Child Custody - Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity...
Child Custody - Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity of individuals with disabilities to make independent decisions. When a specialist's expert opinion confirms a child's inability to make independent decisions, custody decisions should not be based on the child's implied or express consent, as it could have significant consequences for the child. (Para 22) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - Cognitive Capacity - Courts should give due credence to expert opinions on a person's mental capacity, especially when dealing with individuals with cognitive limitations. In child custody matters, the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount, even when considering the wishes of a child with limited capacity. The totality of circumstances must be considered when determining the best interests of the child, including their education, support system, emotional well-being, and familial relationships. (Para 32) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - Foreign Orders - Principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing order of a Foreign Court must yield to the best interests of the child, especially when the Court has decided to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this regard. Such cases must be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of 'what would serve the interests and welfare' of the minor. The preexisting order of a Foreign Court is merely one of the circumstances to consider when assessing the best interests and welfare of the person concerned. This doctrine was evolved to protect children who may, unwittingly, become collateral damage in their parents' legal disputes. It has gained significance over the past several years, owing to the frequency and ease of migration. (Para 31) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - International Parental Child Abduction - The Appellant (mother) and Respondent No. 4 (father) are US citizens, divorced in the US. Their elder son has mild intellectual developmental disorder and cerebral palsy, resulting in significant cognitive limitations. After the divorce, the father brought the child to India. The mother filed a petition in the High Court alleging illegal detention. The High Court, after a brief interaction with the child, ruled that he was consensually living with his father in India. The Supreme Court, doubting the child's capacity to make independent decisions, ordered a medical assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The assessment concluded that the child's cognitive abilities were equivalent to an 8–10-year-old, and he lacked the capacity to make complex decisions. Whether the child has the capacity to make independent decisions regarding his place of residence. What course of action would best serve the child's interests and welfare. Held, the Supreme Court relied on the expert opinions from NIMHANS and a previous evaluation by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, concluding that the child does not possess the capacity to make independent, informed decisions on complex matters like long-term residence. The High Court erred in relying solely 2 on a brief interaction with the child. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the Supreme Court determined that the child's best interests lie in returning to the US. This decision considered the child's established life, education, support system, and close relationship with his younger brother, who also has special needs, in the US. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother. The father was directed not to impede their return and to maintain contact with his sons. The US Consulate General, Chennai was directed to return the child's passport and facilitate his return. (Para 41) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 125 (4) - Interpretation of - Whether a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, is absolved of paying maintenance to his wife under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if the wife refuses to comply with the decree and return to the matrimonial home? Held, a wife's refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically disqualify her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The refusal must be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, including whether the wife had justifiable reasons for not returning to the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide social justice and prevent destitution. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically bar a wife from claiming maintenance if she has valid reasons for refusing to return to her husband. This judgment clarifies that the mere existence of a restitution decree does not override a wife's right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court must examine the facts of each case to determine whether the wife's refusal to comply with the decree is justified. The ruling reinforces the protective intent of maintenance laws in ensuring the financial security of women. Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : (2025) 3 SCC 33
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 125 – Maintenance – Whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting – Held, a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her second husband, even if her first marriage was not legally dissolved. A formal decree of dissolution is not mandatory. If the woman and her first husband mutually agreed to separate, the absence of a legal divorce does not prevent her from seeking maintenance from her second husband. The right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband. (Para 17 & 18) N. Usha Rani v. Moodudula Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2025 INSC 129
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 125 - Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents- Question of enhancement of permanent alimony awarded to unmarried wife as per Standard of living wife enjoyed during the marriage – Held, appellant-wife who is unmarried and is living independently, is entitled to a level of maintenance that is reflective of the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage and which reasonably secures her future - High Court noted Respondent-husband's income, financial disclosures and past earnings establish that he is in a position to pay higher amount and enhanced the maintenance amount to Rs. 50,000/- per month, subject to a 5% increase every two years to ensure financial stability for appellant-wife - Appeal was allowed. (Paras 7 - 9) Rakhi Sadhukhan v. Raja Sadhukhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2025 INSC 789 : AIR 2025 SC 3268
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 125 - Refusal to Grant Maintenance - The Family Court erred in relying on a compromise deed filed before a 'Court of Kazi' to hold the appellant-wife responsible for the marital dispute, as the deed contained no admission of fault by the wife. The Supreme Court also rejected the Family Court's assumption that a second marriage precludes dowry demands, deeming it speculative and legally untenable. The Supreme Court set aside the Family Court's findings and directed the husband to pay Rs. 4,000 per month as maintenance to the appellant from the date of filing the maintenance petition. [Paras 14 & 15] Shahjahan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2025 INSC 528
Constitution of India - Article 226 - Habeas Corpus - Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159 : (2025) 4 SCC 342
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 112 - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 112 - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Evidence Act, 1872 - DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Family Courts Act, 1984 - Legitimacy - Jurisdiction of Civil and Family Courts - Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy, as the Family Court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984, applies only to matters involving marital relationships. Since the case involved an alleged extra-marital relationship, the Civil Court was the appropriate forum. The Family Court's jurisdiction is limited to matters involving marital relationships, and it cannot entertain claims based on alleged extra-marital relationships. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Section 12(c) - Adoption and Property Rights - Doctrine of Relation Back - The appellant was adopted by defendant No.1, on 16.07.1994, after the death of her husband. The appellant claimed a half share in the suit schedule properties, arguing that he became the legal heir upon adoption. Held, under Section 12(c) of the Act an adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate that vested before the adoption. The court applied the "Doctrine of Relation Back," which states that adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property. However, lawful alienations made by the widow before the adoption are binding on the adopted child. The court upheld the validity of the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.2 and 3, as the alienation was made after defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of the property. The appellant's challenge to the sale deed was dismissed. The court declared the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void. The court found that the gift deed lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid gift, such as delivery and acceptance of the property. The trial court's decision to grant the appellant the entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 was restored. Sri Mahesh v. Sangram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 6
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 11 - Grounds for Void Marriage - Includes bigamy, prohibited degrees of relationship, or sapinda relationships under Section 5 of the Act. The Court rejected the argument that a void marriage, being legally non-existent, precludes alimony claims, emphasizing the legislature's intent to include decrees of nullity within Section 25(1). The discretionary powers under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, extend to granting interim maintenance and permanent alimony, respectively, even in cases where a marriage is declared void, subject to the court's assessment of the case's facts and parties' conduct. (Para 28) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197 : AIR 2025 SC 951
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 24 - Interim Maintenance - Courts may grant interim maintenance pendente lite in void or voidable marriage cases, provided Section 24 conditions are met, with discretion based on the applicant's conduct. (Para 28) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197 : AIR 2025 SC 951
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 25 - Permanent Alimony - A spouse in a void marriage is entitled to seek permanent alimony under Section 25, subject to the court's discretion based on the facts and conduct of the parties. A decree of nullity under Section 11 qualifies as a "decree" under Section 25(1), enabling alimony claims. (Para 18, 28) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197 : AIR 2025 SC 951
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Sections 11, 24 and 25 – Held, permanent alimony and interim maintenance can be granted under Sections 25 and 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, respectively, even when a marriage is declared void under Section 11. The ruling resolved conflicting Supreme Court decisions, clarifying that the term "any decree" in Section 25 includes decrees declaring a marriage void. (Para 18, 28) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197 : AIR 2025 SC 951
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - The marriage was dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, considering the short cohabitation period (80 days), multiple litigations, and failed reconciliation attempts. The appellant was directed to pay Rs. 25 Lakhs as a one-time alimony settlement. All pending criminal and civil cases between the parties were ordered to be closed. The impugned orders of the Trial Court and High Court were quashed, the marriage was dissolved, and all related legal proceedings were terminated. (Para 34) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Live-in Relationships – False Promise of Marriage – Held, prolonged cohabitation in a live-in relationship (over two years in this case) implies mutual consent to sustain the relationship without reliance on a promise of marriage. Allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage are unsustainable when two adults voluntarily cohabit for an extended period, as such cohabitation raises a presumption of consensual relations not contingent on marriage. The Court noted the absence of specific allegations that the physical relationship was induced solely by a promise of marriage and emphasized that extended cohabitation reflects a voluntary choice by both parties. Acknowledging the growing prevalence of live-in relationships, driven partly by women's financial independence, the Court advocated a pragmatic judicial approach, favoring a presumption of implied consent based on the relationship's duration and the parties' conduct over a pedantic interpretation. The criminal proceedings were held to be an abuse of process, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 10, 14 - 16) Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2025 INSC 635
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007; Section 23 - Requirements - Scope and interpretation of - Beneficial Legislation - Breakdown of Relations - Senior Citizens' Rights - Conditions in property transfers involving senior citizens - Tribunal's Power - Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal's order granting relief under Section 23 - Held, the Act is a welfare-oriented statute aimed at protecting the rights of senior citizens. It must be interpreted liberally to further its objectives. For a property transfer to be void under Section 23, it must be shown that the transfer was conditional upon the transferee maintaining the transferor and that the transferee failed to fulfill these conditions. The Court noted the appellant's allegations of neglect and abuse by the respondent, holding that such behavior violated the conditions implied in the Gift Deed and related promissory note. The Court reaffirmed the Tribunal's authority under the Act to cancel property transfers and order possession transfer if necessary to protect senior citizens. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench judgment of the High Court, and the respondent was directed to restore possession of the property to the appellant. It restored the orders of the Single Judge and the Tribunal, quashing the Gift Deed executed by the appellant in favor of the respondent. The judgment reinforced the Act's purpose of providing senior citizens with simple, expedient remedies against neglect or abuse. Tribunal Powers. Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : AIR 2025 SC 458 : (2025) 2 SCC 787
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 - The Act does not mandate automatic eviction of children from parents' homes. Eviction orders are not obligatory in every case under the Act. The primary objective is to ensure maintenance and welfare of senior citizens, with eviction permissible only in exceptional circumstances to safeguard their well-being. The Tribunal must exercise discretion judiciously, ordering eviction only when necessary. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside an eviction order in a case where an elderly mother sought to evict her son from their ancestral home, citing insufficient grounds for eviction and pending civil disputes over property shares. The Court expressed concern over declining family unity and the increasing prevalence of disputes between elderly parents and their children. [Paras 32 & 33] Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2025 INSC 404 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1442
Muslim Law - No Legal Recognition for Sharia Courts, etc. - Non-binding Nature of Decisions - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that entities such as 'Court of Kazi', 'Court of Darul Qaza', or 'Sharia Court', by any name, lack legal recognition. Their decisions, including fatwas, are not enforceable under law. Such decisions or declarations are valid only if voluntarily accepted by the affected parties and do not contravene any law. Even then, they bind only the consenting parties and not third parties. [Para 23] Shahjahan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2025 INSC 528
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) - Extradition Order Quashed - The Trial Court's order directing extradition of the appellant (husband) residing in the USA, due to his non-appearance, was held untenable, especially given the illegal impoundment of his passport. (Para 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) - Passport Act, 1967; Section 10 - Illegal Impoundment of Passport - Impounding the appellant's passport without providing an opportunity to be heard violated principles of natural justice, rendering it ex-facie illegal. The Court directed the release of the passport within one week. [Para 43, 46] Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) - Physical Presence in DV Act Proceedings - Proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature and do not mandate the personal presence of a party, except in cases of breach of a protection order under Section 31. (Para 18, 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Power of High Courts to quash complaints under Section 12(1) or orders under Sections 18 to 23 using inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) - Held, High Courts can exercise inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) to quash proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, or orders under Sections 18 to 23, to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The notion that Section 482 CrPC is inapplicable due to the predominantly civil nature of DV Act proceedings is incorrect. However, High Courts must exercise caution and restraint, intervening only in cases of patent illegality or abuse of process, given the DV Act's purpose as welfare legislation to protect women from domestic violence. A cautious approach is recommended to avoid undermining the Act's objectives. The civil nature of DV Act proceedings does not preclude the application of Section 482 CrPC. (Paras 37, 39) Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2025 INSC 734 : AIR 2025 SC 2598
Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act, 2018 - Sections 3/5 - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 318(4) and 319 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bail application - Supreme Court granted bail to appellant who was arrested by the police under anti-conversion law following his marriage to a woman belonging to another religion – Marriage was consensual with the approval of their respective families - State cannot object to appellant and his wife living together in consensual case - Pending criminal proceeding cannot come in the way of appellant and his wife residing together on their own volition - Granted bail to appellant - Set aside order of High Court and Appeal allowed. Aman Siddiqui @ Aman Chaudhary @ Raja v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 678