Juvenile Justice Act 2000 Applies Retrospectively : Supreme Court Orders Release Of Convict Who Was Juvenile When Crime Was Committed In 1981

Update: 2025-10-10 04:34 GMT
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The Supreme Court on Thursday (October 9) ordered the release of the murder convict under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offence in 1981. The Court held that the JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act, 2000.The Court rejected the State's argument that since...

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The Supreme Court on Thursday (October 9) ordered the release of the murder convict under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offence in 1981. The Court held that the JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act, 2000.

The Court rejected the State's argument that since the offence was committed in 1981, the provision of the JJ Act, 2000 would not be applicable, and the law prevailing at the time of the offence would be applicable. Instead, a bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih relying on the Constitution bench judgment of Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 and two judge bench judgment of Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344 observed that all persons who were below the age of eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1st April, 2001 would be treated as juveniles even if the claim of juvenility is raised after they have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the date of commencement of the JJ Act, 2000 and were undergoing sentences upon being convicted.”

The Petitioner, who was twelve years old at the time of the commission of the offence (murder), moved the Supreme Court under Article 32 claiming that his detention exceeded the three-year limit under Section 15(1)(g) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, thereby violating his fundamental right to life and liberty.

In 1984, the Sessions Court convicted and sentenced the petitioner. He was directed to be kept in a children's home as per the Indian Children Act, 1960. In 2000, the Allahabad High Court acquitted the petitioner and three co-accused allowing their appeal. However, in 2009, the Supreme Court reversed the acquittal and restored the conviction. The petitioner remained absconding and was taken into custody only in 2022.

After the petitioner completed more than three years of sentence, he filed the writ petition in Supreme Court seeking release.

 Noting that there was no dispute regarding the juvenility of the Appellant, the Court ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, a murder convict, based on the digital copy of the judgment without waiting for the certified copy, noting his fundamental right to life and personal liberty was violated.

“Since there is no quarrel with the fact that the petitioner was a child at the time of commission of the offence and the petitioner having been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty has been curtailed not in accordance with procedure established by law. Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 is writ large and, hence, the benefit of release from detention ought to be extended to the petitioner.”, the court said.

Since the Appellant has attained the age of 18 years and was convicted before the commencement of JJ Act, 2000, the Court noted that he is entitled to the benefit under the JJ Act, 2000.

Further, the Respondent-State was unable to show any impediment in the Indian Children Act, 1960 (law prevailing at the time of commission of offence in 1981) for the release of the Appellant under the JJ Act, 2000, the court said.

“No provision in the 1960 Act has been brought to our notice that creates a legal impediment and, thus, limits our authority to grant relief to the petitioner. Incidentally, the developments in legislation in relation to juvenile justice introduced by the Parliament from time to time can hardly be overlooked. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is the new avatar of Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000. Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000, relevant for the present case, permits raising of a plea of juvenility in any court at any stage and even after final disposal of a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. On the plain terms of Section 7-A, the courts are under an obligation to consider the plea of juvenility and to grant appropriate relief if, at all, in an enquiry it is found that the convict was a juvenile on the date of offence.”, the court observed.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

Cause Title: HANSRAJ VERSUS STATE OF U.P.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993

Click here to read/download the judgment

Appearance:

Mr. Parinav Gupta, Adv. for the petitioner

Mr. Neeraj Shekar, Adv. for the respondent 

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