SUPREME COURT HALF YEARLY DIGEST 2025

BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023, (BSA) / INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, (IEA)

Section 6. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Section 8 IEA - Circumstantial Evidence and Motive - In murder trials relying on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of evidence that eliminates reasonable doubt, but proof of motive is not mandatory. A fact is considered proved when it excludes reasonable doubt based on reason and common sense, not trivial or fanciful doubts. Circumstantial evidence must form a cohesive chain, with each circumstance independently verified, consistently pointing to the accused's guilt and excluding alternative hypotheses. The Supreme Court upheld the accused's conviction for murder based on circumstantial evidence, finding a clear pattern of evidence establishing guilt. The appeal was dismissed, reaffirming that the law requires elimination of reasonable doubt, not proof beyond all doubt. (Para 10) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 INSC 793

Section 8 IEA - Forensic Evidence - Incriminating evidence, including the recovery of the murder weapon (gun and pellets) linked to the deceased's injuries through forensic and ballistic analysis, bolstered the prosecution's case. The accused's silence and failure to explain the recovery of the weapon further strengthened the prosecution's case. (Para 10) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 INSC 793

Section 7. Facts necessary to explain or introduce fact in issue or relevant facts.

Section 9 IEA - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Non-examination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 15. Admission defined

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Inadmissibility of Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statements Against Co-Accused at Bail Stage - Whether statements of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., implicating a co-accused, can be considered at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Held, statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by an accused implicating a co-accused are inadmissible at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Such statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, cannot be used against a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 315 - Exculpatory Statements - Lack credibility and cannot be tested by cross-examination unless the maker testifies under Section 315 of the Cr.P.C. They can only be used to contradict the maker or ascertain their stance, not to implicate a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Inculpatory Statements - If confessional, they are inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act unless proven during trial under Section 30, and only if the confession implicates both the maker and the co-accused in a joint trial. Admissions are admissible only against the maker per Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Conditions for using confessions against co-accused - A confession implicating a co-accused can be considered only during trial, subject to: relevance and admissibility under the Evidence Act; being duly proven against the maker; implicating both the maker and the co-accused; both accused undergoing a joint trial for the same offence. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, and 26 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Criticism of High Court's approach - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for relying on co-accused statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to deny anticipatory bail, emphasizing that such statements are barred by Sections 17, 21, 25, and 26 of the Evidence Act at the bail stage. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 409, 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Political Vendetta in Bail Considerations - The Court clarified that while political bias or vendetta is a relevant factor in bail pleas, it cannot be the sole ground for granting bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before factoring in political motives. The case arose from an Excise Policy scandal in Andhra Pradesh involving allegations of favoritism towards select liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore in losses. The accused, charged under Sections 409, 420 of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which relied on co-accused statements. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail plea but clarified the legal position on Section 161 statements. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Section 22. Confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding

Sections 24, 25, 26, 45 IEA – Child Rape and Murder – Death Penalty – DNA Evidence – Held: Trial conducted in a flawed and irregular manner. Trial Judge erroneously permitted the investigating officer to narrate the accused's confessional statements during examination-in-chief and admitted them as evidence, violating admissibility rules. Non-examination of the scientific expert who conducted DNA profiling was fatal to the prosecution's case. Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody for forensic samples, with unsealed samples and unverified transmission to the Forensic Science Laboratory, raising concerns of tampering. Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 40, 47, 50, 54, 55] Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2025 INSC 444

Section 24 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial Evidence - Credibility - Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require rigorous scrutiny. They must be voluntary, truthful, and inspire confidence. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. Extra-judicial confessions require corroboration by other evidence. (Para 16 – 19 & 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Extra-Judicial Confession - Credibility and Voluntariness - The credibility of the witnesses testifying to the confession is crucial. Confessions made in a doubtful mental state lack voluntariness and reliability. (Para 19) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 and 162 - Material Omissions and Contradictions - Significant omissions in statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that contradict courtroom testimony, undermine credibility. Such omissions can be considered contradictions under the explanation to section 162 of the Cr.P.C. (Para 21 & 22) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for credible evidence. Convictions must be based on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Benefit of Doubt - If the evidence is weak and lacks credibility, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 24 & 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - The accused was convicted of murdering his livein partner. The conviction was primarily based on extra-judicial confessions to witnesses. The accused's mental state was questioned, and there was a lack of corroborating physical evidence. Material omissions were noted in witness statements. Therefore, the conviction was overturned. (Para 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 23. Confession to police officer

Section 27 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 - Admissibility of Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Held, the testimony of an Investigating Officer relying solely on witness statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 162 Cr.P.C., as such statements lack evidentiary value and can only be used to contradict witnesses during trial. While police officers may be competent witnesses for recoveries of physical evidence under Section 27, their testimony cannot be used to substantiate witness statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to prove motive, conspiracy, or preparation for a crime. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Section 27 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 - The High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal of the accused, relying on the Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to address deficiencies in the prosecution's case. The trial court had rejected this evidence due to the bar under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Held, the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations, as all witnesses turned hostile, and the Investigating Officer's testimony, based solely on Section 161 statements, was inadmissible. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Section 27 IEA - Admissibility of accused's statement under Section 27 when the recovery of evidence is not proved to be based on the accused's disclosure. Held, for a confessional statement to be admissible under Section 27, the discovery of a fact must directly result from the accused's information, demonstrating their knowledge of its existence. In this case, discrepancies in witness testimonies and lack of evidence linking the recovery to the appellant's disclosure rendered the statement inadmissible. The chain of circumstantial evidence, including the "last seen together" circumstance and extrajudicial confessions, was incomplete due to inconsistencies and a significant time gap between the last sighting and the recovery of the body. The absence of motive, supported by evidence of the appellant's relationship with the deceased and assurances of marriage, further weakened the prosecution's case. Non-examination of material witnesses, such as the appellant's mother and brother-in-law, also undermined the prosecution's claims. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be conclusively proved to sustain a conviction. The appeal was allowed, and the accused were acquitted, as the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 22 - 50] Md. Bani Alam Mazid @ Dhan v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2025 INSC 260

Section 27 IEA lifts the ban, though partially, to the admissibility of confessions. The removal of the ban is not of such an extent so as to absolutely undo the object of Section 26. As such the statement whether confessional or not is allowed to be given in evidence but that portion only which distinctly relates to discovery of the fact is admissible. A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Appellant-accused as to its existence. The essential ingredients of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are threefold: i. The information given by the accused must led to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. ii. Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. iii. The discovery of the facts must relate to the commission of such offence. If the recovery memos have been prepared in the police station itself or signed by the panch witnesses in the police station, the same would lose their sanctity and cannot be relied upon by the Court to support the conviction. (Para 19, 20, 27) Raja Khan v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2025 SC 1254 : 2025 Cri LJ 1295 : (2025) 3 SCC 314

Section 27 IEA - A disclosure statement under Section 27 unaccompanied by the supporting evidence is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction cannot be solely based on the disclosure statement because it is considered a weak piece of evidence. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2025 INSC 119 : AIR 2025 SC 845

Section 27 IEA - Unreliable Witness Testimony - Lack of Corroborative Evidence - Eyewitness testimony must be free from material omissions and contradictions to be relied upon for conviction. The prosecution must examine all material witnesses and provide corroborative evidence to support its case. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2025 INSC 119 : AIR 2025 SC 845

Sections 25, 27, 106 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 26. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.

Section 32 IEA - Dying Declaration - Reliability and Corroboration - A dying declaration is a significant piece of evidence in criminal law and can solely form the basis for conviction if its quality is ascertainable and consistent with the case facts. In cases of multiple or inconsistent dying declarations, courts must scrutinize the evidence carefully to determine which declaration is credible, requiring corroborative evidence to resolve contradictions. In the present case, the deceased's initial statements to a doctor and police constable claimed an accidental fire while cooking, but a later statement to a Judicial Magistrate implicated the appellant, alleging he poured kerosene and set her on fire. The inconsistencies, lack of corroborative evidence, and absence of clarification regarding earlier statements render the dying declaration doubtful. Conviction based solely on such a declaration is unsafe without supporting evidence, especially where the deceased's explanation for earlier false statements lacks credibility and contradicts other evidence on record. (Para 12-14) Suresh v. State, AIR 2025 SC 1561 : 2025 INSC 318 : (2025) 4 SCC 794

Section 39. Opinions of experts.

Section 45 IEA - Expert Opinion - Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that opinions of experts skilled in foreign law, science, art, or identification of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Such expert opinions, while significant, are not binding on the court and are subject to judicial scrutiny. Courts may rely on expert opinions, particularly in scientific matters, but such reliance is contingent upon the opinion being clear, reasoned, and supported by credible data. The credibility of an expert witness depends on the reasons and materials underpinning their conclusions, which must be intelligible, convincing, and testable to assist the court in forming an independent judgment. If an expert report is inadequate, cryptic, or lacks clarity, it is not safe for the court to rely on it wholly. The court must analyze the expert report alongside other evidence to determine its reliability. These principles, though discussed in criminal law contexts, are applicable to other cases involving expert evidence. (Para 56-60) Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2025 INSC 411

Section 45 IEA - Expert evidence on handwriting is opinion-based and cannot substitute substantive evidence, requiring corroboration by clear direct or circumstantial evidence. A cautious approach to handwriting identification due to its imperfect nature, requiring careful examination of the expert's reasoning and, where appropriate, corroboration, though convincing uncorroborated expert testimony may be accepted if no reliable contrary evidence exists. Relying on a handwriting expert's report without examining the expert in court is improper, as it denies the accused the opportunity to cross-examine, especially when the report's authenticity is not admitted by the accused. (Para 42 - 44) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2025 INSC 322 : 2025 Cri LJ 1843

Section 63. Admissibility of electronic records

Section 65B IEA - Electronic Evidence - Electronic evidence, such as CCTV footage, must be accompanied by a Section 65-B certificate to be admissible in court. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2025 INSC 116 : AIR 2025 SC 1103

Section 94. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document.

Sections 91 and 92 IEA - Oral evidence contradicting written terms is inadmissible unless exceptions like fraud or mistake apply. (Para 23) Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 411 : 2025 INSC 466 : AIR 2025 SC 2025

Section 108. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions

Section 105 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 304 Part I and 201 - The appellant, along with friends, encountered the deceased in an inebriated condition beneath a bridge. An altercation ensued, during which the appellant struck the deceased with a cement brick, causing fatal head injuries. The appellant subsequently set the deceased's body on fire to destroy evidence. Both Trial Court and High Court held the appellant guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, citing grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for Section 304 Part I and 2 years for Section 201 IPC. Held, the Court examined the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which requires the provocation to be both grave and sudden, depriving the accused of self-control. The Court noted that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of the moment, with the appellant using a nearby cement brick, not a weapon. However, the Court found that the provocation (a slap and verbal abuse) was not sufficiently grave to fully justify the reduction of the crime from murder to culpable homicide. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (4 years), considering the appellant's time served and the circumstances of the case. Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld but sentence reduced to time already served. Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2025 INSC 90

Section 109. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge

Section 106 IEA - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - Prosecution must disprove accused's plea of alibi before convicting based on 'last seen' theory. Mere fact that the husband and wife were last seen together in their shared home does not, by itself, justify convicting the husband for the alleged murder if he raises a plea of alibi and the prosecution fails to effectively disprove it. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the accused to prove his alibi, despite his early claim of absence in an intimation to the police and the police's failure to investigate the same. While a husband's failure to explain his wife's death in their shared home can be a strong incriminating circumstance, it cannot alone establish guilt, especially when he has raised a plausible plea of alibi offering an explanation about his absence at the place of incident. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - If the prosecution establishes that shortly before the crime, they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also resides, then if the accused does not offer any explanation or offers an explanation which is palpably false; that would be a strong circumstance, establishing his culpability in the crime. However, it cannot be the sole circumstance leading to the conclusion of guilt on the part of the accused husband. In the present case, the accused has also offered an explanation that he had gone for duty at the cement factory; which is also mentioned in the first intimation given by the accused. The police ought to have inquired about his presence at the factory to disprove his alibi. Even before the FIR was registered, the intimation recorded clearly indicated this fact. The explanation was not one offered as an after-thought nor can it be termed to be false or even an improbable one. A mere suspicion cannot lead to a finding of guilt, especially when there is not available a chain of circumstances, unequivocally pointing to the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime. (Para 9) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Murder - Acquittal - Reversal by High Court - Deceased, married for two years, found dead with ligature mark on neck - Trial Court acquitted husband and in-laws, finding death to be suicide - High Court convicted husband under Section 302 IPC, citing failure to explain death under Section 106 and disbelief in alibi. Held, High Court erred in reversing acquittal without evidence of manifest illegality or perversity in Trial Court's findings - Medical evidence inconclusive on homicidal death - Prosecution failed to disprove husband's plausible alibi of being at work, supported by initial police intimation - Section 106 inapplicable absent prima facie evidence of guilt - No chain of circumstances established guilt unequivocally - Allegations under Sections 498A, 306 IPC unsubstantiated - Conviction set aside, Trial Court's acquittal restored - Appeal allowed. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge - Application in Criminal Cases - Burden of Proof - Prima Facie case requirement - The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which places the burden of proving facts within the special knowledge of a person on that person, must be applied with care and caution in criminal cases. It cannot be invoked to compensate for the prosecution's failure to establish a prima facie case. The prosecution must first prove all elements necessary to establish the offence, and only then does the burden shift to the accused to explain facts within their special knowledge. Failure to provide a reasonable explanation or giving a false one may be considered a circumstance against the accused, but the prosecution retains the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Court found sufficient prima facie evidence, including the accused's presence at the scene, suspicious conduct, and failure to explain incriminating circumstances, justifying the application of Section 106. The Court set aside the accused's acquittal, allowing the State's appeal. (Paras 76, 78, 80, 82, 88) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 106 IEA - Held, the accused's failure to explain the circumstances of his wife's death, which occurred within their home with only their daughter present, was a significant factor. The Supreme Court overturned the acquittal of a man accused of murdering his wife, relying heavily on the credible testimony of their seven-year-old daughter. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Sections 106, 118 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 201, and 34 - The case involved a man accused of murdering his wife and secretly cremating her body. The Trial Court convicted him under Sections 302, 201, and 34 of the IPC, but the High Court acquitted him, questioning the reliability of his seven-year-old daughter's testimony due to an 18-day delay in recording. The Supreme Court, finding no evidence of tutoring and noting the testimony's consistency and corroboration by circumstantial evidence, set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction. The State's appeal was allowed, reaffirming that a credible child witness's testimony does not require corroboration to sustain a conviction. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 106 IEA - Initial burden is upon the prosecution to first prima facie establish the guilt of the accused and then only the burden shifts upon the accused to explain the circumstances as contemplated by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials and places the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, does not, in any way, stand modified by the provisions contained under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The said provision cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce the evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. The said provision cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all elements necessary to establish the offence. In other words, the prosecution does not stand absolved from its initial liability to prove the offence and it is only when such an onus is discharged and a prima facie case of guilt is made out that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act may come into play. Ravi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2025 SC 1215 : 2025 Cri LJ 1382 : (2025) 3 SCC 584

Section 113. Burden of proof as to ownership

Section 113 BSA - The Section embodies the well-recognised principle that possession is prima facie proof of ownership. A person in possession is entitled to remain in possession until another person can disclose a better title under Section 113 of the BSA. Therefore, once the plaintiff proves that he has been in possession of the suit property, the burden of proving that the plaintiff is not the owner is on the defendant who affirms that the plaintiff is not the owner. The Section does not make a distinction between the Government and a private citizen. Section 113 is, therefore, equally applicable where a Government claims to be the owner or challenges the ownership of the plaintiff who is in possession of the property. It is not disputed that before the possession of the Subject Land was taken over, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property for more than twenty years. The onus, therefore, under section 113 of the BSA was on the State to prove that the Government had a subsisting title to the Subject Land. (Para 72) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Section 116. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 117. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman

Sections 113A and 113B IEA - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Section 118. Presumption as to dowry death

Section 113B IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 304B and 498A - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2025 INSC 133

Section 119 - Court may presume existence of certain facts.

Section 114 IEA - Invocation of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is not at all permissible when the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden- The weakness in the defence or the accused's failure to substantiate the fact while answering question in his accused statement cannot become the strength of the prosecution. (Para 37) Hiralal Babulal Soni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 266 : AIR 2025 SC 1522

Section 120. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape

Section 114A IEA - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615

Section 124. Who may testify

Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807

Section 118 IEA - Child a Competent Witness - Law on Child Witness Testimony - No Minimum Age for Testimony - Preliminary Examination Mandatory - Appellate Scrutiny - Admissibility of Testimony - Demeanor Recording - No Mandatory Corroboration - Caution with Discrepancies - Ruling Out Tutoring - Handling Tutored Testimony - Partial Reliability - Minor Discrepancies – Summarized. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 118 IEA - The Supreme Court laid down comprehensive principles governing child witness testimony emphasizing that: (i) A child is a competent witness if they can understand questions and provide rational answers, with no minimum age prescribed. (ii) Trial Courts must conduct a preliminary examination to assess the child's ability to understand the sanctity of giving evidence and record their satisfaction, including the child's demeanor and responses. (iii) Appellate courts may review the Trial Court's assessment of a child's competency by examining the preliminary examination, testimony, or demeanor during deposition and cross-examination. (iv) A child's testimony is admissible if they demonstrate the ability to understand questions and provide coherent, rational answers. (v) Trial Courts must document the child's demeanor during deposition and ensure the testimony is voluntary and not influenced. (vi) Credible and consistent child testimony does not require corroboration and can solely support a conviction if it inspires confidence and explains events without embellishments. (vi) Corroboration may be required if the testimony is tutored or contains material discrepancies, depending on the case's facts. (viii) Courts must carefully scrutinize child testimony to rule out tutoring, relying on confidence-inspiring testimony absent ulterior motives. (ix) Improvised or fabricated testimony must be addressed by confronting the witness with contradictions or proving tutoring through foundational facts and evidence of motive, delay, or discrepancies. (x) Even if parts of a child's testimony are tutored, the untutored portions can be relied upon if they inspire confidence and can be separated. (xi) Minor inconsistencies or coached elements do not discredit a child's testimony if the core account remains credible and withstands cross-examination. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 128. Communications during marriage.

Section 122 IEA - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. (Para 8, 8.8, 12) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 122 IEA - Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. (Para 10) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 148. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing

Section 145 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 – Held, Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 156. Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity.

Section 153 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 401 r/w. 397 & 372 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Section 168. Judge's power to put questions or order production

Section 165 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 311 - Powers of Court to Summon and Examine Witnesses - Wide Discretion of Courts - Role of the Judge - Section 311 CrPC grants courts broad discretionary powers to summon or recall witnesses at any stage of a trial, including after evidence closure, either suo moto or on application by parties, to ensure the availability of valuable evidence for a just decision. Section 311 CrPC works in tandem with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, empowering courts to actively participate in trials by questioning witnesses to elicit truth, without being limited by Section 162 CrPC restrictions. Courts may allow additional prosecution witnesses not listed in the charge-sheet if their examination is deemed necessary due to oversight or other reasons, following standard procedures of examination-in-chief and cross-examination. Courts can summon witnesses under Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 Evidence Act if neither party calls them but their evidence is essential for justice. Cross-examination of court witnesses is permitted only with court approval and is restricted to their court testimony, not prior statements under Section 161 CrPC. Unlike prosecution witnesses, court witnesses cannot be contradicted with prior statements under Section 161 CrPC, as per the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC. However, courts retain wide powers under Section 165 Evidence Act to ask any question, relevant or irrelevant, without such restrictions. A judge must actively participate in trials as a truth-seeker, not a mere referee, using Section 165 Evidence Act powers to question witnesses while avoiding prosecutorial bias, ensuring fairness to both prosecution and defense. (Para 48 - 52) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576

Section 165 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 84 & 302 - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing—suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370