When we talk of democracy in India, one institution comes to mind instantly: the Election Commission of India. It is the institution that secures elections to be conducted evenly, votes counted credibly, and the people will be respected. But if the referee of the democratic game is not regarded as impartial, the entire match is at risk.
That's why the issue of how the Election Commission is appointed and safeguarded is not merely a constitutional technical argument. It's something that gets at the very heart of our democracy. And it takes us to a broader theme: what is constitutionally envisioned for an institution like the Election Commission?
Let's dissect this from three different perspectives: how appointments are done, what the Supreme Court has stated, and how the Commission itself has acted.
EC Appointments: A Constitutional Silence
As provided in Article 324 of the Constitution, the direction, superintendence, and control of elections are vested in the Election Commission of India. Article 324(2) mandates that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and the other Election Commissioners shall be appointed by the President, "subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament."
The issue? Parliament had never enacted such a law. More than seven decades, appointments have been through the executive—practically the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers suggesting names to the President.
On paper, this is innocuous. In practice, though, it grants the governing party almost complete dominance over who is sitting in the Commission. Over the years, critics have highlighted appointments being pushed through or made without any kind of bipartisan input. And once that suspicion creeps in, the public starts to ask itself: is the umpire impartial, or is it playing for one side?
The Constitution framers could not have anticipated this vacuum to remain for so long, but here it is. And since Parliament did not fill it, the Supreme Court finally had to.
Supreme Court Judgments: Reading Integrity Into the Constitution
The Supreme Court has been the guardian of the Election Commission's autonomy. It has provided us with three significant signposts over the years.
1. T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995)
This was the case where the Court recalled that the Election Commission is not a one-man circus. Article 324 builds a strong, independent institution, not a mere curable measure by the ruling government. The judgment emphasized that free and fair elections are part of the fundamental structure of the Constitution—something no government can tinker with.
2. Centre for PIL v. Union of India (2011): The Emergence of "Institutional Integrity"
The case was regarding the appointment of P.J. Thomas as Central Vigilance Commissioner. The Court held it to be unconstitutional, stating that it was not sufficient for a person to be individually qualified—the institution cannot be undermined by the appointment.
That concept of institutional integrity has become a constitutional guiding light since then. Translated to the EC, it implies: even if technically qualified, how they are appointed should elicit public trust. If citizens perceive that the Commission is parachuted into place by the governing party, its institutional integrity takes a hit.
3. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023): Filling the Vacuum The most direct action happened in 2023. The Constitution Bench agreed that the lack of a statute had given the government too much power. The Court set up a temporary method until Parliament acts: a committee made up of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India should choose EC members.
This was an amazing step since it made the process more balanced and bipartisan. The government was not going to make appointments behind closed doors for the first time. The Court also made it clear that all Commissioners, not only the CEC, should have the same protections against being fired. Independence can't be half-hearted. These decisions do something that Parliament has not been able to achieve: they remind us that institutional independence is not a luxury, but a constitutional must.
EC's Own Response: Requesting Protection
Notably, the Election Commission itself has not remained silent on this matter. From time to time, it has written to the government over the years requesting reforms that will secure its autonomy.
Some of the most significant requests are:
- Equal treatment of all Commissioners: At present, only the CEC has the same removal protection as a Supreme Court judge. The other two Commissioners can in theory be removed if recommended by the CEC. This disbalance can lead to unhealthy hierarchies and pressure.
- Independent Secretariat: The EC currently relies on the administrative officials of the government. It has requested its own permanent secretariat, like Parliament and the Judiciary, to escape day-to-day interference.
- Charged Budget: The EC wants its budget to be charged to the Consolidated Fund of India directly, and not as an item that can be adjusted by the allocations of the Finance Ministry. Financial autonomy is essential to avoid the silent pressure.
The Law Commission of India even backed these improvements in its 255th Report on Electoral Reforms (2015). They said that institutional integrity needs more than just independence on paper; it also needs resources and protections in practice.
What Then Is Constitutionally Desired?
Adding it all up, we can figure out what the Constitution, in a sense, calls for:
1. Insulation from Executive Monopoly
It cannot lie with the government of the hour to choose Commissioners. The balanced, bipartisan committee such as the one visualized by the Supreme Court is nearer to what constitutional morality insists on.
2. Equal Safeguards for All Members
The CEC cannot be a fortress while the rest of the Commissioners remain vulnerable. Independence has to reach equally, or else the government can just pressure or marginalize the "weaker" members.
3. Structural and Financial Autonomy
Unless it has a secretariat and a budgetary responsibility of its own, the Commission would always be administratively beholden to the executive. Genuine independence requires these reforms.
4. Transparency and Public Trust
Constitutional design is not simply about legal documents. It is also about perception. Even the most equitable election will be suspect if citizens cease to have faith in the impartiality of the Commission. That perception gap must be avoided under all circumstances.
The Heartbeat of Democracy
The Supreme Court has termed free and fair elections as the "heartbeat of democracy." That heartbeat rests upon the shoulders of the Election Commission. But that Commission rests upon how earnestly we protect its autonomy.
The Constitution framers left it to Parliament to establish an appropriate appointment mechanism. Parliament hasn't done this. The judiciary intervened to plug the gap. The Commission has made a pitch for structural changes. But the ultimate test is with us as a society: are we prepared to insist that our electoral umpire stay out of politics' reach?
Constitutionally, what is sought is not open to misinterpretation. It is plain as day: a Commission appointed by an open and balanced process, equally safeguarded at each level, and equipped with resources to operate without fear.
For at the end of the day, when citizens go to cast their votes in a polling booth, they are not really voting between parties. They are voting whether or not they still have faith that the system is fair. The EC is the custodian of that faith. And if its integrity is lost, democracy itself becomes undermined.
It is for this reason that protection of the institutional integrity of the EC is not only constitutionally wished-for—it is constitutionally necessary.
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