Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest 2025: Property Law

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 - Locus Standi of Proposed Purchaser under Agreement to Sell in Suit for Permanent Injunction against Third Party - Held, a proposed purchaser under an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to file a suit for a permanent injunction against a third party claiming independent title and possession of the property, as such an agreement does not confer proprietary rights. The rights under an agreement to sell are personal, enforceable only against the vendor or, in limited cases under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, against a subsequent transferee with notice, but not against third parties with no privity of contract. The suit by the respondent (proposed purchaser) was not maintainable due to the absence of the vendor as a party and lack of enforceable rights against the appellant (third party). The Supreme Court set aside the trial court and High Court's dismissal of the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 11, allowed the appeal, and held the suit for permanent injunction unsustainable due to the respondent's lack of locus standi and absence of privity with the appellant. (Paras 15, 16) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490 : AIR 2025 SC 2065

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2025 INSC 301

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 11 - Res Judicata and Findings on Title in Injunction Suits - In a suit for injunction, where the question of title is directly and substantially in issue and a finding on title is necessary to grant the injunction, with a specific issue on title framed, a separate prayer for declaration of title is not mandatory. A subsequent suit on title will be barred by res judicata if title-related facts were pleaded and adjudicated by the Trial Court, as findings on possession may depend solely on title. However, if a finding on title is not essential for deciding possession or granting an injunction, or no specific issue on title is framed, any observations on title are incidental and do not attract res judicata. Findings on title in an earlier suit will operate as res judicata in a later suit only if title was directly and substantially in issue. (Para 58, 59) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2025 INSC 273

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Effect of NonChallenge to Validity of Documents - The appellants' argument that the respondent did not challenge the validity of the General Power of Attorney (GPA) and agreement to sell dated 04.04.1986 or the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 does not alter the legal position of the parties. In a suit for injunction simpliciter, the absence of a specific challenge to the validity of these documents or a separate prayer for declaration of title does not impact the legal standing of the parties when no direct challenge to the instruments' validity is raised. (Para 57) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2025 INSC 273

Contract Act, 1872, Section 202 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sections 54, 55 - Registration Act, 1908, Section 17(1)(b) - A General Power of Attorney (POA) without a proprietary interest in favor of the agent is revocable and terminates on the principal's death under Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872. The use of the term "irrevocable" in a POA does not render it irrevocable unless coupled with a proprietary interest in the subject matter. An unregistered agreement to sell, even when executed with a POA, does not confer title or ownership to the agent, as a registered sale deed is mandatory for transferring immovable property under Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A POA and agreement to sell, even read together, do not create a proprietary interest unless registered under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908. A sale executed by a POA holder after the principal's death is invalid due to termination of the agency. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's grant of a permanent injunction in favor of the respondent, affirming the legal heirs' title to the property. (Paras 45-48, 55) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2025 INSC 273

Contract Act, 1872; Section 74 - Whether forfeiture of earnest money under an Advance Sale Agreement (ATS) is penal in nature - The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of Rs. 20 lakhs paid as earnest money under the ATS, dismissing the purchaser's claim that it could not be forfeited as part of the sale consideration. The Court clarified that earnest money, intended as a security deposit to bind the contract, is distinct from an advance or part-payment. Forfeiture of earnest money is not penal in the ordinary sense, rendering Section 74 inapplicable, as established in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405. The forfeiture clause in the ATS was fair, equitable, and imposed mutual obligations on both parties. Even if Section 74 applied, the forfeiture was justified due to the purchaser's breach, causing proven financial losses to the seller exceeding the forfeited amount. The Court affirmed the trial and High Court findings, holding that the Rs. 20 lakhs was earnest money, liable to forfeiture upon the purchaser's failure to pay the balance consideration within the stipulated period. Appeal dismissed. (Para 58) K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2025 INSC 617

Gift, Settlement Deed and Will - Distinction Between – Explained. (Para 11 - 14) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 269ST, 271DA - Prohibition of Cash Transactions Exceeding ₹2,00,000 - Mandatory Reporting by Courts and Sub-Registrars - Disciplinary Action for Non-Compliance - Role of Income Tax Authorities - Circulation of Judgment - Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, 1961 prohibits cash transactions of ₹2,00,000 or more in a single transaction, aggregate per day, or for a single event, except through account payee cheque, bank draft, or electronic clearing systems. Violations attract penalties under Section 271DA to promote digital transactions and curb black money. Courts are obligated to report to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department any suit involving cash transactions of ₹2,00,000 or more to verify compliance with Section 269ST. Sub-Registrars must report documents (e.g., sale agreements) presented for registration indicating cash payments of ₹2,00,000 or above. Failure to report by officials will lead to disciplinary action initiated by the Chief Secretary of the State/Union Territory. The jurisdictional Income Tax Authority shall investigate reported transactions for potential violations. The Registrar (Judicial) was directed to circulate this judgment to all High Court Registrar Generals, Chief Secretaries of States/Union Territories, and the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax for strict compliance. The case involved a property dispute where a charitable trust, in possession since 1929, challenged a 2018 sale agreement claiming ₹75,00,000 in cash, violating Section 269ST. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the trust's revision petition, dismissed the respondents' suit as defective and speculative, and emphasized mandatory reporting of high-value cash transactions by courts and Sub-Registrars to ensure compliance with tax laws. Appeal allowed. (Para 18) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490 : AIR 2025 SC 2065

Limitation Act, 1963; Articles 58, 59 and 65 - Suit for cancellation of a sale deed and recovery of possession - Limitation period is determined by the primary relief of cancellation, which is 3 years under Article 59 of the Act, from the date the right to sue first accrues. The 12-year limitation for possession under Article 65 is ancillary and does not apply when cancellation is the core relief. The suit, filed in 2003 for a 1992 sale deed, was deemed time-barred, as the right to sue accrued in 1992. (Para 23, 30 & 31) Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 471 : AIR 2025 SC 2392

Registration Act, 1908; Section 11 (5) - Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer Act) 1963 (“MOFA”); Section 11(4) - Deemed Conveyance - Writ Court Interference - Scope of powers of the registration officer - Held, the competent authority under the MOFA has the power to grant deemed conveyance to flat purchasers when developers fail to execute formal conveyance. The MOFA, as welfare legislation, protects flat buyers from developer malpractices. High Courts, exercising writ jurisdiction, should refrain from interfering with deemed conveyance orders under Section 11(4) unless manifestly illegal, as such orders do not preclude aggrieved parties from pursuing civil suits. The competent authority's proceedings are summary in nature, requiring reasoned orders, and the registering officer's role is limited, with no appellate power over such orders. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision upholding deemed conveyance to a co-operative housing society. (Para 35 & 37) Arunkumar H Shah Huf v. Avon Arcade Premises Co-Operative Society, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2025 INSC 524 : (2025) 7 SCC 249

Registration Act, 1908; Section 49 - Admissibility of an unregistered agreement to sell as evidence in a suit for specific performance – Held, an unregistered agreement to sell is admissible as evidence to prove the existence of a contract in a specific performance suit under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. The proviso allows such documents to be used as evidence of a contract or collateral transaction, despite being unregistered. (Para 9, 10, 11) Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652

Registration Act, 1908; Section 49 - The appellant relied on an unregistered agreement to sell (dated 01.01.2000) in a suit for specific performance, claiming part payment and possession of the property by the respondent, who failed to execute the sale deed. The trial court and High Court dismissed the suit, citing inadmissibility under the Stamp Act and Registration Act, as registration of such agreements is mandatory in Tamil Nadu due to a State amendment. Held, an unregistered document can be used to prove an oral agreement of sale in a specific performance suit, not as evidence of a completed transfer. The document was admissible under Section 49 to establish contract formation, not title. The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' findings, allowed the appeal, and permitted the appellant to introduce the unregistered agreement as evidence of the oral agreement of sale. [Para 10] Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652

Registration Act, 1908; Section 69 – Registration of transfer document cannot be refused on ground that vendor's title deeds aren't produced or established. It is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property. The Act does not authorize the Registering Authority to deny registration of a transfer document on the ground that the vendor's title documents are not produced or that their title is unproven. Even if a person executing a sale deed or lease does not have title to the property, the registering authority cannot refuse to register the document, provided all procedural requirements are met and applicable stamp duty and registration fees are paid. (Para 11 & 15) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462

Registration Act, 1908; Section 69 – Registration Rules (Tamil Nadu); Rule 55A(i) - As per Rule 55A(i), the person seekig registration of a document was mandated to produce the previous original deed as per which he acquired title and encumbrance certificate. Unless this Rule is complied with, the document will not be registered. It was not within the mandate of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority under the 1908 Act to verify whether the vendor has valid title. Therefore, the Court struck down as unconstitutional Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules as inconsistent with the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. Impugned High Court judgments relying on Rule 55A(i) quashed. Sale deed to be registered upon procedural compliance within one month. Appeal allowed. (Para 16 - 19) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462

Registration Act, 1908; Sections 23, 34 – Unregistered Sale Agreement – Validity of Title – Subsequent Registration – Held, an unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title, even if a subsequent instrument based on it is registered. Nonregistration of the 1982 sale agreement, as required under the Registration Act, cannot be cured by validation in 2006 without a fresh transaction. Section 23 mandates presentation of a document for registration within four months from its execution, with Section 34 allowing condonation of delay for an additional four months upon payment of a fine. The unregistered 1982 agreement is incapable of conferring title, and the High Court erred in granting protection from dispossession based on it. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Para 22) Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646

Registration Act, 1908 – Unregistered Sale Agreement – Title and Possession – An unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title or entitle the claimant to protection from dispossession. The Supreme Court, in an appeal against a High Court Division Bench order, set aside the restraint on dispossession by Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (TSIIC). The respondents' claim, based on an unregistered 1982 sale agreement executed by a General Power of Attorney holder, was invalid. Unregistered agreements are not recognized as valid instruments for transferring immovable property. The respondents failed to establish valid title or rightful possession. The Single Judge's decision denying protection from dispossession was restored. (Paras 17 & 25) Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 12 (3) – Specific Performance of Part of Contract – Readiness and Willingness to Perform - The petitioner filed suit for specific performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of the suit property. In the alternative, he claimed damages of Rs. 60,00,000/- with interest. The Trial Court dismissed the prayer for specific performance, finding the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but directed a refund of Rs. 20,00,000/- with 12% interest. The High Court affirmed this decision, holding that Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable as the petitioner had not relinquished all claims and was seeking damages. Whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance of part of the contract under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act despite not relinquishing all claims to performance of the remaining part of the contract or compensation. Held, Section 12(3) is a discretionary relief and cannot be invoked where the terms of the contract are not severable or when the plaintiff has not relinquished all claims to performance and compensation. Section 12(3) could not be invoked as the petitioner sought damages in addition to specific performance, indicating non-relinquishment of claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court that the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2025 INSC 52 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1290

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 12 - Specific Performance of Part of Contract - Legal Principle - Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows specific performance of part of a contract only if: The plaintiff is ready and willing to perform their obligations. The contract terms are severable, and the plaintiff relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part and to any compensation. Inability to perform may arise due to various factors, including legal prohibitions or deficiencies in quantity or quality of the subject matter. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 16(c) and 34 - Cancellation of Agreement to Sell - Maintainability of Suit - A suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell, filed after its cancellation, is not maintainable unless it includes a prayer for declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Act challenging the validity of the cancellation. Declaratory relief challenging the validity of the cancellation was essential when seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell, as the suit could not be sustained without a valid and subsisting agreement. (Para 24, 26 & 27) Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2025 INSC 450 : AIR 2025 SC 1806

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 22 - Refund of Advance Payment - Necessity of Specific Prayer in Plaint - Held, a refund of advance payment or earnest money as part of sale consideration cannot be granted unless specifically prayed for in the plaint or sought through an amendment under Section 22(2). The Court cannot suo moto grant such relief, as the inclusion of a specific prayer is a sine qua non. However, no express prayer is required for ancillary reliefs, such as delivery of possession, which naturally flow from a decree of specific performance, as clarified in Manickam @ Thandapani v. Vasantha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 395. The forfeiture of earnest money is not penal under Section 74 of the Contract Act in the ordinary sense. In the present case, the appellant's failure to pay the balance sale consideration or fulfill the agreement terms necessitated a specific prayer for refund, which was absent, leading to dismissal of the claim. (Paras 34, 36, 37, 40 & 510) K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2025 INSC 617

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 - Doctrine of Merger - Whether the trial court's decree merges with the appellate court's decree, and whether the time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, as stipulated in the trial court's decree, revives after the appellate court's decision. The plaintiffs filed suits for specific performance of agreements to sell, which were decreed by the trial court in 1994, directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration within 20 days. The defendants appealed, and the first appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed second appeals, which were allowed by the High Court in 2018, restoring the trial court's decree. The plaintiffs deposited the balance sale consideration in 2018, and the defendants filed applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract, which were rejected by the executing court. The High Court upheld the executing court's decision, leading to the present appeals. Held, the doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses the trial court's decree. The doctrine of merger ensures that only one operative decree exists at any given time, and the appellate court's decree supersedes the trial court's decree. The trial court's decree merged with the High Court's decree in the second appeals. Since the High Court did not specify a time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, the 20-day period stipulated by the trial court did not revive. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the amount, and there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2025 INSC 81 : AIR 2025 SC 632

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 - Mere delay in depositing the balance sale consideration does not render a decree of specific performance inexecutable. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, considering factors such as the bona fides of the decree holder, the cause of delay, and the equities created in favor of the judgment debtor. (Para 46) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2025 INSC 301

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 - Rescission of Contract - Whether the defendants (judgment debtors) were entitled to rescind the contract on the grounds that the plaintiffs (decree holders) failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. Held, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the executing court retains jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, even after the decree for specific performance has been passed. The court's power to extend time is discretionary and must be exercised based on the conduct of the parties and the facts of the case. The defendants were not entitled to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the plaintiffs had deposited the balance sale consideration promptly after the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court committed no error in rejecting the defendants' applications for rescission of the contract. The Court reaffirmed the principles of the doctrine of merger and the discretionary powers of the executing court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2025 INSC 81 : AIR 2025 SC 632

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 31 and 34 - Plaintiff seeking declaration of title over a property is not required to seek cancellation of a sale deed executed by another party with whom the plaintiff has no privity of contract. Declaration of title is sufficient and equivalent to seeking cancellation of such a sale deed, as the proviso to Section 34 does not mandate seeking all possible reliefs, only those directly flowing from the declaration. A non-executant of a deed need only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, void, or non-binding, not its cancellation under Section 31. The Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the suit for not seeking cancellation of the sale deed, restoring the trial court's ruling upholding the plaintiff's title via a Gift Deed and declaring the defendant's sale deed void ab initio. (Paras 28 - 30 & 36) Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2025 INSC 553

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." - Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness regarding the testator's direction. Facts: Sanjhi Ram, the testator, executed a Will on November 7, 2005, bequeathing his property to his nephew, Gopal Krishan (Appellant No. 1). He passed away the next day. The Respondents (legal heirs of Sanjhi Ram) challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of testimony from the attesting witness that the testator directed the signing of the Will. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the validity of the Will, ruling that the testator's mental faculties were sound, and the Will complied with legal requirements. Supreme Court's Decision: Interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925: The Court clarified that Section 63(c) provides alternative conditions for attestation: (a) The attesting witness must have seen the testator sign or affix their mark to the Will; or (b) The witness must have seen another person sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the testator. The use of the word "or" is disjunctive, meaning compliance with either condition suffices. The High Court erred in interpreting "or" as "and," thereby imposing an unnecessary requirement that the attesting witness explicitly state the testator's direction. Validity of the Will: The testimony of the attesting witness (DW-1) confirmed that he had seen the testator affix his mark to the Will. This alone satisfied Section 63(c). The requirement of the testator's direction applies only when another person signs the Will on the testator's behalf, which was not the case here. The High Court's finding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of testimony regarding the testator's direction was incorrect. Restoration of Lower Appellate Court's Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, holding the Will valid. Consequently, the subsequent sale deeds executed by Gopal Krishan were also upheld. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Will executed by Sanjhi Ram was valid and complied with the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The High Court's interpretation of the attestation requirements was erroneous, and the Lower Appellate Court's judgment was reinstated. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2025 INSC 18 : AIR 2025 SC 540

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness that the Testator directed the signing of the Will. The testator executed a Will bequeathing his property to his nephew. He passed away the next day. The Respondents challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of a death certificate and irregularities in the Will's execution. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the Will, finding no evidence that the testator was of unsound mind or that the Will was fabricated. Held, the High Court erred in interpreting Section 63(c). The phrase "by the direction of the testator" applies only when an attesting witness sees someone other than the testator sign the Will. In this case, the attesting witness had seen the testator affix his mark, which was sufficient to comply with Section 63(c). The Court emphasized that the word "or" in Section 63(c) is disjunctive, and the requirement of "direction" is not applicable when the witness has seen the testator sign the Will. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, declaring the Will valid and the subsequent sale deeds executed lawful. The appeal was allowed, and the Will was upheld as valid. The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, emphasizing that the requirement of "direction" is not necessary when the attesting witness has seen the testator sign the Will. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2025 INSC 18 : AIR 2025 SC 540

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - A finding of valid execution does not automatically imply genuineness. Suspicious circumstances must be addressed before concluding the genuineness of a Will. Mere registration of a Will does not validate it; it must be proved in accordance with legal mandates. Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coalho, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : 2025 INSC 7 : AIR 2025 SC 518

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Requirements of - Validity of the Will – Mere proof of execution of a Will does not make it genuine if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The defendants failed to prove that the testator executed the Will with a sound disposing mind and understood its contents. The stamp papers for the Will were purchased in the name of the first defendant and she played an active role in its execution, which cast doubt on its authenticity. The defendants' claim under the Will was rejected due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. Leela v. Muruganantham, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : 2025 INSC 10 : AIR 2025 SC 230

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Validity of a Will - Partition of Property – The Trial Court rejected the Will, holding it was not proved in accordance with the law, and granted the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in the properties. The High Court reversed this decision, upholding the validity of the Will and restricting the plaintiffs' share to Schedule A property alone. Held, a propounder who substantially benefits from a Will and participates in its execution raises suspicion, which must be dispelled with clear evidence. The propounder is expected to testify about the proper execution, the presence of attesting witnesses, and other key details. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presenting one attesting witness is insufficient to prove execution unless they confirm the presence and actions of the other attesting witnesses. The Will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the attesting witnesses was insufficient, and the propounder of the Will failed to establish its due execution. The Court noted suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, including the lack of proper attestation and the involvement of the propounder in its preparation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decision, granting the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in both Schedule A and Schedule B properties. The judgment reiterates the strict requirements for proving a Will under the Indian Succession Act and the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for proper attestation and the removal of suspicious circumstances by the propounder. It also highlights the Court's role in ensuring that testamentary documents are executed freely and voluntarily by the testator. Chinu Rani Ghosh v. Subhash Ghosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Transfer of Property Act, 1881; Section 54 - An agreement for sale of immovable property does not transfer title under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Title can only be transferred by a registered sale deed as per the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Transfer of Property Act, 1881; Section 54 - Registration Act, 1908; Section 17, 49- In a dispute concerning an agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014, the appellant argued that the agreement was a security for a loan, akin to a mortgage, and sought to repay the loan to redeem the property. However, the agreement to sell, along with an unregistered power of attorney and related documents, was held incapable of conferring title, interest, or ownership rights in the immovable property, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. These documents were revoked by the appellant on 24.05.2022 and 27.05.2022, prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds. The absence of a suit for specific performance by Respondent No. 1 further weakened their claim, as an agreement to sell, without registration, does not convey title or create any interest in the property. This position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, which clarified that unregistered agreements to sell, even with possession, do not transfer title or interest, except to the limited extent provided under Section 53-A of the TP Act. The Court further held that a power of attorney does not transfer title and is revocable unless coupled with interest, and a will is not a transfer inter vivos, taking effect only post the testator's death. Transactions like SA/GPA/WILL do not constitute valid transfers of immovable property and cannot be relied upon for claiming ownership or effecting mutations in records. This legal position was reiterated in Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352 and Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526, emphasizing that only a registered deed of conveyance can legally transfer title in immovable property, and unregistered documents cannot confer enforceable rights under the Registration Act, 1908, and the TP Act. (Para 9.2,9.3) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 772 : AIR 2025 SC 2933

Transfer of Property Act, 1881; Section 54 - The appellant, Indian Overseas Bank, challenged the findings of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) regarding the ownership of a property allegedly agreed to be sold to a company in exchange for shares. The NCLAT held that the company was in possession of the property by way of part performance of the contract and that the sale deed executed by legal representatives was not binding on the company. Whether the NCLAT was correct in holding that the sale deed was not binding on the company based on the company's possession under part performance of an unregistered agreement. Held, the NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the sale deed as not binding, as no registered sale deed was executed. The Court reiterated that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer ownership rights. Consequently, the legal owner remained the same until a registered sale deed was executed. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the NCLAT's declaration regarding the non-binding nature of the sale deed. However, the Court clarified that no adjudication was made on the ownership rights claimed by the parties, and all remedies for seeking declarations or enforcing rights were kept open. This judgment reinforces the principle that title to immovable property can only be transferred through a duly registered sale deed and not merely by possession under an agreement for sale. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Transfer of Property Act, 1881; Section 55 - Specific Relief Act 1963; Sections 22 and 28(3) - Specific Performance - Possession of Suit Property - In a suit for specific performance, where exclusive possession of the suit property is with the defendant at the time of the decree, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree directing the execution of a sale deed in favor of the plaintiff. A separate claim for possession is not mandatory in such cases, as per the combined reading of Sections 22 and 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Para 64, 65) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764 : AIR 2025 SC 2979

Transfer of Property Act, 1881 - Section 52 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 - Rights of transferees pendente lite - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the outcome of the litigation and may seek leave to appeal if their interests are affected. While a transferee pendente lite is not automatically entitled to be impleaded as a party, they may seek leave to appeal if their interests are prejudicially affected by the decree. However, such leave is discretionary and must be granted judiciously. In the present case, the Court found that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of litigation and while an injunction was in force, failed to establish a valid case for leave to appeal. The Court set aside the High Court's order granting leave, holding that the Respondents could pursue separate legal remedies if they believed they were defrauded by the original owner. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121 : AIR 2025 SC 924

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 10 - Applicability to Government Land Allotments - Restrictive Conditions - Resumption of Land - Held, Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prohibits absolute restraints on alienation, does not apply to government land allotments, as these are not inter vivos or commercial transactions but are governed by public interest. The Telangana government validly imposed conditions on land allotted for charitable purposes in 2001. The Respondent-Trust's subdivision and sale of the land breached these conditions, justifying the State's 2012 resumption order. The High Court's 2022 decision, which invalidated the resumption order as violating Section 10, was set aside, as government allotments are regulated by specific statutory frameworks (Rules 1975 and Board of Revenue Standing Orders), not the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal was allowed, affirming the State's authority to enforce conditions and resume land for public welfare. (Para 23) State of Telangana v. Dr. Pasupuleti Nirmala Hanumantha Rao Charitable Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2025 INSC 679 : AIR 2025 SC 2874

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 122 - Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father also, is invalid. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 3 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2025 INSC 434 : (2025) 5 SCC 198

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 41 and 122 - When a property transfer involves considerations such as love and affection while the donor retains a life interest, it qualifies as a settlement deed in the form of a gift. Once the donee accepts the gift through the settlement deed, the donor cannot unilaterally revoke it. Mere reservation of life interest of the donor and the postponement of the delivery of the possession to the donee would not make the document a Will. Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Upon the retention of the life interest, the donor will continue only as an ostensible owner of the property. Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 53A - Lis Pendens - Protection under Section 53A for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. (Para 9) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Sections 54, 58(e), and 78 - A mortgage created by deposit of title deeds constitutes a legal mortgage and prevails over an equitable mortgage created by deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell, as the latter does not create any interest or charge on the property. An equitable mortgage operates in personam and does not bind third parties, unlike a legal mortgage, which creates a charge enforceable in rem. The equitable mortgage of the Central Bank of India (Respondent No. 1), based on an unregistered agreement to sell, was subservient to the legal mortgage of Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Appellant), created by deposit of a share certificate equivalent to title deeds. Under Section 78 of the TP Act, the respondent's equitable charge was postponed due to lack of public notice and failure to deposit title deeds, prioritizing the appellant's legal mortgage. Appeal allowed. (Para 42, 43, 47, 52) Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2025 INSC 243