Supreme Court Weekly Digest August 18 - 24, 2025

A.J. Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015; Section 13(7) - Kerala University of Digital Sciences, Innovation and Technology Act , 2021 - Section 11(10) - Appointment of Vice-Chancellor - Supreme Court forms Search Committee headed by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia (Chairperson) for Kerala University Vice-Chancellor appointments - The chairman is authorized to constitute separate or joint committees - including 2 members from Chancellor's list and 2 from the State's list - Held that Chairperson must be paid an honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs for every day of proceedings of Search-cum-Selection Committee - Supreme Court laid down appointment process - i. Committee's recommendations endorsed by Chairperson, will be submitted to CM of Kerala; ii. CM can recommend shortlisted names in order of preference, if he believes a candidate is unsuitable their remarks and supporting materials must be sent to Chancellor; iii. The Chancellor will appoint VC from empanelled names, following CM's order of preference; iv. If Chancellor has any reservations against the names or CM's remarks, they can record their opinion with supporting reasons; v. any file where the CM & Chancellor have a disagreement will be sent to SC for a final decision - While this process in underway, Chancellor can issue fresh notifications to continue the current temporary VC in office in accordance with 6 month limit stipulated by Section 13(7) and 11(10) of the respective acts. [Paras 10-22] Chancellor, Apj Abdul Kalam Technological University v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 815

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 195 - Supreme Court laid down following principles to be followed while dealing with a category of offences that fall within the protective sphere of Section 195 CrPC - i. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars Court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 172 to 188, IPC, unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned - Without a complaint from said persons, the Court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences; ii. It is not open to Court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts - it would depend upon the facts of each case; iii. Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC, which requires a complaint by a public servant, offences against public justice - Focus should be on whether the facts in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint; iv. Court must apply twin tests - 1^st - Courts must ascertain having regard to nature of allegations made in FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade mandatory bar of Section 195 IPC - 2nd whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court a public servant is required; v. Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195; Courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of section 195 CrPC; vi. Section 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and section 340 CrPC respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate under CrPC - Once investigation is complete then embargo in section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance - Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of FIR and material collected during investigation, provided procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC is followed. [Para 59] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 372 Proviso - 'victim' - Right to appeal - Substitution of legal heir – Held, expression 'victim' is not limited to the person who has suffered a loss or injury, but also includes their guardian or legal heir - Proviso to Section 372 CrPC grants a victim the right to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence or inadequate compensation - This right to appeal is a statutory right - It is a fundamental right under Article 14 & 21 for a victim - 'Right to prefer an appeal' also includes the 'right to prosecute an appeal' - If a victim who filed an appeal dies, their legal heir can be substituted to continue prosecuting the appeal - Parliament's amendment to Section 372 CrPC aimed at giving an independent right to victims, separate from the State or a complainant - Legal heir of a deceased victim is permitted to pursue an appeal that was originally filed by the victim - The provisions of Section 394(2) CrPC, which states that 'every other appeal' abates on the death of appellant, cannot be applied to an appeal filed by a victim or their heir under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. [Paras 6-9, 11] Khem Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 828 : 2025 INSC 1024

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 394 - Section 372 Proviso - Abatement of appeals – Held, High Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction in a criminal appeal, it has a duty to independently evaluate evidence on record - A judgment must reflect a proper application of mind - In a case where High Court reverses a conviction and acquits the accused, it must provide reasons and a detailed discussions of facts and evidence - The High Court's duty is akin to that of a Trial Court when considering an appeal against a conviction - Appeal allowed and remanded the case to High Court. Khem Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 828 : 2025 INSC 1024

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 156(3), 195 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 186 - Whether a Magistrate can direct the police to register an FIR and investigate an offence under Section 186 IPC under Section 156(3) of CrPC, when Section 195(1)(a)(i) of CrPC mandates that cognizance can only be taken on a written complaint by public servant concerned or their administrative superior – Held, CMM committed a serious error in directing police investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC for an offence under Section 186 of IPC - Section 195(1)(a)(i) is mandatory and creates a bar on the court from taking cognizance of such an offence unless there is a written complaint from the public servant or their administrative superior - While there is no bar on police registering an FIR or conducting an investigation for offences under Section 186, IPC, the bar under Section 195 comes into play at the stage of cognizance - If a police report is filed, it will be deemed a complaint and the police officer will be the complainant, but legal embargo under Section 195 remains because the public servant is not the complainant - Section 195 CrPC does not bar the trial of an accused for distinct offence disclosed by same set of facts - If perusal of FIR makes it clear that the offence under Section 186 IPC is closely interconnected with another distinct offence which is in this case Section 341 IPC, and it cannot be split up, then in such circumstances the bar of Section 195 CrPC will apply to such other distinct offence also. [Paras 34-36, 43, 48, 51] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 468(2)(c), 469(a) and 473 - Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Limitation - Whether the complaints under Drug & Cosmetics Act were barred by the period of limitation prescribed under CrPC - Offence is punishable with a term not exceeding three years, so the limitation period is three years under Section 468(2)(c) of CrPC – Held, the limitation period began on the date the offence was made out, which was when the Drug Analyst's reports were received on March 30, 2020 and April 9, 2010 - Complaints were filed more than 3 years later on June 24, 2013 and July 3, 2013 - Supreme Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that the delay for 'ascertaining the constitutional particulars' of the company could be condoned - The necessary details were available in the government Analyst Report received by the Drug Inspector on the dates of reports themselves - Complainant was aware of the company's particulars from the beginning - Complainant never requested a condonation of delay or an exclusion of time - Lower Courts exceeded their power by granting a benefit that was never claimed - Proceedings were barred by limitation and should be quashed - Set aside High Court's Order. [Paras 8-13] Miteshbhai J. Patel v. Drug Inspector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 822

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 19(1)(a) - Right to Information - Supreme Court examined legal framework on the right to information affirming that the right of citizens to know about candidates is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) - This right is essential for a well-informed electorate to make an intelligent decision while exercising their franchise - A fine balance must be struck between the voter's right to information and the sanctity of people's mandate - Minor procedural errors or technical objections should not be allowed to override the mandate of electorate - The will of the people expressed through the election result is sacrosanct and should be respected unless it has been corrupted by fraudulent practices. [Paras 8, 9] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992

Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 14, 16, 21 - Regularization of Service - State as a Constitutional employer - Daily wage employees - Right to be considered for regularization - State is a constitutional employer and cannot balance budgets by exploiting those who perform basic and recurring public functions - When work is perennial, the public institution's sanctioned strength and engagement practices must reflect that reality - Long term use of temporary labels for regular labour corrodes confidence in public administration and violates the promise of equal protection - While financial constraints are relevant to public policy, they cannot override fairness, reason and duty to organize work on lawful lines – Held, outsourcing cannot be a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial - Later policy to outsource Class IV / Driver functions cannot retrospectively validate earlier arbitrary refusals or be used to deny consideration to workers on whose continuous services the establishment relied for decades - Misuse of temporary employment contracts by government institutions mirrors exploitative practices in private sector and can erode public trust - Where work recurs day after day and year after year, establishment must reflect that in reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices - Quashed State's refusal to sanction posts as unsustainable - Directed all appellants to be regularized - Appeals allowed. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12] Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2025 INSC 998

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act of 1986) - Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (Act of 2019) - Execution of Orders - Interpretation of Statutes - Section 25 - Section 27A – Appeal – Revision – Held, there was a drafting error in Section 25(1) of Act of 1986 and applied the principle of casus omissus and purposive interpretation - The words “where an interim order” in Section 25(1) should be read as “where any order” to ensure all orders, final or interim, are enforceable - This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of the Act, which is to provide effective remedies to consumers - An appeal from an order passed by the District Forum in an execution petition lies to the State Commission under Section 15 of Act of 1986 and no further remedy of appeal or revision is available - Revision petitions against such orders would be treated as appeals since State Commission had the jurisdiction to hear them - Supreme Court requested NCDRC Chairman to take appropriate steps to ensure the expeditious disposal of thousands of execution petitions - Supreme Court read down Section 25(1) of 1986 Act, as amended via 2002 amendment to 1986 Act, making it in line with the Act of 2019 and pre-amendment era - This order is made retrospectively applicable covering all pending execution cases from 2003 to 2020, when Act of 2019, reinstated original position by expressly making 'every order' enforceable - An order passed by any Court or any forum is merely a kind of paper decree unless effective relief is granted to the party entitled thereto - The consumers of justice should feel that they have received justice in reality and not merely on appears. [Paras 18-29, 38] Palm Groves Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2025 INSC 1023

Environmental Protection Act, 1986 - Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notifications – Held, a valid and subsisting District Survey Report (DSR) is mandatory for the grant of environmental clearance (EC) for sand mining - A draft DSR is untenable in law - DSR is prepared under Para 7(iii) of the EIA notification dt. 15.01.2016, following the procedure in Appendix X and the Sustainable Sand Mining management Guidelines, 2016 and Enforcement and Monitoring Guidelines for Sand Mining 2020 - Purpose of a DSR is to scientifically locate sand mining sites by calculating the annual rate of replenishment - Just as forest conservation requires assessing tree growth before timber harvesting, a replenishment study ensures that sand extraction does not exceed the replenishment rate - Excessive sand extraction can have adverse impacts on a river's physical characteristics, such as bed elevation, flow velocity and sediment transport, which can disturb the ecological equilibrium - DSR is valid and tenable only when a proper replenishment study has been conducted - J&K EIA authority erred in granting an environmental clearance based on a DSR that lacked a replenishment report - Upheld order by NGT citing that no provision exists to dispense with the requirement for a DSR and replenishment study - Using heavy machinery like JCBs and excavators for excavation is a violation of the EC conditions - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 20, 26, 29, 30, 32-33, 37-39] Union Territory of J & K v. Raja Muzaffar Bhat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2025 INSC 1025

Equal Pay for Equal Work - Contractual v. Regular/Ad Hoc Employees - Supreme Court examined the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' and is applicable to contractually appointed Assistant Professors - Contractual Assistant Professors were appointed through a rigorous public selection process and performed duties identical to those of their regular and ad hoc counterparts – Held, the State did not dispute that these professors performed the same functions - The principle that temporary employees are entitled to the minimum of the pay scale as long as they remain in service - Directed that the contractual professors be paid the minimum pay scale of an Assistant Professor and that arrears calculated at 8% should be paid from 3 years preceding the date of Writ petition were filed - Supreme Court expressed concern about low salaries of Rs. 30,000 p.m. paid to some contractual Assistant Professor for nearly two decades, noting that their regular counterparts earned significantly more - Suggested that the State should rationalize the pay structure based on the functions performed - Appeals allowed. [Paras 18-20, 22, 29, 31-33] Shah Samir Bharatbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 827 : 2025 INSC 1026

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - International Competitive Bidding (ICB) – Held, deemed export benefits under the FTP are contingent upon a strict adherence to the necessity of procuring goods through ICB - Reliance on a tariff-based competitive bidding process for the selection of the power developer cannot be equated with the mandatory ICB for the supply of goods as required by the FTP - The appellant failed to produce evidence that an ICB process was adopted for the procurement of components, having instead entered into contracts directly with subsidiaries or related companies - Appeals dismissed. [Para 68-71] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - 'Change in Law' Clause - PPA between parties defined a 'Change in Law' as an enactment, promulgation, amendment or repeal of any law – Held, Public Notices issued by Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) are administrative policy instruments and do not meet the contractual threshold of a 'change in law' as they are not statutory enactments or regulations by a competent authority - Government decisions and clarifications including Press releases could not be considered as 'change in law'. [Paras 41-45] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - 'Deemed exports'- Applicability to Power Projects – Held, the concept of 'deemed exports' under the FTP is designed to incentivize the domestic production of movable and marketable goods for export or deemed export - A power generating station being an integrated immovable asset assembled on-site, does not qualify as a 'manufactured good' capable of being exported under FTP - Mere act of assembling individual components at the project site does not transform the entire plant into a 'good' eligible for deemed export benefits - An immovable property, especially a machinery embedded to earth would fail to qualify as 'goods' - Benefit of deemed exports were not available to a coal based thermal power plant. [Paras 57, 60-62] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002

Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966 (Rules of 1966) - Rule 2(g) - State Forest Service - Forest Range Officer (FRO) - Supreme Court examined the definition of 'State Forest Service' under Rule 2(g) of Rules of 1966 and declared that 'any service in a State, being a service connected with forestry and the members thereof having gazetted status', constitutes the 'State Forest Service' subject to the approval of Central Government in consultation with State Government – Held, approval of Central Government is required for the entire service, not for individual posts within it - The post of FRO is part of the State forest Service and that its members are eligible for promotion to the Indian Forest Service (IFoS), provided the service is approved by Central Government - Appellant, a FRO, succeeded on the legal issue, the Court granted limited relief and held that appellant's delay in raising his grievance meant he could not be granted relief for past promotion cycles and that appellant could not be considered ahead of his senior - Respondents must treat the Andhra Pradesh Forest Service, including FROs as the State Forest Service and consider them eligible for promotion - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 6-11] P. Maruthi Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2025 INSC 1019

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 13(1)(ia) & (ib) - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Divorce - Supreme Court orders husband to pay Rs. 1.25 crores permanent alimony to his wife while dissolving marriage – Held, there is no possibility of reconciliation between parties and they have been living separately since 15 years - There is no vestige of matrimonial relationship between them and neither party has shown any inclination to resolve their differences - Mediation efforts also failed - Since the respondent-wife and child have not received any financial support from appellant-husband, Rs. 1.25 crores was directed to be paid - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-9] X v. Y, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2025 INSC 978

National Highway - Citizen's right to unhindered roads - Toll suspension – Held, NHAI or its agents can't levy toll if road is pothole ridden - Public's obligation to pay a user fee for roads is based on assurance that their travel will be free of hindrances - When public pays a toll, they acquire a corresponding right to safe, unhindered and regulated access to the road - Upheld order of High Court's decision to suspend toll collection for 4 weeks - High Court's approach was 'citizen centric approach' and that hardship faced by citizens such as long waits in traffic, strained environment and waste fuel was of greater concern - Supreme Court refused to order a proportionate reduction in toll, noting that the issue was a total lock jam and not just minor repairs in patches - Appeal dismissed and held that citizens should be free to travel on roads for which they have already paid taxes 'without further payment to navigate the gutters and pot-holes, symbols of inefficiency'. [Paras 11, 12, 17] National Highway Authority of India v. O.J Janeesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 819

Penal Code, 1860; Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Ingredients of - Proof of mens rea - Necessity of proximate prior act or live link - Whether continuous harassment alone can constitute abetment – Held, an allegation of continuous harassment alone, without a proximate prior act, may not be sufficient to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC - There must be a definite and demonstrable act by the accused that drive the victim to the extreme act of suicide, which is a test to find mens rea - The test is whether accused intended by his action to drive victim to suicide - Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of section 306 IPC is not sustainable - A 'live link' or 'proximate trigger' is essential to connect accused's actions to the suicide - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 21-24, 29] Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2025 INSC 990

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 186 - 'Obstruction' – Held, 'obstruction' is not limited to physical force, it means any impediment to public servant's discharge of duty - It does not require use of violence or physical abuse - It can occur through threats, intimidation or deliberate non-co-operation as long as it makes the discharge of duty more difficult. [Paras 29-33] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Practice and Procedure - Interim Arrangement for temple management (Maa Chandi Devi Temple) - Supreme Court remands the matter to High Court & directs Collector, Haridwar to conduct a personal inquiry into the management of the Math and submit a report to the High Court - Interim arrangement made by High Court to remain in effect - Remanded matter to High Court. [Paras 7-10] Mahant Bhawani Nandan Giri v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 817

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Held, PIL cannot be used as a mechanism to settle scores between competing government officers - If a person is aggrieved by any action of the State with regard to his illegal removal from the service or due to denial of his legitimate claim to a post, such an officer can very well take recourse to the remedies available to him in law - PIL is a mechanism, which has been devised by the Supreme Court so as to dilute the issue of locus and permit public spirited person to approach the Supreme Court or the High Courts on behalf of persons who, on account of their social and economic backwardness, are not in a position to approach the High Courts or the Supreme Court. [Paras 4-6] Prakash Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 824

Representation of People's Act, 1951 (RPA); Section 123(2) - Section 100(1)(d)(i) & 100(1)(d)(iv) - Corrupt Practice - Whether election can be declared void due to her non-disclosure of income from her income tax returns and amounts to improper acceptance of nomination rendering election void under section 100(1)(d)(i) and corrupt practise under 100(1)(d)(iv) of RPA – Held, mere failure to disclose assets won't invalidate election unless they're substantial - The non-disclosure was not of a 'substantial nature' and did not materially affect the election result - A Court should not rush to invalidate an election based on a 'highly pedantic and fastidious approach' or on 'minor technicalities' that do not substantially impinge on the law or the integrity of the electoral process - Non-disclosure did not constitute a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of RPA, as it was not of a substantial nature - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 8-11] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992

Service Law - Departmental Inquiry - Judicial Review - The power of judicial review of disciplinary inquiry matters is limited to correcting errors of law or procedural errors that result in manifest injustice or a violation of natural justice principles - It is not an appellate adjudication on the merits of the case - If a disciplinary authority accepts findings of the inquiry officer, it is not required to provide detailed reasons for imposing punishment - In a disciplinary inquiry, findings can be based on a preponderance of probabilities and strict proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required - Supreme Court restores SBI official's removal for taking bribes to sanction loans and reiterates limited interference in Writ jurisdiction - Writ Courts can interfere with disciplinary inquiries only in cases of procedural irregularities or violation of natural justice. [Paras 13-15] State Bank of India v. Ramadhar Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2025 INSC 1010

Stray Dogs - Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 (Rules, 2023) - Animal welfare - Public Safety - Directions issued - Supreme Court clarified, supplemented and modified the previous directions, noting that a complete prohibition on releasing vaccinated and sterilized dogs is 'too harsh' and potentially impossible to comply with due to lack of infrastructure - Conflict between the previous order and the Rules, 2023, specifically Rule 11(19), which requires that sterilized and immunized stray dogs be released back into the same area from which they were picked up. In Re : 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2025 INSC 1018

Stray Dogs - Directions issued by Supreme Court are as follows - i. Municipal authorities must continue to pick up and round up stary dogs from Delhi and the NCR and create designated shelters; ii. Previous direction prohibiting the release of picked-up strays is kept in abeyance-instead, dogs that have been sterilized, dewormed and vaccinated must be released back into the same area from which they were captured; iii. Relocation mandate does not apply to dogs that are rapid, suspected to having rabies or display aggressive behaviour - These dogs should be kept in separate shelters after being sterilized and immunized and should not be released back onto the streets; iv. Municipal Authorities are directed to create dedicated feeding spaces for stray dogs in each municipal ward, with notice boards indicating that dogs should only be fed in these areas - Feeding dogs on the streets is not permitted, and those found in violation will face legal action; v. A dedicated helpline must be established by each municipal authority to report violations; vi. No individual or organization shall obstruct the implementation of these new directions - Anyone who obstructs a public servant in the discharge of their duties will be prosecuted; vii. Intervening individuals and NGOs who are considered 'animal lovers' must deposit Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 2,00,000, respectively, with the court Registry within 7 days - Money will be used for creating infrastructure and facilities for stray dogs; viii. Animal lovers may apply to the municipal body to adopt street dogs, and it will be their responsibility to ensure the adopted dogs do not return to the streets; ix. Scope of the matter beyond Delhi & NCR, directing the impleadment of all States and UTs to seek information on their on their compliance with the Rules, 2023; x. Court ordered the transfer of all similar pending writ petitions from various High Courts to the Supreme Court for analogous consideration. [Paras 24-35] In Re : 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2025 INSC 1018

Telegraph Act, 1885 - Section 16(5) - Supreme Court recommends creation of statutory appeal over District judge's compensation order under Section 16(3) - Noted that there is no provision for an appeal against District judge's compensation order forcing parties to resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court which typically does not resort to evidence or disturb findings of fact - First Appellate Court is required to address all issues considered in order impugned and decide the same by giving reasons - Held that there is a significant gap in the law, especially given the increase in litigation related to power and electrical projects and that there is no amendment in sections 10 & 16 of the 1885 Act - Supreme Court noted lack of uniformity in how cases under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 are registered and handled - Referred different statutes like Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, etc. wherein remedy of appeal has been provided. [Paras 23, 27-36] Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd. V. Vinod, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2025 INSC 1004

Telegraph Act, 1885 - Uniform Compensation Rate – Held, it was a 'glaring error' for the High Court to apply a uniform compensation rate for land in different districts (Sonepat & Jhajjar) with varying characteristics and market values - A 100 km transmission line passes through areas with vastly different characteristics, such as proximity to highways and that a uniform rate is not a proper methodology for fair compensation - Correct method is to firstly assess the value of land and thereafter determine compensation payable to landowners - Set aside High Court's order and remitted matter for fresh consideration. [Paras 16, 19, 20] Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd. V. Vinod, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2025 INSC 1004

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (Tenancy Act); Sections 7 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 - Whether the provision of Section 7 of the Tenancy Act regarding the deposit of rent and filing of an application within the specified time, are mandatory or directory, and whether the benefit of Section 5 of the limitation Act, can be invoked by the tenant for condonation of delay – Held, the compliance required under by the tenant under Sections 7(1) and the first part of section 7(2) of the Tenancy Act regarding the deposit of rent and the filing of an application within the specified time is mandatory - Applicability of the limitation Act to proceedings under the Tenancy Act is subject to the provisions of this Act relating to Limitation - This means that if a shorter time period is specified for a proceeding under the Tenancy Act cannot be used to extend it - The term 'shall' in section 7(1) and first part of section 7(2) indicates a mandatory obligation on the tenant to pay or deposit rent - Section 7(2) allows for a one-time extension of upto 2 months, applies only to the payment of the amount specified in a Court Order after the rent has been determined - Since the tenant is required to 'deposit the amount admitted him to be due' together with an application for rent determination within specified time, the deposit and the application are considered a precondition for avoiding eviction - The term 'together' means 'simultaneously' or 'conjointly' - Therefore, a tenant cannot invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay in filing the application - Consequences for non-compliance are specified in Section 7(3) which mandates the tenant's defence against eviction “shall be struck out” if they fail to deposit or pay the required amount within the specified time or any granted extension - The consequences further reinforces the mandatory nature of provision - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 17, 19-21, 22-24, 28, 29, 33-35] Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v. Ismat Ahmed, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2025 INSC 984