Clause Saying Arbitration "May Be Sought" Doesn't Constitute A Binding Arbitration Agreement : Supreme Court

Cause Title: BGM AND M-RPL-JMCT (JV) VERSUS EASTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731

The Supreme Court recently held that a clause in an agreement that arbitration "may be sought" to resolve disputes between the parties will not constitute a binding arbitration agreement.

Approving the refusal of the High Court to refer the parties to arbitartion, the Supreme Court observed that the phraseology of the clause did not indicate that the parties were bound to go for arbitration.

"...clause 13 does not bind parties to use arbitration for settlement of the disputes. Use of the words “may be sought”, imply that there is no subsisting agreement between parties that they, or any one of them, would have to seek settlement of dispute(s) through arbitration. It is just an enabling clause whereunder, if parties agree, they could resolve their dispute(s) through arbitration. In our view, the phraseology of clause 13 is not indicative of a binding agreement that any of the parties on its own could seek redressal of inter se dispute(s) through arbitration," the Court observed.

The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra heard the case where the dispute occurred due to a different interpretation of clause 13 in a contract entered into between the parties. Clause 13 provides an arbitration to be a permissive (or optional) mode of dispute settlement rather than a mandatory one, as it says that the parties 'may' opt for arbitration.

Disputes Arising Out Of 'Work Contract' With MP Govt Instrumentality Shall Be Referred To MP Arbitration Tribunal : Supreme Court

Cause Title: UMRI POOPH PRATAPPUR (UPP) TOLLWAYS PVT. LTD. VERSUS M.P. ROAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752

The Supreme Court today (July 30) reiterated that the disputes related to 'work contract' must be adjudicated exclusively by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“1983 Act”).

Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan refused to interfere with the Madhya Pradesh High Court's ruling, which set aside the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Appellant, for settlement of the dispute arising out of the 'Work Contract' signed with the Respondent-MPRDC (a state-owned venture).

“we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion of the High Court in quashing the private arbitration proceedings and reaffirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal established under the 1983 Act to adjudicate disputes arising from works contract involving the State or its instrumentalities.”, the court said.

The Court clarified that regardless of the presence of the arbitration clause in the 'work contract', disputes arising out of the work contract shall be referred to the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, because of the overriding nature of the 1983 Act.

Mere Pendency Of Criminal Cases Alleging Simple Fraud No Bar To Arbitration : Supreme Court

Cause Title: THE MANAGING DIRECTOR BIHAR STATE FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLY CORPORATION LIMITED & ANR. VERSUS SANJAY KUMAR

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 778

The Supreme Court has allowed the arbitration proceedings to continue in multi-crore Bihar Public Distribution System (“PDS”) Scam, stating that mere pendency of the criminal proceedings in offences involving simple fraud like cheating, criminal breach of trust doesn't bar a dispute from being referred to an arbitration.

“The mere fact that criminal proceedings can or have been instituted in respect of the same incident(s) would not per se lead to the conclusion that the dispute which is otherwise arbitrable ceases to be so.”, the court said.

The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra dismissed the batch of petitions filed by Bihar State Food and Supply Corporation (“BSFSC”) against the High Court's decision to allow application for appointment of an arbitrator in 1,500-crore Bihar Public Distribution System (PDS) scam.

Relying on a seven-judge bench decision in In Re: Interplay, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha approved the arbitration, noting that since there existed a valid arbitration agreement, it would be impermissible at the referral stage to dive deeper into the dispute; instead referred the same to the arbitration for its adjudication.

Place Of Exclusive Jurisdiction Deemed As 'Seat' Of Arbitration : Supreme Court

Cause Title: M/S ACTIVITAS MANAGEMENT ADVISOR PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS MIND PLUS HEALTHCARE PRIVATE LIMITED

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 795

The Supreme Court observed that in the absence of a seat or venue of arbitration in the arbitration agreement, the place where the exclusive jurisdiction has been vested as per the agreement would be regarded as the 'seat' of the arbitration.

The bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar set aside the Punjab & Haryana High Court's order allowing an application for the appointment of an arbitrator in a dispute where the arbitration agreement conferred exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication upon the Bombay High Court.

Relying on Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. (2020), the Court held that the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction as the “seat” of arbitration, even in the absence of an expressly specified seat in the agreement.

“Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts…”, the court said in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd.

Non-Signatories Have No Right To Attend Arbitration Proceedings, Their Presence Breaches Confidentiality : Supreme Court

Cause Title: KAMAL GUPTA & ANR. VERSUS M/S L.R. BUILDERS PVT. LTD & ANR. ETC. (and connected matter)

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 799

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (Aug. 13) observed that a party non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot participate in the arbitration proceedings, as the signatories to an arbitration agreement are only entitled to remain present in the arbitration proceedings.

The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and AS Chandurkar set aside the Delhi High Court's decision, which allowed the non-signatories to an arbitration agreement to attend the arbitration proceedings in the presence of their counsels.

Thus, the Court considered the issue of “Whether it is permissible for a non-signatory to an agreement leading to arbitration proceedings to remain present in such arbitration proceedings?”

Answering in the negative, the judgment authored by Justice Chandurkar observed:

“Once it is clear that the arbitral award would not bind non-parties to the said MoU/FSD as such parties were not signatories to the said documents, there would be no legal basis whatsoever to permit a non-signatory to the MoU/FSD to remain present in the proceedings before the sole arbitrator. When the arbitration proceedings can take place only between parties to an arbitration agreement and Section 35 of the Act does not make the arbitral award to be passed binding on non-signatories to such agreement, we do not find any legal right conferred by the Act that would enable a non-party to the agreement to remain present in arbitration proceedings between signatories to the agreement.”, the court observed.

Mere Non-Signing Won't Invalidate Arbitration Agreement If Parties Otherwise Consented To Arbitration : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Glencore International AG Versus M/s. Shree Ganesh Metals and another

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839

The Supreme Court observed that merely because an arbitration agreement was not signed, there is no bar to refer the dispute to arbitration, if the parties have otherwise consented to arbitration.

The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kumar and Satish Chandra Sharma set aside the Delhi High Court's decision which declined reference to arbitration merely because Respondent No.1 didn't sign the arbitration agreement. Since the Respondent No.1 consented to the contractual terms via email, the Court held that the High Court's refusal to refer to an arbitration on the ground of non-signing of the arbitration agreement cannot be sustained.

“Noting the fact that the requirement of the arbitration agreement being in writing has been continued in Section 7(3) of the Act of 1996, it was observed that Section 7(4) only added that an arbitration agreement could be found in the circumstances mentioned in the three sub-clauses that make up Section 7(4) but that did not mean that, in all cases, an arbitration agreement needs to be signed. It was held that the only pre-requisite is that it should be in writing, as pointed out in Section 7(3). This legal principle would hold good equally for an arbitration agreement covered by Sections 44 and 45 of the Act of 1996.”, the Court said.

Arbitration | Delivery Of Award To Govt Official Not Connected With Case Doesn't Amount To Valid Service On State : Supreme Court

Cause Title: M/S. MOTILAL AGARWALA Versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 867

The Supreme Court has clarified that when the government or one of its departments is a party to arbitration, delivery of an arbitral award to an official who is not connected with or aware of the proceedings cannot be treated as valid service for commencing the limitation period to challenge the award.

Citing its ruling of Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005), the Court said that the delivery of the copy of the arbitral award should be made to the “party to the proceedings”, and if government is part to the proceedings than the delivery should be made to an individual who has the knowledge and is the best person to understand and appreciate an award and more particularly, to take decision for its challenge.

“This Court has held that the award should be received in the context of huge organisations by the person who has knowledge of the proceedings and who would be the best person to understand and appreciate the arbitral award as also to take a decision in the matter of moving appropriate applications.”, the court said.

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan heard the case where the dispute arose after an arbitral award was passed on 12 November 2013 in favor of the Appellant. A signed photocopy of the award was collected by an Assistant Engineer of the Respondent's State Irrigation Department. Based on this, the award-holder argued that the State was bound to file its challenge within 90 days, i.e., by 12 February 2014.

S. 37(1)(a) Arbitration Act | Clause Restricting Interest On Delayed Payments By Itself Won't Bar Pendente Lite Interest : Supreme Court

Cause Title: OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD. VERSUS M/S G & T BECKFIELD DRILLING SERVICES PVT. LTD.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 868

The Supreme Court on Tuesday (Sep.2) observed that an Arbitral Tribunal can grant pendente lite interest unless expressly or impliedly barred in the contract. It added that a contractual clause barring interest on delayed payments does not prevent an arbitral tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest, i.e., the interest for the period during which the arbitration is pending.

“…arbitral tribunal can be denuded of its power to award pendente lite interest only if the agreement/ contract between the parties is so worded that the award of pendente lite interest is either explicitly or by necessary implication (such as in the case of Sayeed & Co. (supra) and THDC First (supra)) barred. A clause merely barring award of interest on delayed payment by itself will not be readily inferred as a bar to award pendente-lite interest by the arbitral tribunal.”, the court observed.

A bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra dismissed the ONGC's appeal, affirming the Gauhati High Court's decision, which justified the grant of pendente lite interest as there was no clause barring the award of pendente lite interest.

Arbitration | Execution Of Award Cannot Be Stalled Merely Due To Pendency Of Section 37 Appeal : Supreme Court

Cause Title: CHAKARDHARI SUREKA VERSUS PREM LATA SUREKA THROUGH SPA & ORS.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 919

The Supreme Court held that the execution of an arbitral award cannot be stalled merely on the ground that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is pending.

A bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan heard the case where the appellant (award-holder/decree-holder) sought execution of the arbitral award. The respondents (judgment-debtors) argued that since a Section 37 appeal was pending against the dismissal of their Section 34 objections, the execution should be deferred.

“In our view, the question of executability of the award can be gone into by the Execution Court in accordance with law while addressing objections as and when raised. However, it would not be proper for the Execution Court to defer consideration of the execution application and the objections thereto only because an appeal is pending under Section 37 when there is no interim order operating against the award against which objection under Section 34 of the Act stands rejected.”, the court observed.

S. 31(7)(b) Arbitration Act | Claim For Additional Post-Award Interest Barred When Award Fixes Rate Until Payment : Supreme Court

Cause Title: HLV LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS HOTEL LEELAVENTURE PVT. LTD.) VERSUS PBSAMP PROJECTS PVT. LTD.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 944

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (Sep. 24) held that if an arbitral award provides a composite interest rate covering the entire period from the cause of action to payment, the award holder cannot claim additional compound interest at the post-award stage under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”).

Section 31(7)(b) of the Act provides for post-award interest at 18% from the date of the award until payment. However, if the arbitral award specifies a composite rate of interest, the award holder cannot claim additional 18% compound interest under this provision. In such cases, the interest is governed solely by the rate in the award, as Section 31(7)(b) applies “unless the award otherwise directs.” In this case, the award expressly set interest at 21% until repayment, therefore the question of awarding post-award interest would not arise, the court said.

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the sale of land. Under Clause 6(b) of the MoU, the appellant had agreed to refund an advance paid by the respondent, along with interest at 21% per annum from the dates of disbursement until actual repayment, in case of termination.

The arbitral tribunal, respecting this contractual term, awarded a composite interest @21% per annum from the date of advance until repayment. However, during execution, the decree-holder claimed entitlement to compound interest @18% ("interest upon interest") by invoking Section 31(7)(b) of the Act and placing reliance on Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. Governor, State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189. The Executing Court rejected this claim, but the High Court remanded the matter, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Arbitral Award Must Be Within Parameters Of Agreement Between Parties : Supreme Court Dismisses Chinese Company's Appeal

Cause Title: SEPCO ELECTRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION VERSUS GMR KAMALANGA ENERGY LTD.

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963

The Supreme Court has recently upheld the setting aside of an arbitral award of nearly ₹995 crore granted in favour of Chinese company SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation, holding that the arbitral tribunal had erred by re-interpreting contractual terms and departing from the agreed stipulations in violation of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

“Numerous precedents laid down by this Court have often emphasised that an arbitrator lacks the power to deviate from or to reinterpret the terms of the contract while making an award. The awards must be within the parameters of the agreement entered between the parties.”, the Court said.

A bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice AG Masih heard the case where the contractual terms do not allow waiver of notice for raising claims unless the parties have agreed to it in written form. After SEPCO left the construction site in 2015, arbitration followed, and in 2020, the tribunal awarded SEPCO ₹995 crore, holding that GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd had waived notice requirements via a 2012 email. The Orissa High Court's Division Bench set aside the award, prompting SEPCO's appeal to the Supreme Court.

High Courts

Allahabad High Court

Venue Is Construed As Seat In Absence Of Contrary Indicia, If Arbitration Agreement Only Mentions 'Venue': Allahabad HC

Case Title: Devi Prasad Mishra v. M/S Nayara Energy Limited (Earlier Essar Oil Limited) Thru Auth. Signatory/ Managing Director [CIVIL MISC. ARBITRATION APPLICATION No. - 2 of

2024

The Allahabad High Court has held that when only one place is mentioned in the arbitration agreement and is termed as “venue”, the same is to be treated as the “seat” also, unless something contrary is mentioned in the agreement.

“If the arbitration agreement mentions only one place and even if it is termed as the 'venue', then unless there is a contrary indicia the 'venue' is construed as the 'seat',” held Justice Jaspreet Singh.

The Court observed that in Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. & others the Apex Court held that where 'seat' of the arbitration is, the Court there will have exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. Further, in B.G.S. S.G.S. Soma JV v. NHPC Limited the Supreme Court held that, in absence of contrary intentions, the venue chosen by the parties will also be the seat of the arbitration.

Justice Singh held that the parties had agreed for arbitration to be held in Mumbai and exclusive jurisdiction was vested with the Courts at Mumbai. Since no contrary clause was present in the arbitration agreement, the Court held that Mumbai was chosen as the 'seat' of arbitration by the parties.

Executing Court Empowered To Grant Statutory Interest Not Mentioned In Award U/S 36 Of Arbitration Act: Allahabad High Court

Case Title: State Of U.P. and 2 Others v. M/S Satish Chandra Shiv Hare-Brothers

Case No. MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 11680 of 2023

Following the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Sudhir Tyagi, the Allahabad High Court has held that under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Executing Court is empowered to grant statutory interest which may not have been mentioned in the arbitral award.

In Union of India and Anr. v. Sudhir Tyagi, it was held that

“..the interpretation of Clause (b) of Section 31(7) of the Act is no more res-integra. The grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) is mandatory. The only discretion which the Arbitral Tribunal has is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded. Where the Arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, then statutory rate, as provided in Section 31(7)(b), shall apply…”

Writ Petition Can Be Converted To Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act If It Does Not Prejudice Respondents: Allahabad High Court

Case Title – Union of India v Bhular Construction Company & Others

Case No. – Matters under Article 227 No. – 8841 of 2023

The Allahabad High Court Bench of Justice Manish Kumar Nigam allowed the conversion of a writ petition under Article 227, Constitution of India (“COI”) into an appeal under Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) noting that where a particular kind of proceeding is not maintainable and a different kind of proceeding lies in respect thereof before the Court, the Court has jurisdiction to convert one into other subject to law relating to limitation and court fees.

The Court relied on its previous judgment in Kailash Chandra v. Ram Naresh Gupta wherein it was held that conversion of a revision into a writ petition under Article 226/227 was permissible. In view of the same, the Court observed that there was no impediment in conversion where a particular kind of proceeding is not maintainable and a different kind of proceeding lies in respect thereof.

S.11 A&C Act | Respondent's Letter Seeking Petitioner To Give Up Interest On Outstanding Amount Indicates Ongoing Dispute: Allahabad HC

Case Name: M/S Assam Dental Supply Co. Through Its Proprietor Sr Manoj Jhingren v. Director General, Medical And Health Services, Uttar Pradesh Swasthya Bhawan, Lucknow And Another

Case Number: Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. - 17 Of 2025

The Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Jaspreet Singh, while hearing a Section 11 petition under the Arbitration Act, observed that the letter of the Respondent addressed to the Petitioner, requiring them to give up their interest claim on the outstanding amount, showed that the claims were still under consideration. Therefore, the Claims cannot be termed dead, and the Section 11 petition is well within the limitation period.

The parties had exchanged multiple letters concerning the release of the payment. The correspondence continued till June 2023, after which the Petitioner issued the notice dated 14.11.2024 invoking arbitration. The present Petition u/s 11(6) of the A&C was filed on 13.02.2025. Since August 2008, when a part payment was made to the Petitioner, till 2021, there has not been much communication between the parties. However, since October 2021, the Respondent has required the Petitioner to furnish an affidavit to give up the interim claim on the outstanding amount. The letter indicates that the Petitioner's claim is still under consideration.

The bench observed that the Section 11 petition is within the limitation period. The objection concerning the claims being time-barred relates to the case's merits, and the Section 11 Court is not required to examine the same. In light of the above discussion, the Court allowed the Section 11 petition and appointed HMJ O.P. Srivastava (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute.

Rejecting Appeal U/S 34 A&C Act On Grounds Of Jurisdiction Without Indicating Alternate Remedy Amounts To Refusal To Set Aside Award: Allahabad HC

Case Title: Jaiprakash Associates Limited Versus High Tech Tyre Retreaders Pvt. Ltd. and another [APPEAL UNDER SECTION 37 OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 DEFECTIVE No. - 112 of 2025]

The Allahabad High Court has held that rejecting an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on grounds of lack of jurisdiction without providing alternate remedy amounts to refusing to set aside award, making such order appealable under Section 37 of the Act.

Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for appeals against orders setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act.

In Chintels India Limited Vs. Bhayana Builders Private Limited, the Apex Court had held that order refusing condonation of delay was an order refusing to set aside the award and was appealable under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act and discussed the 'effect doctrine' by referring to its earlier judgment in ESSAR Constructions Vs. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy.

Relying on the aforesaid, the bench lead by Chief Justice Bhansali held that

“it would be seen that the effect of the order passed by the Court under Section 34 of the Act is required to be seen for the purpose of examining the maintainability of the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act as to whether the order passed leaves any other avenue for the applicant to seek redressal against the award or the order passed puts an end to the challenge laid to the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, which in the present case is the Council.”

It held that order of dismissal refusing to condone delay was not on the same footing as a order returning appeal to be presented before appropriate forum and the effect of the order needs to be seen for maintainability of the appeal.

Bombay High Court

OPC & Its Sole Director Can't Be Treated As One For Liability Owed: Bombay HC Grants Relief To Director In Dispute Over MasterChef Production

Case Name Saravana Prasad v. Endemol India Private Limited & Anr.

Case Number: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 22714 OF 2024 WITH COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 22746 OF 2024

The Bombay High Court has observed that sole director of a One Person Company (“OPC”), cannot be treated parallelly with the separate legal entity.

The court set aside the directions in the impugned order dated 10/07/2024 directing Mr. Saravana Prasad ("Prasad") to deposit Rs. 10.40 crores in a fixed deposit, and disclose all assets and all encumbrances, charges and attachments, and disclosure of all details of all companies and firms in which they are shareholder, director or partners.

The court observed that the Learned Arbitral Tribunal has taken note of the Confirmation Letter as being the core of Endemol's Arguments, and noted that Innovative has not denied the issuance of the Confirmation Letter. The court took the view that the Confirmation Letter was consciously issued in the course of audit confirmation sought by auditors of Endemol. The reasons pertaining to the absence of Confirmation Letter not being issued after 2022, and the implication of accounts reconciliation exercises that the parties engage in, are all matters that are to be dealt by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitral proceedings.

Direction Of Disclosure Or Attachment Of Assets Cannot Be Passed Against A Person Who Is Not A Party To The Arbitral Award: Bombay HC

Case Title: Ningbo Aux Imp and Exp Co. Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. [Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 29646 of 2024

The Bombay High Court has held that a foreign arbitral award cannot be enforced against a person who was not a party to the arbitration proceedings. It ruled that forcing such a person to disclose assets or face coercive enforcement would be without jurisdiction under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan passed the ruling while allowing two interim applications filed by Amstrad Consumer India Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 1) and its shareholder (Respondent No. 2) in a commercial enforcement petition filed by Ningbo Aux Imp and Exp Co. Ltd., seeking enforcement of a foreign award passed under an agreement dated October 23, 2020.

The Court noted that an attempt had been made by the Petitioner to make Respondent No. 2 a party to the arbitration proceedings, and that was rejected by the case manager of the arbitral tribunal. It said:

“… not only is it a case where Respondent No.2 cannot be said to be a party who was unable to participate in the proceedings, Respondent No.2 is a person who was sought to be made a party and the very arbitral tribunal whose arbitral award is sought to be enforced, had not permitted making Respondent No.2 a party.”

Member Of Society Can Be Directed To Vacate Premises U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act For Smooth Redevelopment: Bombay High Court

Case Title: Pranav Constructions Limited Versus Priyadarshini Co-operative Housing Society Limited and others

Case Number:2025:BHC-OS:10901-DB

The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that a member of a society can be directed to vacate the premises occupied by them under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to ensure smooth redevelopment, if they act contrary to the terms of the Development Agreement

These Appeals have been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) challenging the order dated 20 June 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge disposing of Arbitration Petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act without grant of any relief in favour of the Petitioner therein.

The court noted the Bombay High Court in Girish Mulchand Mehta and another Versus Mahesh S. Mehta and another held that if a particular member of the Society is not party to the Development Agreement, Court can make interim measures against such non-co operative member by having recourse to the provisions of Section 9 of the Act.

It further noted that in Ambit Urbanspace, the court dealt with the interim relief under section 9 of the Arbitration Act against occupier who was not a member of the society. In the present case, the Respondent is both a garage occupier and a Society member. Furthermore, the Developer also agreed to provide permanent alternate accomodation. Therefore, the Ambit Urbanspace is relevant to the extent that the rights of the members are subservient to the society's obligations under the Development Agreement.

Proceedings Can Be Remitted Back To Same Arbitrator U/S 33 & 34(4) Of A&C Act Only Before Passing Of Award: Bombay High Court

Case Name: Harkisandas Tulsidas Pabari and Anr. v. Rajendra Anandrao Acharya and Ors.

Case Number: Arbitration Appeal No.62 Of 2007 With Arbitration Appeal No.63 Of 2007

The Bombay High Court Division Bench, comprising Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep V. Marne, observed that a Section 34 Court can only remit back to the same Arbitration following the procedure for remand u/s 33 and 34(4). The act of the Appellant not issuing a notice u/s 21 of the A&C Act to the Respondent, and approaching the same Arbitration, who initiates Arbitral proceedings, results in the Arbitral Tribunal being devoid of jurisdiction.

The bench at the outset noted that the Section 34 Court set aside the arbitral Award on three grounds. Firstly, there is a lack of authorisation to recommence the arbitral proceedings; secondly, the MoU is not a concluded contract; and thirdly, there is an impossibility of specific performance of the MoU. The Court vide order dated 28.09.1998, set aside the Award dated 01.04.1998, on the ground that sufficient opportunities were not given to the Respondents. The Arbitrator did not give the Respondents a notice of closure of proceedings. Hence, the Respondents were not provided a fair opportunity to lead evidence. The Court did not dive into remanding the proceedings back to the same Arbitration, as such power was to be exercised before setting aside the Award. The parties were at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, and by Section 43(4) of the A&C Act, the time spent in a Section 34 petition was to be excluded while calculating the limitation period.

Three-Month Deadline For Passing Arbitral Award Under NSE Byelaws Is Directory And Not Mandatory: Bombay High Court

Case Title – Bhanuchandra J Doshi v Ms Motilal Oswal Securities Ltd. & Anr.

Case No. – Arbitration Petition No. 1341 of 2015

The Bombay High Court Bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan while deciding a petition under Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) had an occasion to interpret Rule 13, National Stock Exchange (“NSE”) Byelaws. The Court held that Rule 13(b) which provided that arbitral award under the Rules must be rendered within three months from the date of entering upon reference was directory and not mandatory in nature.

The Court went on to analyse Rule 13, NSE Byelaws. The Court observed that from a plain reading of Rule 13(b) the time for completion of arbitration is set out as normally three months from the date of entering upon the reference. Under Rule 13(d), the date of entering upon a reference is defined as the date on which the arbitral tribunal has held the first hearing.

Individual Flat Owners Forming Cooperative Society Are Bound By Arbitration Clause Contained In Sale Agreement: Bombay High Court

Case Title – Shivranjan Towers Sahakari Griha Rachana v Bhujbal Constructions

Case No. – Writ Petition No. 11281 Of 2025

The Bombay High Court bench of Justice N.J. Jamadar has observed that when individual flat owners form a cooperative society to enforce rights created in favour of the individual members under the Agreements for Sale, the society cannot claim that it is not bound by the arbitration clause contained in those Agreements. The argument that it is not a signatory to the Agreements for Sale is untenable and such society is not a third party to the arbitral proceedings.

The Court held that the submission by Petitioner's Counsel that Deed of Deemed Conveyance did not contain an arbitration clause and thus arbitration proceedings could not be initiated against it, lacked merit. The Court explained that an arbitration agreement was a creature of contract, however the unilateral Deed of Deemed Conveyance by its very nature was not an instrument inter-vivos. Such a deed would not incorporate an arbitration clause which is an expression of the consensual decision to resolve the dispute by a forum of choice.

Regarding the issue that the Petitioner society was not a signatory to the Agreement for Sale, the Court held that it could not have been a signatory as it was yet to be formed and so the issue could not be determined only on the premise that the Petitioner was not a signatory to the Agreement for Sale which contained the Arbitration Clause.

Based on the statutory provisions contained in the Maharashtra Co-operative Society Act, 1960 and judicial precedents, the Court observed that the registration of a society shall render it a body corporate with power inter alia to sue and be sued in its name.

Calcutta High Court

"Purchase Order Containing Arbitration Clause Will Supercede Tax Invoice Which Does Not Contain Arbitration Clause": Calcutta High Court

Case Title – Super Smelters Limited v United Cables Limited

Case No. – AP-COM 470 OF 2024

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar while allowing an application for appointment for arbitrator observed that the terms and conditions of the purchase order including the arbitration agreement would prevail over and supersede the terms and conditions of the tax invoice which does not contain an arbitration clause.

The Court held that the purchase order was the main contract which contained all the terms and conditions which the parties agreed to be bound by, including the arbitration clause. The tax invoice was issued later. It contained the description of goods sold and the payment to be received. The invoice did not contain any arbitration clause, although the main agreement contained the same. Thus, the intention of the parties to arbitrate was clear and the arbitrator should be appointed.

Thus, the Court concluded that the arbitration clause in the purchase order would bind the parties as it is an all-encompassing agreement. The tax invoice does not contain an arbitration clause but it also does not mention that the purchase order has been superseded. Additionally, the tax invoice has been signed by the Respondent alone. In any event, the issue of novation of the purchase order will be decided by the Arbitrator who is competent to rule on his own jurisdiction and decide the arbitrability of the dispute.

When Parties Cannot Agree Upon Rules Governing Arbitration, Independent Clause Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction Prevails: Calcutta High Court

Case Name: Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary v. Steel Authority of India and Anr.

Case Title: AP-COM 169 of 2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar, while hearing a section 11 petition, observed that Courts at Durgapur would have the exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding vide Clause 46.2.4 of the GCC, as the parties could not agree upon the rules of arbitration governing the proceedings as provided under Clause 46.2.5.

The bench noted that Clause 46.2.4, being an independent clause, provides that unless otherwise mentioned in the contract, the arbitration shall be held at SAIL DSP Durgapur, and the Courts of Durgapur shall have exclusive jurisdiction. It observed that Clause 46.2.5 would apply if the parties had agreed to follow the ICA Rules or the Rules of SCFA. The parties not agreeing with respect to the implementation of Clause 46.2.5, the choice of New Delhi as the venue of the arbitration cannot be treated as the venue. On the contrary, Clause 46.2.4, an independent clause, specifying the seat of the arbitration at Durgapur, and conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts of Durgapur, shall prevail. Furthermore, the parties had the option to select either ICS or SCFA, which they chose not to; hence, the mechanism provided under Clause 46.2.5 failed. Clause 46.2.2 provides that the arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of A&C Act 1996, and therefore the Section 11 application is maintainable.

Arbitration Can Be Initiated Over Termination Of Employee Contract Containing Both Dispute Resolution & Termination Clause : Calcutta High Court

Case Title – Sreepad Bhiwaniwala v. Grant Thornton US Knowledge and Capability Center India Pvt. Ltd.

Case No. – AP No. 62 of 2025

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar while allowing an application for appointment of arbitrator has observed that where an employee has been terminated in terms of an employment contract which contains both Dispute Resolution clause and Termination clause, if it is not a case of termination simpliciter, then the dispute shall be referred to arbitration in terms of the dispute resolution clause.

The Court observed that the ground showed for termination was other "business reasons”. This in the view of the Court was not termination simpliciter as urged by the Counsel for the Respondent. The letter of termination contained a lot of compliances to be maintained by the Petitioner for a considerable period, even after termination.

The Court further held that it is a settled position of law that an arbitrator can rule on his own jurisdiction, which includes arbitrability of the claim made by the Petitioner. For the referral Court, the prima facie existence of the arbitration clause is sufficient to appoint an arbitrator and in this case the dispute is alive.

Issues Of Misjoinder Of Parties & Incorporation By Reference Fall Within Purview Of Arbitral Tribunal: Calcutta High Court

Case Title – Bimla Devi Jaiswal v. M/s Indus Towers Limited

Case No. – AP- 256 of 2021

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar, while allowing an application for appointment of arbitrator has observed that the issues of misjoinder/non-joinder of parties and whether the arbitration clause contained in the principal agreement was incorporated by reference in a subsequent agreement by the successors-in- interest would fall within the domain of the arbitral tribunal.

The Court observed that the law permits the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction covers all questions including validity of the arbitration agreement, joinder of parties, scope of disputes referable etc. The referral court is to satisfy itself, prima facie as to the existence of an arbitration agreement and/or whether the parties chose to be bound by the same, thereby agreeing to refer all disputes between them to an independent and impartial private Tribunal.

The Court relied upon the judgments in Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S Patel (2025) 2 SCC 147, Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP (India)(P) Ltd. (2025) 1 SCC 611, amongst other in support of the position of law that the issue of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties falls within the domain of the arbitral tribunal.

Legal Heir Of Partner Can Seek Reference To Arbitration When Deed Provides For Partnership To Continue After Partner's Death: Calcutta HC

Case Title – Avirup Talukdar v. Avishek Talukdar & Anr.

Case No. – AP- COM/523/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has observed that where a partnership deed provides that the heir of the deceased shall inherit the share and the partnership will continue, then the legal heir can seek reference of disputes to arbitration based on the arbitration clause in the deed of partnership. The Court highlighted that for non-signatories to be made a party to arbitration the requirement of law is that they must prima facie be connected to the arbitration agreement, which is satisfied in case of such a partnership deed.

The Court observed that the dispute arose upon violation of the above Clauses by Respondents, as alleged by the Petitioner. The Court noted that the issue as to whether a non signatory can seek reference of the dispute to arbitration has to be gathered from the agreement, circumstances and conduct and the referral Court is merely required to asses whether prima facie the parties are intrinsically connected to the arbitration agreement or the contract out of which the disputes arose.

Bar Against Even Number Of Arbitrators Is Not Attracted In Case Of Statutory Arbitration U/S 18(3) Of MSMED Act: Calcutta HC

Case Title – M/s BESCO v M/s Hindon Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.

Case No. – F.M.A.T (Arb. Award) No. 47 of 2023

A division bench of Calcutta High Court comprising Justices Uday Kumar and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya in a notable judgment has observed that the bar restricting the number of arbitrators to even numbers, which is applicable when the parties themselves appoint arbitrators under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”), is not attracted to a statutory arbitration under Section 18(3), Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“MSMED Act”). Thus, even if the number of the Council members who acted as arbitrators as in the present case is an even number, it per se does not vitiate the award.

Impleading Non-Signatory Against Whom No Cause Of Action Is Disclosed Does Not Defeat Reference To Arbitration: Calcutta High Court

Case Title – Murshidabad Zilla Parishad v Asian Care Development Private Limited and Ors.

Case No. – FMA 816 of 2025 with CAN 1 of 2025 with FMAT 167 of 2025

The Division Bench of Calcutta High comprising Justices Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Uday Kumar while deciding an appeal under Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) against the dismissal of an application for reference under Section 8, ACA observed that where a non-signatory party has been impleaded against whom no cause of action has been disclosed in the suit and who is a collateral beneficiary, the Court can refer the parties to arbitration. The Court noted that it was well aware that precedents allowed impleadment of such parties only when they were applicants, however, the spirit of Section 8, ACA would allow such reference even if the non-signatory party is a defendant.

The Court observed that the restrictive interpretation given in Sukanya Holdings had suffered a definitive shift as is recorded in a plethora of judgments including the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Cox and Kings Limited v SAP India Private Limited and Anr. (2024) 4 SCC 1 (Cox and Kings). Although the 'group company' theory laid down in Cox and Kings was not applicable in the present case, the concept of primary and substantive relief would still be a guiding factor in case of Section 8 references.

Calcutta High Court Upholds Arbitral Award In Favour Of Sourav Ganguly Over Termination Of Player Representation Agreement

Case Title – Precept Talent Management Limited v. Sourav Chandidas Ganguly

Case No. – AP-COM/167/2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Ravi Kishan Kapur dismissed a Section 34 petition filed against an arbitral award passed in favour of cricket player Sourav Ganguly (“Respondent”) by his former management agency, Precept Talent Management Ltd. (“Petitioner”). While upholding the Arbitral Award, the Court observed that the award was well reasoned and the views taken by the Arbitral Tribunal were plausible. Therefore, the Award did not warrant any interference by the Court.

The Counsel for the Petitioners had argued that as a personality, the Respondent had received Rs. 13.11 crores and the Respondent owed 20% of the same to the Petitioners. The Petitioners had contended that the Tribunal was bound to give effect to the plain terms of the PRA and erred by ignoring the definition of 'commercial rights' and 'promotional services' under Clause 1.1 (gg) of the PRA. The Respondent had advertised and promoted various brands at the request of KKR and had in effect commercially exploited himself for gain.

The Court observed that the Tribunal had arrived at a finding that the contract entered into by KKR with the Respondent was for playing cricket and independent of the exploitation of the commercial rights of the Respondent. Additionally, the tribunal had held that the promotional activities which the Respondent had undertaken in terms of the KKR contract were promotional activities of and on behalf of KKR and were not individual endorsements of any of the players playing for KKR. Thus, the Petitioners were not entitled to a share.

Court Can Extend Mandate Of Arbitrator Multiple Times If Sufficient Cause Is Shown U/S 29A(5) Of Arbitration Act: Calcutta HC

Case Title: ROHAN BUILDERS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. VS BERGER PAINTS INDIA LIMITED

Case Number: AP-COM/428/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the courts are not prohibited from extending the mandate of the Arbitrator multiple times if sufficient cause is established under section 29A(5) of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, it extended the mandate of the Arbitrator beyond the timeline set by the Supreme Court.

This is the second filed by the Petitioner seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitrator under section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).

The court observed that the Supreme Court while disposing of the application held that the courts are not bound by the limitation period for filing extension applications nor are they prohibited from granting extension more than once. While parties can mutually extend the time period by six months, such timelines are not applicable to extensions ordered by the courts. Even delayed applications can be entertained if the sufficient cause is shown.

Based on the above, the court held that this court is not prohibited from granting further extensions if sufficient cause is established even if the Supreme Court has fixed the date of publication of the Award.

[Arbitration Act] S.34 Pleas Are Of Commercial Nature, Cannot Be Decided By Bench Having Ordinary Original Jurisdiction: Calcutta High Court

Case Title – Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited v Marine Craft Engineers Private Limited

Case No. – A.P.O. 84 of 2023 With A.P. 831 of 2018

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justices Arijit Banerjee and Om Narayan Rai while deciding a Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) appeal, set aside an order passed in Section 34, ACA petition on the ground that the court passing it lacked the jurisdiction to pass such an order. The concerned judge had the power to determine only such applications under Section 34 which did not pertain to commercial matters, whereas the power to decide Section 34 applications of commercial nature vested with another judge.

After looking at the roster of the Court on the said dates, the Court observed that on both the aforesaid dates i.e. when the said Judge (who has passed the Impugned Order) took up the matter for adjudication for the first time and when the matter was marked heard in part by the said Judge, the said Judge had determination only over such applications under Section 34, ACA which did not pertain/relate to commercial matters. The Court clarified that the determination in respect of all arbitration applications including those under Section 34, ACA relating to commercial matters in terms of Section 10, CC Act rested with another Hon'ble Judge of this Court in terms of the roster dated November 14, 2019.

Mere Use Of Expression “Arbitration” Insufficient To Constitute A Binding Agreement U/S 7 Of A&C Act: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: ROSHAN AGARWAL VS. NATIONAL PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION LIMITED (NPCCL) & ANR.

Case No.: AP-COM/218/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that mere use of the expression “Arbitration” in a clause will not automatically make the clause a binding arbitration agreement as contemplated under Section 7 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996 unless there is a clear intent to refer disputes to Arbitration. The court observed that an arbitration agreement has to be couched not in precatory, but obligatory words. Although, there is no particular form or universally practiced format in framing an arbitration agreement, but the words used must be certain, definite and indicative of the determination of the parties to go for arbitration and not a choice or a mere possibility to refer such dispute to arbitration.

Rejection Of Claims By Writ Court Over Disputed Issues Does Not Bar Reference To Arbitration: Calcutta High Court

Case Title:P.K THAKUR AND COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED

Case Number:AP-COM 461 of 2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that when the claims of the petitioner are not adjudicated by writ courts and subsequently by the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition on the ground that they involve disputed questions of fact and law which are beyond the remit of the court, and the petitioner is directed to invoke the alternative remedy of arbitration due to the undisputed existence of an arbitration clause, the matter should be referred to arbitration and whether the time period spent in prosecuting before the writ courts should be excluded can be decided by the Arbitrator.

Cause Of Action Arises From Clear Refusal To Perform Contractual Obligations, Not Mere Non-Performance: Calcutta High Court

Case Title:Kamini Ferrous Limited Vs. Om Shiv Mangalam Builders Private Limited & Anr.

Case Number:A.P - 43 of 2024

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that when there is a clear refusal by one of the parties to perform the terms of a contract, the cause of action arises from the date of such refusal, and not from the date of initial non-performance, especially where negotiations continued, implying that the parties possibly wanted to extend the time for performance.

The present application filed under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 arose from an agreement executed on 13.04.2012. Clause 14 of the Agreement states that all disputes and differences relating to or arising from the agreement shall be referred to arbitration.

Reference To Dispute Resolution Board Not Mandatory Before Invoking S.11(6) Of Arbitration Act If It Is Not Constituted On Time: Calcutta HC

Case Title: M/S. NATIONAL PROJECT CONSTRUCTION (NPCCL) VS MILITARY ENGINEER SERVICES (MES)

Case Number:AP-COM/559/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that a party cannot be compelled to approach the Dispute Resolution Board (DSB) for resolution of disputes first before invoking the jurisdiction of the court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act especially when the DSB was not constituted as per terms of the contract and its composition was not even communicated to the Petitioner within the stipulated time period after the execution of the contract therefore seeking reference to the DSB when the petitioner approaches the court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act cannot be accepted.

Proceedings Between Expiry Of Arbitrator's Mandate And Its Extension Are Not Void If Mandate Is Extended: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: GLEN INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED VS ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED

Case Number: AP-COM/540/2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that proceedings conducted by the Arbitrator between the expiry of the mandate and its subsequent extension cannot be declared void once the application seeking extension is allowed. Upon extension, the mandate relates back to the date of expiry.

The present application has been filed seeking extension of the Arbitrator's mandate. Earlier, the Respondent objected on the ground that the Arbitration continued the proceedings even after the mandate had lapsed. However, as noted by the court in its previous order, the petitioner's continuous participation and examination of witnesses constituted an implied agreement between the parties to extend the mandate.

Delivery Of Certified Copy Of Award After Signing & Authentication Constitutes Valid Service U/S 31(5) Of Arbitration Act: Calcutta HC

Case Title: J.D. ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED VS PURBACHAL UDYOG

Case Number: IA No: GA/1/2022 EC/87/2021

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that delivery of a certified copy of the award, signed by the members, when properly addressed, stamped, and sent by speed post with delivery confirmed by the postal department, amounts to effective service even if the original signed copy of the award is not dispatched.

The present application has been filed under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) seeking a declaration that the award dated 10.11.2020 is non-est and unenforceable. It is further prayed that the execution proceedings should be stayed pending disposal of the application.

Counterclaim In Arbitration Cannot Be Allowed After Commencement Of Claimant's Evidence: Calcutta High Court

Case Title: Gayatri Granites & Ors. VS. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd.

Case Number: C.O. 2449 of 2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya has held that a counterclaim in arbitration proceedings cannot be allowed after the commencement of the claimant's evidence, as doing so would cause serious injustice to the other party.

The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution against an order passed by Arbitrator by which an application seeking amendment in the Statement of Defence (SoD) to include a counterclaim was rejected.

The court observed that upon a reading of Section 23 as a whole and more particularly Subsection 2A, it is evident that no time limit has been prescribed within which the respondent may submit a counter claim. The only limitation for submitting a counter claim as provided in sub-section (2A) is that the same shall have to fall within the scope of arbitration agreement. It further observed that a counter claim can be raised with the written statement, through its amendment and by subsequent pleadings. However, the cause of action for filing the counter claim must arise either before or after filing of the suit but in any case it must not arise after the defendant has delivered his written statement or the time period for filing the written statement has expired.

Court Hearing Appeal U/S 37 A&C Act Can Direct Furnishing Of Security Even Without Application U/S 9: Calcutta HC

Case Title: BEEVEE ENTERPRISES & ORS. VERSUS L & T FINANCE LIMITED

Case Number: APOT 208 OF 2025 IA NO. GA 1 OF 2025

The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Arindam Mukherjee has held that while disposing of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the Court is empowered under Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) to impose conditions and direct the respondent to furnish security for the loan as per the Agreement, even in the absence of a formal application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, since such a course does not contravene any of the provisions of the Act.

The court noted that the arbitration clause gives exclusive power to the lender to appoint the arbitrator without any participation of the borrower. In the clause, no specific arbitrator has been named granting absolute authority to the lender to appoint the arbitrator through its Principal Officer. However, as per section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act read with fifth schedule and the Supreme Court's judgments in TRF Limited and Perkins, a Principal Officer is ineligible to appoint an arbitrator due to a direct connection with the party. Therefore, the appointment was void.

Plea Against Misuse Of Digital Signature Does Not Amount To Denying Existence Of Arbitration Agreement: Calcutta High Court

Case Title – Sunita Gupta v Ms URGO Capital Limited & Ors.

The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Krishna Rao, while referring parties to arbitration, has observed that if the Plaintiff alleges that its digital signatures were used without its consent, such an allegation of fraud does not amount to a denial of the existence of the arbitration agreement.

The Court analysed the loan documents to assess the contention of the Plaintiff that their signatures were obtained by fraud and their digital signatures were used without their consent. The Court observed that in the sanction letter dated 25.07.2023, the name of the Plaintiffs appeared as co-applicants nos.3,4 and 5. In the schedule of term, Vedanta Limited was recorded as the principal borrower and the names of Defendant No.3 along with Plaintiffs was also mentioned.

The Court observed that the Plaintiffs had only taken the ground of fraud that Defendant No.3 had misused the OTP provided by the Plaintiffs and the said OTP was used for digital signatures of the plaintiffs to which the Plaintiffs had never consented. Defendant No.3 was not denying the agreement.

Delhi High Court

WhatsApp, Email Communications Between Parties Can Constitute Valid Arbitration Agreement: Delhi High Court

Title: BELVEDERE RESOURCES DMCC v. OCL IRON AND STEEL LTD & ORS

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 740

The Delhi High Court has ruled that communications between the parties through WhatsApp and emails can constitute a valid arbitration agreement.

Justice Jasmeet Singh perused Section 7(4)(b) of the Arbitration Act and said that it is not necessary for a concluded contract to be in existence for a valid arbitration agreement to be existing between the parties. The Court was dealing with a plea filed by a UAE based company, Belvedere Resources DMCC, seeking monetary security of approximately Rs. 23.34 Crores from OCL Iron and Steel Ltd., Oriental Iron Casting Limited and Aron Auto Limited.

Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause Prevails Over Arbitrator's Procedural Order In Determining 'Seat' Of Arbitration: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/S Viva Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 755

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that an 'exclusive jurisdiction clause' in the arbitration agreement unequivocally denotes the 'seat' of arbitration. The court observed that any contrary determination made by the Arbitrator without the express written consent of the parties only relates to a 'venue' under Section 20(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court therefore dismissed the Section 29A(5) petition due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The court observed that the phrase 'Any suit or application for the enforcement of this arbitration clause shall be filed in the competent court at Gautam Budh Nagar, no other court or any other district or Pradesh or outside Uttar Pradesh shall have any jurisdiction in the matter' in Clause 32 of the Contract unequivocally reflected the intention of partis to confer exclusive jurisdiction solely on the courts at Gautam Budh Nagar 'for enforcement of the arbitration clause'.

The Court noted that although the arbitrator had fixed the seat as Delhi in the Procedural Order, the respondent had not consented to it. It noted that the respondent had already filed an application before the Arbitrator seeking clarification/review/modification of the Procedural Order to the limited extent that New Delhi is merely the venue.

Past Professional Relationship Creates Enough Bias To Terminate Arbitrator's Mandate U/S 14 Of A&C Act, Duration Is Immaterial: Delhi HC

Case Title: ROSHAN REAL ESTATES PVT LTD versus GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 758

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that if any person had any professional or supervisory relationship with the party to the Arbitration, such person cannot be appointed as an Arbitrator as per Entry 1 of the Seventh Schedule. It does not matter whether such a relationship existed over 17 years ago but the real test is whether such a relationship created a reasonable apprehension of bias. Accordingly, the mandate of the Arbitrator was terminated in the present case.

The court held that in the present case, the petitioner and the appointed arbitrator had a professional relationship in the past. The Petitioner was a contractor and the Appointed Arbitrator was acting as a Superintendent Engineer in CPWD which was a client of the Contractor. The Respondent contended that their interaction was limited and happened over 17 years ago. Nonetheless, it shows that a professional, business or supervisory relationship existed between the petitioner and the Arbitrator.

It further held that “Entry 1 of the Seventh Schedule, in particular, is designed to insulate the arbitral process from both actual and perceived bias by disqualifying individuals who have had a past or present business relationship with a party to the dispute.”

Contract Clause Favouring Employer Over Contractor In Claiming Damages Are Deemed Knowingly Included If Not Challenged Before Tribunal: Delhi HC

Case Title: M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED. Versus RAIL VIKAS NIGAM LIMITED

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 760

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that clauses of the contract giving an advantage to the employer over the contractor in claiming damages, if not questioned before the Arbitral Tribunal or at the time of formation or execution of the contract, cannot be questioned under section 34 of the Arbitration Act as the parties are deemed to have knowingly incorporated such clauses in the contract.

It further observed that the petitioner's conduct shows that it was aware of the arrangement entered into between the parties as no compensation was claimed while seeking extension of time due to the failure of the Respondent in handing over the site and obtaining approvals. The extension of time was granted by the Respondent without imposing any penalty.

It further observed that however, the claim for compensation was raised subsequently via a letter which was denied by the Respondent citing clause 2.2 of the GCC. It is well settled that the AT is the master of facts and evidence and is in a better position to interpret the clauses of the contract based on the factual context. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Susaka (P) Ltd held that a plea not raised before the AT amounts waiver or clear abandonment and cannot be raised later in the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

Amendment To Bring Additional Grounds U/S 34 Of A&C Act Is Maintainable If Objections Are Not Beyond Judicial Scrutiny Of Court: Delhi HC

Case Name: Raheja Developers Limited v. Ahluwalia Contractors India Ltd

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 762

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri while hearing amendment petition filed u/s 34 of the A&C Act observed that the omission to plead a ground of challenge in the original Section 34 petition pertaining to non-adherence to the mandatory procedure of Section 29A would not oust the jurisdiction of the Section 34 Court to scrutinize the same. The Court held that the amendments sought in the present application fall within the exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction.

The bench further observed that the amendment sought in the present petition, when tested on the yardstick laid down in Hindustan Construction, is clear that the additional grounds raised are legal in nature, which are supported by the foundational facts pleaded in the Section 34 petition. The Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdictional competence to continue with the arbitral proceeding after the expiration of the statutory period enshrined u/s 29A of the A&C Act is a legal question which the Section 34 Court would have enquired into. The failure to raise an objection in the original Section 34 petition pertaining to the failure to adhere to the mandatory procedure u/s 29A for extension of the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate would not oust the Section 34 Court from examining whether the Arbitral Tribunal was functus officio at the passing of the award.

Mandate Of Arbitrator Can Be Terminated For Delay In Passing Award Despite Absence Of Automatic Termination Clause In NSE Bye-Laws: Delhi HC

Case Title: RAM KAWAR GARG versus BAJAJ CAPITAL INVESTOR SERVICES LIMITED NOW NEW NAME IS JUST TRADE SECURITIES LIMITED AND ORS.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 764

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that although the National Stock Exchange (NSE) Bye Laws do not provide for the automatic termination of the Arbitrator's mandate after the expiry of the time period stipulated under Bye Law 7(b) of the NSE Bye Laws, the mandate of the Arbitrator can be terminated by the Relevant Authority if the Arbitrator fails to pass the award within time thereby indirectly limiting the arbitrator's mandate. This shows that the intent and spirit of both the NSE Bye-Laws and the Arbitration Act is the same as both prescribe for the termination of the arbitrator's mandate if timely award is not passed.

Parties Can't Be Barred From Performing Contractual Obligations In Final Partial Award When It Remains In Force: Delhi HC

Case Title: UNION OF INDIA versus VEDANTA LIMITED & ANR.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 792

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that parties cannot be prevented from performing their contractual obligations as interpreted in the Final Partial Award, especially when both the Final Partial Award as well as the contract interpreted therein have not been stayed and remain in force.

The present appeal has been filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) against an order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) by which an application of the Appellant seeking a restraint on the Respondent from unilaterally implementing the Final Partial Award (FPA) until final quantification is made by the AT, was dismissed.

It further observed that just because no agreement was reached between the parties on quantum does not relieve the Respondents from performing its obligations under the PSC which was in force. The AT only allowed the parties to return for quantification if needed. The reliance of the Respondent on the FPA is not an enforcement but mere adherence to the contractual obligations as interpreted in the FPA. As the FPA is not a money decree and final quantification is still pending, the Respondent was within its right to recover post exploration costs.

The court further observed that in the absence of the AT's directions for final quantification, the Respondent's deductions could be considered unilateral. However, since no stay on either the FPA or PSC was granted, the Respondent was obligated to follow the FPA's interpretation. Therefore, it cannot be said that their actions were unilateral rather they were performing their obligations under the PSC. The AT also permitted the Appellant to seek readjustment after final quantification.

Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Of About ₹229.5 Crores Against NHAI As 'Termination Payment'

Case Title: National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) vs. South Indian Bank Ltd and Union Bank of India Ltd. & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 815

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has upheld an Arbitral Award directing the National Highways Authority of India (“NHAI”/”Petitioner”) to deposit ₹229.50 crores as Termination Payment into the Escrow Account along with interest and costs. The court reiterated that the scope of judicial interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is narrow and circumscribed. The Arbitral Award can be set aside on the ground, inter alia, being in conflict with the public policy of India, patent illegality, violation of principles of natural justice.

The Court rejected the argument of the petitioner that the Concession Agreement did not form part of the Escrow Agreement and Substitution Agreement. Upon examining the recitals of the EA and SA, the Court found that the Concession Agreement was expressly stated to “form part of this Agreement”.

Arbitration Can't Be Restricted To Specific Respondents When Agreements Form Part Of Single Commercial Transaction: Delhi High Court

Case Title: CANARA BANK versus SANJEEV SHARMA & ORS

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 819

The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar held that when an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is filed in opposition to a civil suit, a party cannot later object that the arbitration was intended to apply only to specific respondents, especially when the pleadings indicate that the agreements formed part of a single commercial transaction.

The court noted that the Supreme Court in Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises held that in interconnected agreements which form a single transaction may be referred to arbitration even if some of them lacked arbitration clause or involved non-signatories.

It held that “the pleadings and the prayer, read holistically, indicate that the Appellant, in fact, confirms that all the Agreements are an integral part of the entire transaction and that is the reason why the Suit makes express reference to all the Agreements which formed a part of the Transaction, inter alia, the Tri-partite Agreement, which contained the Arbitration Clause.”

Civil Courts Not Prohibited From Granting Anti-Arbitration Injunction In Foreign-Seated Arbitration If Proceedings Are Vexatious: Delhi HC

Case Title: ENGINEERING PROJECTS (INDIA) LIMITED Versus MSA GLOBAL LLC (OMAN)

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 901

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that Civil Courts are not prohibited from granting anti arbitration injunction in a foreign seated arbitration if the proceedings are conducted in a vexatious and oppressive manner.

The present application has been filed seeking an injunction against the ongoing arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) stating that the proceedings are vexatious, oppressive, unconscionable and against the public policy of India.

The court while copiously referring to the Supreme Court judgments held that the court is competent to try all civil suits under section 9 of the CPC as the jurisdiction of a Civil Court can only be ousted if it is expressly or impliedly is barred by any law for the time being enforced. Courts do not easily infer exclusion of the jurisdiction and see factors like adequacy of remedies before the Tribunal, adherence to judicial procedures and legislative intent. In the absence of a clear bar on jurisdiction, the court retains its plenary jurisdiction.

The Delhi High Court in Dabhol Power Company held that the court can grant anti arbitration injunctions despite contentions that the Arbitral Tribunal can decide on its own jurisdiction. Neither section 5 nor section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) prohibit civil courts from doing the same especially when the proceedings in a foreign seated arbitration are found to be oppressive.

Mere Pendency Of Formal Signature By One Party Doesn't Preclude Parties From Being Referred To Arbitration: Delhi HC Allows Vedanta's Plea

Case Title: VEDANTA LIMITED versus GUJARAT STATE PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 902

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that the mere pendency of a formal signature by one party, when the other party has signed the agreement after reading and understanding its terms, including the arbitration clause, does not prevent the parties from being referred to arbitration.

The court noted that the signed and duly filled copy of the GSA was supplied to the Respondent. In the copy, effective date, gas price and volume which were agreed upon during the RFP process as evident from e-mail, were also incorporated in the GSA. After the conclusion of the contract, the GSA was formally sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent for execution who had read, understood and confirmed its contents. Furthermore, the submission of Forms C1 and C6 by the Respondent fortifies the conclusion that the terms of the GSA including the arbitration clause were accepted.

Arbitral Award Cannot Be Challenged Through Civil Suit: Delhi High Court

Case Title: MMTC LIMITED versus Ms. ANGLO-AMERICAN METALLURGICAL PTY LIMITED AND ORS.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 912

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that an arbitral award cannot be challenged through a civil suit, as such a course is clearly barred under Section 5 read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Such a plaint deserves to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), on the ground that it is barred by law.

It held that “the Arbitral Award may be set aside “only” on the grounds mentioned there under. By using the word “only” twice, section 34 of 1996 Act makes it clear that no challenge to an Award can be launched outside of the said section and beyond the grounds specified therein. This means that section 34 of 1996 Act offers an exhaustive and exclusive remedy to contest an Arbitral Award.”

Restraining Breaching Party From Activities Barred By Shareholders' Agreement Is Not Prohibited U/S 27 Of Contract Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: PAUL DEEPAK RAJARATNAM & ORS. versus SURGEPORT LOGISTICS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 943

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that restraining a breaching party through an interim award passed under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act from engaging in certain activities, as per the terms of Shareholders' Agreement (SHA), to prevent the subject matter of arbitration from being rendered futile, is not barred under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, especially when the contract remains valid and has not been lawfully terminated.

The court further held that existence of a liquidated damages clause does not bar issuance of injunctive reliefs when the damages caused due to the conduct of the breaching party cannot be quantified. The interim reliefs under section 17 of the Arbitration Act were essential to protect the subject matter of the Arbitration and to prevent the arbitration from being rendered futile. Denial of such reliefs would allow the Appellants to cause irreparable harm to the Respondent's business abroad. Furthermore, the interim award is neither punitive nor final rather it was passed to maintain the contractual status quo.

Parties' Decision To Transact Goods In 'Sound Condition' Prevails Over Prior Agreement To Transact On 'As Is Where Is' Basis”: Delhi HC

Case Title – PEC Ltd v. Ms Badri Singh Vinimay Pvt Ltd.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 958

The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar while upholding an arbitral award has observed that if the parties had agreed to transact goods on 'as is where is' basis in the tender document but agreed in the acceptance letter that the goods would be transacted on 'sound condition' basis, then the earlier agreement will stand substituted by the latter understanding between the parties and the goods will be transacted on 'sound condition' basis.

The Court observed that the earlier “as is where is basis clause” subsequently stood substituted and was only limited to as to whether the Respondents carried out their obligation of lifting that conformed to the stipulation of “sound condition”, the Court observed that it had to look at the entire dispute from the narrow conspectus of as to whether the Respondents had adhered to the Agreement between the parties which was for the supply of cargo in “sound condition”, i.e. 960 bags.

OYO Approaches Delhi High Court Challenging Arbitral Award In Co-Working Space Lease Dispute Against Lenskart

Oyo has filed a section 34 petition before the High Court of Delhi, challenging a few portions of an arbitral award passed in the dispute between Oyo and Lenskart (“Oyo Hotels and Homes Pvt Ltd v. Lenskart Solutions”) pertaining to the termination of a co-working space lease during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the arbitral proceedings, Oyo was partially successful and has filed the Section 34 petition to set aside the arbitral tribunal's finding concerning compensation for the lock-in period under the lease agreement, the award of interest, and observations concerning the issue of stamp duty.

Post-Termination Restrictive Covenants In Employment Contracts Are Void U/S 27 Of Contract Act: Delhi High Court

Case Title: Neosky India Limited & Anr. v. Mr. Nagendran Kandasamy & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 977

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that post-service restrictive covenants in employment contracts, which operate after cessation of employment, are void and are not enforceable under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act”) and violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The court vacated the injunction granted in an application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), which restrained the Respondents from engaging in a competing business post-termination of their employment agreements.

Timeline Prescribed For Filing Statement Of Defence Under Rule 18(3) Of Indian Council Of Arbitration Rules Is Directory In Nature: Delhi HC

Case Title: ANEJA CONSTRUCTIONS (INDIA) versus DOOSAN POWER SYSTEMS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 980

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Jain has held that the timeline prescribed under Indian Council of Arbitration Rules, 2024 for filing a Statement of Defence by the respondent is directory in nature and can be extended by the Arbitral Tribunal if a sufficient cause is established.

The Court noted that a careful perusal of the impugned order, it becomes clear that the Arbitral Tribunal believed that it had jurisdiction to extend the timelines in the interest of justice. While acknowledging the timelines prescribed by the ICA Rules, it held that the time can be extended if a sufficient cause is shown. The Arbitral Tribunal also noted that the cases cited by the claimant relate to statutory provisions whereas the timelines in the present case emerge from the ICA Rules, not any specific legislation.

Interim Injunction U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Cannot Be Granted To Prevent Convening Of Meeting For Removal Of Director: Delhi High Court

Case Title – Drharors Aesthetics v. Debulal Banerjee

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 981

The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Anil Kshetarpal and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar has observed that an interim injunction under section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) cannot be granted to prevent convening of extraordinary general meeting for removal of a director as it effectively amounts to grant of final relief and impinges upon statutory powers conferred to a Company under the Companies Act, 2013.

The Court observed that a perusal of the Impugned order revealed that the District Judge found prima facie merit in the contention of the Respondent that the notices for Board Meeting and EGM were issued in contravention of Sections 169 and 173(3), Companies Act, 2013 as they did not meet the statutory minimum of 7 days and lacked sufficient particulars regarding the grounds of proposed removal which denied the Respondent the reasonable opportunity of being heard. On this basis, the District Judge granted the interim injunction.

Failure To Frame Counter Claim As An Additional Issue When It Forms Part Of Pleadings Is Patently Illegal: Delhi High Court

Case Title – Indraprastha Power Generation Co Ltd. v EM Services P Ltd.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 991

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that once the reasons/basis for a counter claim, the amount and computation of the counter claim had been made in the Reply, it does not matter if there is no specific prayer in the prayer clause. In such a scenario, an arbitral award refusing to frame an issue for the counter claim would be patently illegal and would be against the fundamental policy of Indian Law.

The Court observed that once there was counter claim of the Petitioner in its pleading and the Petitioner had spelt out the reasons as well as has given basis for arriving at a figure of counter-claim and moreover, the Respondent in its rejoinder had denied the claim of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the Sole Arbitrator to frame an issue in this regard and to that extent the order dated 13.02.2022 passed by the Sole Arbitrator is erroneous.

Delhi High Court Issues Notice On Plea Challenging Appointment Of Ex-Railway Officials As Arbitrators In Railway Dispute

Case Title: M/s Royal Infraconstru Limited v. Union of India, West Central Railway
Case No.: O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 80/2025
The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Amit Bansal has issued notice in a petition filed under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), seeking termination of the mandate of the Standing Arbitral Tribunal (“SAT”) constituted by the Union of India, West Central Railway (“Respondent”) in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV).

Govt Notifications Imposing Restrictions On Usage In Contracts For Supply Of Gas Are Laws Under Article 12, Must Be Complied With: Delhi HC

Case Name: Gujarat State Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd. v. M/S Gail (India) Ltd.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1019

The Delhi High Court, while dismissing a Section 34 petition, observed that the five contracts entered into between the parties were subject to the restrictions imposed by the Government. By providing the gas at a subsidised price, the Government has the authority to regulate the use of such gas.

The bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad held that the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (“MoPNG”) had apprised the Petitioner of the Government's policy concerning the usage of APM gas. The learned Sole Arbitrator was correct in holding that the buyer of the gas would not be entitled to use the subsidised gas for any other purpose than the contemplated in the contract, i.e., production of fertilisers.

Dismissal Of Plea U/S 8 Of A&C Act Amounts To Res Judicata; S.11 Court Cannot Refer Parties To Arbitration: Delhi High Court

Case Name: Surender Bajaj v. Dinesh Chand Gupta and Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1032

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, while dismissing a Section 11 petition under the A&C Act, observed that dismissing a Section 8 application under the A&C Act amounts to res judicata. The Section 11 Court cannot refer the parties to Arbitration if the order dismissing Section 8 is not set aside or interfered with.

A Collaboration Agreement dated 26.11.2018 was entered into by the parties, and the Petitioner was required to carry out the construction. In lieu of the construction, the possession and ownership of the second floor were to be handed over to the Petitioner. The said construction was carried out; however, the Respondent was not handing over the possession and ownership of the property.

Arbitrator's Decision To Defer Compliance With Essential Pre-Condition In Agreement Amounted To Rewriting Contract, Vitiated It: Delhi HC

Case Title – BHEL v. Xiamen Longking Bulk Material Science and Engineering Co.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1062

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh while allowing a petition under Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) observed that when the contract required the bidder to establish an office in India as a pre-requisite to performance, the decision by the Arbitrator holding that compliance could be deferred, amounted to rewriting the contract. Such a holding violated fundamental policy of Indian law and the award was liable to be set aside.

The Court observed that Clause 1, PEM which was part of the bid of the Respondent and was accepted by the Petitioner, contained clear undertakings by the Respondent to open an office in India and an Indian Bank Account before the commencement of the execution of the Indian component of the contract. This was not a mere formality but it was central to compliance with the RBI guidelines.

The Court further observed that from a conjoint reading of the PEM, LoA and GCC leaves no scope for payment to any unrelated third party or for waiver of the local office/bank account requirement without the consent of the Petitioner. The finding of the Arbitrator that the requirement to establish a project office and bank account could be deferred until after drawing approval and even substituted by the use of a third party's bank account, was a direct departure from the contractual framework agreed to between the parties. Additionally, the Respondent had never denied the obligation of opening an Indian office and bank account but only highlighted its inability to do so.

Independent Panel Of Arbitrators Not Curated By Either Party Cannot Be Challenged On Grounds Of Impartiality: Delhi High Court

Case Title: M/s. KNR Tirumala Infra Pvt. Ltd. versus National Highways Authority of India

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1068

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that when the panel of arbitrators from which appointments are to be made is broad-based, comprising retired Supreme Court Judges and other eminent officials, and is independent, not controlled by any party, the other party cannot refuse to abide by the institutional rules it has consciously agreed to, on the ground that the panel is not impartial.

The court observed that through a circular amendment in the SAROD Rules, it was provided that obtaining membership is not a mandatory precondition for invoking arbitration under its Rules. Non-members are equally entitled to initiate arbitration and participate in proceedings under the SAROD framework. Thus, the very mischief that was sought to be addressed in Rani Constructions (supra) has been remedied.

It further observed that the principles laid down in CORE II are not applicable to the facts of the present case as the contractor's choice in CORE II was restricted to two names from a list of Railway Officers while the General Manager retained an exclusive control to appoint other arbitrators giving one party dominant control. This clause was struck down by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the Appointment of Arbitrators under SAROD or ICA is made under independent rules from a neutral panel.

Absence Of Word 'Seat' Does Not Oust Court's Jurisdiction Conferred By Arbitration Agreement: Delhi High Court

Case Title: SNS ENGINEERING PVT. LTD. versus M/S HARIOM PROJECTS PVT. LTD. AND ANR.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1084

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that absence of the word 'seat' does not strip the court of its exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of an arbitration agreement.

This is a petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) seeking appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties arising out of the Work Order/ Acceptance Letter dated 21.10.2021.

The Court observed that in the present case, clause 14 of the Acceptance Letter clearly provides that in case of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Letter, the dispute shall be decided by the Ahmedabad Court. Therefore, the coutt at Ahmedabad has jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and appoint the arbitrator.

It further observed that “While interpreting such exclusive jurisdictional clauses it must be borne in mind, that when parties agree in the arbitration clause/ agreement to vest exclusive jurisdiction in a particular Court for adjudication of any disputes thereof, it is to be presumed that they intended that Court only to have supervisory control.”

Arbitration Clause In Loan Agreement Becomes Incorporated In Deeds Of Guarantee When Both Form Part Of Single Transaction: Delhi HC

Case Title – Intec Capital Limited v Shekhar Chand Jain

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1090

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that contemporaneously executed Loan Agreement and Deeds of Guarantee, where the intent of the parties to incorporate the Loan Agreement into the Deeds of Guarantee is clear, the Guarantor although a non-signatory to the Loan Agreement, becomes bound by the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement.

The Court observed that since the fact that the Loan Agreement contained an arbitration clause and that the Respondents had not signed the Loan Agreement were undisputed, the main issue for consideration was whether the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement could be said to have been incorporated into the Deeds of Guarantee.

The Court observed that the distinction between “general reference” to another contract and “incorporation by specific reference” laid down in M.R. Engineers was relevant to the present case. In the said case, the Apex Court had held that a general reference to another document would not incorporate the arbitration clause of that document, unless the reference is specific to the arbitration clause or the entire document is expressly incorporated. Thus, the Court observed that the test is whether there is clear intention of the parties to import the arbitration clause.

Usage Of Disputed Trademark Even After Filing Of Challenge Would Cause Serious Confusion To Public: Delhi High Court

Case Name: M/S Azure Hospitality Private Limited v. Amit Bhasin, Proprietor Of Retail India Solutions

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1115

The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Shail Jain, while hearing a Section 37(1)(b) appeal under the Arbitration Act, observed that using the subject brand names after a dispute between the parties can cause enormous confusion to the public. People may associate the Respondent's outlets with the Appellants.

terminated due to non-payment of the Project Management Fee. The Respondent cannot be allowed to use the subject brand name indefinitely.

The bench observed that there is a serious dispute between the parties. Prima facie, once the Franchise Agreements are terminated, using the subject brand names could cause serious confusion to the public, who may still associate the Respondent's outlets with the Appellants.

Unadjudicated Claims Cannot Be Secured Through Interim Relief U/S 9 Of A&C Act Merely Due To Financial Distress: Delhi HC

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that mere financial distress of the other party would not be a ground to allow interim relief and grant its unadjudicated claim under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act (ACA).

"However, the calculation of any permissible rebate and the resolution of quality-based objections require factual findings and interpretation of the terms of the Agreement, which is an exercise to be carried out in the arbitration. Hence, the amounts claimed by the petitioner at this stage are unadjudicated claims, which cannot be secured through interim relief merely because respondent No. 1 is in financial distress," the court said.

The Court observed that the main issue for its consideration was whether Respondent No. 1 could be directed to secure the amount in dispute only on the ground that it is in financial distress and consequently, the Arbitral Award that might eventually be passed against it could become infructuous.

The Court observed that though it was not strictly bound by the provisions of CPC, it could not completely disregard its underlying principles. For passing an interim order in the nature of attachment before an award, the Court needed to satisfy itself that the conditions underlying Order XXXVIII Rule 5, CPC are met. The Court has to be convinced that there exists a strong prima facie case that the other party is actively trying to dissipate its assets to defeat the outcome of the award.

Commercial Unit Buyers Not Barred From Seeking Arbitration Relief After Availing Remedies Under RERA: Delhi High Court

Case Title: HARMEET SINGH KAPOOR & ANR. versus M/S NEO DEVELOPERS PVT LTD and Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1159

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Pratibha M. Singh and Justice Shail Jain has held that Buyers of commercial units are not prohibited from seeking arbitration relief subsequent to availing remedies under RERA, provided that the arbitration petitions were filed after a change in circumstances.

The court at the outset observed that although the Supreme Court's judgment in Ireo Grace Realtech bars simultaneous remedies for the same cause of action but does not prohibit the party from seeking arbitration relief once the circumstances have changed. The RERA remedies were invoked before the issuance of the completion certificate, whereas the arbitration petitions were filed after the completion certificate was issued.

It was further observed that the buyers ran from pillar to post since 2015, despite making substantial payments. The court held that the respondent not only withheld possession of the units but also earned rentals by leasing the said units, going against the RERA's directions.

Foreign Arbitral Awards To Be Enforced Under Indian Law, Interpretation Of 'Public Policy' U/S 48(2)(b) A&C Act Is Limited: Delhi HC

Case Name: Roger Shashoua & Ors. v. Mukesh Sharma & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1165

The Delhi High Court observed that to enforce a New York Convention Award, an application u/s 47 of the A&C Act, 1996 has to be filed. Thereafter, the onus shifts on the party opposing the enforcement to make out a ground enlisted in Section 48 of the A&C Act. The bench observed

"The settled legal position with respect to foreign awards is that, except strictly in terms of grounds of challenge as set out in Section 48 of the A&C Act, 1996, foreign arbitral awards are to be enforced in accordance with law in India. The substantive facts and merits of a particular case are not to be gone into. This position of law has been upheld in a catena of judgments, including the judgment of this Court in Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain (India) Co., [(2008) SCC OnLine Del 1271].”

The bench observed that the Supreme Court in Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano Spa (2014) has clarified the scope of the public policy exception to foreign awards. The expression 'public policy of India' u/s 48(2)(b) of the A&C Act has an extremely narrow scope and meaning. Unlike Section 34 of the A&C Act, which allows a broader interpretation of public policy, Section 48(2)(b) of the A&C Act has a circumscribed and limited application when it comes to the enforcement of foreign awards. Even based upon an assumption that the Tribunal's direction concerning the transfer of shares is beyond the scope of the agreement, the same would not bar the enforceability of the impugned arbitral awards.

Delhi HC Declines To Restrain Encalm Hospitality From Doing Business With Clients Of Dreamfolks Services, Says No Mandate Of Exclusivity

Case Title – Dreamfolks Services Limited v Encalm Hospitality Private Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1183

The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Amit Bansal refused to enforce a negative covenant against Encalm Hospitality Private Limited holding that its agreement with Dreamfolks Services Limited did not mandate exclusivity between the latter and its clients and thus Encalm was not in violation of the Agreement.

The Court observed that the Petitioner placed reliance on Clause 4.4 of the Agreement to contend that the Respondent could not do business with the Clients of the Petitioner either directly or through representatives during the subsistence of the Agreement. The stand taken by the Petitioner was that “representatives” would include other third-party service providers. Further, the obligation would continue during the notice period of 90 days beginning from 04.08.2025, which the Respondent was required to honour.

The Court observed that the Agreement did not contain a list of Petitioner's clients nor did the Agreement stipulate that the Clients of the Petitioner were its exclusive Clients. The Court held that while the Petitioner had enumerated in the petition that ICICI Bank, Yes Bank, Axis Bank and American Express were its clients, however, nothing had been put on record to substantiate that the said entities/banks were its exclusive clients and that they had not entered into similar agreement with other service providers like the Petitioner.

Gujarat High Court

Writ Court Interfering With Every Procedural Order In Arbitral Proceedings Is Contrary To Aim Of A&C Act: Gujarat HC

Case Name: Gujarat Power Corporation Limited v. Tata Power Renewable Energy Limited

Case Number: R/Special Civil Application No. 6910 of 2025

The Gujarat High Court while dismissing a writ petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution observed that the Writ Court can exercise their power only in cases where the only if the order in questions is “completely perverse”, or the order in questions is crippled with “bad faith” or the order in questions falls in the category of “rarest of rare circumstances”.

The bench of Justice Mauna M. Bhatt further held that if the Writ Court exercises its jurisdiction in curing every procedural lapse in arbitral proceedings, the same would amount to opening Pandora's box, which would be contrary to the principle of minimum judicial intervention.

The bench observed that the impugned judgment does not pass the test of either being “perverse” or having been passed in “bad faith” to warrant the Writ Court to exercise judicial interference. The order was passed by the Ld. Sole Arbitrator takes a plausible view, and even no stretch of imagination can compel the impugned order to be treated as “exceptional” or “rare”, such that it would shock the conscience of a prudent person

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Closure Of Partnership Activities Till Dissolution Of Firm Cannot Be Granted As Interim Relief U/S 9 Of A&C Act: HP High Court

Case Title – Nitin Gupta v Arrpit Aggarwal

Case No. – Arb. Case No. 116 of 2025

The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua has observed that an interim relief petition under Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) claiming closure of business and manufacturing activities of the partnership business cannot be granted when the principal dispute pertains to the business activities of that partnership. Granting such a relief would amount to the destruction of the subject matter of arbitration and would defeat the very intent and purpose behind the aforesaid section.

The Court observed that the object of Section 9, ACA is to preserve the subject matter and secure arbitration. In the guise of praying interim relief under Section 9 petition, relief of nature destructive to the main subject matter could not be granted. Filing of an application by a party by virtue of its being a party to an arbitration agreement is for securing a relief which the court has power to grant before, during or after arbitral proceedings by virtue of Section 9, ACA.

Employer Liable To Reimburse Customs Duty Paid By Contractor If Exemption Certificate Not Provided At Import Stage: HP High Court

Case Title: Himachal Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s Orange Business Service India Technology Pvt. Ltd.

Case Number:Appeal No. 01 of 2019

The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) filed by Himachal Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (HPPCL) upholding an arbitral award in favour of Orange Business Service India Technology Pvt. Ltd. The court held that the failure to provide exemption certificate by employer at the time of importation of goods for ADB funded project made it liable to reimburse the customs duty paid by the contractor.

A bench comprising Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Ranjan Sharma found the Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal which directed the reimbursement of Rs. 1 crore with 10% interest to be well reasoned, consistent with contractual terms and not vitiated by patent illegality. It held that “the Corporation having been satisfied with the supply, installation and commissioning of the project, now cannot turn around and shake off its liability on account of its own inefficiency.”

It further held that the scope of interference under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower than section 34. Only patent illegality justifies the court's interference. Ultimately, the court held that failure to issue exemption certificates on time coupled with satisfaction with the work completion fastened the liability on the Appellant to reimburse the customs duty.

Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

J&K High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Of ₹1.37 Crore To Entrepreneur Whose Gulmarg Hotel's Lease Was Illegally Terminated By Govt

Case-Title: UT Of J&K & ORS VS MRS. RAJINDER OBEROI

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 257

The Jammu & Kashmir High Court has upheld Rs. 1.37 crore in compensation to a woman entrepreneur whose hotel lease was wrongfully cancelled, stating that illegal termination of lease resulted in losses to the extent of Rs.1,37,57,009/.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar held that the Arbitral tribunal was justified in awarding the amount towards the financial loss suffered by the claimant, stemming from the unlawful termination of the lease, which had rendered her unable to operationalise a tourism project and repay institutional loans.

The case revolved around a 1989 lease deed granted by the government to the respondent/claimant for running a hotel in Gulmarg. However, the lease was terminated midway on the ground that the claimant had not commissioned the project for over 14 years.

The court however observed that “Asking the respondent to set up a new hotel business at Gulmarg during peak militancy would be asking for the moon."

Jharkhand High Court

Purpose Of A&C Act Stands Defeated If There Are Delays In Executing Arbitral Award: Jharkhand High Court

Case Name: R.K. Construction Private Limited v. State of Jharkhand

Case Number: C.M.P. No. 397 of 2025

The Jharkhand High Court division bench comprising Chief Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Justice Rajesh Shankar observed that the purpose and the object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, would stand defeated if there are delays in the execution of the Arbitral Award.

The present petition was filed by M/s/ R.K. Construction Private Limited (“RKCPL”), praying for expeditious adjudication of the execution petition filed by RKCPL before the execution court. The Court observed that there can be no objection to a prayer for expeditious adjudication. The Supreme Court in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Ors. (2021) provided detailed guidelines and directions concerning the conduct of the execution proceedings. The Supreme Court at ¶42.13 had observed that the executing Court must dispose of the execution proceedings within six months from the date of filing of the petition. The concerned period may be extended only by recording reasons for delay in writing.

Karnataka High Court

Seat Of Arbitration Retains Jurisdiction Over Execution Proceedings Irrespective Of Location Of Judgment Debtor's Assets: Karnataka High Court

Case Title: Ms. Sumita Abhishek Sundaram v. Sankalpan Infrastructure Private Limited

Case No.: WRIT PETITION No.35715 OF 2024 (GM - CPC)

The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna has held that the seat court of an arbitration always retains jurisdiction over execution proceedings irrespective of where the award-debtor is located or has its assets, even when another execution petition is pending in another jurisdiction.

The Court, in considering the question of jurisdiction for the seat of arbitration, had relied on the judgment in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited (2020), wherein the Supreme Court observed:

"Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral proceedings in connection with the arbitration in one court exclusively.”

The Court had held that Bangalore would be the seat of arbitration because the respondent Company had its business or a branch at Bangalore, where the petitioner was functioning. The Court referred to Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., which interpreted Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

"The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation has a subbordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place...".

Madras High Court

Party Can't Evade Two-Tier Arbitration By Questioning Authority Of Appellate Tribunal To Dismiss Appeal On Grounds Of Limitation: Madras HC

Case Title: ICICI Securities Limited versus Kariabettan Sugumar

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 238

The Madras High Court bench of Justice Abdul Quddhose has held that once the petitioner chooses to file the appeal instead of directly approaching the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the petitioner cannot wriggle out of the two-tier arbitration, by stating that they were not given an opportunity by the Appellate Tribunal to prosecute the appeal on grounds of limitation.

Meghalaya High Court

Disputes Over Disaffiliation Of State Golf Associations Can Be Referred To Arbitration Under Clause 66 Of IGU Rules: Meghalaya High Court

Case Title – Meghalaya Golf Promoters Society v. Union of India

Case No. – WP(C) No. 154 of 2025

The Meghalaya High Court bench of Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, in a notable judgment has observed that the dispute resolution clause provided in Clause 66 of the IGU Rules and Regulations would apply to instances of disaffiliation of a state golf association by the Indian Golf Union (IGU) and the arbitration would be conducted under the aegis of Arbitration Commission of the Indian Olympic Association. However, seeing the gross violations of principles of natural justice, the Court allowed the writ petition notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy in the form of arbitration.

Orissa High Court

Clause 18 Of Vivad Se Vishwas-II Scheme Is Mandatory If Claim Satisfies Twin Test: Orissa High Court

Case Name: Paradip Port Trust (PPT) v. M/s Modi Project Limited

Case Number: ARBA No. 8 of 2023

The Orissa High Court, while hearing an appeal u/s 37 of the A&C Act, a Writ Petition filed by the Respondent for directions to the Appellant to consider the offer made under appeal, observed Vivad se Vishwas II (contractual disputes) scheme (“the scheme”), observed that Clause 18 of the scheme is mandatory in nature.

The bench of Justice Sanjeeb K. Panigrahi observed that once a contractor chooses to settle under such terms, the procuring entity cannot deny the claim without violating the legitimate expectation generated by the scheme.

Regarding the nature of Clause 18 of the scheme, the bench observed that the clause provides that where the claim amount is ₹500 crore or less, the entity “will have to accept” the claim if the same is covered following the guideline. The essence of the scheme is such that once a claim in compliance with the parameters is made, the procuring entity does not have the discretion to reject it.

The policy mandates that where the claim amount is below ₹500 crore, the claim is to be accepted. The statutory compulsion removes the discretion in the decision-making process of public undertakings. Following the principles of administrative law, an instrument of the State cannot act arbitrarily. Since the scheme stipulates that certain claims "will have to be accepted," there is a binding obligation. If these claims were to be rejected, it would be contrary not only to the scheme but also to the doctrine of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Patna High Court

S.5 Of Limitation Act Applies To Revision Pleas Under Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Act: Patna High Court

Case Title – State of Bihar & Others v. Dayanand Sinha & Others

Case No. – Civil Revision No. 34, 66 and 112 of 2017

The Patna High Court Bench of Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya has observed that Section 5, Limitation Act applies to revisions under Section 13, Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Act, 2008 (“BPWCDA Act”), meaning thereby that delay in filing a challenge to awards passed under BPWCDA Act can be condoned by applying Section 5, Limitation Act. Since there were conflicting opinions of the Patna High Court on the said point, the matter was sent or reference to a larger bench.

The Court highlighted that Section 34(3), ACA clearly provided that the application may be entertained within a period of 3 months extended by thirty days but not thereafter whereas Section 13, BPWCDA states that application be made to it within three months and it does not clearly exclude the same as it is in addition to and supplemental to ACA. In view of the settled law, the Court observed that an express reference to an exclusion was not essential and the court could examine the language of the special law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that certain provisions of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded. Thus, the Court concluded that Section 5, Limitation Act is applicable to the revisional power of the High Court under Section 13, BPWDCA Act.

Rajasthan High Court

Filing Application U/S 10 Of Commercial Courts Act With S.34 Petition Fulfills Requirements U/S 34 Of A&C Act: Rajasthan High Court

Case Title – Continental Engineering Corporation Limited v Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 274

The Rajasthan High Court Bench of Justices Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Chandra Prakash Shrimali has held that merely if an application filed under Section 10, Commercial Courts Act (“CCA”) does not mention Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) in the heading, it does not mean that the application cannot be treated as an application under Section 34, ACA. Filing the application under Section 10, CCA and annexing the Section 34 petition fulfils the requirement of Section 34 and such a filing is not defective or untenable in law.

The Court also highlighted instances where it was in fact the Respondent's conduct which had led to delay in the adjudication of the application under Section 34, ACA. The Court observed that the contents of the aforementioned application clearly reveal it being objections under Section 34, ACA which were originally filed before the Commercial Court. The Single Judge, therefore, ought to have looked into the contents thereto. Thus, the Court held that it was unable to accept the findings of the Single Judge that there was no application moved under Section 34, ACA.

Telangana High Court

Commercial Courts Act Is Entity-Neutral In Terms Of Limitation; Govt Suffers Same Pitfalls As Private Entity: Telangana High Court

Case Name: M/s. Telangana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited v. Mark Raj Kumar

Case Title: I.A.No.1 OF 2025 IN/AND COMCA No.1 of 2025

The Telangana High Court Division Bench, comprising Justices Moushumi Bhattacharya and B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, observed that the Commercial Courts Act 2015 is an entity-neutral statute in terms of the limitation period. The Commercial Courts Act 2015 is in place to ensure the speedy resolution of high-stakes commercial disputes.

The bench at the outset observed that the appellant in the affidavits failed to explain the lapse of four months between 07.06.2023 and 09.10.2023. In light of respondent no. 1 demanding the return of the original Title Deeds of the scheduled property, TSIDCL realised that they had not made any decision concerning the impugned order. Furthermore, no explanation is given for the lapse of six months from November 2023 to May 2024, and it was in the second week of December 2024 that the present appeal was filed.

The bench observed that in order to exercise their discretionary power u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, sufficiency of cause should be shown to the Court. 'Sufficient' cause must reflect a sense of purpose and a willingness to restore diligence. The appellant only provided sporadic dates in the timeline from February 2023 to December 2024, with no explanation for the long blanks in between these dates.

Non-Signatory Must Have Live & Proximate Connection To Arbitration Agreement For Being Pulled Into Proceedings U/S 9 Of A&C Act: Telangana HC

Case Name: K.Bala Vishnu Raja v. Emaar Hills Township Private Limited and Others

Case Number: C.R.P. Nos. 1014 and 1184 of 2024

The Telangana High Court Division Bench comprising of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao has observed that for being pulled into the proceedings u/s 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, a non-signatory must have a live and proximate connection to arbitration agreement.

The bench observed that the law has pushed the boundaries to pull in non-signatories to the arbitration agreement where the conduct of such parties reflects their intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement. A non-signatory cannot escape the obligations of an arbitration agreement by simply claiming they are not a party to it, if the facts show a close and direct connection with that agreement.

Commercial Courts Act Envisages 'Marked Difference' Between Specified Value & Pecuniary Value: Telangana High Court

Case Name: M/s Janset Labs Pvt. Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.

Case Number: CRP No. 1932 of 2025

The Telangana High Court Division Bench comprising of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gidi Praveen Kumar while hearing a Civil Revision Petition (“CRP”) observed that specified value forms the foundation of a commercial dispute for admission into the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CC Act”). The pecuniary value, on the other hand, highlights the competence of the Court for trying such a commercial suit.

The bench noted that the expression 'Specified Value' u/s 2(1)(i) of the CC Act is different from the expression 'Pecuniary Value' u/s 3 (1A) of the CC Act. Section 3(1A) was added via the 2018 amendment concerning the pecuniary value of the Commercial Courts having original civil jurisdiction under the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Furthermore, Section 3(1A), beginning with a non-obstante clause, contemplates that the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, shall specify the pecuniary value of the Commercial Courts, which shall not be less than ₹ 3 lacs. Therefore, although both provisions were added via the 2018 amendment, these provisions are distinct and occupy different fields.