Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest 2025: Service Law

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565

Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2008; Rule 18 - Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982; Rules 5, 9 and 14 - Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 - Disability Pension - Invalided Soldier - Presumption of Disability Due to Military Service - Burden on Army to Prove Otherwise - Soldier invalided out of service due to disability presumed to have incurred disability from military service unless proven otherwise by the Army - No requirement for soldier to prove disease was contracted or aggravated by military service - Disability leading to invalidation presumed to be above 20%, entitling soldier to 50% disability pension - Beneficial provision to be interpreted liberally - Army directed to grant 50% disability pension with 6% interest on arrears from 01.01.1996 for life, payable within three months. (Paras 44 - 46) Bijender Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2025 INSC 549 : AIR 2025 SC 2130

Banking Service - UCO Bank Pension Regulations, 1995 - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(p) and 18(1) - Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957; Rule 58 - Bipartite Settlement, 1966 - An employee dismissed for misconduct after completing over ten years of service is entitled to pensionary benefits under the Bipartite Settlement. Regulation 22 which denies pension to removed employees, does not override Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act. An employee meeting the minimum qualifying service requirement cannot be denied pension, regardless of misconduct, harmonizing the provisions to uphold the employee's superannuation benefits. Appeal dismissed. (Para 14, 17 & 22) Uco Bank v. Vijay Kumar Handa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2025 INSC 442 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1484

Banking Service - Union Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976; Regulation 19 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) - Procedural Fairness - Mala Fides - Retirement Benefits - Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of a charge sheet by Union Bank of India against a former employee, without obtaining the Central Vigilance Commission's (CVC) first-stage advice in a vigilance-related case, violated procedural fairness and the Bank's regulations. Held, the Bank's actions, initiated just before the appellant's retirement after 34 years of unblemished service, breached procedural fairness, particularly as the Bank had assured the High Court that the charge sheet would be issued only after receiving CVC advice. The Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings, finding the Bank's failure to obtain and consider CVC's first-stage advice before issuing the charge sheet arbitrary, mala fide, and in violation of Regulation 19 and CVC circulars. The appeal was allowed, the charge sheet and disciplinary proceedings were set aside, and the Bank was directed to release the appellant's full retirement benefits, excluding back wages. (Para 21) A.M. Kulshrestha v. Union Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2025 INSC 744 : AIR 2025 SC 2520

Caste Certificate - Plea to submit caste certificates beyond cut-off date - OBCNCL/MBC-NCL certificates valid for one year, extendable to three with affidavit – appellants lacked valid certificates at application deadline – No relaxation permissible – As per relevant law, rules and instructions, a certificate of a claim, as put forth by the appellants, was valid for 1 year from the date of issuance, and subsequently, extendable up to 3 years, provided an affidavit to the said effect was also produced along with the originally issued certificate. A claim made by a candidate, while filling their application as per the concerned advertisement, was to hold good as on the date of his or her application or as per the last date of submission of applications prescribed by the concerned advertisement. Thereupon, considering the date of issuance of the category certificates in the appellants' case, none of them had a valid certificate and/or accompanied by the affidavit as per the proforma at the relevant time as per requirement. (Para 33, 36 - 38) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (Karnataka); Rule 16(a)(iii) – Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (Karnataka); Rule 6 – Cadre Change at Employee's Request – Effect on Seniority - the Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error in directing the appellant to grant seniority to the respondent in the cadre of First Division Assistant with effect from the date in which the said respondent has entered service in the cadre of Staff Nurse from 05.01.1979, instead of 19.04.1989, when she was appointed in the new cadre of First Division Assistant. (Para 24) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389

Compassionate Appointment - Applicable Scheme - Date of Death vs. Date of Consideration - Conflicting Precedents - Terminal Benefits - Retrospective Application - Canara Bank Scheme 1993/2005 - Merits of Claim - No severe financial hardship was demonstrated post-death to warrant compassionate appointment. The widow and respondent (son) were the only dependents; married daughters were settled. The High Court's direction under the 1993 Scheme was set aside, and the appeal allowed by dismissing the respondent's claim. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Conflicting Judicial Precedents on Applicable Scheme - The Court flagged ongoing uncertainty, noting divergent views across decisions - Date of Death View (Binding Precedent): Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 44; Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (2015) 7 SCC 412; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas (2020) 10 SCC 496; Indian Bank v. Promila (2020) 2 SCC 729; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi (2023) [Implied Reference]. These hold that claims must be decided under the scheme existing at the date of death, absent retrospective application of a subsequent scheme. No vested right accrues on death to demand consideration under a prior scheme if superseded. – Date of Consideration View: SBI v. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661; MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh (2014) 13 SCC 583; N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka (2020) 7 SCC 617. These apply norms prevailing at the time of application consideration, as no vested right exists post-death. The Court observed that three-judge Bench decisions in N.C. Santhosh (supra) and Amit Shrivas (supra) are at variance, and the reference to a larger Bench in State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (2019) 5 SCC 600 remains undecided. It debated retrospective application of executive schemes but deferred resolution, noting an existing reference. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Deceased bank employee left behind widow, unmarried son (respondent, now overage for entry-level post), and three married daughters (not dependents). Family received family pension of Rs. 4,637.92 (deemed sufficient for two dependents) and terminal benefits of Rs. 3.09 lakh. High Court directed appointment and Rs. 5 lakh compensation, upheld on appeal with costs. Impugned High Court orders set aside; compassionate appointment denied for absence of indigence. However, invoking inherent powers and prior coordinate bench observations, employer directed to pay respondent lump sum ex-gratia of Rs. 2.5 lakh within two months as final settlement, considering generated expectations from litigation success. (Para 32, 44, 49) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Delay in Claim – A lapse of over two decades in pursuing the claim (father's death in 2001; claim assessed in 2025) does not automatically bar consideration where the dependent has diligently litigated against the employer and courts. Respondent's current age is irrelevant if merits are otherwise assessable. (Para 27, 28) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Disagreement with Canara Bank (2015): Overruling aspects of Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra), the Court held that Clause 3.2 (keeping offers open for minors till majority) is a benevolent provision for human dignity, not linked to terminal benefits. Grant of family pension/terminal benefits does not bar compassionate claims, as they serve distinct purposes. However, judicial propriety precluded referral to a larger Bench, given the pending Sheo Shankar Tewari reference and the claim's two-decade pendency. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Principles - 1. Exception to Equality: Compassionate appointment, offered on humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the constitutional principle of equality in public employment. 2. Rule-Based: It cannot be granted without specific rules or instructions. 3. Purpose: Aimed at addressing sudden financial crises due to the death or medical incapacitation of the family's breadwinner. 4. Immediacy: Appointments must be made promptly to alleviate distress, and delayed applications may be rejected. 5. Strict Interpretation: As a side-door entry, rules must be strictly interpreted. 6. Not a Right: Compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right, and depends on fulfilling eligibility criteria, including financial indigence. 7. No Inheritance: It cannot be claimed as an inherited right or based solely on descent. 8. Financial Need: The family's financial distress is a primary condition; terminal benefits and other income sources are considered to assess penury. 9. No Reservation: Vacancies cannot be reserved for minors until they attain majority unless specified by rules. 10. Judicial Restraint: Courts cannot grant compassionate appointments outside statutory regulations or based solely on sympathy. The Court underscored that compassionate appointments are not meant to provide endless support or bypass constitutional safeguards under Articles 14 and 16, ensuring fairness and objectivity in the process. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – Scope and Criteria – Held, compassionate appointments under schemes for dependents of deceased employees dying in harness are to be granted only in "hand-to-mouth" cases where the family is below the poverty line and struggling with basic expenses like food, rent, and utilities due to lack of steady sustenance. Such relief is not warranted merely for a fall in standard of life following the breadwinner's death. There is no straitjacket formula; each case must be assessed on its peculiar financial condition, with indigence of dependents being the fundamental precondition. Failure to prove such indigence renders the claim untenable, as it would otherwise create an impermissible reservation conflicting with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 29) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Compassionate Appointment – The respondent's father, an employee of Canara Bank, died in 2001 prior to retirement. The respondent sought compassionate appointment under the Canara Bank Compassionate Appointment Scheme, 1993. During pendency of High Court proceedings, the Bank introduced the 2005 Scheme, replacing appointments with lump-sum ex-gratia payments, and discontinued the 1993 Scheme via circular. The High Court directed appointment under the 1993 Scheme, leading to the Bank's appeal. Whether, for compassionate appointment claims, the applicable scheme is that prevalent on the date of the employee's death or on the date of consideration of the application. Effect of family pension and terminal benefits on eligibility for compassionate appointment under the 1993 Scheme. Interpretation of Clause 3.2 of the 1993 Scheme regarding minors and terminal benefits - Discussed. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184

Constitution of India; Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of functus officio does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127

Constitution of India - Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111

Constitution of India - Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656

Consumer Forum - Qualification for appointment - A bunch of appeals and review petitions arose from Bombay High Court orders invalidating aspects of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of the President and members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020 (“2020 Rules”), concerning appointments to consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, particularly in Maharashtra. In Impugned Order I, the Bombay High Court struck down Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules for executive dominance in the selection process (violating judicial independence per Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC 1, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369 (“MBA – III”), and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455 (“MBA – IV”)) and partially invalidated Rule 10(2) on tenure extensions; absent clear reappointment rules, it applied Rule 8(18) of the Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowances, and Conditions of Service of President and Members of State Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2019, temporarily. Impugned Order II clarified that directions in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 231] (“Limaye – I”) on written examinations apply only to non-judicial members of State Commissions and District Commission members. Impugned Order III (Telangana High Court) set aside District Commission appointments predating Limaye – I. The Supreme Court examined consumerism's constitutional foundations under Articles 38, 39, and 47, its evolution, and the adequacy of tenure-based grievance redressal mechanisms. Issues: (i) Feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum (e.g., Consumer Tribunal or Consumer Court) for consumer disputes, replacing or supplementing tenure-based appointments with permanent judicial/non-judicial members, staff, and Presiding Officers (potentially headed by sitting judges), alongside enhanced strength and infrastructure; (ii) Notification of revised recruitment rules ensuring judicial independence (majority judicial selection committees), efficiency (five-year tenures per precedents), and differentiated processes (no examinations for judicial posts; mandatory for non-judicial); (iii) Validity of 2020 Rules' provisions on selection committees, examinations, and reappointments; (iv) Scope of Limaye – I directions; (v) Status of existing/pending appointments, terminations, and recruitments amid transitions. Held: Upholding consumerism as a constitutionally embedded right integral to participatory democracy, economic activity, and environmental justice, the Court held that impermanent, tenure-based offices undermine security of tenure, motivation, judicial quality, efficiency, and consumer trust—necessitating a shift to permanency for qualitative, timely decisions. Exercising Article 142 powers, it advocated revamping consumer fora toward permanency at district, state, and national levels, aligning with precedents on judicial independence (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, “MBA – IV”). Struck down unsustainable aspects of 2020 Rules; clarified Limaye – I requires no written examinations/viva voce for Presidents/Judicial Members of State Commissions or District Commission Presidents, but mandates them (in consultation with State Service Commissions) for Non-Judicial Members; restricted District Commission President qualifications to serving/retired District Judges; set aside Impugned Order I (qua 2019 Rules' applicability for reappointments), upheld Impugned Order II, set aside Impugned Order III; allowed review petitions exempting judicial posts from examinations; mandated four-year tenures for continuing appointments (five-year for future ones); applied judgment prospectively except as directed. Directions: (i) Union of India to file affidavit within 3 months assessing constitutional viability of permanent Consumer Tribunal/Court with permanent staff/members/Presiding Officers, enhanced strength, infrastructure, and independence; (ii) Union to notify new Rules within 4 months incorporating five-year tenures, majority judicial selection committees, differentiated examination requirements, and restricted qualifications per precedents (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, MBA – IV); (iii) States to complete fresh recruitments within 4 months of notification. Granted interim protections (under Article 142) to seven categories of Presidents/Members, with continuing appointments limited to four-year tenures: (1) Maharashtra appointees (05-10-2023, post-examination) to complete tenures or continue until new process completion; (2) Maharashtra terminated members (06-10-2023) eligible for reappointment consideration under new Rules (judicial posts exempt from examination; non-judicial required); (3) Pre-Limaye – I (pre-2023) serving Presidents/Members to complete tenures or continue until new process; (4) Other States' serving/appointed Presidents/Judicial Members (with/without examinations) to complete tenures; stay-delayed selectees to be appointed for full terms; (5) Pre-Limaye – I non-judicial selectees (without examinations): serving to complete tenures; post-Limaye – I to continue until new process (no appointment if only selected); (6) Post-examination non-judicial selectees: serving to complete tenures; stay-delayed to be appointed for full terms; (7) Other States' terminated members eligible for reappointment under new Rules (judicial exempt from examination; non-judicial required). Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634

Deputation and Pension – Right to Absorption – Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules - West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules – No right to absorption in borrowed department – Service rendered by a state government employee on a deputation basis in a central government's department would not entitle him to pension as per Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Appeal Allowed. Union of India v. Phani Bhusan Kundu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Disability Pension – Burden of Proof – Schizophrenia – Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – Medical Board Opinion - Whether the Army bears the burden to prove that a disability arising during service is not service-related, and whether denial of disability pension without reasoned medical opinion is permissible. Held, under the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, disability pension provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of the personnel. The burden of proof lies with the Army to demonstrate that a disability arising during service is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. The Medical Board's opinion, lacking reasons to classify schizophrenia as a constitutional (hereditary) disorder, was deemed arbitrary and insufficient. Since the appellant was medically fit at enrolment in 1988 and the onset of schizophrenia occurred during service, the authorities failed to discharge the burden of proving the illness was not service-related. Denial of disability pension based on an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is impermissible, as reasons are statutorily required to justify discharge and denial of pension benefits. Where the authority initiates discharge due to a medical condition (not at the personnel's request), the onus to substantiate the grounds for denying disability pension lies heavily on the authority. Appeal allowed; disability pension granted to the appellant. (Para 32 - 36) Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2025 INSC 644 : AIR 2025 SC 2804

Disciplinary Action - Moral Turpitude - Dismissal from Service - Proportionality of Punishment - Doctrine of Proportionality - This doctrine forbids the competent authority to act arbitrarily, vengefully or so harshly that the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee pricks the conscience of the court. Held, Respondent-Constable was a member of a disciplined Para Military Force and was posted in sensitive border area. He was obligated to perform his duties and guard the cash boxes with utmost dedication, honesty, commitment and discipline. Contrary to the faith and trust reposed in him by his superiors, he broke open the cash box. On being found guilty of gross misconduct involving moral turpitude, relying on confessional statement and evidences, it is duty of Disciplinary authority to impose a punishment on Respondent. This duty increases especially in Para military forces. All the members of the force must note that there is zero tolerance for such brazen misconduct, where the guardian of the cash box became its looter. The genuineness of the respondent's confession has not been doubted by the High Court. High Court ought not to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to compel the authorities to impose a punishment less than dismissal from service. Misconduct proved against respondent is so grave and alarming that any punishment less than dismissal from service would prove inadequate and insufficient. High Court ought not to have applied doctrine of proportionality herein. Appeal allowed. (Paras 10, 11) Union of India v. No. 900224364 Const/G.D. Jageshwar Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 668

Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554

Disciplinary Proceedings - Extension of Time - Due Process and Natural Justice - Disciplinary proceedings extending beyond a court or tribunal's stipulated time limit without a genuine attempt to seek an extension are unlawful. If a time limit is conditioned with lapse of proceedings upon default, the disciplinary authority loses jurisdiction. Extensions may be sought in exceptional circumstances, but continuing proceedings without an extension, particularly despite objections, risks bias and violates due process. Non-compliance with judicial orders undermines the rule of law. In a case involving an Assistant Engineer accused of embezzling Rs. 2.5 crore, the Court identified multiple breaches of natural justice, including failure to provide enquiry documents and non-adherence to the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. The enquiry was declared wholly vitiated, and the Court dismissed the appeal, awarding the respondent full retiral benefits, adjusted for provisional pension arrears. (Paras 10, 38, 60, 62, 63, 70) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2025 INSC 555

Disciplinary Proceedings - The appellant, a Senior Medical Officer with 34 years of unblemished service, was served a charge-sheet 11 days before his retirement on March 31, 2017, alleging misconduct, including non-compliance with Election Commission directives, unauthorized leave, and failure to participate in the pulse polio program. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the appellant was denied an extension of service. An inquiry officer was appointed a year later, and the appellant was found guilty of most charges, leading to a 2% permanent pension cut. The High Court modified the penalty to a 2% pension cut for 5 years, but the appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed were justified. Whether the High Court's modification of the penalty was adequate. Whether the appellant's procedural rights were violated during the inquiry. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and the disciplinary authority's penalty, holding that the charges were not substantiated by legal evidence. The Court found that the inquiry officer's findings were based on perceived moral duties rather than the actual charges, and the disciplinary authority failed to provide a fair hearing. The appellant was exonerated of all charges, and the Court directed the restoration of his full pension, along with repayment of deducted amounts with 6% interest. The Court also awarded costs of ₹50,000 to the appellant, citing mala fide intent by the respondents in initiating disciplinary proceedings as retaliation for the appellant's prior litigation against high-ranking officials. The Court emphasized that disciplinary actions must be based on legal evidence and procedural fairness, and penalties must be proportionate to the misconduct. The Court deprecated the misuse of disciplinary proceedings to target employees, especially those nearing retirement, for personal vendettas. The Election Commission's policy exempting employees nearing retirement from election duty was highlighted, and the Court found the disciplinary action contrary to this policy. The appellant's full pension was restored, and deducted amounts were ordered to be repaid with interest. Costs of ₹50,000 were awarded to the appellant, with liberty for the State to recover the amount from responsible officials. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing all penalties and restoring the appellant's pension, while condemning the misuse of disciplinary proceedings for personal vendettas. Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83

Disciplinary Proceedings - The respondent, a former branch manager of Syndicate Bank, was accused of financial irregularities, including fictitious debits, fraudulent withdrawals, and misappropriation of funds during his tenure at the Mudigubba branch (2007-2008). A disciplinary inquiry found the charges proven, leading to his dismissal in 2012. The respondent was acquitted in criminal proceedings but failed to overturn the dismissal in subsequent appeals. The High Court set aside the dismissal, citing lack of evidence and procedural unfairness, and ordered reinstatement with full benefits. Whether the disciplinary inquiry was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence. Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the disciplinary authority's decision. Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct. Held, the disciplinary inquiry was fair, principles of natural justice were followed, and the findings were based on substantial evidence, including the respondent's admissions and documentary proof. The Court reiterated that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not exonerate an employee in disciplinary proceedings, as the standards of proof differ. However, considering the respondent's long unblemished service (21 years), the pressure of work, and the reimbursement of the financial loss, the penalty of dismissal was deemed disproportionate. The Court modified the penalty to a reduction in the time scale of pay for one year, without cumulative effect or adverse impact on pension. The appeal was partly allowed. The findings of misconduct were upheld, but the penalty was reduced to a minor penalty under Regulation 4(e) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The respondent was entitled to retiral benefits, to be paid within four months. The judgment reaffirms the high standards of integrity expected from bank officers and the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It underscores the principle of proportionality in imposing penalties, especially in cases involving long-standing employees with otherwise clean records. Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601

Education - Role of Teachers - The Court highlighted the pivotal role of teachers in shaping the future of the nation, especially in primary and upper primary education. Teachers are instrumental in moulding young minds, instilling values, and preparing students to be responsible citizens. The Court emphasized the need for teachers to adapt to modern challenges, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, while guiding students to discern right from wrong. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134

Education – Technical Education – AICTE Notifications – Qualifications for Teachers – PhD Requirement - Entitlement to Revised Pay Scales and Redesignation under 6th Pay Commission – Held, Assistant Professors in Engineering institutes (appointed after March 15, 2000), who did not have PhD qualification at the time of appointment or failed to acquire PhD within seven years of their appointment, cannot claim re-designation as Associate Professors in terms of the 2010 notification issued by the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). At the same time, teachers who were appointed in various Engineering institutes prior to March 15, 2000, when PhD was not an essential requirement for the post of Assistant Professor, will receive the benefit and redesignation to the post of Associate Professor as per 6th Pay Commission. (Para 17 & 27) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605

Education - West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016 - Eligibility cut-off for D.El.Ed candidates of the 2020-22 batch applying for Assistant Teacher posts in West Bengal is the date of the recruitment notification (21.10.2022), not the earlier announcement (29.09.2022), as no cut-off was specified in the Rules, 2016. Eligibility is determined by the date in the advertisement inviting applications when rules lack a cut-off. The Court upheld the 21.10.2022 notification, allowing candidates who received certificates on 29.11.2022 to participate, and directed the recruitment process to proceed expeditiously under Article 142. [Paras 24, 30 - 33] Soumen Paul v. Shrabani Nayek, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2025 INSC 451

Equivalence of Qualifications - Judicial Interference - Where the appointing authority, after obtaining necessary clarification, accepts the equivalence of a candidate's qualification (Diploma in Electrical and Electronics Engineering) with the prescribed qualification (Diploma in Electrical Engineering) for recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer, and no glaring disparity exists between the two, Courts should refrain from interfering by setting aside the appointment on grounds of mere difference in nomenclature. The burden lies on the challenger to demonstrate arbitrariness or illegality in such acceptance, failing which judicial review is unwarranted, as equivalence is primarily a matter for the recruiting authority to determine. [Para 17 - 23] Sajid Khan v. L. Rahmathullah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2025 INSC 251 : AIR 2025 SC 1300

Forest Service - Performance Appraisal Reports (PARs) - Authority to Act as Reporting, Reviewing, or Accepting Authorities for Indian Forest Service (IFS) Officers up to Additional Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (APCCF): Held, reporting, reviewing, and accepting authorities for IFS officers up to APCCF must be their immediate superiors within the Forest Department, as mandated by Supreme Court rulings in State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa (1987) and Santosh Bharti v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007). For the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF), the reporting authority may be from another department, provided they are higher in rank and familiar with the PCCF's work. The Supreme Court quashed the Government Order (G.O.) dated June 29, 2024, permitting Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, such as District Collectors and Divisional Commissioners, to comment on PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF, as it violated prior Court directions in Santosh Bharti (September 22, 2000) and TN Godavarman Thirumalpad (April 19, 2004). Noting Madhya Pradesh as the only state adopting this practice, the Court deemed it contemptuous but refrained from further action. The Ministry of Environment and Forests had directed that PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF be evaluated by superior Forest Department officers. IAS officers may provide comments on IFS officers' developmental work on a separate sheet, subject to review by a superior IFS officer. The State of Madhya Pradesh was directed to amend its rules to comply with prior Court orders. The ruling upholds the autonomy of the IFS in performance appraisals up to APCCF, restricting evaluations to Forest Department officers, except for the PCCF. (Para 37) In Re Performance Appraisal Reports of the Officers of the Indian Forest Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2025 INSC 748

Frivolous Litigation - The petitioner, a former employee of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), was dismissed in 2000 for habitual absenteeism and misconduct. Despite multiple judicial and administrative forums upholding his dismissal, the petitioner engaged in persistent and frivolous litigation, including filing multiple review petitions, appeals, and complaints alleging corruption against judges. The Court condemned the petitioner's abuse of the judicial process, emphasizing that such conduct wastes valuable judicial time and resources. The Court imposed a cost of ₹1,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, as a deterrent against unscrupulous litigants. The SLP and the application for condonation of delay were dismissed, and the Court underscored the need to curb frivolous litigation to ensure timely justice for genuine cases. Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2024 INSC 1051

Government Service - Sikkim Government Services (Leave) Rules, 1982; Rule 36 r/w. 32 - A government servant re-employed after retirement is not entitled to additional leave encashment under Rule 36 of the Rules if they already availed the maximum 300 days of leave encashment upon initial retirement. Rule 36 applies only to employees retiring at the age of superannuation (58 years) and does not extend to re-employed individuals. Rule 32, which governs re-employed servants, operates independently and does not entitle them to fresh leave encashment. Leave encashment, rooted in principles of equity and deferred compensation, must balance employee welfare with the financial stability of the employer, particularly when public funds are involved. Allowing multiple encashments for the same leave accrual risks unjust enrichment and burdens the public exchequer. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, upheld the State's clarificatory Office Memorandum, and rejected claims of procedural unfairness, finding no violation of natural justice. (Paras 14, 16, 21- 33) State of Sikkim v. Dr. Mool Raj Kotwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 472 : 2025 INSC 559 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1770

IAS (Pay) Rules, 2016; Rule 2 - Contention that no benchmark score was fixed under Rule 2 is inconsequential. Clause 7.2 of the Guidelines clearly states that no benchmark is required. Moreover, the absence of a fixed benchmark does not constitute arbitrariness or discrimination, as the appellant was considered a 'special case' despite 90% of his ACRs being unavailable. (Para 23) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

IAS Officer - Individual excellence may foster a superiority complex, potentially undermining discipline, decorum, and collegiality. Given the critical need for collective leadership at the highest levels of civil service, the Committee was justified in prioritizing adherence to discipline and collegiality. (Para 22) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

IAS Officer - Promotion to Chief Secretary Grade - Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Eligibility Criteria - Screening Committee - Dismissal of Plea - Officer failed to meet the mandatory requirement of having 90% of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) completed, a key criterion for promotion eligibility. (Para 25) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 17B - In cases of wrongful dismissal, lump sum compensation may be more appropriate than reinstatement with back wages in specific circumstances, provided courts balance the interests of the employee and employer with reasoned justification. Back wages are not automatic and depend on whether the dismissed employee was gainfully employed post-termination. The quantum of back wages is at the court's discretion if the employee admits to or is proven to have had gainful employment, with the employer bearing the burden of proof under Section 17B. In this case, the employer was found guilty of suggestio falsi (false representation) and suppresio veri (suppression of truth) before the Labour Court and Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, violating natural justice principles. The employee, a driver dismissed after a vehicular accident, was awarded 75% back wages from termination to superannuation, along with full terminal benefits, modifying the High Court's order for 100% back wages. (Para 25, 30, 34, 44, 45) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : AIR 2025 SC 1172 : (2025) 4 SCC 321

Judicial Officers' Pay - Directions - Increase of posts of District Judges - Constitution of Committees - Payment of Arrears - Regular Meetings - Clarification on Allowances - The Supreme Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to frame rules regarding the increase of posts of District Judges in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale categories. All High Courts were directed to constitute Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary within four weeks, with a Nodal Officer appointed to address day-to-day grievances of judicial officers. States were directed to pay arrears to judicial officers, including Special Judicial Magistrates, within three months. The Committees were directed to meet at regular intervals (not exceeding three months) to ensure timely resolution of grievances. The Court clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every ACP stage, irrespective of promotions or ACP benefits. The Court emphasized the importance of timely implementation of its orders and the need for institutional mechanisms to address the service conditions of judicial officers. The directions were issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, binding all State Governments and High Courts to comply. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Implementation of Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) Recommendations - The Court addressed the non-implementation of the SNJPC recommendations, particularly regarding the payment of super-time scale and selection grade scales for judicial officers, which were approved by the Court in its order dated 19.05.2023. The Court emphasized the need for timely payment of arrears and directed the constitution of Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary (CSCDJ) in each High Court to oversee the implementation of these recommendations. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Individual Grievances - Miscellaneous Applications - The Court disposed of several intervention applications and clarified that individual grievances should be addressed by the respective High Courts through the newly constituted Committees. The Court directed the Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary in the High Court of Telangana to address the grievance of a petitioner regarding inadequate pension, in line with the Court's earlier orders. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Remuneration for Special Judicial Magistrates - The Court clarified that Special Judicial Magistrates are entitled to a minimum remuneration of Rs. 45,000/- per month, along with a conveyance allowance of Rs. 5,000/- per month, effective from 01.04.2019. The Court directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay arrears to these magistrates within three months. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Officers' Pay - Risk Allowance and Higher Qualification Allowance - The Court addressed issues related to the admissibility of risk allowance for judicial officers and clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every Assured Career Progression (ACP) stage, rejecting the argument that such allowances would lead to unjust enrichment. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130

Judicial Service – Civil Judge Appointments – Candidates denied appointment for submitting category certificates beyond the cut-off date - Advertisement silent on certificate issuance date – Held, the Advertisement appears to be silent on the aspect of last date of issuance of valid category certificate, however, clause (i) and (iii) of paragraph 6 explicitly provide that the candidates from concerned categories therein were to furnish certificate issued by the competent authority as per rules. Clauses 1 and 2 of paragraph 18 clarified that candidates should only apply under a said category if they meet all the eligibility conditions as per the Advertisement. The Subsequent Notice, which was issued by the High Court on 04.08.2022, cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any basis. It specified that the certificate belonging to the concerned reserved category should have been issued prior or upto 31.08.2021 i.e. the last date of receipt of the application in pursuance to the Advertisement. This was because the Advertisement required a candidate to possess eligibility upto the cut-off date. Thus, the Subsequent Notice issued was in consonance with law and as per the Advertisement, applicable Rules, instructions and circulars issued by the competent authority. The plea of the appellants is unsustainable and deserves to be rejected. No relaxation can be granted in the given facts and circumstances of the case nor can it be claimed as a matter of right in the absence of any such discretionary clause in the Advertisement/Rules/Instructions. Appeal dismissed. (Para 26 & 36) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

Judicial Service - Constitution of India; Article 311 - Termination of Judicial Officers - Adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Punitive Action - Natural Justice - Misconduct Allegations - Termination of judicial officers based on adverse ACRs without timely communication, opportunity to explain, or expungement of adverse remarks is arbitrary and illegal. "Poor performance" claims must be substantiated by clear and consistent evidence; contradictory or unsubstantiated claims in ACRs are insufficient grounds for termination. "Other material" used as a basis for termination, such as pending or concluded complaints, necessitates a fair opportunity to be heard, especially when such complaints form the foundation of termination, in adherence to Article 311 of the Constitution and relevant Conduct Rules. Termination based on misconduct allegations and "inefficiency," even if complaints were closed or resulted in advisories, is punitive and stigmatic, rendering it illegal if done without due process. Termination orders based on such flawed procedures are liable to be set aside, as they violate established principles of law and natural justice. (Para 16) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289

Judicial Service - In a landmark ruling affirming judicial independence and equality under Article 14, the Supreme Court held that all retired High Court judges are entitled to full and equal pensionary benefits under the "One Rank One Pension" principle, irrespective of their date of appointment, source of entry (district judiciary or Bar), length of service, or status as permanent or additional judges. Discrimination in terminal benefits post-retirement violates constitutional equality, as judges in service receive uniform treatment. The Court issued comprehensive directions: 1. Retired Chief Justices of High Courts shall receive a full pension of ₹15 lakhs per annum. 2. Other retired High Court judges (including additional judges) shall receive ₹13.5 lakhs per annum. 3. Full pension applies regardless of service breaks between district judiciary retirement and High Court elevation. 4. Judges elevated from district judiciary post-introduction of the New Pension Scheme (NPS) are entitled to full pension; States must refund judges' NPS contributions (with accrued dividends) but retain State contributions. 5. Family pension and gratuity extend to widows/widowers or family members of judges dying in harness, without minimum service qualifiers, by aggregating career service periods. 6. All allowances, including leave encashment, pension commutation, and provident fund, shall comply with the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. The judgment, pronounced by CJI Gavai, emphasizes that post-retirement benefits are essential for judicial dignity, rejecting distinctions based on entry mode or pension schemes. Certain writ petitions by former judges were also considered. In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2025 INSC 726

Judicial Service - Increase in LDCE Quota - Reduction in Qualifying Service - Accelerated Promotion for Civil Judge (Junior Division) - Restoration of Advocate Practice Requirement - Vacancy Filling and Calculation - Suitability Criteria for Promotion - Directions - The Supreme Court directed all High Courts and State Governments to amend service rules to increase the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) quota for promotion from Civil Judge (Senior Division) to District Judge (Higher Judicial Service) from 10% to 25%. The minimum qualifying service for Civil Judge (Senior Division) to appear in LDCE for promotion to Higher Judicial Service reduced to 3 years, with a total minimum service of 7 years (including Civil Judge (Junior Division) service). 10% of posts in Civil Judge (Senior Division) reserved for accelerated promotion of Civil Judge (Junior Division) through LDCE, with a minimum qualifying service of 3 years. Civil Judge (Junior Division) aspirants must have a minimum of 3 years of practice as an advocate. Unfilled LDCE posts to be filled through regular promotion based on 'merit-cum-seniority' in the same year. Vacancies for LDCE to be calculated based on cadre strength where not already implemented. High Courts and State Governments to frame or amend rules to assess suitability for promotion to Higher Judicial Service based on: Updated knowledge of law, Quality of judgments ACRs of the preceding 5 years, Disposal rate in the preceding 5 years, Performance in viva voce, General perceptions, awareness, and communication skills. All High Courts and State Governments to amend relevant service rules to implement the above changes. Ensure rules are framed or amended to assess candidate suitability for promotion to Higher Judicial Service. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Judicial Service - Practical experience is critical for judicial officers handling issues of life, liberty, property, and reputation. Most High Courts, except Rajasthan and Sikkim, and States, except Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Nagaland, and Tripura, supported reintroducing the practice requirement. Concerns raised about superficial practice by aspirants signing vakalaths without effective experience. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - Recruitment for Civil Judge (Junior Division) – Practice Requirement - The Supreme Court restored the 3-year practice requirement for candidates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts, clarifying that experience gained as law clerks with judges or judicial officers will count towards fulfilling this requirement. The Court emphasized that allowing fresh law graduates without practical experience into judicial service has proven problematic, as they lack firsthand exposure to court proceedings and the administration of justice, which is essential for judicial roles. The 3-year practice condition will not apply to recruitment processes notified before the judgment but will be mandatory for future recruitments. The Court underscored the necessity of practical experience to equip candidates with the skills to handle issues of life, liberty, property, and reputation of litigants effectively. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - Recruitment of Fresh Law Graduates as Judicial Officers – Minimum 3-Year Practice Requirement Restored – Held, Appointment of fresh law graduates without prior Bar experience problematic; bookish knowledge and pre-service training insufficient for judicial role; practical exposure to courtroom dynamics essential; 3-year practice mandate applies to future recruitments; law clerk experience counts towards practice period. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - Representation of Women in Judiciary - Importance of Diversity - Held, the Supreme Court emphasized that increased female representation in the judiciary enhances judicial responsiveness to diverse social contexts, challenges gender stereotypes, and promotes equality in decision-making. The dismissal of the appellant, a female judicial officer from the Scheduled Tribe category, for non-disclosure of prior employment was deemed unwarranted, and her reinstatement was ordered. The Court highlighted three key aspects: (i) entry of women into the judiciary, (ii) retention and professional growth of women, and (iii) advancement to senior judicial roles. Greater representation of women shifts gender stereotypes, enhances visibility, and encourages access to justice. The Court recognized the appellant's perseverance and potential to contribute to a competent, diverse, and inclusive judiciary. (Para 29, 31) Pinky Meena v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2025 INSC 756 : AIR 2025 SC 3013

Judicial Service - Termination of Judicial Officer - Alleged Concealment of Prior Employment and Academic Impropriety - Violation of Natural Justice - Constitutional Rights under Articles 14 and 16 - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a former Civil Judge and judicial magistrate, setting aside the High Court's Full Court decision to terminate her service in 2020. The termination, based on non-disclosure of prior government employment and simultaneous pursuit of academic degrees, was held to be a disproportionate penalty for a minor omission. The appellant's explanation—that she resigned from her teaching position before joining the judiciary and discontinued her B.Ed. upon learning of university regulations—was found reasonable. The dismissal process violated natural justice principles due to the lack of an opportunity to be heard. While probationers lack an absolute right to a post, arbitrary or discriminatory termination without adherence to natural justice violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court ordered reinstatement with notional pay fixation, treating the appellant as a confirmed employee who completed probation, but without backwages. (Para 23, 26, 32) Pinky Meena v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2025 INSC 756 : AIR 2025 SC 3013

Judicial Service - The Court examined the pension entitlements of retired High Court judges, addressing disparities arising from date of appointment, source of entry (judicial service vs. Bar), and status as permanent or additional judges. Relying on the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (HCJ Act), and precedents including M.L. Jain v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 355, P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India (2014) 12 SCC 1, and Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Union of India 2024 INSC 862, the Court declared a uniform "one rank one pension" norm for this constitutional office. Issues: 1. Whether pension calculations must reckon full judicial service, using last pay as a High Court judge. 2. Validity of pension ceilings under the HCJ Act and Article 14 discrimination. 3. Parity in post-retiral benefits between permanent/additional judges and those elevated from judicial service/Bar. 4. Impact of service breaks or New Pension Scheme (NPS) on entitlements. Holdings and Principles Laid Down: The Court summarized the following binding principles: (i) Entire service as a judge is reckoned for pension, based on last pay drawn as a High Court judge (not hypothetical District Judge pay). [M.L. Jain (1985) 2 SCC 355]. (ii) Pension ceiling under clause (b), Paragraph 2, Part III, First Schedule to HCJ Act violates Article 14; effaced since 1 January 1996 per M.L. Jain (II) (1991) 1 SCC 644. Pension follows proviso ceiling therein. (iii) No discrimination in pension fixation for constitutional office holders; uniform pay, allowances, and perks extend to pensions regardless of elevation source. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (2014) 12 SCC 1]. (iv) Judicial officers' and Bar members' pre-elevation experience counts equally toward pension. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra); Jagdish Chandra Gupta 2024 INSC 862]. (v) Classification by elevation source (Bar vs. service) lacks rational nexus and is unreasonable. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (vi) "One rank one pension" is the norm for constitutional offices. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (vii) No discrimination in family pension payments. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (viii) Service breaks (e.g., between District Judge retirement and High Court elevation) do not deny pension based on High Court salary. [Union of India v. Justice (Retd.) Raj Rahul Garg (Raj Rani Jain)]. (ix) High Court judges elevated post-NPS are entitled to GPF benefits under HCJ Act. [Justice Shailendra Singh v. Union of India]. Significance: This judgment ensures parity and non-discrimination in judicial pensions, reinforcing constitutional uniformity for High Court judges' post-retiral benefits. In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2025 INSC 726

Judicial Service - The Supreme Court reinstated a minimum three-year practice requirement for advocates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts, reversing the earlier relaxation from the 2002 All India Judges Association case. The decision revealed a lack of consensus among High Courts and States, with most supporting the three-year practice condition alongside a law degree, while Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Nagaland, and Tripura opposed any such requirement. The High Courts of Rajasthan and Sikkim also resisted the mandate, and conflicting stances emerged between certain High Courts and their respective State Governments, such as Chhattisgarh and Punjab & Haryana. The Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts endorsed prior practice but did not specify a minimum duration. The Court clarified that the practice period is calculated from provisional enrollment and does not apply to ongoing recruitment processes. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - The Supreme Court restored the 3-year minimum practice condition for entry into judicial service but clarified that this requirement will not apply to recruitment processes already notified by High Courts or States prior to the judgment. The condition will apply only to future recruitment processes. Recruitment processes previously held in abeyance due to this case may now proceed. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - The Supreme Court restored the requirement of a minimum of three years of practice as an advocate for eligibility to apply for entry-level judicial service posts (Civil Judge, Junior Division). The period of practice may be reckoned from provisional enrollment and includes experience as law clerks. The condition does not apply to recruitment processes initiated by High Courts before May 20, 2025, but applies to future recruitments. All High Courts and State Governments are directed to amend service rules accordingly. Candidates must provide a certificate from the Principal Judicial Officer or an advocate with a minimum 10-year standing, endorsed by the designated officer, to verify practice. The Court observed that allowing fresh law graduates without practical experience into judicial service has been counterproductive, as firsthand court experience is essential for effective judicial functioning. The decision overrules the 2002 judgment in All India Judges Association case, which had removed the minimum practice requirement. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735

Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Judicial Service - Women in Judiciary - Gender Equality - Judicial Decision-Making - Maternity Rights - Indirect Discrimination - Reinstatement of Terminated Judicial Officers - Increased representation of women in the judiciary is essential for enhancing judicial decision-making, particularly in cases affecting women, and for promoting broader gender equality by challenging stereotypes and encouraging women's participation in other decision-making roles. International covenants, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and CEDAW, mandate protection of maternity rights and equal employment opportunities for women, including freedom from discrimination during pregnancy and maternity. Miscarriage has profound physical and psychological consequences for women, requiring sensitive consideration in the workplace. Courts must address and rectify indirect discrimination, which often masks underlying patriarchal systems, to ensure equal opportunity and gender equality in public employment. A holistic approach to evaluating judicial officers, especially women, necessitates considering their medical and emotional circumstances, including the impact of pregnancy and miscarriage, and not solely relying on performance metrics like pendency and disposal. Termination orders of judicial officers were set aside, and they were reinstated with consequential benefits, emphasizing the need for a sensitive work environment and guidance for women in the judiciary. (Para 17 & 18) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 - Maternity leave is an integral component of maternity benefits, forming part of reproductive rights recognized under international human rights law, encompassing the rights to health, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, and dignity. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order denying maternity leave to a government teacher for her third child, citing the State's two-child norm policy. The appellant, who had two children from a prior marriage (not in her custody) and sought leave for her first child born during employment, was entitled to maternity benefits under the Act. The Act prevails over conflicting State service rules by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. The Act's provisions on maternity leave duration (26 weeks for women with fewer than two surviving children, 12 weeks for those with two or more) do not limit benefits based on the total number of children, and “surviving children” refers to those in the custody of the woman employee. The State's two-child norm must be harmonized with the objectives of maternity benefits through purposive interpretation. The impugned order was set aside, restoring the Single Judge's direction to grant maternity leave from 11 October 2021 to 10 October 2022. (Paras 28, 32, 34, 35) K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : 2025 INSC 781 : AIR 2025 SC 2719 : (2025) 8 SCC 263

Military Service - Ex-Servicemen Quota – Eligibility of Indian Military Nursing Service (IMNS) Personnel - Whether personnel of the Indian Military Nursing Service (IMNS) qualify as "ex-servicemen" under the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-Servicemen Rules, 1982 for reservation in Punjab Civil Services. Held, IMNS personnel are eligible for "ex-serviceman" status under the 1982 Rules, as IMNS forms part of the Indian Military and the armed forces of the Union. The 1982 Rules aim to facilitate the resettlement of veterans, and excluding IMNS personnel would defeat this purpose, particularly given Punjab's significant contribution to the armed forces (7.7% of Army personnel). IMNS personnel satisfy the criteria for "ex-serviceman" status under Rule 2(c) of the 1982 Rules. Effective resettlement of ex-servicemen is vital for maintaining armed forces morale and encouraging youth enlistment. The Court dismissed the appeal challenging the High Court's ruling, affirming that Respondent No. 4, a released IMNS officer who served as a short-service commission officer and received gratuity upon release, qualifies as an "ex-serviceman" under Rule 2(c). Respondent No. 4 is eligible for appointment under the ex-servicemen quota without affecting the appellant's appointment (an ex-Army Captain). Respondent No. 4 is entitled to notional service benefits but not backwages. The ruling clarifies the inclusive scope of the "ex-serviceman" definition under the 1982 Rules, ensuring equitable employment opportunities for IMNS personnel in Punjab Civil Services. (Paras 14, 15, 18, 22) Irwan Kour v. Punjab Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 530 : 2025 INSC 494 : AIR 2025 SC 2161

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Held, under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1972, gratuity can be forfeited, wholly or partially, if an employee is terminated for misconduct constituting an offence involving moral turpitude, without requiring a criminal conviction. The observation in Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529, suggesting conviction as a prerequisite for forfeiture, was obiter dicta and not binding. The term "offence" under the Act, as per the General Clauses Act, refers to any act or omission punishable by law, judged on the standard of preponderance of probabilities in disciplinary proceedings, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal proceedings. The Disciplinary or Appointing Authority must determine if the misconduct constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and decide the extent of forfeiture based on the misconduct's gravity. In the present case, the Court upheld forfeiture for suppression of the actual date of birth and misappropriation of fares by MSRTC conductors, as these acts constituted offences involving moral turpitude, despite no criminal proceedings. Appeal allowed. (Para 10, 13) Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 216 : 2025 INSC 233

Pay Scale - Employees appointed on a temporary basis against sanctioned posts are entitled to a regular pay scale after completing three years of service, as per the relevant government circular. The designation of employees as "part-time" does not negate their entitlement to a regular pay scale if they are appointed against sanctioned posts and fulfill the conditions of the applicable rules. The absence of a Screening Committee for scrutinizing eligibility does not justify denying benefits to employees who are otherwise similarly situated to those who have received such benefits. The appellants were granted the benefit of a regular pay scale, and the State was directed to pay arrears accordingly. Rakesh Kumar Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2025 INSC 136 : (2025) 3 SCC 326

Pensionary Benefits – Regularization of Absence as Extraordinary Leave – Break in Service - Whether a retired government employee can be denied pensionary benefits on the ground of 'break in service' when their unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Held, pensionary benefits cannot be denied to a retired government employee whose unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Once the absence is treated as extraordinary leave, it cannot be considered a 'break in service' for denying pension. Denial of pensionary benefits must be supported by a departmental inquiry proving unauthorized absence, and the burden cannot shift to the employee to prove they were prevented from working. In the absence of such an inquiry, the regularization of service prevails, entitling the employee to pensionary benefits. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the State Administrative Tribunal and High Court. The respondents were directed to finalize the appellant's pension within three months. (Para 11, 12) Jaya Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2025 INSC 270 : AIR 2025 SC 1575

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – A batch of job contract employees in Odisha, initially engaged under job contract establishments and later regularised in pensionable posts, claimed pensionary benefits counting their entire pre-regularisation service. The Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Single Judge of the Orissa High Court upheld the claim, treating job contract service akin to work-charged service. The State's writ appeals before the Division Bench were dismissed as time-barred due to inordinate delay. The State approached the Supreme Court via special leave petitions, many filed belatedly. Appeals allowed; costs imposed. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Distinction between work-charged employees and job contract employees – Entitlement to pension for pre-regularisation service – Job contract employees not entitled to count entire pre-regularisation service towards pension; only qualifying period to make eligible for pensionary benefits – Unlike work-charged employees, whose full service of 5 years or more counts if uninterrupted and followed by regular appointment – 2001 amendment to Rule 18(6) limits job contract service to minimum qualifying period post-regularisation – State's delay in appeals condoned due to fiscal implications on exchequer and large number of affected employees, but costs of ₹1.5 lakhs per employee imposed on State for lethargic litigation approach – Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Orissa High Court orders set aside insofar as they allowed full pre-regularisation service for job contract employees. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Whether job contract employees, upon regularisation, are entitled under the Odisha Pension Rules, 1992, to pension benefits counting their full pre-regularisation service period, or only a limited qualifying portion thereof, as distinct from work-charged employees. Held: The Supreme Court, departing from the norm against condoning excessive delays, examined the merits given the matter's impact on numerous employees and the State exchequer. It clarified the statutory distinction under Rule 18: sub-Rule (3) qualifies the full uninterrupted service of work-charged employees (5+ years) for pension upon regularisation, whereas sub-Rule (6) limits job contract employees to only that service portion necessary to achieve pension eligibility post-regularisation. The 2001 amendment reinforced this intent to curb undue fiscal burden. The Tribunal and High Court misinterpreted the rules by equating the two categories. Full pre-regularisation service for job contractors impermissibly expands eligibility beyond legislative scheme. Directions issued for State to deposit ₹1.5 lakhs per affected employee within 4 weeks, non-effective until compliance; dismissed delay-based petitions revived per merits. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259

Police Service - Constitution of India; Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Police Service - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Prolonged suspension - Reinstatement - Subsistence Allowance - The applicant, an Assistant Superintendent (Jail), sought revocation of his suspension which was extended periodically. The suspension followed allegations of providing undue facilities to ex-promoters/directors of Unitech Ltd. who were under trial for financial misappropriation involving home buyers' funds. The Supreme Court directed the suspension of 32 Tihar Jail officials, including the applicant, pending further proceedings. The applicant argued for reinstatement, citing the prolonged suspension and lack of progress in the criminal case. The Court recalled the suspension order, leaving it to the Competent Authority to decide on reinstatement based on whether it would impede the ongoing departmental proceedings. The Court noted that suspended officials are entitled to 75% of their pay as subsistence allowance after six months of suspension, unless denied for valid reasons. Bhupinder Singh v. Unitech Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Promotion - Direct Recruitment - Procedure - Whether an employee is entitled to claim promotion to a post that is required to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment, and not through promotion from a feeder cadre? Whether a vacancy meant for direct recruitment can be filled merely by issuing an internal circular, without a public advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates? The importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice. The petitioner, employed as a peon since 1978, sought promotion to the post of Tracer, claiming eligibility based on a 3-month training course. The Administrative Tribunal initially directed the State to consider her case for promotion. However, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that the post of Tracer was to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Held, the post of Tracer, as per the 1979 Rules, is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment and not through promotion. Rule 5(1)(e) of the 1979 Rules explicitly states that all posts of Tracers in Categories I, II, and III shall be filled by direct recruitment. The petitioner, being a peon, was not eligible for promotion to the post of Tracer, as it is not a promotional post under the Rules. The Court reiterated that direct recruitment to public posts must follow a transparent process, including public advertisements and competitive examinations, as mandated by Rule 7 of the 1979 Rules. The State's failure to issue a public advertisement and follow the prescribed procedure rendered the appointments invalid. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87 : AIR 2025 SC 676

Promotion - Eligibility criteria - Medical Education Service - Post of Associate Professor - Distinction Between Administrative and Teaching Cadres - Whether the High Court of Kerala was justified in interfering with the promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Department of Neurosurgery on the ground of lacking five years of physical teaching experience as an Assistant Professor after acquiring the M.Ch. degree. Whether Government Order (G.O.) dated April 7, 2008, or G.O. dated December 14, 2009, governed the eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Medical Education Service. Whether the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS & SSR), particularly Rule 10(ab), applied to the promotional appointment in question. Held, G.O. dated April 7, 2008, which governed the recruitment and promotion in the Medical Education Service, did not explicitly require five years of teaching experience after acquiring the M.Ch. degree for promotion to the post of Associate Professor. The absence of such a requirement in the Teaching Cadre (Branch-II) was deliberate, as it was explicitly mentioned in the Administrative Cadre (Branch-I). The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing excludes the other) to conclude that the omission of the phrase “after acquiring postgraduate degree” in the Teaching Cadre was intentional. Rule 10(ab) of the KS & SSR, which generally requires experience to be gained after acquiring the basic qualification, was held inapplicable to the promotional appointment in question. The Court reasoned that G.O. dated April 7, 2008, being a special rule, superseded the general rules under the KS & SSR. The phrase “unless otherwise specified” in Rule 10(ab) allowed for exceptions, and the specific requirements of G.O. dated April 7, 2008, constituted such an exception. The High Court's reliance on Rule 28(b)(1A) of the KS & SSR was also deemed erroneous, as it applied only when no qualified candidate was available for promotion, which was not the case here. The requirement of post-qualification experience was more relevant for administrative posts (Branch-I) than for teaching posts (Branch-II), where the emphasis was on overall teaching experience. Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2025 INSC 70

Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2025 INSC 72 : AIR 2025 SC 465 : (2025) 6 SCC 460

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Courts should scrutinize whether the decision to cancel a selection process is wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe. When systemic fraud or irregularities vitiate a recruitment process, the entire process becomes illegitimate. If 2 wrongdoers can be segregated, innocent candidates should not be penalized by the cancellation of the entire process. In cases involving larger public interest, additional grounds can be considered to examine the validity of an order. The court can review the original reasons that caused the cancellation of the select list. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Each case regarding the cancellation of a select list must be decided on its own facts. The court must determine if the recruiting authority's decision to cancel the entire process, rather than save a part of it, is disproportionate and irrational. If the selection process borders on fraud, such as through violations of reservation policies, the decision to cancel the entire process can be justified. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Rights of Empanelled Candidates - Empanelment does not grant an indefeasible right to appointment, but empanelled candidates have a right to challenge adverse decisions. The appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel arbitrarily; there must be cogent reasons for not making appointments. Policy decisions not to carry forward the selection process must be bona fide, justifiable, and free from arbitrariness. (Para 53) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Interview-Based Selection - Presumption of Favouritism - Arbitrariness and Judicial Review - When a government itself acknowledges that a selection process based solely on interviews carries an inherent risk of arbitrariness and potential for misuse, this perception is a significant factor in judicial review. An assessment of candidates based solely on interview marks can reasonably lead to a presumption of favouritism. In such circumstances, courts should exercise significant restraint in substituting their judgment for the government's decision, especially when the government has acted to rectify a selection process perceived as flawed. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Public Employment - Recruitment Process - Cancellation of Select List by Successor Government - Judicial Review - Proportionality Test - Scope of Interference - Where a successor government cancels a select list prepared by a previous government due to detected illegalities and irregularities, the judicial review court must apply the proportionality test to assess whether the cancellation was justified. The court should consider whether the government's decision was so disproportionate and incommensurate with the detected illegalities/irregularities as to warrant interference. The court should not substitute its own view for that of the government, especially when the government's decision is not unreasonable or implausible. The government's decision to ensure diversity, inclusivity, and fairness in public service, even if it entails canceling a tainted selection process, should be given due deference. (Para 52) Public Employment - Absence of Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidates - The absence of a challenge from unsuccessful candidates does not preclude the government from addressing perceived arbitrariness or potential for favouritism in a selection process. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Recruitment Process - Constable positions in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) - Political Change and Cancellation- The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by publishing fresh advertisement. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the PET. It would be desirable if rules are framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias or arbitrariness. (Para 63 & 64) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705

Recruitment - Qualification - Teacher Eligibility Test - Whether the High Court erred in permitting candidates with Central Teacher Eligibility Test (CTET) or State Teacher Eligibility Test (STET) qualifications to participate in the recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand, despite the Jharkhand Teacher Eligibility Test (JTET) being the prescribed eligibility criterion under the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023? Whether the State of Jharkhand acted arbitrarily by altering the eligibility criteria mid-way through the recruitment process, in violation of the principles laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864 ? Whether the State Government has the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) Guidelines, 2011 ? Held, the Jharkhand High Court erred in permitting CTET and STET qualified candidates to participate in the ongoing recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand. The Court emphasized that the eligibility criteria, as per the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, required candidates to pass the JTET, and this criterion could not be altered mid-way through the recruitment process. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak that the eligibility criteria for recruitment cannot be changed after the recruitment process has commenced, as it would violate the guarantee of equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution. The State's decision to relax the eligibility criteria based on the Advocate General's concession was deemed arbitrary and unfair. The State Government does not have the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the RTE Act and NCTE Guidelines unless the Central Government issues a notification under Section 23(2) of the RTE Act. The State's actions in this case were not in compliance with the statutory framework. The impugned judgment of the High Court permitting CTET and STET holders to participate in the recruitment process was set aside. Only JTET holders who possessed the requisite qualifications under the 2022 Recruitment Rules prior to the 2024 amendment were declared eligible for appointment. CTET and STET holders who applied after the High Court's judgment or the amendment in the rules were deemed ineligible for recruitment under Advertisement No. 13/2023. The appeals were allowed, and the recruitment process was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, without any mid-way alterations to the eligibility criteria. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134

Reservation – Validity of OBC-NCL/MBC-NCL Certificates – Cut-off Date for Eligibility - Split Verdict - The appeals arose from a split verdict by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court on May 18, 2023, concerning the appointment of Civil Judges under the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010. The Supreme Court heard the appeals before a 3-Judge Bench due to the Division Bench's split verdict and held that in the absence of a specified cut-off date in recruitment advertisements, the last date for application submission is the default date for assessing eligibility, including the validity of reserved category certificates. OBC-NCL and MBC-NCL 2 certificates are valid for one year, extendable to three years with an affidavit, as per State circulars. Certificates issued beyond this period are invalid for claiming reservation benefits. Subsequent notice clarifying cut-off date, aligning with existing rules and judicial precedents, is not arbitrary. Appellants' certificates issued between 2012-2018 and after cut-off date were invalid, and no relaxation permissible absent discretionary clause in rules. Appeals dismissed, upholding High Court's exclusion of appellants from interviews for Civil Judge posts. (Para 36 - 39) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232

Retired Employees – Recovery of Excess Payment – Principles of Equity - Excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable. (Para 9 & 11) Jogeswar Sahoo v. District Judge Cuttack, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2025 INSC 449 : AIR 2025 SC 2291

Retirement Age - Prescribing different retirement ages for employees based on the type of disability is arbitrary and violates Article 14. The Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board retired a locomotor-disabled electrician at 58, while visually impaired employees could serve until 60 under a 2013 state policy (OM 29.03.2013). Such distinctions discriminatory, mandating uniform retirement benefits for all benchmark disabilities under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The impugned decision was set aside, affirming equal treatment across disability categories and the appellant's legitimate expectation of an extended retirement age until the policy's withdrawal in 2019. Appeal allowed. (Para 14) Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 646 : 2025 INSC 472

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90

Rule Against Bias - Audi Alteram Partem - Cure at Revisional Stage - Whether the selection of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998 was vitiated due to violation of the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) ? Whether the cancellation of appointments without affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) violated the principles of natural justice, and whether demonstrating prejudice is necessary to establish such a violation ? Whether the breach of natural justice at the initial stage (Collector's order) can be cured at the revisional stage (Commissioner's order) ? The appellants, relatives of members of the selection committee, were selected for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in 1998. Their selection was challenged by an unsuccessful candidate alleging nepotism and bias. The Collector quashed the selection, citing bias and nepotism, without issuing notice to the appellants. The Commissioner and High Court upheld the decision, despite the appellants' contention that they were denied a fair hearing. Held, the selection was not vitiated by bias. The recusal of committee members with relatives among the candidates, as per the Panchayat's resolution, eliminated any reasonable likelihood of bias. The statutory definition of "relative" was not fully considered by the lower authorities, and the absence of a hearing prevented the appellants from demonstrating the fairness of the selection process. The Court found a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, as the appellants were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the initial stage. The breach of natural justice was fundamental, and the prejudice exception did not apply. The Court emphasized that procedural fairness is inherent and cannot be dispensed with, even if no prejudice is demonstrated. The denial of natural justice at the initial stage could not be cured at the revisional stage. The appellate process cannot rectify a fundamentally flawed initial decision, especially when the revisional authority did not conduct a fresh hearing or address the procedural defects. The selection process was not vitiated by bias, but the cancellation of appointments without a fair hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Given the 25-year tenure of the appellants under interim orders, the Court declined to remand the matter for fresh inquiry, deeming it impractical and unjust. The judgment reaffirms the importance of procedural fairness in administrative decisions, emphasizing that the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing, are fundamental and cannot be overlooked. The Court also clarified that the rule against bias must be assessed contextually, and the doctrine of necessity may apply in cases where recusal is impractical due to small jurisdictions or statutory mandates. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

Seniority – If a government employee holding a particular post is transferred on public interest, he carries with him his existing status including seniority to the transferred post. However, if an officer is transferred at his own request, such a transferred employee will have to be accommodated in the transferred post, subject to the claims and status of the other employees at the transferred place, as their interests cannot be varied without there being any public interest in the transfer. Subject to specific provision of the Rules governing the services, such transferees are generally placed at the bottom, below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. (Para 19) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389

Subordinate Service - Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (Subordinate Service Rules) and Kerala Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (Special Rules) govern completely separate cadres. Rule 4(b) of the Special Rules applies only after appointment as Assistant Engineer, and cannot be applied for lower promotions. (Para 24) Sajithabhai v. Kerala Water Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2025 INSC 354

Subordinate Service - Re-evaluation of answer sheets - The Supreme Court directed the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission (UPSSSC) to re-evaluate answer sheets for the 2021–2022 Revenue Lekhpal examination due to ambiguities in three questions from Booklet Series “B.” For Question 58 (Salt Satyagraha Location), the Court held both (A) Dandi and (C) Sabarmati as correct, noting the march started at Sabarmati but the act of defiance occurred at Dandi, and awarded marks for either choice. For Question 63 (Longest National Highway in UP), options (C) NH2 and (D) None of these were accepted due to outdated designations. For Question 90 (Solar Photovoltaic Irrigation Pump Scheme grant), both (B) 30% and (C) 45% were deemed valid due to policy changes. Criticizing UPSSSC for framing ambiguous questions, the Court ordered re-evaluation for affected candidates without disturbing selected candidates. (Para 10 - 12) Reetesh Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 523

Transfer - Distinction between transfers on request and transfers by absorption in public interest - Determination of seniority of employees absorbed from the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) into the Directorate of Medical Education (DME) following the abolition of the dual control system in medical colleges in Kerala - Held, the transfer of employees from DHS to DME was a result of a policy decision by the Kerala government to abolish the dual control system, and the absorption was not based on the employees' request but on their option to join DME. The proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SS Rules), which applies to transfers on request, does not apply to transfers by absorption made in public interest or administrative exigency. The seniority of the absorbed employees should be maintained as per Rule 27(a) and 27(c) of the KS&SS Rules, meaning their seniority would include their past service in DHS. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside, and the State of Kerala was directed to prepare the seniority list of DME employees, including both original and absorbed employees, in accordance with the Court's ruling. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the absorbed employees, holding that their seniority should include their past service in DHS, as the transfer was a result of a policy decision and not a request-based transfer. Geetha V.M. v. Rethnasenan K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2025 INSC 33 : AIR 2025 SC 824

University - Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - Appeal against High Court order dismissing writ petition seeking inclusion in University's General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Appellant, appointed as Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987, did not opt for Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) despite opportunities. University statutes provided for two retiral benefit schemes: CPF (opt-in) and General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity (default). University issued Office Order dated 21.02.2008, reiterating this, stating non-exercise of CPF option would result in inclusion in the default scheme. Appellant's name was omitted from the list of those included in the default scheme. Whether the appellant, who did not opt for CPF, is entitled to be included in the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Held, Yes. University statutes and Office Order clearly stipulate that non-exercise of CPF option automatically entitles employees to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity scheme. High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based on nonexercise of option, as non-exercise led to inclusion in the default scheme. Similar relief granted to similarly placed persons by the High Court. High Court order set aside. University directed to provide retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme within four months, subject to adjustments of CPF benefits, if any, availed by the appellant. Appeal allowed. (Para 12) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312

University - Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - the default retiral scheme applicable to the University's employees is General Provident Fund-cumpension-cum-gratuity, unless the employee has specifically opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme. (Para 9) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312