Supreme Court Weekly Digest With Subject /Statute Wise Index [March 01 to 09]

Supreme Court Weekly Digest March 2025 [March 1 - 9, 2025]

(Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 297)

Advocate

Advocate-Client Relationship - Undertakings given by advocates must be with the client's express authorization. A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter. It is also clear that the lawyer is to respect the decision-making right of the client. It flows from this that any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client. (Para 10) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Bail

Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Child Custody

Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity of individuals with disabilities to make independent decisions. When a specialist's expert opinion confirms a child's inability to make independent decisions, custody decisions should not be based on the child's implied or express consent, as it could have significant consequences for the child. (Para 22) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Cognitive Capacity - Courts should give due credence to expert opinions on a person's mental capacity, especially when dealing with individuals with cognitive limitations. In child custody matters, the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount, even when considering the wishes of a child with limited capacity. The totality of circumstances must be considered when determining the best interests of the child, including their education, support system, emotional well-being, and familial relationships. (Para 32) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Foreign Orders - Principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing order of a Foreign Court must yield to the best interests of the child, especially when the Court has decided to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this regard. Such cases must be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of 'what would serve the interests and welfare' of the minor. The preexisting order of a Foreign Court is merely one of the circumstances to consider when assessing the best interests and welfare of the person concerned. This doctrine was evolved to protect children who may, unwittingly, become collateral damage in their parents' legal disputes. It has gained significance over the past several years, owing to the frequency and ease of migration. (Para 31) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

International Parental Child Abduction - The Appellant (mother) and Respondent No. 4 (father) are US citizens, divorced in the US. Their elder son has mild intellectual developmental disorder and cerebral palsy, resulting in significant cognitive limitations. After the divorce, the father brought the child to India. The mother filed a petition in the High Court alleging illegal detention. The High Court, after a brief interaction with the child, ruled that he was consensually living with his father in India. The Supreme Court, doubting the child's capacity to make independent decisions, ordered a medical assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The assessment concluded that the child's cognitive abilities were equivalent to an 8–10-year-old, and he lacked the capacity to make complex decisions. Whether the child has the capacity to make independent decisions regarding his place of residence. What course of action would best serve the child's interests and welfare. Held, the Supreme Court relied on the expert opinions from NIMHANS and a previous evaluation by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, concluding that the child does not possess the capacity to make independent, informed decisions on complex matters like long-term residence. The High Court erred in relying solely on a brief interaction with the child. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the Supreme Court determined that the child's best interests lie in returning to the US. This decision considered the child's established life, education, support system, and close relationship with his younger brother, who also has special needs, in the US. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother. The father was directed not to impede their return and to maintain contact with his sons. The US Consulate General, Chennai was directed to return the child's passport and facilitate his return. (Para 41) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Execution Proceedings – Delay in Execution of Decree – Directions - Execution proceedings should not be used to re-litigate issues already decided in the suit. The executing court's role is limited to ensuring the decree is executed, not to question its validity. The judgment underscores the importance of timely execution of decrees and prevents parties from frustrating decrees through collusive claims raised during execution proceedings. It reaffirms the principle that executing courts cannot go behind the decree or re-adjudicate issues already decided in the suit. The Court issued directions to all High Courts to monitor and expedite the disposal of pending execution petitions, emphasizing the need to avoid delays in the execution of decrees. The Court reiterated the need for expeditious disposal of execution proceedings, directing all High Courts to ensure pending execution petitions are decided within six months. (Para 75) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Section 47 - Collusion and Delay in Execution - Whether the courts below erred in upholding objections raised by the respondents (claiming possession as cultivating tenants) against the execution of a decree for specific performance and possession. Whether the respondents are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, and whether the executing court could decide the validity of the decree on this ground. The appellants sought specific performance of a 1980 sale agreement for immovable property. The trial court decreed in their favor in 1986, directing the vendors to execute the sale deed and deliver possession. The decree was upheld by the High Court in 2004 and the Supreme Court in 2006. During execution, the respondents (nephews of the vendors) obstructed possession, claiming to be cultivating tenants in possession since 1967. They filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC, which was allowed by the executing court and upheld by the High Court. The appellants challenged the orders, arguing that the respondents' claims were collusive and aimed at frustrating the decree. Held, the respondents' claims of being cultivating tenants were raised belatedly during execution proceedings, despite being aware of the litigation since 1983. The respondents' actions, supported by the vendors, were collusive and aimed at delaying the execution of the decree. The Court rejected the respondents' claim of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, as they were only registered as tenants in 2008, long after the decree was passed. The certificate of possession granted in 2008 was based on a “no objection” from the vendors, who no longer held title to the property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the executing court. The executing court was directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the appellants within two months, with police assistance if necessary. (Para 70) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Section 47, Order XXI Rule 97 & 101 - Execution of Decree for Possession - Scope and Applicability - Section 47 of the CPC provides for the determination of questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree between the parties to the suit. Order XXI Rule 97 r/w 101, addresses specific situations where a decree-holder for possession of immovable property faces resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession. While Section 47 is a general provision applicable to all executions, Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 deal specifically with the execution of decrees for possession. Order XXI Rule 97, empowers the executing court to adjudicate on obstructions by "any person," including judgment-debtors and third parties and Rule 101 mandates the determination of all questions, including those related to right, title, or interest, arising in such proceedings. An application filed under Section 47, if pertaining to resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession, can be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 and adjudicated under Rule 98. The executing court has a duty to consider the substance of the application and apply the relevant rule, even if the application is incorrectly labeled. Dispossession is not a prerequisite for entertaining an application under Order XXI Rule 97. The procedure under order 21 rule 97 and 101 is a specific procedure, and supercedes the general procedure of section 47, when dealing with execution of a decree of possession. (Para 51 - 54) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction – Subsequent setting aside of an injunction order does not absolve a party from liability for disobedience committed during its pendency. (Para 7.4) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Rule 2A provides for punishment by attachment of property or imprisonment for up to three months for violating injunction orders issued under Rules 1 and 2. This Rule applies to disobedience of injunctions during the pendency of a suit, while violations of a decree should be addressed through execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32. (Referred to: Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, (Para 7.3 & 8) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 319 and 401 - Summoning Additional Accused - Revisional Jurisdiction - Relation Back - Trial Court's Functus Officio - Opportunity of Hearing - When a High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the CrPC, sets aside a Trial Court's order rejecting an application under Section 319 CrPC, the rectified order relates back to the date of the original Trial Court order. Consequently, a summoning order issued by the Trial Court in compliance with the High Court's revisional order also relates back to the initial rejection of the Section 319 application, deeming it to have been passed before the conclusion of the trial. Unlike initial Section 319 applications, the conclusion of trial does not bar the adjudication of a Section 319 application directed by the High Court in revision. The Trial Court is not rendered functus officio in considering a Section 319 application after trial conclusion when acting on a revisional order. A summoning order issued pursuant to a High Court's revisional order is an extension of that order, effectively replacing the original rejected Section 319 application. A person summoned under Section 319 CrPC does not have a right to be heard before being added as an accused, unless they were previously discharged in the same proceeding before trial. However, if a trial court rejects a 319 CrPC application, and therefore a right accrues to the proposed accused, and the high court in revisional jurisdiction then passes an order prejudicial to that right, the high court must provide an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused, as mandated by Section 401(2) CrPC. (Para 115) Jamin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 294

Section 406 - Transfer of Trial – Principles - Whether the Supreme Court can transfer a case under Section 406 Cr.P.C. if the court where the complaint is filed lacks territorial jurisdiction? Held, lack of territorial jurisdiction alone not sufficient ground. Broad factors to be considered include: (i) Prosecution acting in collusion with the accused. (ii) Likelihood of accused influencing witnesses or causing harm to complainant. (iii) Comparative inconvenience and hardship to parties and witnesses. (iv) Communally surcharged atmosphere affecting fair trial. (v) Hostile persons interfering with the course of justice. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. Ensuring a fair trial is the paramount consideration. (Para 49) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Section 482 (as per new Act, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) - Quashing of FIR - Abuse of Process of Law - Repetitive False Allegations - Respondent filing multiple identical FIRs against different individuals - Lack of cooperation with investigation – Where a complainant files multiple, near-identical FIRs alleging serious offenses (including rape and molestation) against numerous individuals across different police stations, and fails to cooperate with the investigation, coupled with lack of other evidence beyond her statement, the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused constitute an abuse of the process of law. In such circumstances, the High Court ought to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (as per new Act, under Section 528 BNSS) to quash the FIR. (Para 5 - 9) Rakesh Walia v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 282

Contempt of Court

Contempt Jurisdiction - The Court reiterated that contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts, and when there is an express violation of a court order, contempt proceedings are justified. However, considering the age and health of one of the appellants, the Court modified the High Court's order by deleting the imprisonment sentence while upholding the attachment of property and enhancing the compensation payable. (Para 14) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Disobedience of Court Orders - Contempt powers are exercised to maintain the dignity of the court and ensure compliance with its orders. Alienation of the subject matter property despite express orders of the Court entirely justify the stand taken by the High Court in punishing the appellants for contempt of Court. When there has been an express violation of an order of a Court, as is in the present case, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction cannot be faulted with. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, confirmed. (Para 12 & 13) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Election Law

Recount of Votes - Sanctity of Electoral Process - Principle of secrecy of ballots - Conditions under which a recount can be ordered - Whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was justified in ordering a recount of votes in an election for the post of Gram Pradhan under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The appellant challenged the election results for the post of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat alleging discrepancies in the vote count. The appellant claimed that the Presiding Officer orally informed him of 1194 votes cast in three polling booths, while the official Form 46 recorded 1213 votes. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered a recount, but the High Court set aside this order, citing lack of documentary evidence and the principle of secrecy of ballots. Held, a recount of votes should not be ordered lightly and must be based on specific allegations supported by material facts. A recount is permissible only when: (i) The election petition contains adequate material facts supporting the allegations of irregularities. (ii) The court is prima facie satisfied that a recount is necessary to ensure justice. (iii) The secrecy of the ballot is not compromised without sufficient cause. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. Each vote holds intrinsic value, and any irregularities in the counting process must be addressed to uphold democratic principles. The Court found that the appellant had raised legitimate concerns about the discrepancy in vote counts and the missing Presiding Officer's diary, which was a crucial document. Additionally, three out of four candidates supported a recount, further justifying the need to verify the election results. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order for a recount of votes. The judgment reaffirms the principles of free and fair elections, the sanctity of the ballot, and the conditions under which a recount can be ordered. It highlights the judiciary's role in ensuring that electoral processes adhere to constitutional values and democratic norms. The appeal was allowed. (Para 1, 15, 16, 19) Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 296

Factories Act, 1948

Section 2 (k) and (m) - Interpretation of "Factory" and "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning as Manufacturing - Welfare Legislation - Applicability of Definition under Central Excise Act – Held, the definition of "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948, clearly encompasses "washing and cleaning" of any article or substance with a view to its delivery. The Act is a welfare legislation aimed at protecting workers' health and safety, and therefore, its provisions must be interpreted liberally to give effect to the legislative intent. The Court rejected the High Court's reliance on the definition of "manufacture" under the Central Excise Act, 1944, stating that the Factories Act provides its own specific definition, which must be applied. The Court underscored that the inclusion of "washing and cleaning" in the 1948 Act, absent in the 1934 Act, was a deliberate expansion to include previously excluded undertakings. Thus, a laundry business involving cleaning and washing clothes, including dry cleaning, using power and employing more than ten workers, falls within the definition of "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. (Paras 30, 36, 38 & 42) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276

Section 2(k) and 2(m) - Interpretation of - "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning - Applicability to Laundry Services - Effect of ESIC Act Amendments – Held, the activity of washing and cleaning, including dry cleaning, carried out by a laundry service, constitutes a "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. This activity, aimed at the use, delivery, or disposal of cleaned linen, squarely falls within the definition. Consequently, the premises where such activity is conducted, employing more than ten workers with the aid of power, qualifies as a "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that dry cleaning does not render a product usable or saleable, emphasizing the plain meaning of the statutory definition. The Court distinguished prior judgments under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) Act, noting that the definition of "manufacturing process" was incorporated into the ESIC Act only in 1989, and thus, earlier decisions based on the pre-amendment definition are inapplicable. The 1948 Act's definition, which explicitly includes "washing and cleaning," must prevail. The registration of the respondent as a factory under the ESIC Act, although not the sole basis of the decision, supports the conclusion that the respondent's activities fall within the scope of the Factories Act, 1948. (42-49) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Condonation of Delay - National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) - Lengthy Orders - Verbose Submissions - The Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the NCLAT's practice of issuing excessively lengthy orders, particularly in applications for condonation of delay, citing a 17-page order in the present case. The Court acknowledged that while detailed orders may sometimes be necessary, it also pointed to the role of "verbose and unnecessary long submissions of the members of the Bar" in contributing to such lengthy adjudications. The Court observed a trend of lengthy submissions and pleadings from legal practitioners before the NCLAT, even in routine matters like condonation of delay. (Para 4) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Section 14 and 96 - Distinction between the moratorium applicable to a corporate debtor under Section 14 of the IBC and the interim moratorium applicable to individuals and personal guarantors under Section 96 of the IBC - The former is much broader in scope and stays all proceedings against the corporate debtor, including execution and enforcement actions. However, Section 96 of the IBC is more limited in its scope, staying only "legal actions or proceedings in respect of any debt." Unlike corporate insolvency proceedings, where the goal is a comprehensive resolution of the company's liabilities, individual insolvency proceedings are designed primarily for restructuring personal debts and providing relief to the debtor. The legislative intent behind limiting the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC must be respected, and a blanket stay on all regulatory penalties would result in defeating the objectives of consumer protection laws. (Para 30) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Section 61(2) - Condonation of Delay - Limitation - Hyper-technical Approach - Foreign Company – Held, while timelines under the IBC are crucial, a hyper-technical approach by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) can lead to undue delays, defeating the purpose of the Code. In a case where an appeal was e-filed within the permissible 15-day condonation period under Section 61(2) of the IBC, but the hard copy was filed after a weekend holiday, the delay adequately explained. The appellant's status as a foreign company, the NCLAT should have exercised discretion and condoned the delay. The Court set aside the NCLAT's order rejecting the condonation of delay and directed the NCLAT to proceed with hearing the appeal on merits. (Para 2, 5 & 6) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Section 79 (15) - "excluded debts" - Damages awarded by NCDRC for deficiency in service fall under "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of IBC, thus not covered by moratorium. The definition of "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of the IBC, which includes fines and statutory penalties, reinforces that such liabilities remain enforceable despite an ongoing insolvency process. (Para 32 & 33) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Section 95 and 96 - Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 27 - Whether the execution of penalty orders imposed by the NCDRC can be stayed during an interim moratorium under IBC. The appellant, a real estate developer, faced multiple penalties (27 in total) imposed by the NCDRC for failing to deliver possession of residential units to homebuyers within the agreed timeline. The appellant sought a stay on the penalty proceedings, citing an interim moratorium triggered under Section 96 of the IBC due to insolvency proceedings initiated against them under Section 95 of the IBC. The NCDRC rejected the application, holding that consumer claims and penalties do not fall within the moratorium under the IBC. Held, regulatory penalties imposed under the Consumer Protection Act for non-compliance with consumer rights do not fall within the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC. The decision reinforces the distinction between debt recovery proceedings and regulatory actions, ensuring that consumer protection mechanisms remain effective even during insolvency proceedings. (Para 37) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Section 96 - Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 27 – Penalties imposed by the NCDRC are regulatory and punitive in nature, aimed at ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws, and do not fall within the definition of "debt" under the IBC. The interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC applies only to debts and does not extend to regulatory penalties or criminal proceedings. The Court distinguished between civil debt recovery proceedings and regulatory penalties, emphasizing that the latter serve a public interest function and cannot be stayed under the IBC moratorium. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on precedents related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, noting that penalties under the Consumer Protection Act are distinct and serve a different purpose. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to comply with the NCDRC's penalty orders. (Para 29, 38, 40) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Judicial Service

Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 406 - Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction? Held, a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Power to transfer cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly. Mere inconvenience or hardship to the accused, such as travel or language barriers, does not justify transfer unless there is a reasonable apprehension of injustice. (Para 49 & 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Section 138 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 406 - Whether the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. encompasses cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act? Held, the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not include cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Section 138 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Transfer Petition – Maintainability - The issue of lack of territorial jurisdiction in complaints filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is a matter to be raised before the Trial Court. The Magistrate has the power to return the complaint for presentation to the proper court if satisfied that the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the issue of territorial jurisdiction cannot be adjudicated in a transfer petition. (Para 2 & 3) Kamal Enterprises v. A. K. Constructions Co, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 289

Section 138 r/w. 141 – Vicarious Liability of Non-Executive Directors – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Held, Non-executive and independent directors cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act for dishonor of cheques unless specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement in the company's affairs at the relevant time. Mere designation as a director or attendance at board meetings does not create automatic liability. The complaint must contain specific averments establishing a direct nexus between the directors and the financial transactions in question. In the absence of such specific allegations and where records confirm a non-executive role without financial decision-making authority, criminal proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act against non-signatory, non-executive directors are liable to be quashed. (Para 16 & 18) K.S. Mehta v. Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 286

Section 138 and 142 (2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 406 - Petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, to the Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. The petitioner argued that the entire transaction, including the loan processing, EMI deductions, and SARFAESI proceedings, occurred in Coimbatore, and no cause of action arose in Chandigarh. The petitioner also cited inconvenience, language barriers, and harassment as grounds for transfer. The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act, as amended in 2015, the jurisdiction for complaints under Section 138 lies with the court where the cheque is delivered for collection through the payee's bank account. The court in Chandigarh had jurisdiction as the cheque was presented for collection there, even if the transaction occurred in Coimbatore. The petitioner's grievances did not meet the threshold for transfer, as the Chandigarh court had valid jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the transfer petition, holding that no case was made out for transferring the proceedings from Chandigarh to Coimbatore. It is always open for the petitioner accused to pray for exemption from personal appearance or request the Court that he may be permitted to join the proceedings online. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292

Penal Code, 1860

Sections 120B, 468 and 471 - Forgery of a marksheet - Handwriting Expert - Admissibility of Evidence - The conviction was based on the handwriting expert's opinion that the appellant had written the postal cover in which the forged marksheet was sent. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the original postal cover, which was crucial to establish the appellant's handwriting. Without the original document being exhibited and proved, the handwriting expert's report had no evidentiary value. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Murari Lal v. State of M.P., emphasizing that while handwriting expert opinion is relevant, it must be approached with caution and the reasons for the opinion must be carefully examined. The uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert can be accepted if the reasons are convincing and there is no reliable evidence casting doubt. However, in this case, due to the lack of the original document, the expert opinion had no basis. Therefore, the conviction based solely on the handwriting expert's opinion, without proving the original document, was unsustainable, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 12 & 15) C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 287

Section 298, 353 and 504 - Use of offensive and derogatory terms, such as "Miyan-Tiyan" and "Pakistani," while in poor taste, does not automatically amount to deliberately wounding the religious feelings of another. Essential ingredients of the alleged offences were not made out. No assault or use of criminal force was established under Section 353 IPC, the alleged remarks did not amount to wounding religious sentiments under Section 298 IPC, and no act was found to provoke a breach of peace under Section 504 IPC. Appeal allowed; criminal proceedings quashed. (Para 19 & 20) Hari Nandan Singhv v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Section 302 - The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court and the High Court for the murder of his two minor children. The murders were committed allegedly as a result of familial discord over the appellant's sister-in-law's relationship with a co-worker, which the appellant disapproved of. The appellant was also separately convicted for the murders of his sister-in-law and mother-in-law. The case was based on circumstantial evidence, and the prosecution relied on witness testimonies, SMS messages, and call records to establish the appellant's guilt. Whether the prosecution proved the homicidal death of the children beyond reasonable doubt? Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt? Whether the death sentence was appropriate, or should it be commuted to life imprisonment without remission? Held, the Court reiterated the principles governing the imposition of the death penalty, emphasizing that it should be reserved for the rarest of rare cases. While the circumstantial evidence in this case was strong, the absence of criminal antecedents and other mitigating factors warranted commutation of the death sentence. The judgment also highlighted the importance of considering all mitigating circumstances, including the possibility of reformation, before imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murders of his children. However, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission, considering the following mitigating factors: (i) The appellant had no prior criminal antecedents. (ii) He had good relations with his family, as testified by prosecution witnesses. (iii) The case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, and while the evidence was unimpeachable, the Court found that the death penalty was not the only appropriate punishment. The gravity of the crime, involving the murder of innocent children, was undeniable. However, the Trial Court had not adequately considered all mitigating circumstances, including the appellant's lack of criminal history and his behavior during the trial. The appeals were partly allowed. The conviction was upheld, but the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission. The appellant will remain in prison for the remainder of his natural life. (Para 16 & 17) Ramesh A. Naika v. Registrar General, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 281

Sections 306 and 114 - Abetment of suicide - The appellants were accused of abetting the suicide of an individual who allegedly consumed poison due to blackmail by the appellants over compromising photographs and videos. The trial court and the High Court had convicted the appellants. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the charge of abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Key issues included the delayed filing of the FIR, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, lack of recovery of incriminating evidence (such as the alleged suicide note, poison, or stolen ornaments), and the absence of proximate instigation by the appellants leading to the suicide. Mere harassment or blackmail, without direct incitement or proximate acts compelling suicide, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. The appellants were acquitted. (Para 36 & 40) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Section 376 - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Quashing of FIR - Where a complainant, a highly qualified major woman, alleges rape based on a false promise of marriage after a 16-year long consensual relationship, the allegations are deemed unreliable due to material contradictions and prolonged silence. The deletion of Section 313 IPC (causing miscarriage) by the Investigation Officer and the lack of evidence against other co-accused further weaken the complainant's case. The prolonged period of consensual sexual relations, the complainant's independent life and travel to meet the accused, and her portrayal of herself as the accused's wife indicate a live-in relationship gone sour, not rape. Applying the principles of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921; Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204 the court held that the physical relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise, and prolonged consensual relations negate the claim of vitiated consent. Mere breach of promise does not equate to a false promise, and the accused's mala fide intent must be established. The FIR and subsequent proceedings are quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 19, 26, 29, 30, 34, 37 & 39) Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Section 376 - Rape - The High Court had overturned the Trial Court's conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence, citing glaring lacunae in the prosecution's case. Key issues included the prosecutrix's lack of cooperation during medical examination, the absence of physical evidence (such as semen or blood), and contradictory testimonies from the prosecutrix's parents, particularly her mother, who turned hostile. The Court noted the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and the failure to establish the prosecutrix's mental state conclusively. The High Court's acquittal was based on the benefit of the doubt, and the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere, upholding the acquittal. (Para 10 & 12) State of Himachal Pradesh v Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 297

Sections 498A and 304B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Sections 498A and 304B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sisters-in-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 7 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291

Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002

Registration of Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) - High Court cannot direct Enforcement Directorate (ED) to register ECIR merely on prima facie finding that predicate offence existed. (Para 5) P. Madhavan Pillai v. Rajendran Unnithan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 295

Public Interest Litigation

Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 28 - Mere delay in depositing the balance sale consideration does not render a decree of specific performance inexecutable. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, considering factors such as the bona fides of the decree holder, the cause of delay, and the equities created in favor of the judgment debtor. (Para 46) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283