Supreme Court Weekly Digest [September 10 - 14, 2025]

Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 482 - Anticipatory Bail - Hierarchy of Courts - The concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the High Court for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS does not mean a person can directly approach the High Court, bypassing Sessions Court - The Hierarchy of Courts demands that a person seeking pre-arrest bail should not be allowed or encouraged to bypass the jurisdiction of the concerned Session court - Encouraging practice of directly approaching the High Court for anticipatory bail would flood the High Court with a large number of applications, creating a 'chaotic situation' - A significant number of applications would likely be granted at the Session Court level acting as a 'filtration process' before cases reach the High Court - In most states, there is a consistent practice requiring litigants to first approach the Session s Court for anticipatory bail and only if relief is denied, they can approach High Court. [Paras 6-9] Mohammed Rasal C. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 884

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 151 - Inherent power- Delay of 3966 days in filing second appeal – Held, High Court erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days based on administrative lapses and lack of follow-up by the State's officials - Such grounds do not constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Condoning such a delay would defeat the fundamental objectives of the Limitation Act, which are to ensure finality in litigation and prevent a litigant from being kept in a state of uncertainty - Delay by State agencies due to administrative lethargy should not be condoned - Supreme Court warned High Courts not to condone inordinate delays by State agencies on grounds of administrative lethargy and laxity - Appeal allowed. [Para 116, 171, 255, 260-263] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 154 – FIR – Held, police officers, as 'sentinels' of the law, must be vigilant, prompt and objective in performing their duties, shedding any personal biases - Police's failure to register a FIR despite being informed of a cognizable offence was a total 'dereliction of duty' - As per Section 154 CrPC, Police are duty-bound to register a cognizable offence once they receive information - Supreme Court criticized the Superintendent of Police for not taking action on a written complaint sent by appellant's father as mandated by section 154(3) CrPC - Found it distressing that senior officials did not file an affidavit in the matter before the highest court, leaving it to a local police inspector - Directed the Home Ministry to form a SIT to investigate the appellant's allegations, register an FIR for the assault and take appropriate action - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16, 18-24] Mohammad Afzal Mohammad Sharif v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 894 : 2025 INSC 1100

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 154 - Registration of FIR - It is the duty of the police to register an FIR if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - The police are not required to go into the genuineness and credibility of information - High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC is not absolutely barred by the availability of alternative remedies - Held that when allegations pertain to the abuse of an official position and corrupt practices by public servants, such actions fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences that need to be inquired into - A preliminary inquiry is not necessary before the registration of an FIR in such cases - Report of a preliminary inquiry is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to oust a Constitutional Court's power to conclude that a cognizable offence has been committed - It is high time that those who investigate are also investigated to keep the public's faith in the system. [Paras 26 - 32] Vinod Kumar Pandey v. Seesh Ram Saini, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2025 INSC 1095

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 197 – Held that issue of sanction to prosecute under Section 197 CrPC can be taken up before Trial Court at any stage of proceedings - the determination depends on the nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial - The petitioner is permitted to apply to the trial court for an exemption from personal attendance under these sections 228 and 355 of BNSS. [Paras 7 - 9] Ram Sagar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 891

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Principles governing the conduct of joint or separate trials - i. Separate trial is rule under Section 218 CrPC, a joint trial may be permissible where the offence form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Section 219-223 CrPC are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion; ii. The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons; iii. The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time; iv. Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated and; v. an order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible. [Para 16] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 218 to 223 - Equality before Law - Article 14 – Held, the Trial Court's order to segregate the trial of an accused, solely because he is a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), is legally unsustainable and violates the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution - While Section 218 if CrPC establishes a separate trial as the general rule, joint trials are permissible exceptions, particularly when offences are part of the same transaction - In the present case, since the prosecution's own case was based on an overarching conspiracy and common evidence, a joint trial was appropriate - All accused persons are equal before law, and preferential segregation based on an individual's public position or status violates the principle of equality under Article 14 - Segregating the appellant's trial without any legal or factual necessity amounted to arbitrary classification and undermined the integrity of the criminal justice process. Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 432 - Validity of section 376DA of IPC for prescribing a mandatory life sentence for the remainder of the convict's life is challenged - Right to seek remission - “shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life” – Held, even with the prescribed punishment an accused person still has the right to seek remission - this right is both a constitutional remedy under Article 72 and or Article 161 and a statutory right under provisions like Section 432 of Cr.P.C. or the BNSS - Each state has its own policy of remission, which is a reduction in the sentence, even in cases of death penalty or life imprisonment - A person sentenced under Section 376DA or 376DB still has the right to apply for a reduction of their sentence - Right to seek remission applicable even when convict sentenced to imprisonment for remainder of life - Supreme Court left open the question of law whether it was proper to prescribe a mandatory sentence, without giving discretion. [Paras 9 - 11] Mahendra Vishwanath Kawchale v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 897

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Bail and Anticipatory bail Applications – Held, while considering anticipatory bail, the Court must balance the liberty of individuals against the legitimate requirements of investigation - The gravity of allegations, abuse of official position, and non-cooperation with investigation can outweigh the ground of long delay in initiation of proceedings - Affecting personal liberty, particularly bail and anticipatory bail, should not be kept pending indefinitely - Bail courts must be sensitive to constitutional ethos and ensure expeditious disposal of such matters - An inordinate delay in passing an order related to a citizen's liberty is not in tune with the constitutional mandate under Article 21 - The allegations, including the abuse of official position and the appellants' failure to cooperate with the investigation despite a long period of interim protection, justified the denial of pre-arrest bail - The cancellation of the mutation entries did not efface the appellants' alleged initial role in certifying them - Supreme Court made strong observations on the inordinate delay by the High Court in disposing of the applications and underscored the importance of the expeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applications and reiterated guidelines from Satendra Kumar Antil Case - Such applications should be disposed of within a stipulated time frame - Directed to dispose bail applications within 2 months - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 16-18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2025 INSC 1114

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Bail and Anticipatory bail Applications – Supreme Court passed following directions - i. High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within a period of 2 months from date of filing; ii. High Court shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts prioritise matters involving personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments; iii. Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations in long pending cases with promptitude so that neither the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of undue delay; iv. Being the highest constitutional for a in the States, High Courts must devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. [Paras 18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2025 INSC 1114

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 415 – Cheating - Quashing of FIR – Held, the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, it must be shown that the false representation was of a material fact that induced the victim to act in a way that they wouldn't have otherwise - Since a fire NOC was not necessary for obtaining recognition, the alleged the use of a fake NOC could not have induced the Education Department to grant recognition - the vital link between the false representation and the alleged inducement was missing, meaning the essential ingredients of cheating were not met - Offences under section 468 and 471 IPC were not attracted because there was no dishonest intention to cause wrongful gain or loss, as the issuance of recognition was not dependent on the alleged forged NOC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 15-20] Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : 2025 INSC 1096

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Supreme Court quashed criminal case against petitioner, citing his age and an unconditional apology he made before the Court - FIR was registered for 'objectionable comments' made at Jaipur Literary Conference - Supreme Court condemned Petitioner's statements as 'very objectionable' and found them unbecoming of a person of his status, it noted that the criminal cases had been pending for about 12 years and that petitioner is now 90 years old - Supreme Court's decision to quash the complaints was based 'only by reason of the apology offered' - Petition Allowed. [Para 5] Ashis Nandy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 896

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (BPBA) - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country – Held, constitutional framework emphasizes the right to life with dignity under Article 21 and mandates a welfare centric approach to vulnerable populations, including inmates of beggars' homes - Such institutions are not penal facilities but places for rehabilitation and care, and must adhere to humane conditions consistent with constitutional morality - BPBA and corresponding Rules provide the statutory backdrop regulating beggars' homes, their management, and inmates' rights - Considered balance between public order and guaranteeing dignified living conditions and rehabilitation opportunities for inmates - Noted extensive oversight measures, multiple inspections, reports from authorities and NGOs, and continuing reforms addressing infrastructure, medical facilities, hygiene, nutrition, legal aid, and vocational training - Mandated a paradigm shift from punitive detention to social justice and protective custody with comprehensive rehabilitation. [Paras 11-15, 16, 17, 19-22] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country under following heads - i. Preventive Healthcare and Sanitation; ii. Infrastructure and capacity; iii. Nutrition and Food safety; iv. Vocational Training and rehabilitation; v. Legal Aid and awareness; vi. Child and Gender Sensitivity; vii. Accountability and oversight - Directed that every State/UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for Beggars' Homes, comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, Public Health authorities, and independent civil society members to prepare - i. Prepare and publish annual reports on the condition of Beggars' Homes and; ii. Maintain accurate records of illnesses, deaths and remedial actions taken; iii. In every case where the death of an inmate is attributed to negligence, lack of basic facilities, or failure to provide timely medical care; iv. The State/UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next kin of the deceased; v. initiate departmental and where warranted, criminal proceedings against the officials found responsible; v. State Govt's/ UTs shall maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates, recording details of admission, health, training, release and follow up. [Para 23] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115

Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to fair trial – Held, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental aspect of Article 21- Segregation order was passed by the Trial Court suo moto, without prior notice or an application from the prosecution, and without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard - This is a serious procedural and constitutional infraction, stating that mere physical presence of counsel does not constitute a meaningful opportunity for a hearing - Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant - The discretion to file a chargesheet lies exclusively with the investigating agency - Noted that even if separate charge sheets are filed, offences arising from the same transaction should be tried together. [Paras 14 - 23] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113

Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to shelter – Held, right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 - Urged the Union Government to come up with a revival fund to provide financing for stressed real estate projects undergoing insolvency proceedings - Home-buying should not be treated as a mere commercial transaction or a speculative instrument - the State has a constitutional obligation to create a framework that ensures timely possession of homes and prevents developers from defrauding homebuyers - Speculative participants driven purely by profit motives cannot be permitted to misuse the IBC, which is a remedial framework for the revival and protection of sick companies - In case of real estate, the IBS's purpose is to protect genuine homebuyers, the judgment underscored, clarifying that such speculative investors have alternative remedies under the consumer protection laws, RERA, or through civil courts - Government cannot remain a 'silent spectator' and must fulfil its constitutional duty to safeguard homebuyers. [Para 20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Dual Pricing Policy - Validity of the interim coal Policy dt. 15.12.2006, which increased the notified price of coal by 20% for the linked consumers of the non-core sector, was examined - The Court reaffirmed that price fixation process violates constitutional mandates or results in hostile discrimination - Judicial review extends to verifying relevant consideration and rational basis in classification but not to re-evaluating economic policy - The classification between core and non-core sector consumers for dual pricing was held to have a rational nexus to the objective of protecting vital national economic interests and common good, as core sector industries consume over 90% of coal and are critical for the economy - Differential pricing was upheld as consistent due to vital public utility functions - Higher prices for non-core industries, producing non-essential goods, can be justified given their minimal impact on the public – Held, only test to ensure that there was no arbitrariness or unfair discriminatory practices at play, was to see whether such dual price fixation was based on reasonable classification in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution - Appellant was held empowered to notify interim prices under the deregulated regime of the Colliery Control Order, 2000 and the there is no restriction on price notification pending policy formulation by the expert committee - The respondents are not entitled to a refund of the excess of the excess amount paid amount paid under Interim Coal Policy absent evidence that they had borne the cost themselves and not passed it on to consumers - Burden was on respondents to prove no unjust enrichment - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-19, 52-65, 70-75, 79-88, 96-113, 114-115] Coal India Ltd. v. Rahul Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2025 INSC 1103

Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Last seen theory - Supreme Court acquitted accused for rape-murder case, on following grounds - i. Prosecution failed to establish a clear and convincing motive; ii. Testimonies of the witnesses who claimed to have last seen the accused with the victim were unreliable due to significant delays in recording their statements and the fact that they did not see the victim with the accused; iii. The links in the chain of circumstances were broken; iv. There is strong inference of evidence planting; v. the DNA report, which was primary basis for conviction, was considered unreliable and inconsistent - Held that death penalty can only be imposed in the rarest of rare cases on unimpeachable evidence - Trial Court had not properly evaluated mitigating circumstances before awarding it and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12, 51- 56] Akhtar Ali @ Ali Akhtar @ Shamim @ Raja Ustad v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 890 : 2025 INSC 1097

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) - Section 29, 8 - Locus standi of State - Validity of will - Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 - Probate of will – Held, State cannot invoke Doctrine of Escheat to challenge a will which is granted probate - Government is a stranger to the property when a Hindu hireless male dies with a will - The state's locus standi to assail the probate grant was negated by the Court, as the case involved testamentary succession, not intestate succession attracting Section 29 of HAS - The Court emphasized the doctrine of escheat under section 29 applies only when an intestate leaves no heir qualified under the HAS - It has to be ascertained as to whether there are any Class1 or Class 2 heirs, agnates or cognates - Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the HAS Act, Section 29 of the said Act would apply as it would be a case of failure of heirs - Since probate was granted by the High Court, the legatees under the will, had the right to succeed - Held that it is only in the event of intestate succession. Section 29 of the HAS Act applying that there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased male Hindu on the government and not otherwise - Supreme Court imposed Rs. 1 lakh each on Petitioners for suppression and clarified that only heirs or persons entitled to succeed could seek revocation under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, if probate was wrongfully granted. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5 - 6] State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 906

Insolvency and bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7 & 5 - Financial creditor - Homebuyer v. Speculative Investor – Held, a genuine homebuyer under the IBC is one who intends to take physical possession of the residential unit, whereas a 'speculative investor' is one who enters a transaction with the sole purpose of generating profits and no intention to obtain possession - the determination of whether an allottee is a speculative investor is a factual inquiry guided by the parties intent, considering factors like the nature of the contract, number of units purchased and presence of assured returns or buy-back clauses - Schemes with assured returns, compulsory buybacks, or excessive exit options are in reality 'finality derivatives masquerading as housing contracts. [Paras 18-20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 65 and Article 59 - Suit for possession - Void v. Voidable document – Held, an instrument of sale is not executed by the owner, it is void ab initio and considered a nullity - If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, and would be void - In such a case, the owner is not required to seek cancellation of the instrument or a declaration that it is void - A suit for possession based on title can be filed, and it will governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which provides a limitation period of 12 years from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff - Article 59, which provides a 3 year limitation period, applies to fraudulent transactions that are voidable, not void - High Court erred in applying Article 59 of the Limitation Act - When sale deed is void, suit possession governed by limitation period of 12 years under Article 65 instead of Article 59 - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-31; 34, 39, 40] Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 900 : 2025 INSC 1105

Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - State instrumentalities - Public interest - “within such period” – Held, the expression 'within such period' under Section 5 of Limitation Act means the entire period from the date the cause of action accrued until the date of actual filing, not just the period after prescribed limitation expired - A party seeking condonation of delay must explain what prevented them from filing the appeal or application within the statutory period of limitation - If the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100 days - Total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of officers of the State and its agencies should not be given a premium - Condonation of delay is not a matter of right - while a liberal approach is preferred to achieve substantial justice, negligence and inaction cannot be ignored - A delay should not be condoned merely because doing so would benefit the State - the principle of 'public interest' cannot be used to justify the State's inaction and lethargy - The law of limitation is founded on public policy and is based on the maxims interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniiunt. [Paras 41-50, 59-61, 71] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104

Medical Negligence – Held, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) overstepped its jurisdiction by creating a new case that was not based on original complaint - Complainant had not alleged any deficiency in antenatal care, rather, he had asserted that tests were prescribed and undergone - A decision must be based on the case pleaded and that a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings - Multiple medical boards, constituted at the request of the complaint, had reviewed the case and found no 'gross medical negligence' in the management of the patient by the treating doctors - The doctor cannot be held liable for an unfavourable outcome without strong evidence of negligence, and that Courts and Consumer Forums should not substitute their own views for those of medical specialists - Appeal allowed and directed complainant to return Rs. 10 lakhs. [Paras 23-30] Deep Nursing Home v. Manmeet Singh Mattewal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2025 INSC 1094

NCLT, NCLAT Vacancies must be filled on war footing - RERA must be adequately staffed – Held, dedicated IBC benches with additional strength should be constituted - Services of retired judges may be utilized on ad hoc basis until regular appointments are made - Noted that though such directions were issued earlier also, no effective step has been taken in the ground - Directed the Union Government, within three months, to file a compliance report on measures taken to upgrade NCLT/NCLAT infrastructure nationwide - Recent closure of Chandigarh NCLT and portions of Delhi NCLT due to water seepage in Courtrooms and chambers of members underscores the urgency of robust infrastructural support - Noted that government shall prioritise e-filing, video conferencing and dedicated case management systems for IBS matters. [Para 24] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138, proviso to section 142 - Supreme Court quashed complaint, citing that there cannot be an 'automatic or presumed condonation' of a complaint filed beyond the statutory time limit - When a complaint is filed beyond the mandatory time limit, a proper application or affidavit must be filed by complainant disclosing the reasons for delay - Held that the High Court's opinion that a separate application for condonation of delay is not a 'statutory mandate' under Section 142(b) of the Act was also erroneous - Court is obligated to take note of a complaint being filed beyond the limitation period, consider the reasons disclosed for the delay, and come to a 'judicious conclusion' that condonation is justified before taking cognizance and issuing summons. [Paras 6-9] H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 889

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 299, 300 and 307 - Causation and proximate cause in homicide - Is offence of murder made out when death occurs days after fatal injury - Supreme Court reaffirmed that, to establish culpability for murder under Sections 299 and 300 IPC, death must be a direct consequence of the injuries inflicted, even if delayed by complications such as septicemia or pneumonia - Mere lapse of time or intervening medical conditions do not disrupt the casual chain unless they constitute an independent supervening cause removing the connection between injury and death - Held that the adequacy or efficiency of medical treatment offered to the victim is wholly irrelevant in determining criminal liability under Section 302 IPC, as per explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC - If the injuries are dangerous in nature, the penetrator is responsible for ensuing fatal complications, regardless of potential recovery through optimal medical care - Delay in death due to medical complications or protracted treatment does not diminish the offender's liability from murder to culpable homicide - Conviction under Section 307 IPC requires proof of intention or knowledge as defined under Section 300 IPC - Even if the injuries are not fatal, intention inferred from weapon used, body part targeted and persistent assault is decisive - High Court erred in downgrading the conviction from murder to attempt to murder solely based on the prolonged survival of victim and alleged lack of proper treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 25-27, 30, 31, 40-49, 57, 59-61, 66, 67] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2025 INSC 1107

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 299, 300 and 307 - Supreme Court laid down following propositions to be followed by the Courts while dealing with cases where there was a delay in death resulting from an injury- i. If injury was fatal and intended to cause death, it is murder under Section 300 (1st part), even if death occurred later due to complications; ii. If injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course, it is murder under Section 300 (3rd part), despite delayed death; iii. If injuries were imminent dangerous to life, it is murder under Section 300 (4th limb), regardless of medical treatment or complications; iv. If complications flow from injury, the accused remains liable for death; v. if complication was remote, it may be culpable homicide, if inevitable, it is murder under Section 302; vi. Even if no single injury was sufficient, courts can infer intent to kill if injuries collectively were fatal; vii. Courts must see of injuries were naturally sufficient to cause death, intervening causes don't reduce liability unless too remote. [Para 69] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2025 INSC 1107

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302, 304 Part I- Right of private defence – Held, the right of private defence is a valuable right that serves a social purpose and should not be narrowly construed - it cannot be weighed in a 'golden scale' or with 'arithmetical precision' - a Court must view the situation from the perspective of a common and reasonable person, not with 'detached objectivity' or a 'hyper technical approach' - when an individual is faced with an imminent threat, such as being shot by an assailant, it is unreasonable to expect them to apply a 'rational mind in exercising his right of private defence' - the right of private defence can be exercised when there is a reasonable apprehension of an offence and it is not necessary for the offence to be actually committed- the force used should not be disproportionate, but a person in 'imminent and reasonable danger' of death or grievous injury cam inflict harm, even extending to death, on their assailant - Since the deceased was the initial aggressor and attacked the appellant with a pistol, the appellant's retaliation was a justified act of private defence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6 - 8] Rakesh Dutt Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 892

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 3(2)(v) - Supreme Court acquitted appellant and held - i. that prosecution's case, at its highest, shows that a long-standing neighbourhood quarrel between the families escalated; ii. Appellant had been acquitted of all other offences, including unlawful assembly, rioting, causing hurt and criminal intimidation and these acquittals have become final; iii. For an offence under Section 306 IPC, there must be clear mens rea and a direct or active act that leaves the deceased with no option but to commit suicide; iv. Casual words spoken in a fit of anger, without intending the consequences, do not constitute abetment - Held that harassment faced by victim, did not constitute instigation to the extent that she was left with no other option but to take her life - Set aside conviction and High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-23] Geeta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2025 INSC 1089

Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) - Supreme Court allowed application seeking modification of the time schedule for pharmacy courses in terms of the proposed schedule - this new schedule will be effective from academic session 2026-2027 - application for an extension for the academic year 2025-2026 is also allowed, with deadline for completing approval processes extended to September 30, 2025 and the deadline for compliance/appeals extended to October 10, 2025 - Proposed schedule would have the academic session start on August 1 and the last date for student admission be August 15 - New schedule would also include a one-month extension period for the PCI to use in case of unforeseen circumstances. [Paras 5, 6] Parshavanath Charitable Trust v. All India Council For Technical Education, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 895

Right of persons with disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 - Articles 14, 19, 21 – Held, Indian legal framework on disability rights has evolved from a charity based model to a rights-based framework - this shift is guided by statutory enactments and constitutional mandates - This Act was enacted in line with India's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) - It guarantees substantive rights, including community living and protection from abuse - Judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution to reframe disability as a structural disadvantage requiring active redressal and inclusion - That failure to ensure accessibility constitutes systematic exclusion and infringes on the equal protection clause of Article 14 - Reasonable accommodation is essential for substantive equality under Article 14, but also cautioned against framing the value of a person with a disability in terms of productivity - Supreme Court expressed concerns over the denial of general category seats to persons with disabilities who score higher than the cut-off marks for the unreserved category - Directed Union Government to explain if appropriate steps have been taken to ensure that PwDs, who score higher than the general cut off, are given 'upward movement' by accommodating them in the general category - Direct consequence of not providing upward movement to the meritorious candidates applying under the category of PwD would be that even when a candidate with disability scores higher than the cutoff for unreserved category, such a candidate would invariably occupy the reserved seat thereby denying the opportunity to a lower scoring candidate with disability to make claim on the said post - this defeats the very purpose of reservation under Section 34 - Directed monitoring of the implementation of RPwD Act, 2016 to be undertaken under the name and style of a project called 'Project Ability Empowerment' and assigned the task to 8 NLUs across the country and project report shall be filed within 6 months. Reena Banerjee v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2025 INSC 1101

Safeguarding the interests of homebuyers - Supreme Court directed every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with local revenue authorities upon payment of at least 20% of the property cost by buyer - To protect senior citizens and bona fide homebuyers, contracts that significantly deviate from the Model RERA agreement to sell, or that incorporate returns/buyback clauses where the allottee is over the age of 50, must be supported by an affidavit sworn before the competent Revenue Authority, certifying that the allottee understands the attendant risks - Held that in projects at nascent stages, 2 such as where land is yet to be acquired or construction has not commenced, proceed from allottees shall be placed in an escrow account and disbursed in phases aligned with project progress, as per a RERA-sanctioned SOP - Every RERA shall devise such SOPs within 6 months. [Paras 21] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Service Law - Migration of reserved category candidates to unreserved category - Relaxations availed – Held, Office memorandum, which disallows migration for candidates who avail of 'relaxed standards' like age and experience, does not apply to relaxations in physical standards such as height, weight and chest - Supreme Court drew a distinction between relaxations in age, experience, and written examination standards and variations in physical measurements - Different physical standards for genders, castes or geographical locations are not 'relaxations' in same sense as age or experience concessions - They are distinct parameters for different categories of candidates - Availing physical relaxation doesn't bar reserved candidate from general category selection if rules don't forbid. [Paras 9-12] Uma Shankar Gurjar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2025 INSC 1083

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - Section 2(n), 3(2), 9 - Complaint of sexual harassment filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 9 - Whether the subsequent administrative actions against the appellant would constitute sexual harassment under the Act to extend the limitation period – Held, a complaint of sexual harassment must be filed within 3 months of the last incident, or within an extended period of 3 months, for a total of 6 months - the definition of sexual harassment includes unwelcome acts of a sexual nature as well as circumstances such as implied or explicit threats of detrimental treatment in employment or creating a hostile work environment - For subsequent actions to be considered part of the sexual harassment, there must be a direct link between the new action and a prior overt act of sexual harassment - A distinction exists between a 'continuing wrong' where the injury persists, and a 'recurring wrong', where a fresh cause of action arises each time - Administrative actions taken against the appellant, such as her removal as Director, were collective decisions of the Executive Council based on an independent complaint - These actions were administrative in nature and did not create a gender-based hostile environment - they were not directly linked to the prior sexual harassment and did not constitute a continuing wrong - the last incident of sexual harassment was in April 2023 and the complaint filed in December 2023 was time-barred - Directed VC-respondent no. 1 to mention judgment in his resume - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 14 - 32] Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 902 : 2025 INSC 1106

Tender - Bid Disqualification - Judicial Review – Held, a bid pursuant to a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) can't be rejected solely for non-production of the document that was not prescribed in the NIT - The tender authorities cannot impose conditions not expressly stated in the tender document - The disqualification was invalid for the following reasons- i. Clause 5(D) of the NIT did not explicitly mandate the submission of the JV agreement itself to prove proportionate share; the work execution certificate provided by the appellant, which clearly stated its 45% share in the JV (Joint Venture), was a valid document for this purpose; ii. The tender's conditions must be clear and unambiguous - Since NIT did not explicitly require the JV agreement, the tendering authority could not reject the bid for its nonsubmission; ii. Rejection of the bid as 'incomplete' under Clause 8.1 was contrary to NIT's terms because the required work execution certificate had been submitted; iv. High Court's decision to go beyond the reasons provided by the Tender Evaluation Committee and disqualify the appellant based on the washery committee under Clause 5(B) was improper - Partly allowed and remanded the matter to High Court for a fresh determination. [Paras 13 - 24] Maha Mineral Mining & Benefication v. Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2025 INSC 1085