Supreme Court Weekly Digest March 2025 [March 17 - 23, 2025]

[2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 338]

Administration

Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Advocates Act, 1961

A right of an Advocate to appear for a party and to practice in the courts is coupled with the duty to remain present in the court at the time of hearing, and to participate and conduct the proceedings diligently, sincerely, honestly and to the best of his ability. Rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, and they are inherently connected with each other. (Para 18) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Anticipatory Bail

Condition for Automatic Custody Upon Charge-Sheet Submission - Such a specific direction, mandating coercive steps for custody, was improper. When granting anticipatory bail, the court should leave it open for the trial court to decide on bail after the charge-sheet is filed and the accused appears. (Para 3) Ritesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 326

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

In the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contractus). (Para 31) Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 317

Section 34(2)(b) - An Arbitral Award upholding agreement to return acquired land is liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b) as it is in conflict with the public policy of India. (Para 15) Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Bhagwan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Auroville Foundation Act, 1988

Section 19 - Residents' Assembly's role is advisory and recommendatory. While it assists in formulating the Master Plan, it does not have the power to dictate the composition of committees constituted by the Governing Board. The Residents' Assembly or any individual resident of the Auroville Foundation cannot claim any right to be a part of a Committee or Council constituted by the Governing Board of the Foundation. (Para 15) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Petition filed by disgruntled residents to hamper development of Auroville - Some disgruntled and discontented residents kept on filing the petitions one after the other, dragging the Foundation into unnecessary litigations. The writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court was one of such ill-motivated petitions filed by her to abuse the process of law to hamper the development of Auroville and to cause obstructions to the smooth functioning of the Governing Board of the Foundation. Hence, the Appeal by the Auroville Foundation is allowed with cost of Rs.50,000/- (Para 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Civil Procedure

Execution of Decree - Extension of Time - Limitation - Doctrine of Merger - Executing Court's extension for depositing the advance payment cannot be interfered with. Since the Appellate Court's ruling, which lacked a time limit, superseded the Trial Court's decision under the doctrine of merger, the Executing Court was not bound by the Trial Court's timeline. (Para 10) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331

Constitution of India

Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their in-house pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Section 2(1)(d) – To qualify as a "consumer" under the Act, there must be a direct contractual relationship between the parties. A party having no privity of contract with the service provider cannot be regarded as a consumer as per the Act. (Paras 17, 20, 21, 23) Citicorp Finance v. Snehasis Nanda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 332

Criminal Law

Arrest - Defiance of Court Order - Grant of Bail - Police, with knowledge of the protection order, hastily added serious charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 leading to the appellant's arrest. The Court deprecated this conduct, emphasizing that the police should have sought leave from the Court before arresting the appellant. The Court, considering the mala fide nature of the arrest, allowed the appeal, directing the appellant's release on bail, and made the interim order of protection absolute. (Para 5 & 7) Manish Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 325

Criminal Procedure

Criminal Appeal - Old age of the accused and the long lapse of time from the commission of the offence can always be a ground available to give some priority to the appeals against conviction of the accused on bail. (Para 15) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333

If a court intends to add a person as an accused, it cannot direct the police to include their name in the charge sheet. Instead, the court may issue a summons to the proposed accused if sufficient grounds exist, even if they are not named in the charge sheet. (Para 3) Gopal Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 328

Registration of FIR - Cognizable Offence - Preliminary Inquiry – Scope of - the landmark decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. The Lalita Kumari decision reaffirmed "the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. (Para 12) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Registration of FIR - Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the CrPC but would also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law. (Para 14) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Section 156 (3) - Before a complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies under sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. (Para 8) Ranjit Singh Bath v. Union Territory Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 329

In the present case, the allegations against the appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation and trial. The appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs under Section 482 CrPC, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum. (Para 13) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315

Education

Admission Eligibility - Curing Defect During Course - Interim Orders - Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit - Where a student, initially admitted to a B.A.M.S. course without fulfilling the mandatory English subject requirement, subsequently passed the English exam during the pendency of a writ petition and completed the entire course under interim orders, and where the college itself had provisionally admitted the student subject to passing the English exam, the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based solely on the initial ineligibility. The principle of "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" dictates that an act of the court should not prejudice anyone, and this principle was disregarded by the High Court. The student's subsequent fulfillment of the eligibility criteria, coupled with the college's provisional admission and the completion of the course under interim orders, warranted the issuance of the B.A.M.S. degree. (Para 8) Zaid Sheikh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 319

Environment

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) and 14 - Not every environmental dispute constitutes a "substantial question relating to environment" under Section 2(1)(m) of the NGT Act. A substantial question must involve a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation under the enactments in Schedule I. The NGT cannot assume jurisdiction and interfere with an approved Master Plan under the guise of applying the "Precautionary Principle" when no substantial environmental question arising from the implementation of Schedule I enactments is established. The Auroville Foundation Act, 1988, being a special Act with overriding effect, must be considered in assessing the validity of NGT directions. (Para 9, 13 & 14) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) - Substantial question relating to environment - Auroville Township Project – National Green Tribunal barred the Auroville Foundation from developmental activities in their township in Puducherry - Held, no substantial question relating to environment had arisen, nor violation of any of the enactments specified in Schedule-I was alleged. The Tribunal therefore had committed gross error in assuming the jurisdiction and giving directions untenable in law. (Para 18 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312

Though it is true that precautionary principle and polluter pays principle are part of the environmental law of the country, it is equally true that while the right to clean environment is a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the right to development equally claims priority under the fundamental rights, particularly under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is a need for sustainable development striking a golden balance between the right to development and the right to clean environment. (Para 17) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006

State Government has no authority to impose additional restrictions or interpretations on qualifications for post of Food Safety Officer (FSO) as prescribed by central government. (Para 23 – 27) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336

High Court Rules

High Court Rules (Calcutta) - Rule 26 - Roster Allocation - Chief Justice's Power - Judicial Discipline - Division Bench of the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide a writ petition when the case was not allocated to it by the Chief Justice, who is the master of the roster. The Court reiterated that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction, and any adjudication beyond the assigned roster is void. The impugned order of the Division Bench, which had allowed the writ petition, was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration by a bench assigned by the Chief Justice. (Para 7) Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers v. GRSE Workmens Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 322

Haj Policy 2025

These Writ Petitions, filed by various Haj Group Organisers (HGOs), challenged the Union of India's quota allocation for Haj pilgrims under the Haj-2025 Policy. The petitioners alleged arbitrary and discriminatory allocation. The Court, after hearing the parties, initially directed a meeting to facilitate equitable redistribution of quota among HGOs. Following this, some redistribution occurred, and the Court extended the deadline for submission of revised Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to allow for further discussions. The Court clarified that it was not interfering with the Haj-2025 Policy itself, but addressing its initial implementation issues. The petitions were disposed of, with liberty granted to parties to raise future grievances before the appropriate forum. Interlocutory applications seeking to raise additional issues were dismissed as not maintainable. (Para 8 – 12) Kolkata Tours and Travels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 335

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Section 31(1) – Effect of Resolution Plan Approval - Post-Resolution Income Tax Demand - Held, once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority, all claims not included therein, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, stand extinguished. (Para 8) Vaibhav Goel v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Section 48 - Land acquired by the government through its sovereign power of eminent domain for public purposes cannot be transferred back to the original owner by the beneficiary of the acquisition through private agreements. (Para 16) Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Bhagwan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Motor Accident Claims

Direct Bank Transfer of Compensation - Streamlining Payment Process – Directions issued. (Para 17 - 21) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318

Discrepancy in the make of the vehicle cannot be a ground to deny a rightful claim when the vehicle's registration number and other key details are consistent and correctly mentioned. (Para 4) Parameshwar Subray Hegde v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 334

Enhancement of Compensation - 100% Disability – The Supreme Court enhanced compensation awarded to a 21-year-old claimant who suffered 100% permanent disability (quadriplegia) in a motor vehicle accident. The Court reassessed the claimant's income, considering his qualifications and potential, and granted future prospects. Additional compensation was awarded for attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, future medical expenses, loss of marriage prospects, and physiotherapy. (Para 8 - 13) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 – Return of a dishonoured cheque simpliciter does not create an offence under Section 138 NI Act. The cause of action arises only when a demand notice is served and payment is not made within the stipulated fifteen-day period. (Para 9) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314

Section 138 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 & 17 - Where the cause of action for an offence under Section 138 NI Act arises after the imposition of a moratorium under Section 14 IBC, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be initiated against the Director of the Corporate Debtor. Upon the imposition of a moratorium and the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) under Section 17 of the IBC, the management of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP, and the powers of the Board of Directors are suspended. Consequently, the Director lacks the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by a notice under Section 138 NI Act. The judgment in P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 is distinguishable, as in that case, the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the imposition of the moratorium. Proceedings under section 138 of the NI Act are quashed, when the cause of action arises after the imposition of moratorium, and the director of the company has been suspended from his duties, and the IRP has taken over the management of the company. (Para 11 - 13) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314

Penal Code, 1860

Sections 147, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 323, 325, 452 – Incident of 1989 – Accused assaulted multiple persons, including deceased, over a dispute – Trial Court convicted under Section 302/149 IPC with life imprisonment – High Court converted conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, reduced sentence to time served (76 days) with fine, citing advanced age of accused (70–80 years) and 28-year delay –Medical evidence inconclusive on cause of death (asphyxia, 15 days post-assault) – No intent to murder established – Long lapse of time and age of accused justified leniency –Appeal dismissed. (Para 13 & 14) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333

Section 376 - Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

In cases involving serious economic offences under the PMLA, such as illegal diversion and layering of funds leading to revenue losses, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution. Proceedings should not be quashed absent compelling legal grounds. Where allegations suggest significant financial misconduct, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and ensure accountability. The cascading effect of such offences necessitates a thorough judicial process to protect state revenue and legitimate investment sectors. (Para 31) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Offence of money laundering under PMLA is a continuing offence. Act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. Legislative intent of PMLA is to combat money laundering, which involves transactions spanning over time. Continued utilization and concealment of proceeds of crime, even in recent times, extends the offence. Money laundering is an ongoing activity as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy. Proceedings initiated under PMLA for continuing offences are valid. (Para 24 & 25) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Person need not be named as accused in complaint to retain seized property under Section 8(3). (Para 10) Union of India v. J.P. Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 338

The argument that proceedings under the PMLA are invalid due to the amount involved not meeting the statutory threshold of Rs. 30 lakhs (prior to amendment) is rejected. The determination of the threshold must be based on the entirety of the transaction and the overall financial trail, not isolated instances. The alleged proceeds of crime, including land allotment fraud, hawala transactions, and illegal gratification, significantly exceeded the threshold. The totality of evidence, even on a prima facie assessment, indicated that the proceeds of crime were substantially higher than the statutory limit, rendering the appellant's reliance on the threshold baseless. (Para 26 - 29) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Recruitment

Educational Qualification - A candidate possessing a higher degree of qualification cannot be rejected solely because a lower degree of qualification is required for a particular post. (Para 32) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Service

Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - the default retiral scheme applicable to the University's employees is General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity, unless the employee has specifically opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme. (Para 9) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316

Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - Appeal against High Court order dismissing writ petition seeking inclusion in University's General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Appellant, appointed as Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987, did not opt for Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) despite opportunities. University statutes provided for two retiral benefit schemes: CPF (opt-in) and General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity (default). University issued Office Order dated 21.02.2008, reiterating this, stating non-exercise of CPF option would result in inclusion in the default scheme. Appellant's name was omitted from the list of those included in the default scheme. Whether the appellant, who did not opt for CPF, is entitled to be included in the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Held, Yes. University statutes and Office Order clearly stipulate that non-exercise of CPF option automatically entitles employees to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based on non-exercise of option, as non-exercise led to inclusion in the default scheme. Similar relief granted to similarly placed persons by the High Court. High Court order set aside. University directed to provide retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme within four months, subject to adjustments of CPF benefits, if any, availed by the appellant. Appeal allowed. (Para 12) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316

Supreme Court Rules 2013

A strange practice was being followed in the Supreme Court regarding the marking of the presence of the number of advocates for the party, without anybody certifying whether they all are authorised to appear for the party. In most of the matters, simple or complicated, a number of appearances of advocates would be shown in the proceedings, running into pages and pages, without any verification as to whether such advocates were in fact present in the Court or were in fact authorised to appear for a particular party. Every vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance filed in the case carries a lot of responsibility and accountability. (Para 5 & 17) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Appearances of only Senior Advocates or Advocate-on-Record or Advcoate, who are physically present and arguing in the Court at the time of hearing of the matter and one Advocate/Advocate-on-Record each for assistance in Court to such arguing Sr Advocate, Advocate-on-Record or Advocate, as the case may be, will be recorded in the record of proceedings. The Appearance Slip as per Form 30 prescribed by the SC Rules only allowed the recording of these appearances. (Para 20) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

No advocate, other than the Advocate-on-Record for a party, can appear, plead and address the Court in a matter unless he is instructed by the AOR or permitted by the Court. A Senior Advocate shall not appear without an AOR in the Supreme Court. Though an advocate is entitled to appear before the Supreme Court, his appearance would be subject to the 2013 Supreme Court Rules. As per Rule 1(b) of Order IV, no advocate other than AOR can appear for the party. On a conjoint reading of this Rule along with Rule 20, no AOR can authorise any person except another AOR to act for him in any case. Similarly, Rule 1(b) has to be read with Rule 2(b), which says that no Senior Advocate can appear without an AOR. (Para 13) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

Section 15 - Rule 15 of TADA Rules - Confession to Police Officer - Admissibility - Procedural Safeguards - Kartar Singh Guidelines - Issue Estoppel - Confessional statements were unreliable and failed to meet the procedural safeguards under the Act, as the recording officer failed to ensure the voluntariness of the accused while taking confessions. The statements of the accused did not contain the time of recording of the confession or indicate from where they were produced. No time was given to the accused for reflection before the recording of the confessional statements, which vitiated the said statements. There was nothing on record to suggest that the witness who recorded the statement was authorized to do so. The procedure laid down in the Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (e.g., voluntariness, free atmosphere, reflection time) regarding the recording of confessional statements in coercive environments (BSF camp, Joint Interrogation Centres) under the TADA was violated. Accused confession further barred by issue estoppel from prior acquittal in 2002. Eyewitnesses failed to identify accused, and unrecovered murder weapon weakened prosecution case. Special Court's acquittal upheld as no evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; no error or perversity found. (Para 22 - 27) State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 337

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 53A - Lis Pendens - Protection under Section 53A for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. (Para 9) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956

The term 'degree' is defined under Section 22(3) the UGC Act, which states that the 'degree' means the 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and the 'Doctorate Degree'. Thus, wherever the word 'degree' is used, unless a specific exclusion is provided, the same would include within its scope and ambit all three, 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and a 'Doctorate Degree'. (Para 29) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Vexatious Litigation

If the parties misuse the process and attempt to obtain an order by "trick and strategem", the Courts would be justified in imposing the costs for igniting such vexatious litigation. (Para 9) Leelawati v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 321

Writ Petition

Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313