarriage of Justice - Court expressed concern over that accused-appellant was taken into custody and judicial process took long time to come to a conclusion - due to which appellant-convict has been in custody for years – Noted - that in USA, acquittal after a long period of incarceration has led courts to direct States to award compensation to the persons who suffered behind bars and eventually held innocents - this right has been recognized by both Federal and the State statutes in USA - Held that it is for Legislature to consider this aspect in India. [Para 46] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

'Joint and inseverable decrees' - 'Contradictory or inconsistent decrees'- Whether a decree is joint and inseverable or joint must be decided for the purposes of abatement of entire appeal, only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in proceedings vis the remaining parties would suffer the consequences of contradictory or inconsistent decrees - A decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other. [Relied on Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra by LRs and Ors. V. Pramod Gupta and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 272; Para 17] Suresh Chandra v. Parasram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 728 : 2025 INSC 873

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) - Sections 18(2) - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (ACA) - Sections 2(4), 43 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Whether time barred claims can be referred to conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act - Limitation Act won't apply to Conciliation process under MSMED Act but applies to arbitration – Held, MSME suppliers may pursue time-barred debts through conciliation proceedings under the Act, such claims cannot be enforced through arbitration, as the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings initiated under MSMED framework - Conciliation is a voluntary and settlement driven process, out of court procedure, not adjudicatory in nature - Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals and applications filed before Courts - the Limitation Act bars remedy under the Act but does not extinguishes the right, hence time barred debt can be recovered vide other remedies through a court of law - The Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceeding under section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. A time barred debt can be referred to conciliation - Set aside order of High Court to the extent of applicability of Limitation Act to conciliation proceedings under MSMED Act. Relied on State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660; Para 25, 26, 31, 33, 51, 52] Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2025 INSC 864

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) - Section 18(3) - Eventuality of failure of settlement - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 43 - Whether time-barred claims can be referred to arbitration under section 18(3) of the MSMED Act - Conflict between MSMED Act and Arbitration and Conciliation Act - Arbitration is an adjudicatory proceeding initiated upon filing of the application, making the limitation act applicable on it - Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, being a special law with an overriding effect prevails over section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act - Section 18(3) provides for applicability of all provisions of Arbitration Act as would apply if there were an arbitration agreement, which includes Section 43 - Upheld order of High Court on applicability of Limitation Act on arbitration proceedings and, held, the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under section 18(3) of the MSMED Act - The statutory deeming fiction in section 18(3) of MSMED Act, ensures applicability of Section 43 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, attracting Limitation Act. Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC (2021) 18 SCC 790; Paras 35, 41-43, 48-49] Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2025 INSC 864