Supreme Court Monthly Digest-August 2025

[Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 858]

Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 2002 (Kerala) - Rule 9(2) - Ethyl alcohol content in coconut toddy - Supreme Court on May 1, 2024, directed the government to reassess the appropriateness of 8.1% v/v limit for ethyl alcohol in coconut toddy - Expert Committee was constituted who recommended that maximum allowed ethyl alcohol content for self-produced alcohol from coconut palm today be 8.89% v/v at 15.56°C - Relying on this report Supreme Court held that prosecutions based on earlier assumption of an 8.1% v/v maximum ethyl alcohol content could not be sustained - Quashed 2007 Kerala Govt. Order capping coconut toddy alcohol content at 8.1% v/v. [Paras 2-5] Komalan v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 800

Advocates Act, 1961 - Enrolment Fees - Contempt Petition - Bar Councils can't collect any amount as “optional fee” during enrolment - Supreme Court closed a contempt petition after the Bar Council of India (BCI) affirmed its commitment to ensuring State Bar Councils (SBCs) comply with judgment in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 which prohibits charging enrolment fees beyond the stipulated amount under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 - Supreme Court clarified that no “optional” fees can be collected by any State Bar Council or the BCI, and fees must strictly adhere to the direction in the main judgment. [Paras 4-9] K.L.J.A. Kiran Babu v. Karnataka State Bar Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Alimony & Property Settlement – Held, alimony received after first divorce was not a relevant factor to determine the alimony payable after the divorce of the second marriage - The respondent's claim for Rs. 12 crores in permanent alimony and encumbrance-free ownership of the apartment as unjustified, considering that appellant-husband is an unemployed person and has responsibility of an autistic child - Appeal allowed. [Para 17, 20] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Animal Welfare – Vantara - Article 32 - Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Supreme Court noted that present writ petition alleges unlawful acquisition of animals, mistreatment of animals, money laundering etc. with no material of probative worth or supporting evidence - Such petitions ordinarily be dismissed, but Supreme Court decided to call for an independent factual appraisal to verify the allegations, particularly given the accusations against statutory authorities - Directed constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) composed of respectable persons of impeccable integrity and high repute to assist the Court by conducting a factfinding inquiry - SIT is to report by September 12, 2025. C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 835

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('1996 Act') - Held, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot be permitted to remain present in arbitration proceedings, as it would breach confidentiality and exceed the Court's jurisdiction after appointing an arbitrator - Section 35 of the 1996 Act states that an award binds only parties to the arbitration and those claiming under them - 'Party' is defined by section 2(h) as a party to an arbitration agreement - Permitting a non-signatory to be present in proceedings where the award would not bind them has no legal basis and is 'unknown to law' - Such a direction breaches the confidentiality principle enshrined in Section 42A of the 1996 Act, which requires the arbitrator, arbitral institution and parties to maintain confidentiality. Kamal Gupta v. L.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2025 INSC 975

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Held, an agreement between a Port authority and a private entity cannot override the provisions of the law, specifically the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 - When a tariff revision dispute arises, and parties fail to agree, a competent authority must resolve the issue - An arbitrator's award is contrary to basic legal principles if it reads clauses of an agreement in isolation - Entire agreement must be read as a whole. [Para 26] Paradip Port Authority v. Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2025 INSC 971

Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 - Requirement of signature on arbitration agreement - An arbitration agreement can be inferred from the exchange of letters or other forms of communication that provide a record of agreement - Mere fact that a contract containing an arbitration clause was not signed by one party does not invalidate the agreement, particularly when the parties conduct clearly shows their acceptance of the contract's terms - When parties act in furtherance of a contract by fulfilling their obligations, such as supplying and accepting goods, furnishing letters of credit and referencing the contract in subsequent correspondence, this conduct demonstrates an unequivocal acceptance of the contract, including its arbitration clause. [Paras 14-15] Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2025 INSC 1036

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11(6) – Held, after appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) and disposal of the proceedings, Court becomes functus officio and cannot issue further ancillary directions - Once arbitrator was appointed, Court lost jurisdiction to entertain new applications, such as the prayer for permission to intervene or remain present - 1996 Act is a self-contained Code and Section 5 restricts judicial intervention to only what is expressly provided -Invoking section 151 of the CPC was not permissible in this context - Applications set aside. [Paras 14- 22] Kamal Gupta v. L.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2025 INSC 975

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11 & 21 - Appointment of arbitrator - Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause - Seat of Arbitration – Held, when an agreement contains an arbitration clause and also clause specifying exclusive jurisdiction of a particular High Court, this exclusive jurisdiction clause, even without explicitly using the terms 'seat' or 'venue' must be understood in the context of arbitration for dispute resolution, thereby establishing the specified location as the seat of arbitration – Then an application for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act must be filed before High Court having jurisdiction over the designated seat of arbitration. Set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-10] Activitas Management Advisor v. Mind Plus Healthcare, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 795

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11 - Scope of - Arbitrability of disputes - Serious allegations of fraud - Arbitrability of disputes arising from agreements for custom milling of paddy, where allegations of massive fraud and criminal proceedings were initiated against rice millers – Held, mere pendency of criminal cases alleging simple fraud, no bar to arbitration - Since there existed a valid arbitration agreement, it would be impermissible at the referral stage to dive deeper into the dispute, instead referred the same to the arbitration for its adjudication. [Paras 21, 24-28] Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation v. Sanjay Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2025 INSC 933

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 9 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 92 - Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint – Held, respondents having agreed to resolve the dispute through arbitration and subsequently obtaining consent decree in their favor based on the arbitral award, could not later the award as a nullity due to non-arbitrability under Section 92 of CPC - Respondents conduct of “approbation and reprobation” to be impermissible and barred by the doctrine of estoppel by conduct and election - Appellants were granted liberty to revive their withdrawn execution proceedings to enforce the consent decree - The respondents were estopped by their conduct from raising the issue of non-arbitrability after having benefitted from the arbitration and the resulting consent decree. [Paras 14- 20] Sanjit Singh Salwan v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2025 INSC 988

Arbitration - Foreign Arbitration Agreement - Reference to Arbitration - Under Section 45 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a judicial authority must refer parties to arbitration if there is an agreement in writing for arbitration, unless it prima facie finds that agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed - Burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement lies with party seeking to rely on it and only prima facie proof is required before the referral court - The Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a 'mini-trial' on existence or validity of agreement, as that is a matter for arbitral tribunal - The arbitration agreement in the contract was binding and that matter should be referred to arbitration if prima facie case for an agreement exists - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 24- 28] Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2025 INSC 1036

Caste Certificate - Caste Certificate was issued while she was a minor - based on this certificate, she was admitted to the MBBS course on July 24, 2016, and completed her degree in 2021 - On July 7, 2022, Verification Committee declared that she did not belong to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) – Held, despite the fraud committed by her father, due to which a meritorious student would have her entire career ruined if the appeal was dismissed - While equity should follow the law, it found it appropriate to grant the appellant an opportunity to protect her career - Father was more responsible for creating this imbroglio due to his suppression of material facts - Regularized the appellant's MBBS admission, but held that she could not claim the status of 'Mannervarlu' ST in future - Degree certificate was to be considered final - Expressed concern that an eligible, meritorious candidate from ST category lost an opportunity due to appellant's admission - Supreme Court in order to compensate ordered the appellant's father to deposit Rs. 5 lakhs to the national Defence Fund within 2 months - If the Scrutiny Committee had verified the caste certificate earlier, the situation might not have occurred - Appeal was partly allowed. [Paras 20 - 33] Chaitanya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 853

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) - Section 6, 70, 73, 74 - 'Initiation of any proceedings' and 'subject matter' – Held, CGST Act prohibit the initiation of “any proceedings” on the “same subject matter” - Term 'any proceedings' refers to the formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings through the issuance of a show cause notice and it does not include the issuance of summons or conduct of a search or seizure - 'Subject matter' relates to any tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from a specific contravention that the department wants to assess or recover - Issuance of a summons cannot be equated with initiation of proceedings barred by the Act - Mere presence of an overlapping aspect under investigation does not automatically make the subject matter “same”. [Relied on K.P. Mohammed Salim v CIT 2008 11 SCC 573; G.K. Trading v. Union Of India & Ors. 2020 SCC Online All 1907; Paras 21, 23, 54-56, 86, 87] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) - Section 6(2)(b) - Two-fold test – Held, the bar under Section 6(2)(b) is attracted immediately when any two proceedings initiated by the Department aim to assess or recover an identical or partially overlapping tax liability, deficiency or obligation for a specific contravention - If proceedings involve distinct infractions, they do not constitute the 'same subject matter' and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) is not attracted - The two-fold test to determine if a subject matter is the 'same' involves - i. checking if an authority has already proceeded on an identical tax liability or alleged offence by the assesses based on the same facts; ii. Determining if the demand or relief sought is identical. [Paras 87, 88] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - Supreme Court issued guidelines to be followed in cases where, after the commencement of an inquiry or investigation by on authority, another inquiry or investigation on same subject matter is initiated by a different authority- i. An assessee must comply with a summons or show cause notice as its mere issuance does not confirm that an investigation has been formally initiated; ii. If an assessee discovers an overlapping inquiry, they must immediately inform the authority that started the subsequent investigation; iii. Tax authorities must communicate with each other to verify the assessee's claim to avoid redundant proceedings and optimize resources; iv. If the investigations are on different "subject matters," the authorities must inform the assessee in writing, explaining the reasons and specifying the distinct subjects; v. Authorities can proceed with their inquiry until it is confirmed that a duplicate investigation or show cause notice for the same liability already exists, in which case the subsequent show cause notice will be quashed; vi. When an overlap is confirmed, the authorities must decide which one will continue the investigation, and the other must forward all relevant materials, as the assessee has no legal right to choose; vii. If authorities cannot agree, the investigation will be handled by the one that started it first, and courts can order the transfer; viii. If authorities do not follow these guidelines, the assessee may file a writ petition with the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Para 97] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XLI Rule 27(1) - Additional Evidence - Whether it is necessary for an Appellate Court to consider the pleadings of the parties before adjudicating a prayer to lead additional evidence – Held, an Appellate Court must first examine the pleadings of the party seeking to introduce additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of CPC - This is to ensure that the case is supported by the party's pleadings - Without necessary pleadings, allowing additional evidence is an unnecessary exercise - Appellate Court must also consider the pleadings of the party seeking to lead additional evidence - High Court erred in allowing the defendant to present additional evidence without first examining whether that evidence was in line with the defendant's pleadings - Set aside order of High Court and instructed to re-examine the appeal and defendant's application to lead additional evidence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8-10] Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2025 INSC 1027

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 102 – Held, Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, which prevents a pendente lite transferee from judgment-debtor from resisting execution of a decree, does not apply where the objection is raised by a transferee from a third party, who was not a party to the suit - The transferees from third parties, are entitled to protection under Section 97-98 CPC, and can raise objection against the execution of decrees subject to the satisfaction of conditions mentioned therein - Rule 102 of Order XXI applies only to a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the immovable property which was subject matter of that suit pendente lite - If the person who is resisting or obstructing the execution of decree of possession of such property, is not the transferee of judgment debtor, i.e. he does not trace his title from judgement-debtor, bar of Rule 102 does not apply to him - Appellant derived his title not from judgement-debtor but from independent purchaser - Therefore, Rule 102 could not bar his objections against the execution of decree - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 13] Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2025 INSC 1044

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 102 - Supreme Court explains why this applies only to a transferee from judgment debtor - Held that Rule 102 intends to protect the interests of the decree-holder against the attempts of unscrupulous judgment-debtors and their subsequent transferees who indulge in activities and leave no stone unturned to deprive the decree-holders from reaping the benefits of the decree granted in their favour. [Para 9] Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2025 INSC 1044

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXXIX Rule 3 – Held, ex-parte injunction must be vacated if plaintiff fails to comply with mandatory conditions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC - This ensures that a party being restrained without a hearing is informed of the reasons and the applicant must satisfy the court about gravity of situation - It stressed that non-compliance with the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXXIX would vitiate the order, as Parliament prescribed a specific procedure for exceptional circumstances - Upheld order of High Court - Petition dismissed. [Paras 5-8] Time City Infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 791 : 2025 INSC 966

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXX Rule 10 - Proprietorship Firm - Proprietary concern is only a business name and not a juristic person - A suit against the proprietor of a proprietorship is the real party being sued - Order XXX Rule 10 of CPC, is merely an enabling provision and does not debar a suit being filed against the proprietor directly – Held, a proprietorship concern is not a juristic person and is merely a trade name used by an individual for their business - A proprietorship cannot sue, it can be sued in its trade name under Order XXX Rule 10 CPC, which is an enabling provision - Proprietor is the 'real party' in a suit against a proprietorship concern - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4, 5] Dogiparthi Venkata Satish v. Pilla Durga Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2025 INSC 1046

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 96 - Adverse Possession - Pleading & proof - cannot be raised for the first time in appeal without foundational pleadings, issues and evidence - Held that adverse possession is a factual plea requiring specific assertions and proof regarding the date possession began, its nature, knowledge to legal claimants, duration and whether it was open and undisturbed - Supreme Court allowed exceptions where an adverse possession plea might be allowed later if adequately supported by existing facts and without surprising the opposing party - the Court found that present case lacked such circumstances - A plea of adverse possession requires clear and specific foundational pleadings, an issue framed for trial and cogent evidence - Upheld order of High Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 19, 29, 30] Kishundeo Rout v. Govind Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 790 : 2025 INSC 956

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 92 - Purpose of - Section 92 is a 'representative suit' intended to protect public trusts from harassment by frivolous suits - the Court must look at the 'dominant purpose of the suit' as discernible from the plaint's allegations to determine if leave should be granted - the suit must be of a representative character - instituted in public interest and not merely for the vindication of individual or personal rights - Held that a society, even if not an express trust, can be considered a 'constructive trust' under Section 92 CPC if it functions for a public charitable purposes and receives endowments for that purpose - That dominant purpose of the suit and representative character of plaintiffs are paramount for Section 92 actions. [Paras 34-38] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 92 - Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Public Charitable Trusts - Constructive Trust - Maintainability Suit – Held, a formal 'entrustment' of property or funds by a third party is not a necessary ingredient to deem a society for public charitable purposes, by its very nature, is intended for the benefit of those in need, thereby becoming property 'entrusted' to it, thus acquiring the character of a 'constructive trust' - A constructive trust arises by operation of law where a person holding title to property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched - Appellant is engaged in a 'public purpose of charitable nature' given its principal activity of providing healthcare services to underprivileged sections - Supreme Court reiterated that the 'dominant purpose' of the suit, accessible strictly from the plaint's allegations, determines whether leave must be granted under Section 92 CPC, and that such suits are of a representative character for vindication of public rights, not merely personal rights - Entity won't lose character of public trust by mere registration under Societies Registration Act - There's no bar to a representative suit under Section 92 of CPC against a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, if it qualifies as a 'Constructive Trust' - Appellantentity was not a registered 'trust', it functions at par with a 'constructive trust' because its funds are meant solely for public benefit - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 42-55, 90, 107, 136] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXVI Rule 1 - Failure to enter witness box – Held, refusal of a party to a civil suit to enter the witness box and offer testimony, especially when the facts are within their exclusive personal knowledge, can lead to grave evidentiary consequences - A Court may draw an adverse presumption against the party who, despite being physically able to attend court, deliberately abstains from testifying without a valid reason - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 50- 58] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Bail on medical grounds – Held, medical opinion is essential before granting medical bail, especially when claim lacks urgency or specificity - High Court erred in granting bail to accused on medical grounds without constituting a medical board to assess the genuineness of the claim, which was contrary to established law - Directed that Court must also consider the collective's cry for justice and societal concern, which should be given priority over individual liberty in a case involving a heinous crime - A court should not conduct a detailed examination of evidence or an elaborate documentation of the merits while passing bail orders - It should only be satisfied about a prima facie case - Post bail good conduct of the accused, while relevant to the question of continuation of bail, cannot retrospectively validate an otherwise unsustainable order. [Paras 20, 22] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 195 - Supreme Court laid down following principles to be followed while dealing with a category of offences that fall within the protective sphere of Section 195 CrPC - i. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars Court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 172 to 188, IPC, unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned - Without a complaint from said persons, the Court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences; ii. It is not open to Court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts - it would depend upon the facts of each case; iii. Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC, which requires a complaint by a public servant, offences against public justice - Focus should be on whether the facts in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint; iv. Court must apply twin tests - 1^st - Courts must ascertain having regard to nature of allegations made in FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade mandatory bar of Section 195 IPC - 2nd whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court a public servant is required; v. Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195; Courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of section 195 CrPC; vi. Section 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and section 340 CrPC respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate under CrPC - Once investigation is complete then embargo in section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance - Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of FIR and material collected during investigation, provided procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC is followed. [Para 59] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 362- Supreme Court laid down guidelines - Exceptional circumstances wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter or review its own judgment or a final order under Section 362 CrPC - i. Such power is expressly conferred upon Court by CrPC or any other law for the time being in force; ii. The Court passing such a judgment or order lacked inherent jurisdiction to do so or; iii. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain such judgment or order; iv. A mistake on the part of Court caused prejudice to a party; v. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to notice of Court while passing such judgment or order - Held that none of the exceptions apply to the present case. [Paras 34A] Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2025 INSC 1020

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 372 Proviso - 'victim' - Right to appeal - Substitution of legal heir – Held, expression 'victim' is not limited to the person who has suffered a loss or injury, but also includes their guardian or legal heir - Proviso to Section 372 CrPC grants a victim the right to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence or inadequate compensation - This right to appeal is a statutory right - It is a fundamental right under Article 14 & 21 for a victim - 'Right to prefer an appeal' also includes the 'right to prosecute an appeal' - If a victim who filed an appeal dies, their legal heir can be substituted to continue prosecuting the appeal - Parliament's amendment to Section 372 CrPC aimed at giving an independent right to victims, separate from the State or a complainant - Legal heir of a deceased victim is permitted to pursue an appeal that was originally filed by the victim - The provisions of Section 394(2) CrPC, which states that 'every other appeal' abates on the death of appellant, cannot be applied to an appeal filed by a victim or their heir under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. [Paras 6-9, 11] Khem Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 828 : 2025 INSC 1024

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 389 - Suspension of sentence - Fixed term sentence v. Life imprisonment - Liberal approach – Held, when a convicted person is sentenced to affixed period of sentence and files an appeal, suspension of sentence should be considered liberally by the Appellate court unless there are exceptional circumstances or statutory restrictions - This approach differs from cases involving life imprisonment, where the consideration for suspension is different - The Appellate Court is duty-bound to objectively assess the matter and record reasons for concluding that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail - The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick lacunae or loopholes in prosecution's case - What needs to be looked at is something palpable, apparent or gross on the face of record, on the basis of which the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable - Mere fact that the accused was granted bail during trial and did not misuse liberty is not of much significance for suspending the sentence after conviction, as effect of bail granted during trial loses significance upon conviction - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and remanded the matter to High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-22] Aasif @ Pasha v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 784 : 2025 INSC 944

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 389 - Suspension of Sentence - High Court suspended sentence of POCSO convict observing no sign of sexual assault was found by medical expert on prosecutrix and no FSL/DNA report available on record – Held, High Court did not advert to relevant factors for considering case for suspension under Section 389 CrPC - High Court shall examine whether prima facie there was anything palpable on the record to indicate if the accused had a fair chance of overturning the conviction - While considering an application for suspension, it is must to examine whether the material on record is sufficiently strong to prima facie suggest likelihood of the convict's acquittal - If answer is affirmative then the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this court, he should not be behind the bars for long time till the conclusion of appeal - Distinguished between setting aside of bail by a higher Court and cancellation of bail - While cancellation of bail is due to some supervening circumstances like breach of condition and setting aside of bail is concerned not with the breach of condition but with justifiability and soundness of the order granting bail - High Court did not even consider antecedents - Set aside order of high Court, directing respondent to surrender before Trial Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-16] Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2025 INSC 935

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 394 - Section 372 Proviso - Abatement of appeals – Held, High Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction in a criminal appeal, it has a duty to independently evaluate evidence on record - A judgment must reflect a proper application of mind - In a case where High Court reverses a conviction and acquits the accused, it must provide reasons and a detailed discussions of facts and evidence - The High Court's duty is akin to that of a Trial Court when considering an appeal against a conviction - Appeal allowed and remanded the case to High Court. Khem Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 828 : 2025 INSC 1024

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 439 - Anticipatory Bail - Interim protection made absolute - Supreme Court previously granted protection from arrest to the appellant, on condition that he join the investigation - State-respondent filed a counter affidavit, admitting that the appellant's implication was based on a confessional statement from a co-accused but alleging that appellant had not cooperated with investigation by claiming he threw his mobile phone into a river – Held, no grounds to support the allegations of non-cooperation, stating that merely because nothing incriminating was discovered does not mean the accused failed to cooperate - State's affidavit did not mention any efforts to trace the appellant's phone or collect call detail records - Appellant had been granted similar protection in a prior case, deemed it appropriate to make the interim anticipatory bail order absolute, subject to appellant cooperating with the investigation and furnishing bail bonds before Trial Court. Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 439 – Bail - Cancellation of bail - Annulment of bail – Principles - Held, considerations for granting bail and for its cancellation are not identical - Granting bail involves a preventive evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a review of the prior decision - Cancellation can be due to supervening circumstances or if the original order was legally flawed - A bail order can be set aside even in the absence of subsequent misconduct if it is found to be perverse, unjustified or legally untenable - An order granting bail can be annulled in an appeal if it is perverse, unjustified or passed in violation of settled legal principles - An order can be considered perverse if it is founded on irrelevant considerations or a non-consideration of material facts - Cancellation of bail is a serious matter involving deprivation of personal liberty - Set aside order of High Court - Appeals allowed. [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 22] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 156(3), 195 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 186 - Whether a Magistrate can direct the police to register an FIR and investigate an offence under Section 186 IPC under Section 156(3) of CrPC, when Section 195(1)(a)(i) of CrPC mandates that cognizance can only be taken on a written complaint by public servant concerned or their administrative superior – Held, CMM committed a serious error in directing police investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC for an offence under Section 186 of IPC - Section 195(1)(a)(i) is mandatory and creates a bar on the court from taking cognizance of such an offence unless there is a written complaint from the public servant or their administrative superior - While there is no bar on police registering an FIR or conducting an investigation for offences under Section 186, IPC, the bar under Section 195 comes into play at the stage of cognizance - If a police report is filed, it will be deemed a complaint and the police officer will be the complainant, but legal embargo under Section 195 remains because the public servant is not the complainant - Section 195 CrPC does not bar the trial of an accused for distinct offence disclosed by same set of facts - If perusal of FIR makes it clear that the offence under Section 186 IPC is closely interconnected with another distinct offence which is in this case Section 341 IPC, and it cannot be split up, then in such circumstances the bar of Section 195 CrPC will apply to such other distinct offence also. [Paras 34-36, 43, 48, 51] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 362, 340 - Power to review / Recall - Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under Section 340 CrPC is permissible or not – Held, Section 362 CrPC explicitly prohibits a criminal court from altering or reviewing its judgment once it has been signed, except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors - Prohibition is 'complete' and prevents a criminal court from reviewing its own judgment - Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC are criminal in nature, as they can lead to a criminal trial and punishment - They are governed by CrPC and a review application under CPC is not maintainable - A Court become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the Courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-34, 39-41] Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2025 INSC 1020

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Bail - Setting aside v. Cancellation of bail - Principles for setting aside bail orders - Supreme Court examines the correctness of the bail order itself, while latter pertains to the accused's conduct subsequent to the bail grant - Held that grant of bail is a discretionary judicial remedy that requires balancing the personal liberty of the accused and gravity of offence - Judicial discretion in bail matters must be informed by assessing the nature and seriousness of the charge - A superior court can set aside a bail order if it is found to be illegal, perverse, unjustified, arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations - The court should conduct threadbare analysis of prosecution evidence or adjudicate its merits at bail stage - An order granting bail must reflect application of mind - Conduct of accused subsequent to grant of bail is generally not considered when reviewing an appeal against the grant of bail but rather in an application for cancellation of bail - An appeal against bail should not be used as a retaliatory measure - Accused, being a celebrated wrestler and Olympian with societal impact could have a domineering influence over witnesses or delay trial proceedings - The fact that accused remained absconding after the FIR and nonbailable warrants were issued - High Court granted bail without considering grievous nature of the crime - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19-25] Ashok Dhankad v. State NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2025 INSC 974

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 193 - Cognizance of offences - Whether a Court of Session can summon an accused under Section 193 CrPC based on materials in the Police Report, independent of Section 319 CrPC, in cases exclusively triable by it – Held, Sessions Court can summon additional accused at committal stage under Section 193 CrPC - The term 'cognizance' means conscious application of mind by court, leading to initiation of criminal proceedings or steps to ascertain of there's a basis for such proceedings - Cognizance is taken of offence and not the offenders - If Court during its proceedings comes to know about involvement of the other accused, has the power to summon them - Court of Sessions has complete jurisdiction to summon any individual accused of the crime - This power under Section 193 CrPC is distinct from Section 319 CrPC, which comes into play after evidence has been recorded - Sessions Court's role after committal, as per sections 226, 227 and 228 CrPC, is limited to deciding whether there is sufficient material, to proceed with the trial or discharge the accused - It does not involve deciding whether cognizance of offence should be taken - Once the Court takes cognizance of the offence, it becomes the Court's duty to find out the real offenders and if it comes to the conclusion that besides the persons put up for trial by the police some others are also involved in the commission of the crime, it is the Court's duty to summon them to stand trial along with those already named, since summoning them would only be part of the process of taking cognizance - Petition dismissed. [Paras 16, 20, 45-48, 58-60, 69, 77, 86, 89, 90, 103] Kallu Nat @ Mayank Kumar Nagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 770 : 2025 INSC 930

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319(4)(b) is a deeming provision, dispensing with the formal committal order by providing that the person added will be deemed to have been an accused even when cognizance was taken first - Cognizance is of offence and not the offenders - It is duty of the Court to find out who the offenders are - This is clear from section 190 of the CrPC read with section 2(d), definition of complaint, which include allegations against unknown person also - No dispute regarding powers of Court to bring the person under section 319(1) CrPC. [Para 103] Kallu Nat @ Mayank Kumar Nagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 770 : 2025 INSC 930

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 319 - Power to summon additional accused - Public Servant - Rule of highest standards – Held, the power of Court to summon a person as an additional accused under Section 319 CrPC is judicial in nature and independent of the investigating agency's opinion - Even if a person is not named in the FIR or chargesheet, they can be summoned to face trial if evidence recorded during the trial indicates their involvement in the offence - The opinion of investigating agency is merely tentative and does not override the Court's independent judicial assessment based on trial evidence - Summoning of appellant under section 319 CrPC was lawful - Supreme Court upholds Punjab jail official's conviction for helping undertrial's escape attempt -When public functionaries betray institutional trust, consequences are far-reaching, Custodial officers must be held to the highest standards of integrity. [Paras 12-15] Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2025 INSC 957

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 432, 433, 433A - Life imprisonment - Fixed term sentence – Remission - Distinction between completion of fixed term sentence and remission of life imprisonment - High Court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment without remission - Whether an accused who has completed “life imprisonment for a fixed term”, such as twenty years of actual sentence without remission, is entitled to be released from prison on completion of such a sentence, or if they must seek remission from competent authority – Held, 'life imprisonment' means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of convicted person's natural life and cannot be equated with any fixed term - Courts have the power to impose a fixed-term sentence exceeding 14 years, when commuting a death penalty or otherwise deeming it appropriate - 'Without consideration of remission' means that during that specific period, the convict cannot seek any remission of their sentence - On completion of such a judicially determined fixed term, the convict is entitled to be released from jail - There is no obligation for the appellant to make a fresh application seeking remission of his life sentence from sentence review board after completing the specified fixed term. Appeal allowed. [Paras 8,9, 10, 14.5, 15] Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2025 INSC 969

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Anticipatory Bail - High Court allowed pre-arrest bail to Respondent 2 in FIR registered under Sections 498A, 323, 313, 506, 307 and 34 of IPC r/w Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Held, condition imposed by High Court while granting bail to accused (resumption of conjugal life and maintenance with dignity and honour) is “beset with risk” and ought not to have been imposed - Pre-arrest bail deserved to be granted within the settled parameters and only conditions traceable to Section 438(2) of CrPC could be imposed. [Paras 4-8] Anil Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 762

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, there was no evidence, particularly no forensic evidence, to support the allegation of rape committed when the prosecutrix was a minor - Promise to marriage and subsequent relationship based on consent won't amount to rape - Allegation of rape under the POCSO Act was made more than 3 years after the alleged incident - A promise to marry followed by a consensual physical relationship does not amount to rape - Supreme Court quashed FIR against appellant citing it as abuse of the process of law - Set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. Kunal Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 765

Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 468(2)(c), 469(a) and 473 - Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Limitation - Whether the complaints under Drug & Cosmetics Act were barred by the period of limitation prescribed under CrPC - Offence is punishable with a term not exceeding three years, so the limitation period is three years under Section 468(2)(c) of CrPC – Held, the limitation period began on the date the offence was made out, which was when the Drug Analyst's reports were received on March 30, 2020 and April 9, 2010 - Complaints were filed more than 3 years later on June 24, 2013 and July 3, 2013 - Supreme Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that the delay for 'ascertaining the constitutional particulars' of the company could be condoned - The necessary details were available in the government Analyst Report received by the Drug Inspector on the dates of reports themselves - Complainant was aware of the company's particulars from the beginning - Complainant never requested a condonation of delay or an exclusion of time - Lower Courts exceeded their power by granting a benefit that was never claimed - Proceedings were barred by limitation and should be quashed - Set aside High Court's Order. [Paras 8-13] Miteshbhai J. Patel v. Drug Inspector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 822

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 19(1)(a) - Right to Information - Supreme Court examined legal framework on the right to information affirming that the right of citizens to know about candidates is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) - This right is essential for a well-informed electorate to make an intelligent decision while exercising their franchise - A fine balance must be struck between the voter's right to information and the sanctity of people's mandate - Minor procedural errors or technical objections should not be allowed to override the mandate of electorate - The will of the people expressed through the election result is sacrosanct and should be respected unless it has been corrupted by fraudulent practices. [Paras 8, 9] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992

Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 14, 16, 21 - Regularization of Service - State as a Constitutional employer - Daily wage employees - Right to be considered for regularization - State is a constitutional employer and cannot balance budgets by exploiting those who perform basic and recurring public functions - When work is perennial, the public institution's sanctioned strength and engagement practices must reflect that reality - Long term use of temporary labels for regular labour corrodes confidence in public administration and violates the promise of equal protection - While financial constraints are relevant to public policy, they cannot override fairness, reason and duty to organize work on lawful lines – Held, outsourcing cannot be a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial - Later policy to outsource Class IV / Driver functions cannot retrospectively validate earlier arbitrary refusals or be used to deny consideration to workers on whose continuous services the establishment relied for decades - Misuse of temporary employment contracts by government institutions mirrors exploitative practices in private sector and can erode public trust - Where work recurs day after day and year after year, establishment must reflect that in reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices - Quashed State's refusal to sanction posts as unsustainable - Directed all appellants to be regularized - Appeals allowed. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12] Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2025 INSC 998

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 317(1) - Removal of member of Public Service Commission on grounds of misbehaviour - This case arises from a reference by President of India for the removal of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, a member of Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC), on the ground of misbehaviour – Held, the charges of misbehaviour against Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage were not proved - The principle of 'collective responsibility' does not apply to a reference for removal under Article 317, as removal is individual and not collective - There was no direct evidence to prove the respondent's involvement in the paper setting, moderation or leakage - Allegations were not substantiated by cogent evidence and that her actions did not meet the threshold of 'misbehaviour' or even a 'lapse' - State's actions were based on prejudice without sufficient material to support a conclusion of misbehaviour - Supreme Court recommended that suspension be revoked forthwith and that she be entitled to all consequential and monetary benefits. [Paras 28, 29, 69-71, 75-77] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Constitution of India - Article 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80 – State – Notice – Held, Appellant, being a State Financial Corporation and thus a 'State' under Article 12 of Constitution was entitled to mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC - When a suit is filed against State instrumentality, the plaintiff must either issue a notice under Section 80(1) CPC or obtain leave under Section 80(2) CPC - Failure to do so bars the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction against the State, rendering the suit unsustainable and liable to dismissal - A judgement rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, including execution or collateral proceedings - The Trial Court has a duty to address the satisfaction of Section 80 notice as a precondition for initiating a suit. [Para 13, 29, 30] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Constitution of India - Article 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498A of IPC, finding allegation to be 'common place, banal and vague” and “without any specific instances mentioned” having been filed one year after the couple's admitted separation - Set aside order of High Court and quashed FIR and ended marriage by using its powers under Article 142. [Paras 13-16] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Constitution of India - Article 226 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Misuse of Public Funds - Naming of government schemes after political leaders - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of using courts to settle political scores between rival political parties, stating that political battles should be fought before the electorate - Held that writ petition challenging a government welfare scheme named “ungaludan Stalin” was misconceived in law and an abuse of the process of law - Petitioner rushed to High Court within 3 days of making the representation to the ECI, without giving the ECI an opportunity to decide on the matter - Previous judgments in Common Cause I, II, III, and IV dealt with the use of photographs of political leaders and heads of executive in public-funded advertisements, they do not prohibit a scheme from being names after a political leader - Supreme Court dismissed writ petition with costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to be deposited with the State for implementation of welfare schemes for the underprivileged - Appeals allowed. [Paras 17-25] Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Thiru. C.Ve. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2025 INSC 976

Constitution of India - Article 22 – Grounds of Arrest - Held, constitutional and statutory framework mandates that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest but it does not prescribe a specific form or insist upon written communication in every case. [Paras 20, 23] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979

Constitution of India - Article 233 - Appointment of District Judges - Reference to Constitution Bench - A person not already in the service of the Union of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if they have been for not less than 7 years an advocate or a pleader and are recommended by the High Court for appointment - Supreme Court referred two substantial questions of law regarding the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution to a Constitution Bench of five judges - Whether a judicial officer who has already completed seven years at the bar, recruited for subordinate judicial services, would be entitled to appointment as ADJ against a bar vacancy - Whether eligibility for appointment as a DJ is to be seen only at the time of appointment or at the time of application or both - Writ Petition was filed for review of decision passed in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, which held that an advocate who applies for the post of DJ by way of direct recruitment should continue to be a practising advocate until date of appointment and should not already be in judicial service of Union or State and held that rules framed by High Court debarring Judicial officers from staking their claim as against posts reserved for direct recruitment from Bar would not be ultra vires to the Constitution - Supreme Court directed registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate orders for Constitution of 5 judge bench. [Paras 17-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2025 INSC 965

Constitution of India - Articles 124(4), 124(5), 217, 218 - Judicial Misconduct - In House Procedure - Constitutional Validity - Removal of Judges - Fundamental Rights - Confidentiality of Inquiry - In-house procedure devised by the Supreme Court is a legally sanctioned, internal mechanism to address complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting judges of High Court and Supreme Court - It is not a parallel or extra-constitutional mechanism - the inquiry under the “in-house procedure” is a confidential, fact-finding exercise, distinct from a guilt-finding inquiry and is akin to a preliminary inquiry preceding disciplinary proceedings - the 'in-house procedure' has legal sanction, finding its roots in the law declared by Supreme Court under Article 141 of Constitution - The report of such an inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final - Paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the “in house procedure”, which allow the CJI to intimate the President and PM regarding serious misconduct short of impeachment serving as a vital mechanism for maintaining institutional integrity, public confidence and judicial accountability - The entire process under the “in house Procedure” is confidential, and placing incriminating evidence (like photographs/video footage) against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a measure provided or approved by the procedure - Held that this procedure violates Article 14 and 21 is unsustainable, as the procedure laid down is considered fair and just and does not compromise judicial independence. [Paras 80, 112, 114, 116, 121, 123-125] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943

Constitution of India - Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 - Army Act, 1950 - Section 12 - Indian Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Branch - Short Service Commission (SSC) – Recruitment Policy - Gender Discrimination - Supreme Court quashes Army policy to reserve higher number of JAG posts for men than woman – Held, once the Union of India has permitted the induction of women into JAG branch under Section 12 of Army Act, it cannot restrict the number of women candidates through policy or administrative instruction - Reserving a double number of vacancies for males through a notification dated January 18, 2023, was unconstitutional and violated Articles 14, 15, 16 - The selection criteria and process for both male and female candidates in JAG are identical, with only minor differences in physical attributes and overall process is intended to be 'gender neutral' and merit based - A combined merit list should be prepared and any recruitment policy leading to indirect discrimination is unconstitutional - Fundamental rights, particularly the Right to Equality cannot be waived, especially when marks obtained by candidates were not in the public domain - True meaning of gender equality is that all meritorious candidates, irrespective of gender, should be selected - Directed Union of India and Indian Army to conduct recruitment in JAG in a manner that there is no bifurcation of seats for any gender that is if all female candidates are deserving, all of them should be selected - The practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which is discriminatory to women. Petition allowed. [Paras 83-98, 101, 105-108, 114] Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2025 INSC 954

Constitution of India - Distinction between remission and release on completion - Held remission applies when the sentence is not yet complete and involves a reduction in sentence imposed - Release on completion occurs when the convict has served the full period of incarceration they were sentenced to undergo - In case of an indeterminate life sentence, remissions cannot lead to automatic release, a final order is required - For a fixed term sentence, completion of the term, especially one 'without remission' entitles release - If convict is detained beyond actual release date, it would violate Article 19(d) and 21 of Constitution of India. [Paras 8,9] Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2025 INSC 969

Constitution of India - Petitioner's Conduct & Waiver - Maintainability of Writ Petition - The writ petition challenging the “In-house Procedure” and the inquiry report was not entertained primarily due to the petitioner's conduct, specifically acquiescing to the uploading of incriminating evidence and participating in the inquiry without demur, only raising objections after the report was submitted - Held that Petitioner's conduct did not inspire confidence for the Court to entertain writ petition. [Para 104-106] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943

Constitution of India - Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983 (TSR Act) - Tripura State Rifles (Recruitment) Rules, 1984 (TSR Rules) - Executive Instructions v. Statutory Rules – Held, Executive instructions cannot supplant statutory rules that already occupy the field - The recruitment for the post of Enrolled followers was governed by the Tripura State Riffles Act, 1983 and Rules, and the cancellation of the process through an executive memorandum was not permissible - State failed to prove that the existing recruitment process was unfair or non-transparent - The Court affirmed that 'changing the rules after the game has begun' is not permissible - The recruitment process was at an advanced stage, with interviews already conducted and the application of the new policy, which abolished interviews, was contrary to this principle - Appellants, having participated in and cleared various stages of the recruitment process, had a legitimate expectation that the process would be completed - The cancellation was arbitrary and not justified on the pretext of 'larger public interest' - The Court directed the respondents to finalize and complete the recruitment process as per the TSR Act and TSR Rules within 2 months - Executive instructions issued under Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India cannot override the act done under the Statute and the rules made thereunder - The Executive instructions can only supplement the act and rules through which recruitment process was carried out, but it cannot supplant the specific provisions which already occupy the field - Burden is on the State to justify the decision on the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution and show how its decision was in furtherance of larger public interest - State has failed in discharging such burden - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31- 35, 42- 44, 47- 60] Partha Das v. State of Tripura, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 850 : 2025 INSC 1049

Constitution of India - 'Misbehaviour' - Meaning and Scope - The term 'misbehaviour' is not defined in the Constitution and must be given a wide import, not a narrow construction - It is to be understood in the context of the alleged misbehaviour, the office in question, and the standards required of a person holding such office - 'Misbehaviour' generally refers to conduct that could erode public faith and confidence in the constitutional office - It is a vague and elastic term encompassing various facets of conduct contrary to good conduct - Misbehaviour is different from 'proved misbehaviour' under Article 124(4) of Constitution - Standard of proof is not 'beyond reasonable doubt' but rather the ' reasonable preponderance of probabilities' – Held, allegations were general in nature and inquiry Committee did not name Ms. Bage as an accused or indicate her involvement in the paper setting, moderating or leakage. [Para 20-25, 27-28, 34, 35] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act of 1986) - Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (Act of 2019) - Execution of Orders - Interpretation of Statutes - Section 25 - Section 27A – Appeal – Revision – Held, there was a drafting error in Section 25(1) of Act of 1986 and applied the principle of casus omissus and purposive interpretation - The words “where an interim order” in Section 25(1) should be read as “where any order” to ensure all orders, final or interim, are enforceable - This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of the Act, which is to provide effective remedies to consumers - An appeal from an order passed by the District Forum in an execution petition lies to the State Commission under Section 15 of Act of 1986 and no further remedy of appeal or revision is available - Revision petitions against such orders would be treated as appeals since State Commission had the jurisdiction to hear them - Supreme Court requested NCDRC Chairman to take appropriate steps to ensure the expeditious disposal of thousands of execution petitions - Supreme Court read down Section 25(1) of 1986 Act, as amended via 2002 amendment to 1986 Act, making it in line with the Act of 2019 and pre-amendment era - This order is made retrospectively applicable covering all pending execution cases from 2003 to 2020, when Act of 2019, reinstated original position by expressly making 'every order' enforceable - An order passed by any Court or any forum is merely a kind of paper decree unless effective relief is granted to the party entitled thereto - The consumers of justice should feel that they have received justice in reality and not merely on appears. [Paras 18-29, 38] Palm Groves Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2025 INSC 1023

Contempt of Court - Conflicting orders by two judges - Forgiveness vs. Punishment - Role of Bar and Bench – Held, castigating lawyers over small mistake may affect their career - Order was passed by Supreme Court arising from conflicting orders passed by two Judges of this Court, this matter was placed before a three-judge bench by CJI - Supreme Court agreed with the views expressed by Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, stating that the majesty of law lies not in punishing but in forgiving a person who acknowledges their mistake - Bar and Bench are like two wheels of the Golden Chariot of Justice, working in tandem - Majesty of law lies not in punishing someone but forgiving them for their mistakes - Both advocates have rendered apology and both advocates have expressed their remorse with promise not to repeat this in future - Application dismissed. [Paras 8-13] N. Eswaranathan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 777

Contempt of Court - Lawyer's Duty - Transfer petition based on scurrilous allegations against a High Court Judge - A transfer petition was filed seeking transfer a criminal petition - Grounds for transfer petition included allegations that the High Court of Telangana's single Judge showed partiality and procedural discrimination by summarily curtailing the petitioner's argument to 5 minutes - Supreme Court issued a show-cause notice for contempt of court to the alleged contemnor no. 1, and the counsel who drafted the petition due to the “scandalous and scurrilous remarks” made against High Court – Held, a misconception exists among some lawyers who believe that their duty to the client supersedes their duty to the court - This misconception must be rooted out - Counsel who sign applications with 'matter scandalizing the court' without verifying the prima facie grounds are themselves guilty of contempt - A lawyer's duty is to advise their client against making such allegations - Supreme Court condemned the trend of lawyers criticizing judges without reason and practice of seeking transfers by alleging that a political figure's involvement will prevent a litigant from getting justice in a particular state - High Court judges are constitutional functionaries who are not inferior to Supreme Court judges and enjoy the same immunity - It is duty of Apex Court to protect them - Making scandalous allegations against them based on involvement of a political figure scandalizes the entire administration of justice - Alleged contemnors tendered an apology to the Supreme Court but court directed that it would have been more appropriate to apologize to that Judge. [Paras 7-17] In Re: N. Peddi Raju, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2025 INSC 989

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Civil Contempt - Wilful disobedience - Delayed compliance - Adjudication of new claims in contempt proceedings - Contempt petitions were filed by Petitioner alleging non-compliance with the Supreme Court's order dt. January 17, 2018, which directed the respondent bank to pay outstanding dues within 3 months - Delay was attributed to administrative difficulties following the merger of banks and difficulty in retrieving legacy records - While there was a delay in payment, the material on record didn't prove a wilful intent – Held, delay in complying with the Court's direction without any wilful or contumacious intent doesn't invite contempt of court - Rejected the claim for pensionary benefits citing that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used to raise new claims or seek reliefs not granted in original proceedings - Considering the prolonged litigation since 1980s and the decade long delay in disbursing retirement dues, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to award a lump sum payment to bring the matter to a close - Directed the respondent bank to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the LR of deceased petitioner as compensation for the protracted delay - Petition dismissed. [Paras 16-21] A.K. Jayaprakash v. S.S. Mallikarjuna Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2025 INSC 1003

Criminal Appeals - Delay in delivery of judgment - High Courts - Directions issued by Supreme Court – Held, if the high Court doesn't deliver judgment in 3 months after reserving, Registrar must place the matter before Chief Justice - Reiterated the guidelines issued in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar wherein Court directed that the parties are free to move an application before CJ of High Court for withdrawal of case and to be assigned to a different bench, if judgment is not pronounced within 6 months after being reserved - Many High Courts have adopted practice of pronouncing the final order without reasoned judgment which is then not delivered for substantially long time - It deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal. [Paras 7-10] Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 834 : 2025 INSC 1039

Criminal Jurisdiction - Directions to High Court Judge - Reconsideration on CJI's request - Role of Supreme Court - Institutional Integrity - Supreme Court recalled direction to remove Allahabad HC Judge from criminal jurisdiction - Modification came after an undated letter from the CJI requested a reconsideration of directions issued in paras 25 & 26 of previous order - Held that its initial intention was not to cause embarrassment or cast aspersions on the concerned Judge, but to intervene when the dignity of institution is imperiled, especially given a pattern if erroneous orders from said judge - Supreme Court reiterated the importance of maintaining the dignity and authority of the judiciary and the faith reposted in it by the people - High Courts are final court of justice for 90% of litigants and they expect the justice delivery system to function in accordance with law - High Court should always uphold the Rule of Law and institutional credibility - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4-12] Shikhar Chemicals v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 768 : 2025 INSC 945

Death Penalty - Procedural fairness in capital sentencing – Held, Indian society no longer conceives criminal punishment purely in retributive terms and also measures quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility of human reform - Machinery which feeds the death-penalty system is itself fragile - Investigations rely on confessions extracted in opacity, recoveries whose provenance is contested and forensic material of doubtful rigour - Possibility of wrongful conviction can never be dismissed as a remote abstraction - Moving from pure retribution to genuine reform is not an act of undue leniency but it is a statement of faith in human capacity for improvement. [Paras 27, 28] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043

Death Sentence - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 – Held, jurisdiction under Article 32 is a 'special constitutional safeguard' that remains available to death row convicts, even after appeals, reviews and mercy petitions have been rejected, due to the irreversible nature of capital punishment - Procedural finality cannot prevent the Court from intervening to cure a constitutional violation that impacts life or liberty - Court has an inherent power to correct its own errors to prevent 'manifest injustice' - Supreme Court emphasized on Manoj an others v. State of Madhya Pradesh which mandated the collection of mitigating circumstances such as collecting comprehensive mitigating circumstances - including psychiatric, psychological and social-history reports - have become an 'indispensable' procedural safeguard - a death sentence imposed without these safeguards violates Article 14, 21 of the Constitution - Judgments of Constitutional Courts are presumed to apply retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise - Hence, death row convict is entitled to the benefit of the Manoj judgment even if their sentence was finalized before the guidelines were established - Petition under Article 32 is maintainable because the petitioner is seeking to enforce a right that was not available at the time of their prior judicial proceedings - Article 32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters - Reopening will be reserved for only those cases where there is clear, specific breach of new procedural safeguards, as these breaches are so serious that if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused person's basic rights like dignity and fair process - Maintained conviction of Petitioner and referred the matter to be heard on sentencing - Petition allowed. [Paras 21-26, 33, 42-58] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043

Doctrine of estoppel by conduct and election - Supreme Court applied principle that a party cannot “approbate and reprobate” or “blow hot and cold” by taking inconsistent positions in court proceedings - It was noted that respondents had initially pleaded that their suit was not barred by section 92 CPC, then willingly referred the dispute to arbitration and accepted the award, leading to a consent decree in their favor - Subsequent attempt by respondents to challenge the validity of the award was deemed an impermissible change of position - Held that there can be no estoppel against the law, the issue in this case was an “equitable hurdle of estoppel” based on respondents conduct, which had caused the appellants to alter their position to their detriment - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-19] Sanjit Singh Salwan v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2025 INSC 988

Doctrine of Sub-Silentio - A judgement is an authority only for what it decides - When a judgment fails to address issues raised, it is said to be 'sub-silentio' and cannot be held as a binding precedent on those undecided issues - Precedents sub silentio, not accompanied by reasons, cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect under Article 141 of Constitution. [Para 13] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Election Commission of India (ECI) - Voters List - Supreme Court has directed the ECI to take series of additional steps as an interim measure - i. ECI will display a list of approximately 65 lakhs voters whose names appeared on 2025 Voter List but were not included in Draft Roll dt. August 1, 2025; ii. The list will be displayed district-wise on the websites of the District Election Officers; iii. Information will be booth-wise and accessible by using the Electors Photo Identity (EPIC) number; iv. The displayed list must also include the reason for the non-inclusion of names in Draft roll; v. Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Bihar must also display soft copies of these district-wise lists on its website; vi extensive publicity will be given in vernacular and English daily newspapers with wide circulation in Bihar; vii. Aggrieved persons can submit their claims with a copy of their Aadhaar card; viii. ECI is to obtain a compliance report from all Booth Level Officers and District Election Officers and place it on record as a collated Status Report. [Para 3] Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 804

Election Law - Recounting of Votes - Supreme Court directed recounting of all votes by a nominated Registrar - Following the orders, OSD (Registrar) submitted a report on August 6, 2025, which compiled the revised results - According to which appellant received 1051 votes and respondent received 1000 votes - Recounting was conducted by a Judicial Officer and saw no reason to doubt the report, it was video graphed and signed by the parties representatives - Held appellant as the elected Sarpanch - Supreme Court noted that other issues raised before the election Tribunal were still pending and allowed the parties to agitate these issues before the tribunal - Directed Election Tribunal to accept the report of OSD Registrar as final and conclusive result of the recount and declaration of appellant as the elected sarpanch is subject to the final judgment of the Election Tribunal. [Paras 7-10] Mohit Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 809

Electricity (Amendment) Rules, 2024 - Rule 23 – Held, any gap/regulatory asset, aligning with clause 8.2.2. of National Tariff Policy, 2006 - Under Rule 23, any gap created should not exceed 3% of the approved ARR and must be liquidated with carrying costs in a maximum of three equal yearly instalments from next financial year - Existing gaps should be liquidated in a maximum of 4 years - APTEL- Appellate tribunal under Section 111 of Electricity Act has appellate jurisdiction to re-appreciate facts and apply the law, examining legality, propriety or correctness of law and issue directions to Regulatory Commissions when they fail to comply with Act - Regulatory Commissions are accountable for managing regulatory assets effectively - The Court also directed all State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) to submit detailed time-bound roadmaps outlining the schedule for regulatory asset liquidation, including the associated carrying costs. [Paras 71, 70, 68, 69, 69.8] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Electricity Act, 2003 - Regulatory Asset - Creation, continuation and liquidation - A “regulatory asset” is an intangible asset created by regulatory commissions to acknowledge an uncovered revenue gap or shortfall when a distribution licensee cannot fully recover reasonably incurred costs through tariff revenue - this amount is recoverable in future over a period of time - It is generally created when projected revenue from determined tariffs is significantly lower than the revenue required by the distribution company to recover costs and achieve a return on investment - the creation of a regulatory asset can also occur during truing up if actual revenue realization is less than the Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) - Such assets are often created to prevent “tariff shock” to consumers by deferring recovery over subsequent years. [Para 67, 69] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Electricity Act, 2003 - Regulatory Asset - Statutory Basis and National Tariff Policy - the creation and continuation of a regulatory asset is not a statutory concept or a power explicitly granted under the Electricity Act, 2003 - The National Tariff Policy, 2006 mandates that a regulatory asset should be created only in exceptional circumstances, clearly defined through regulations and limited to natural causes or force majeure conditions - Held that recovery should be time-bound, preferably within the control period and not exceeding three years - Electricity is a public good and its distribution is statutorily regulated, being a material resource under Article 39 of Constitution, mandating equitable distribution. [Para 63, 67, 65, 70] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Electricity Act, 2003 - Section 86(1)(b) – Held, the fixing of the price for purchase of electricity and Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that incorporates such a price must be reviewed and approved by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission - A generating company and a distribution licensee cannot, through a private agreement, unilaterally execute a PPA or set a tariff for the supply of electricity within a State without the Commission's review and approval under Sector 86(1)(b) of the Act - Mandatory requirement of Section 86(1)(b) of the Act requires the Commission's review and approval for any changes to electricity purchase prices - Supplementary PPA dt. September 10, 2010, was executed independently and unilaterally by the parties and was never submitted to Commission for approval - Commission's order dt. February 9, 2010, which increased the tariff from Rs. 2.87 per kWh to Rs. 2.95 per kWh, did not apply to the appellant's case since its PPA stipulated a tariff of Rs. 2.50 per kWh, not Rs. 2.87 per kWh - Supreme Court did not interfere with the APTEL's order because it appeal was not filed against it - Revised tariff of Rs. 2.60 per kWh (based on weighted average) has been in use for a long time, and upsetting the process would not be appropriate at this late stage - Private agreements to change tariffs without Commission approval are invalid - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 21-31] KKK Hydro Power Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2025 INSC 1057

Electricity Act, 2003 - Sections 61, 62, 64, 86 - Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 32 - Income Tax Rules, 1962 (Rules, 1962) - Rule 5 - Accelerated depreciation - Tariff determination - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - State Instrumentality - Whether wind energy projects that did not avail accelerated depreciation were entitled to seek a separate tariff determination from the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC), even after entering into PPAs with a fixed tariff applicable to projects availing accelerated depreciation – Held, tariff determination is an exercise of statutory power and not solely a matter of contractual volition, allowing for review by appropriate commission if public interest dictates - GUVNL-appellant is a State instrumentality and bound to promote the State's policy objectives, including development of renewable energy sources and cannot act as “model citizen” and cannot act like a “Shylock” - In IT Act and Rules, 1962, allow an assessee to choose between accelerated and normal depreciation at the time of filing their return for assessment year in which power generation commenced - This statutory liberty cannot be curtailed by appellant unilaterally fixing a binding price in a PPA entered into long before statutory option is to be exercised - Merely signing PPAs with a tariff applicable to projects availing accelerated depreciation did not bind respondent companies to that price for entire life of their projects - Appellant's conduct, seeking to bind the companies to an inapplicable tariff, was patently unfair and did not reflect positively on a State instrumentality - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 20, 24] Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Green Infra Corporate Wind Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 767 : 2025 INSC 922

Electricity - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 56, 65, 73 – Held, Regulators cannot rewrite PPA under guise of equity - Sanctity of contract must prevail - PPA is a commercial arrangement with allocated risks and specific remedies - Parties rights and obligations must be governed by the explicit terms of contract - A delay in commissioning a 220kV evacuation system by a state instrumentality, even if beyond the developer's control does not constitute a Force Majeure event under the PPA's terms - Invoking the force majeure cluse requires a notice within 7 days of the event, which is a condition precedent - Omission to issue the required notice is fatal and cannot be remedied by relying on an inapplicable provision - A distribution licensee is entitled to encash the performance security if the developer fails to achieve the commercial operation date within the stipulated period, if no formal extension has been obtained or valid force majeure claim has been made - Right to invoke the guarantee is a specific contractual remedy that must be exercised in accordance with the contract's framework. [Paras 37-42] Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (CESC) v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 840 : 2025 INSC 1034

Electricity - Regulatory Jurisdiction – Held, jurisdiction of regulatory bodies like the State Commission and the appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) is to enforce the law and adjudicate disputes within four corners of a commercial contract - Regulatory bodies cannot under the guise of equity or fairness, rewrite the contractual terms, direct the restitution of amounts lawfully realized, or mandate alterations to tariffs and timelines in a manner inconsistent with the agreement - This principle applies even when the parties are state instrumentalities - Set aside order of APTEL - Appeal allowed. [Para 43] Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (CESC) v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 840 : 2025 INSC 1034

Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (PF Act) - Section 11(2) - Supreme Court set aside Karnataka High Court order and restored a writ petition, remanding the matter for a fresh decision after impleading Axis bank as a respondent - High Court is directed to examine the priority of first charge between the EPFO and the secured creditors in light of Section 11(2) of the PF Act and High Court must also consider if the EPFO created a charge on the properties to be auctioned by Axis bank prior to the auction - High Court has to first deal with this issue and determine if Axis Bank has the first charge and priority over the EPFO to satisfy its dues from secured property under the SARFEASI Act, 2002 - Appeal allowed. [Para 8 - 13] Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Ltd. v. Regional Pf Commissioner II and Recovery Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2025 INSC 1045

Environmental Law - Matheran Eco - Sensitive Zone - Paver Blocks on Roads - Supreme Court accepted recommendations of IIT Bombay Report and NEERI Report (expert bodies) and permitted the State government to lay clay paver blocks on the main road - Directed that no concrete bed should be used under the paver blocks, but other measures recommended by expert bodies, such as a non-woven geotextile layer, cambering of roads, and lateral drains, should be implemented - It was clarified that no paver blocks should be laid on internal roads or trekking routes. In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996

Environmental Law - National Green Tribunal (NGT) - Polluter Pays Principle - Environmental Compensation (EC) – Held, NGT has no power to direct ED probe under PMLA - NGT lacks jurisdiction to issue such a directive, as its powers are limited by Section 15 of NGT Act of 2010 - An FIR must be registered for a scheduled offence before invoking the PMLA - NGT's penalty, which was based on the company's turnover, lacked a rational nexus with the alleged pollution - A company's revenue or its quantum has no connection to the penalty for environmental damage - If the NGT found the penalty to be minimal, it should have referred to the CPCB's (Central Pollution Control Board) methodology instead of a company's turnover - Question of the maintainability of PIL at this stage, noting that initial reports from Joint Committee indicated violations of environmental laws - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-13] C.L. Gupta Export Ltd. v. Adil Ansari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2025 INSC 1035

Environmental Law - Powers of Pollution Control Boards – Held, environmental regulators have a compelling duty to adopt and apply preventive measures irrespective of actual environmental damage - Ex-ante action is necessary for this purpose and a certain measure in exercise of powers under Section 33A and 31A of the Water and Air Acts is essential - The powers of Boards under above sections are identical to those under section 5 of Environment Protection Act, which includes power to direct polluting industries to pay amounts for remedial measures - Boards are empowered to take similar actions - Recent 2024 amendments to Water & Air Acts, introducing decriminalization and the office of “Adjudicatory Officer” do not create a conflict with the State Board's power to direct payment of environmental damages - Boards have the discretion to decide appropriate action against a polluting entity, whether its punishment by penalty or immediate restoration, or both - This power must be guided by transparency and non-arbitrariness - Supreme Court directed that necessary subordinate legislation (Rules and Regulations) must be notified to ensure fair, transparent and non-arbitrary imposition of restitutionary and compensatory environmental damages, with procedural certainty - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10, 12, 27, 31, 33, 35, 36] Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2025 INSC 923

Environmental Law - Supreme Court struck down a part of Centre's January 29, 2025 notification that had exempted construction projects related to industrial sheds, schools, colleges and hostels from obtaining prior environmental clearance under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 – Held, Education is now an industry and strikes down Centre's exemption for educational buildings from environmental clearance - This exemption, contained in Note 1 to Clause 8(a) of the amended schedule, was arbitrary and contrary to the purpose of the Environment Protection Act - Rest of the notification was upheld - Court applied a literal interpretation to 2006 notification and found that it did not provide for applicability of General Conditions to projects under Entry 8(a) and 8(b) of the Schedule - Wherever the General conditions were intended to apply, it was specifically mentioned in column 5 of the Schedule - SEIAA is a statutory body of experts and is better equipped to conduct environmental impact studies for projects within their respective states - 2006 notification itself outlines the composition and procedure for the SEIAA - Note 1 to Entry 8(a) of Notification dt. 29th January, 2025 was upheld - Petition partly allowed. [Paras 22, 26, 40, 42, 46] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2025 INSC 961

Environmental Law - Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Water Act) - Section 33A - Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Air Act) - Section 31A - Polluter Pays Principle – Compensatory / Restitutionary Damages vs. Penalties – Held, Pollution Control Boards can impose environmental compensation on polluting entities but was not empowered to levy compensatory damages under Section 33A of Water Act and Section 31A of Air Act as such actions amounted to imposition of penalties for which a specific procedure under Chapters VII & VI of respective Act was contemplated - There is distinction between a direction for payment of restitutionary and compensatory damage as a remedial measure for environmental damage and a punitive action of fine - Punitive action can only be taken through procedure prescribed in statute - Environmental restitution is a constitutional and statutory obligation, not punitive action. [Paras 19, 20, 27, 30] Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2025 INSC 923

Environmental Protection Act, 1986 - Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notifications – Held, a valid and subsisting District Survey Report (DSR) is mandatory for the grant of environmental clearance (EC) for sand mining - A draft DSR is untenable in law - DSR is prepared under Para 7(iii) of the EIA notification dt. 15.01.2016, following the procedure in Appendix X and the Sustainable Sand Mining management Guidelines, 2016 and Enforcement and Monitoring Guidelines for Sand Mining 2020 - Purpose of a DSR is to scientifically locate sand mining sites by calculating the annual rate of replenishment - Just as forest conservation requires assessing tree growth before timber harvesting, a replenishment study ensures that sand extraction does not exceed the replenishment rate - Excessive sand extraction can have adverse impacts on a river's physical characteristics, such as bed elevation, flow velocity and sediment transport, which can disturb the ecological equilibrium - DSR is valid and tenable only when a proper replenishment study has been conducted - J&K EIA authority erred in granting an environmental clearance based on a DSR that lacked a replenishment report - Upheld order by NGT citing that no provision exists to dispense with the requirement for a DSR and replenishment study - Using heavy machinery like JCBs and excavators for excavation is a violation of the EC conditions - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 20, 26, 29, 30, 32-33, 37-39] Union Territory of J & K v. Raja Muzaffar Bhat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2025 INSC 1025

Equal Pay for Equal Work - Contractual v. Regular/Ad Hoc Employees - Supreme Court examined the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' and is applicable to contractually appointed Assistant Professors - Contractual Assistant Professors were appointed through a rigorous public selection process and performed duties identical to those of their regular and ad hoc counterparts – Held, the State did not dispute that these professors performed the same functions - The principle that temporary employees are entitled to the minimum of the pay scale as long as they remain in service - Directed that the contractual professors be paid the minimum pay scale of an Assistant Professor and that arrears calculated at 8% should be paid from 3 years preceding the date of Writ petition were filed - Supreme Court expressed concern about low salaries of Rs. 30,000 p.m. paid to some contractual Assistant Professor for nearly two decades, noting that their regular counterparts earned significantly more - Suggested that the State should rationalize the pay structure based on the functions performed - Appeals allowed. [Paras 18-20, 22, 29, 31-33] Shah Samir Bharatbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 827 : 2025 INSC 1026

Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) - Section 157- Confessional FIR - Admissibility in Evidence - FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence - It can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 or to contradict under Section 145 of IEA - In a criminal trial, if the maker of the FIR is the accused, it cannot be used against him as evidence if it is inculpatory in nature - The exception is if the accused offers himself to be examined as a witness - A confessional statement made by an accused person to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence against him due to absolute protection provided under section 25 of IEA and also protected by Section 162 CrPC - FIR can be used for limited purposes - i. to prove conduct under section 8; ii. Admissions under section 21; iii. Discovery under Section 27- High Court erred in corroborating Medical evidence with confessional contents of FIR lodged by appellant himself - Appeals allowed. [Paras 16-25] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927

Evidence Act, 1872 - Expert Witness (Medical Evidence) - is examined for their specialized knowledge to prove the contents of reports like a post-mortem report - Evidence provided by an expert is advisory in nature, and its credibility depends on the reasons and underlying data supporting their conclusions - An accused cannot be convicted of murder solely based on medical evidence. [Paras 27, 28] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927

Evidence Act, 1872 - Hostile Witness - Sole Eye-witness – Held, testimony of prosecution witness is not be discarded in its entirety merely because the witness has turned hostile - Courts are entitled to rely upon any portion of such testimony which is found to be credible and is corroborated by other evidence on record - Maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” does not apply in India - Conviction can be bases on testimony of a single eyewitness, if such testimony is found to be trustworthy and inspires confidence. [Paras 16] Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2025 INSC 957

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 50 - Opinion on relationship when relevant – Held, the testimony of a witness, even if not a blood relative, can establish a familial relationship under Section 50, if it is based on personal knowledge and longstanding acquaintance with parties - Opinion of such a person, expressed by conduct, is a relevant fact, and mere hearsay or gossip is insufficient - In a case where there is a lack of documentary evidence, such testimony can assume significant evidentiary value, especially if it remains unshaken during crossexamination. [Paras 22-25, 39-42] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 101, 102 - Burden of Proof and Onus of Proof – Held, a distinction exists between the burden of proof, which rests on the party asserting a fact and never shifts, and the onus of proof, which is a continuous process that shifts between parties based on the evidence presented - Once the plaintiffs have sufficiently discharged their initial burden of proof, the onus shifts to the defendants to rebut the claim with evidence. [Paras 43-48] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Rape and Murder – Acquittal – Held, prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of incriminating circumstances and pointed out several significant issues - i. DNA report was inconclusive and a supplementary report was inadmissible as the expert witness was not examined and the report was not presented to the accused under Section 313 CrPC; ii. 'Suspicious conduct' of the accused, cited by prosecution witnesses, was found to be a natural action for a labourer returning home from work and could not be considered an incriminating circumstance; iii. Recovery of a comb used, by the sniffer dog was deemed doubtful due to contradictory witness testimonies regarding its color - Procedure involving the dog squad was also not properly documented; iv. Recovery of the victim's underwear from the accused's field was found to be a 'planted recovery' as it was not mentioned in the original complaint filed by the victim's father- Present case is yet another classic example of lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure which has led to the failure of a case involving brutal rape and murder of an innocent girl child - The prosecution had 'fallen woefully short of proving the guilt of the accused-appellants by clinching evidence and acquitted them, giving them the benefit of doubt - Appeal allowed. [Paras 65 - 79] Putai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2025 INSC 1042

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - International Competitive Bidding (ICB) – Held, deemed export benefits under the FTP are contingent upon a strict adherence to the necessity of procuring goods through ICB - Reliance on a tariff-based competitive bidding process for the selection of the power developer cannot be equated with the mandatory ICB for the supply of goods as required by the FTP - The appellant failed to produce evidence that an ICB process was adopted for the procurement of components, having instead entered into contracts directly with subsidiaries or related companies - Appeals dismissed. [Para 68-71] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - 'Change in Law' Clause - PPA between parties defined a 'Change in Law' as an enactment, promulgation, amendment or repeal of any law – Held, Public Notices issued by Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) are administrative policy instruments and do not meet the contractual threshold of a 'change in law' as they are not statutory enactments or regulations by a competent authority - Government decisions and clarifications including Press releases could not be considered as 'change in law'. [Paras 41-45] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - 'Deemed exports'- Applicability to Power Projects – Held, the concept of 'deemed exports' under the FTP is designed to incentivize the domestic production of movable and marketable goods for export or deemed export - A power generating station being an integrated immovable asset assembled on-site, does not qualify as a 'manufactured good' capable of being exported under FTP - Mere act of assembling individual components at the project site does not transform the entire plant into a 'good' eligible for deemed export benefits - An immovable property, especially a machinery embedded to earth would fail to qualify as 'goods' - Benefit of deemed exports were not available to a coal based thermal power plant. [Paras 57, 60-62] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002

Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966 (Rules of 1966) - Rule 2(g) - State Forest Service - Forest Range Officer (FRO) - Supreme Court examined the definition of 'State Forest Service' under Rule 2(g) of Rules of 1966 and declared that 'any service in a State, being a service connected with forestry and the members thereof having gazetted status', constitutes the 'State Forest Service' subject to the approval of Central Government in consultation with State Government – Held, approval of Central Government is required for the entire service, not for individual posts within it - The post of FRO is part of the State forest Service and that its members are eligible for promotion to the Indian Forest Service (IFoS), provided the service is approved by Central Government - Appellant, a FRO, succeeded on the legal issue, the Court granted limited relief and held that appellant's delay in raising his grievance meant he could not be granted relief for past promotion cycles and that appellant could not be considered ahead of his senior - Respondents must treat the Andhra Pradesh Forest Service, including FROs as the State Forest Service and consider them eligible for promotion - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 6-11] P. Maruthi Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2025 INSC 1019

Fraudulent Settlement - Misrepresentation by Counsel - Supreme Court Ordered BCI inquiry after client denies engagement of advocates who settled his case - Directed BCI to conduct a detailed inquiry into an alleged fraudulent settlement agreement - Restored SLP after respondent claimed that he never authorized any counsel to appear on his behalf or enter into a settlement - Deemed it necessary to examine in detail the facts surrounding the disposal of SLP based on alleged settlement agreement - Supreme Court refrained from drawing conclusions at present stage but directed an inquiry into the role of advocates involved in preparation and filing of the settlement agreement and conduct of proceedings by the end of October 2025. [Paras 5-7] Bipin Bihari Sinha @ Bipin Prasad Singh v. Harish Jaiswal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 794

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 13(1)(ia) & (ib) - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Divorce - Supreme Court orders husband to pay Rs. 1.25 crores permanent alimony to his wife while dissolving marriage – Held, there is no possibility of reconciliation between parties and they have been living separately since 15 years - There is no vestige of matrimonial relationship between them and neither party has shown any inclination to resolve their differences - Mediation efforts also failed - Since the respondent-wife and child have not received any financial support from appellant-husband, Rs. 1.25 crores was directed to be paid - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-9] X v. Y, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2025 INSC 978

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Section 13B - Settlement Agreement - Mutual Consent Divorce- Withdrawal of consent - Supreme Court acknowledged that the respondent-wife's withdrawal from the mutual consent divorce agreement at the second motion was a valid exercise of her statutory right - Held that subsequent demand of wife for a higher alimony demonstrated an intention to coerce a better settlement, and her allegations of coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud regarding the initial settlement were unsubstantiated. [Para 18] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 144C v. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation - Dissenting Opinion (Nagarathna, J.) – Held, provisions of section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive but are mutually inclusive - the period of limitation prescribed under Section 153(2A) or 153(3) is applicable, even when matters are remanded - the non-obstante clause in section 144C(1) does not extend to the timelines prescribed under section 153 - The timelines under Section 153 does not automatically include the process conceived under Section 144C - the entire proceedings, including the hearing and directions by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), must be issued within 9 months as contemplated under Section 144C(12) of the Income Tax Act - the Act is workable even if Section 144C proceedings are subsumed within the limitation prescribed under Section 153(1) or (3) - no final assessments orders can be passed in these cases as same would be time-barred - Appeal Dismissed. [Para 15] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946

Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 144C v. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation - Supreme Court delivers split verdict on time limit for assessments under Section 144C - Interpretation of section 144C in light of Section 153 of IT Act – Held, Section 144C was introduced as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to facilitate expeditious resolution of tax disputes, especially for foreign companies - To reduce the time consumed in making assessment orders for eligible assesses - Satish Chandra Sharma; J. held that timelines in 144C (4) & (13) are independent and in addition to the timeline under Section 153(3) and that section 153(3) applies only to the passing of the draft assessment order - If entire Section 144C procedure were subsumed within Section 153(3), it would make the system unworkable and lead to a “complete catastrophe for recovering tax” - Section 153(3) applies to the passing of draft assessment order and Section 144C extends the timeline for the final order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6.1, 6.2, 8] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Departmental Circulars and Guidelines - Binding nature on revenue authorities – Held, Court relied on Circulars issued by Ministry of Finance and Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), including the 2008 Circular and 2009 Prosecution Manual, which state that prosecution under Section 276C(1) should be initiated only after the IT Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) confirms a penalty for concealment of income - These Circulars are binding on the revenue authorities and can 'tone down the rigour of the statutory provision' - The revenue authorities in this case, failed to adhere to these binding instructions by filing the complaint before any such confirmation - The prosecution, lodged in defiance of the department's own binding circulars and continued even after the Settlement Commission's conclusive finding that there was no suppression of facts, amounted to a 'blatant disregard' of their own directives, citing such actions as a 'serious lapse' and are not justified - Set aside order of High Court and imposed costs of Rs. 2 lakhs on the revenue, payable to the appellant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31-33, 35- 38] Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2025 INSC 1048

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 276C(1) - Wilful attempt to evade tax - Quashing of prosecution - Whether the continuation of the prosecution, initiated before the Settlement application, was abuse of court's process – Held, the Settlement Commission's order was conclusive, and it found that the appellant had made a full and true disclosure of his income, satisfying the conditions of Section 245H - Commission's finding that there was no suppression of material facts meant there was no 'wilful attempt' to evade tax, a key element required for a successful prosecution under Section 276C(1). [Paras 12, 18-21] Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2025 INSC 1048

Insolvency and bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 62 – Appeal - Section 14 - Moratorium - IBC Moratorium doesn't bar voluntary surrender of corporate debtor's leased property to lessor if retaining the asset is deemed unviable and the Committees of Creditors (CoC) endorses decision - Held that commercial wisdom of the CoC should be given primacy during CIRP (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) - this case was distinguished from a simple recovery of property barred by Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, as the CoC and Resolution Professional themselves desired to return the property due to adverse financial implications of retaining it - The respondent was stalling the process for “undisclosed and extraneous reasons” - Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC states that once the adjudicating authority, by order, declares a moratorium, it would prohibit, amongst other acts, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or is in the possession of the corporate debtor - Set aside NCLAT's order and restored NCLT's order. [Paras 9, 10] Sincere Securities v. Chandrakant Khemka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 774 : 2025 INSC 931

Interest on delayed payments to small scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (1993 Act) - If purchase/supply order pre-dates the enactment of the 1993 Act, then interest is governed by section 34 CPC and not the 1993 Act, which operates prospectively - The Act is considered retroactive in the sense that if goods are supplied after its enforcement, the supplier is entitled to the benefit of statutory protection for interest, even if the agreement was entered into prior to the Act's enforcement - The Act mandates payment of compound interest with monthly interests at the rate mentioned in Section 4 - Set aside order of High Court citing miscarriage of justice and excessive interest calculation - Appeals Allowed. [Paras 31-35] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation - Harmonious Construction - Purposive Construction - Non-obstante Clause - A statute must be read as a whole and one provision construed with reference to others to achieve a consistent enactment, avoiding inconsistency or repugnancy - Courts should harmonize conflicting provisions - A construction that renders a provision futile or a 'useless lumber' is to be avoided - non-obstante clause operates only in case of a conflict to give enacting part an overriding effect, not otherwise - If the enacting part and non-obstante clause can be read harmoniously, they should be. [Paras 9.2-9.6] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946

Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000 - Rule 12 - Determination of age - Evidentiary value of school certificates vs. Public Documents and Medical Opinion - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 35 - Relevancy of Entry in public Record - Section 74 - Public Documents - High Court declared respondent 2 as 'Juvenile' – Held, a school transfer certificate issued by a private school where entry of date of birth was based solely on the oral representation of the father, without any supporting documents, is unreliable - Such school's records are not “public documents” and its Headmaster is not a 'public master' for the purposes of Evidences Act - In cases where school records about age on oral representations and are contradicted by statutory documents like a Family Register (maintained under U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947), Voters List and a Medical Board Report, the latter hold more weight - Medical evidence based on scientific investigation should be given due weight and precedence over school administration records that give rise to hypothesis and speculation - Benevolent legislation of the Juvenile Justice Act is meant for genuine child accused and cannot be used as a ploy to subvert justice by accused individuals of matured mind - In serious offences, documents and statutory public records should take precedence over school records that create reasonable doubt about juvenility - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21-23, 25, 26] Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2025 INSC 918

Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 - Major Port Authorities Act, 2021 - Supreme Court recommends creation of appellate body of Orders of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) for tariff determination, in place of current practice of filing appeals directly before Supreme Court - This will make remedy of appeal more effective and meaningful - Since fixation of tariff by expert bodies like TAMP is a highly technical procedure involving knowledge of law, engineering, finance, commerce, economics and management - Set aside order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31-33, 48-54, 58] Paradip Port Authority v. Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2025 INSC 971

Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) - Inadvertent clerical error in filing shipping bills - Whether such an error, once rectified under Section 149 of Customs Act, can defeat a claim for MEIS benefits – Held, an inadvertent clerical error in shipping bills, once permitted to be corrected under Section 149 of the Customs Act, cannot defeat an exporter's substantive entitlement to MEIS benefits - Procedural mistakes, once corrected, cannot extinguish substantive rights - Beneficial schemes should be construed liberally and administrative technology should aid, not obstruct, the implementation of the law - PRC's rejection was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice because no reasons were given and no hearing was granted - Directed respondents to process the appellant's claim for MEIS benefits based on amended shipping bills and pass appropriate orders within 12 weeks - Emphasized the need for systemic correction by the Union of India, DGFT and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs to prevent genuine exporters from being forced into litigation over rectified procedural lapses - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11- 16] Shah Nanji Nagsi Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2025 INSC 1032

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) - Section 163A - Special provisions as to payment of compensation - No-fault liability - Supreme court referred to a larger bench the issue of whether a claim under Section 163A of MV Act, can be maintained by the owner/insurer of a vehicle, or their legal representatives, for death or injury arising from a motor vehicle accident – Held, Section 163A is a special provision with a non-obstante clause, overriding other provisions of MV Act, other laws in force, and any instrument having the force of law, including insurance policy terms that confine claims for an owner-driven to a fixed sum - Supreme Court distinguished claims under Section 163A (no-fault liability) from those under Section 166, where proof of negligence is necessary - Section 163A is a beneficial provision - Claims survive against the insurer even if the insured dies after the accident, the liability shifts to the owner's estate and the insurance company must pay if the policy is valid - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with previous two-judge bench decisions that restricted such claims to third party risks and indicated that section 163A should cover liability with respect to death of an owner or a driver, even if it goes beyond the statutory liability under section 147 or contractual liability in the insurance policy. [Paras 13-17] Wakia Afrin (Minor) v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 764 : 2025 INSC 919

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Held, insurer of registered owner liable to compensate third-party losses arising out of vehicle, if vehicle's registration was not changed after transfer - Agreement between the registered owner and the appellant clearly indicated that registration would only be transferred after full sale consideration was paid, which had not occurred - The registered owner remained the owner and thus liable to compensate the victims, a liability to be indemnified by the insurer - The insurer was not absolved of its liability- Appeal dismissed. [Paras 7-11] Brij Bihari Gupta v. Manmet, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2025 INSC 948

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 2(34) - Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 1963 (A.P. Act, 1963) - Section 3(1) - Andhra Pradesh Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 - Rule 12A - Section 3(1) levies tax on every motor vehicle 'used or kept for use, in a public place in the State' - Expression 'in a public place' not only describes but also limits the words 'used' and 'kept for use' - The liability to pay tax is not on ownership or registration, but on the use or keeping for use in a 'public place' - 'Public place' is a road, street, way or other place to which the public have a right of access – Held, if the public has no right of access to a place, it is not a 'public place' - The liability to pay tax under Section 3(1) of the A.P. Act, 1963, is contingent on the vehicle being used or kept for use in a 'public place' - A motor vehicle could not be subjected to tax for the period it was exclusively used or kept within the restricted premises, even if intimation of non-use was not given under Rule 12A - The vehicles operating exclusively within the enclosed premises of a factory or plant are not liable to pay motor vehicle tax, as such areas do not constitute a 'public place' - Motor Vehicle tax is compensatory in nature - It has a direct nexus with the end use - If a motor vehicle is not used in a 'public place' or not kept for use in a 'public place' then the person concerned is not deriving benefit from the public infrastructure, therefore, he should not be burdened with the motor vehicle tax for such period - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28, 29, 31, 33, 45-50] Tarachand Logistic Solutions v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 852 : 2025 INSC 1052

National Highway - Citizen's right to unhindered roads - Toll suspension – Held, NHAI or its agents can't levy toll if road is pothole ridden - Public's obligation to pay a user fee for roads is based on assurance that their travel will be free of hindrances - When public pays a toll, they acquire a corresponding right to safe, unhindered and regulated access to the road - Upheld order of High Court's decision to suspend toll collection for 4 weeks - High Court's approach was 'citizen centric approach' and that hardship faced by citizens such as long waits in traffic, strained environment and waste fuel was of greater concern - Supreme Court refused to order a proportionate reduction in toll, noting that the issue was a total lock jam and not just minor repairs in patches - Appeal dismissed and held that citizens should be free to travel on roads for which they have already paid taxes 'without further payment to navigate the gutters and pot-holes, symbols of inefficiency'. [Paras 11, 12, 17] National Highway Authority of India v. O.J Janeesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 819

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138, 142(2)(a) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 200, 482 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Dishonour of Cheque - Place of filing complaint – Held, Section 142(2)(a) which was amended in 2015, specifies that an offence under Section 138 should be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction 'if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where payee maintains the account is situated”- Jurisdiction vests in Court where the payee maintains their account and the cheques delivered for collection - Set aside High Court's Order - Appeals allowed. [Paras 7-9] Prakash Chimanlal Sheth v. Jagruti Keyur Rajpopat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 769 : 2025 INSC 897

Penal Code, 1860; Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Ingredients of - Proof of mens rea - Necessity of proximate prior act or live link - Whether continuous harassment alone can constitute abetment – Held, an allegation of continuous harassment alone, without a proximate prior act, may not be sufficient to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC - There must be a definite and demonstrable act by the accused that drive the victim to the extreme act of suicide, which is a test to find mens rea - The test is whether accused intended by his action to drive victim to suicide - Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of section 306 IPC is not sustainable - A 'live link' or 'proximate trigger' is essential to connect accused's actions to the suicide - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 21-24, 29] Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2025 INSC 990

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 120B - Criminal Conspiracy – Held, conspiracy can be established through circumstantial evidence - Meeting of mind is essential, but it is not necessary for all conspirators to know every detail of the conspiracy or to actively participate - The agreement can be inferred by necessary implication from circumstances of the case and conduct of accused - The offence of criminal conspiracy continues until the termination of the agreement. [Paras 17, 18] Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2025 INSC 957

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 186 - 'Obstruction' – Held, 'obstruction' is not limited to physical force, it means any impediment to public servant's discharge of duty - It does not require use of violence or physical abuse - It can occur through threats, intimidation or deliberate non-co-operation as long as it makes the discharge of duty more difficult. [Paras 29-33] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 376 – Rape - Conviction based on sole testimony of prosecutrix - Evidentiary value of Prosecutrix's statement vis-à-vis Medical Evidence - Supreme Court reiterates that conviction in rape cases can be based solely on the creditworthy and consistent testimony of prosecutrix if it inspires confidence, even if medical evidence is not conclusive or does not show external injuries - The Court emphasized that the absence of injuries on private parts is not fatal to the prosecution's case and minor discrepancies in the victim's statement should not be grounds for rejection - Insufficiency of medical evidence or absence of external injury marks does not invalidate a creditworthy victim's testimony in rape cases - Appeal dismissed. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929

Police Rules, 1934 (Punjab) - Rule 16.2 (1) - Dismissal from Service - Unauthorised Absence – Held, disciplinary authority had primarily based the dismissal on the gravest act of misconduct, which was the 37 day unauthorized absence - The reference to past misconduct was merely to add weight to the decision and was not the effective reason for dismissal - The past conduct must be disclosed in the show cause notice - is applicable when the past conduct is the basis for the punishment, but not when the primary charge is a grave act of misconduct - Two parts of parts of Rule 16.2(1) of the Rules of 1934; the first part allows for dismissal for the gravest act of misconduct, while the second part addresses dismissal as a cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving unfitness for service - The requirement to consider the length of service and pension claims applies to second part and not the first - The dismissal of the Constable was for a 'gravest act of misconduct' under the first part of the rule, and therefore, the disciplinary authority was not obligated to consider his length of service - The dismissal was justified due to the Constable's gross indiscipline as a member of a disciplined force - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 25- 33] State of Punjab v. Ex. C. Satpal Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2025 INSC 1056

Practice and Procedure - Interim Arrangement for temple management (Maa Chandi Devi Temple) - Supreme Court remands the matter to High Court & directs Collector, Haridwar to conduct a personal inquiry into the management of the Math and submit a report to the High Court - Interim arrangement made by High Court to remain in effect - Remanded matter to High Court. [Paras 7-10] Mahant Bhawani Nandan Giri v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 817

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Proof of Minority – Held, the victim's 8th standard marksheet, showing her date of birth, corroborated by testimony of her parents, was cogent and reliable evidence to establish her minority at the time of the incident, thereby attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act - Supreme Court focused on need of a sensitive approach in dealing with sexual assault charges, noting that an unmerited acquittal encourages offenders and that rape causes severe psychological and physical harm. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929

Protection of Children from sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) - Sections 6, 29 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 506 - Aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Presumption of Guilt - Criminal Intimidation – Held, incestuous sexual violence committed by parent requires severest punishment, upheld fathers POCSO conviction - Crimes of sexual abuse, especially against children and by a parent, constitute an unspeakable betrayal of trust and assume a “demonic character”, deserving the “severest condemnation and deterrent punishment” - Incestuous sexual violence by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence, with no mitigation in sentencing for such crimes - A father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional - The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response - Directed Rs. 10,50,000/- to be paid as compensation to the victim by State. [Paras 9-16] Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 781 : 2025 INSC 934

Public Institutions - Disapproval of the manner in which present litigation has been conducted by appellant-corporation - Supreme Court noted that Public Institutions particularly those entrusted with the stewardship of public funds, are expected to conduct themselves in legal proceedings with highest standards of diligence, responsibility and accountability - This present case is stark example of how a state owned corporation has been unjustly and unsustainably saddled with financial liability. [Para 47] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Held, PIL cannot be used as a mechanism to settle scores between competing government officers - If a person is aggrieved by any action of the State with regard to his illegal removal from the service or due to denial of his legitimate claim to a post, such an officer can very well take recourse to the remedies available to him in law - PIL is a mechanism, which has been devised by the Supreme Court so as to dilute the issue of locus and permit public spirited person to approach the Supreme Court or the High Courts on behalf of persons who, on account of their social and economic backwardness, are not in a position to approach the High Courts or the Supreme Court. [Paras 4-6] Prakash Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 824

Public Service Commissions - Autonomy and Independence - Collective Responsibility - Public Service Commissions are independent constitutional bodies established to ensure that the recruitment process is free from political pressure, favouritism, and nepotism - Their members hold a position of significant constitutional trust and responsibility - Any subjective conduct or conduct that raises suspicion has the potential to erode public faith and confidence - The principle of ' collective responsibility', as applicable to a Council of Ministers, does not apply to the Chairman or members of a Public Service Commission - Allegation of misbehaviour is individual in nature, not collective – Held, Ms. Bage could not be held responsible for the failures of the Commission as a whole, especially since the 2 principle of collective responsibility does not apply. [Paras 43-46, 65, 68, 69] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Representation of People's Act, 1951 (RPA); Section 123(2) - Section 100(1)(d)(i) & 100(1)(d)(iv) - Corrupt Practice - Whether election can be declared void due to her non-disclosure of income from her income tax returns and amounts to improper acceptance of nomination rendering election void under section 100(1)(d)(i) and corrupt practise under 100(1)(d)(iv) of RPA – Held, mere failure to disclose assets won't invalidate election unless they're substantial - The non-disclosure was not of a 'substantial nature' and did not materially affect the election result - A Court should not rush to invalidate an election based on a 'highly pedantic and fastidious approach' or on 'minor technicalities' that do not substantially impinge on the law or the integrity of the electoral process - Non-disclosure did not constitute a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of RPA, as it was not of a substantial nature - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 8-11] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992

Rickshaw Pullers - Rehabilitation of - Hand pulled Rickshaws – Held, the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws in Matheran is 'inhuman practice' and it should be stopped as it attacks human dignity - Continuing the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws 'belittles the constitutional promise of social and economic justice - To continue such human practice even after 78 years of independence and after 75 years of the Constitution being enacted and promising social and economic justice to its citizens would be betraying the promise - Directed State of Maharashtra to stop this practice in a staged manner within 6 months - Directed the State to evolve a rehabilitation scheme, using the model implemented in Kevadia, Gujarat, where e-rickshaw are given on a hire basis to underprivileged persons, including tribal women - Genuine hand cart and rickshaw pullers will be given priority in the allotment of e-rickshaws - State is also required to bear the expenses for training the allottees - That Scheme could be funded through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds and non-availability of funds would not be an acceptable excuse for non-implementation - Supreme Court stressed that the unique character of Matheran as a pedestrian hill station must be maintained. [Paras 32-49] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996

Right of Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Section 12(c) - Parens patriae - Supreme Court directed States/Union Territories are directed to conduct a survey to identify orphans who have been admitted under the RTE Act, as well as those who have been deprived of their right to educations and the reasons for their deprivation - During the survey, a concurrent effort must be made to admit deserving orphaned children into neighbourhood schools if they have not already been admitted - Granted 4 weeks to complete the survey, collect data, and file an affidavit regarding compliance - Other states that have not yet done so are directed to consider issuing a notification to include orphans in the 25% quota and take steps to ensure compliance - 'Child' includes 'orphan child' - If a state or union territory fails to issue such a notification, the Secretary of the Department of Education must file an affidavit explaining the reasons - Matter is scheduled to be listed on 9th September, 2025. [Paras 5-10] Poulomi Pavini Shukla v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Service Law - Departmental Inquiry - Judicial Review - The power of judicial review of disciplinary inquiry matters is limited to correcting errors of law or procedural errors that result in manifest injustice or a violation of natural justice principles - It is not an appellate adjudication on the merits of the case - If a disciplinary authority accepts findings of the inquiry officer, it is not required to provide detailed reasons for imposing punishment - In a disciplinary inquiry, findings can be based on a preponderance of probabilities and strict proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required - Supreme Court restores SBI official's removal for taking bribes to sanction loans and reiterates limited interference in Writ jurisdiction - Writ Courts can interfere with disciplinary inquiries only in cases of procedural irregularities or violation of natural justice. [Paras 13-15] State Bank of India v. Ramadhar Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2025 INSC 1010

Service Law - Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (1995 Act) - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (1947 Act) - Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) - High Court upheld termination of a driver found to be color blind, without offering alternate employment – Held, Respondent failed to make demonstrable efforts to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, violating statutory obligations and administrative fairness - Clause 14 of Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dt. 17.12.1979, executed under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared color blind with pay protection and continuity of service - This clause remains valid & enforceable - The subsequent MOS dt. 22.12.1986, neither expressly overrides nor impliedly nullifies the 1979 settlement - Both settlements operate harmoniously, with the 1986 settlement being general and the 1979 settlement addressing a specific category of disability (color blindness) - A general provision does not override a specific provision - Failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical retirement is a substantive illegality that violates the appellant's right to livelihood and equal treatment - This obligation is rooted in constitutional discipline and statutory expectation flowing from Article 14 & 21 - The burden lies on Respondent-Corporation to establish that no suitable alternate post was available - Directed Respondent-Corporation to appoint appellant to a suitable post - The obligation to reasonably accommodate such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment. Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 21, 25-27, 33, 35, 37, 40] Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2025 INSC 920

Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra); Section 14 - Land Acquisition - Preferential Right of Owner - Primacy of owner's right over SRA's power - Validity of acquisition of land in a Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area) when the landowner is willing to redevelop it – Held, owner of a plot of land within a SR Area has a preferential right to redevelop the land - Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) can only undertake development if the landholders or occupants do not come forward with a proposal within reasonable time - Publication of the Section 3C(1) Declaration in Official Gazette is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of inviting a landowner to redevelop the land - Without special notice-cum-invitation from SRA to the landowner, the owner may be unable to prepare an SR Scheme due to the inaccessibility of technical information and surveys - A specific notice-cum-invitation to the owner is a necessary procedural requirement to ensure the owner's preferential right is not frustrated - State Government's power to acquire land under Section 14 is subject to the landowner's preferential right to redevelop - Acquisition process must be held in abeyance until the owner's preferential right is extinguished - Acquisition cannot proceed as long as the owner is willing to undertake development - There appears no cogent reason as to why, instead of enacting a self-contained code within Section I-A, the drafters of this legislation chose to incorporate an entirely distinct slum rehabilitation mechanism by amending the existing legislation through Section 3D - Court granted landowner a period of 120 days to submit a fresh SR Scheme for redevelopment - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 45- 48, 50-53, 64- 65, 68, 74, 84] Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2025 INSC 1015

Special Investigation Team (SIT) Report on Noida functioning & land compensation - Supreme Court appreciated SIT's efforts and acknowledged the fair and impartial opinion - Issued following directions - i. DGP (U.P.) is directed to constitute a new SIT with two IPS officers from different states to investigate issues involved; ii. New SIT is to immediately register an FIR and proceed with an inquiry into the points highlighted by previous SIT; iii. Any competent authority required to provide prior sanction to prosecute an officer under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is directed to do so within two weeks of the application; iv. Head of the new SIT, who must be an officer not below the rank of Commissioner of Police, shall place the outcome of the investigation on record via a Status Report; v. New SIT is to submit a copy of its report to the Chief Secretary, who will place it before the Council of Ministers to enable them to make a decision on policy recommendations such as formation of a Metropolitan Corporation; vi. Chief Secretary is directed to ensure a Citizen Advisory Board is constituted within 4 weeks; vii. Principal Secretary, Dept. of Environment, Forest & Climate change and CEO of Noida are directed to ensure project is implemented without environmental impact assessments and approval from Green Bench of the Court - Directed Status Report on the follow-up actions to be placed on record on next date of hearing on October 28, 2025. [Paras 7-10] Virendra Singh Nagar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 807

Stray Dogs - Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 (Rules, 2023) - Animal welfare - Public Safety - Directions issued - Supreme Court clarified, supplemented and modified the previous directions, noting that a complete prohibition on releasing vaccinated and sterilized dogs is 'too harsh' and potentially impossible to comply with due to lack of infrastructure - Conflict between the previous order and the Rules, 2023, specifically Rule 11(19), which requires that sterilized and immunized stray dogs be released back into the same area from which they were picked up. In Re : 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2025 INSC 1018

Stray Dogs - Directions issued by Supreme Court are as follows - i. Municipal authorities must continue to pick up and round up stary dogs from Delhi and the NCR and create designated shelters; ii. Previous direction prohibiting the release of picked-up strays is kept in abeyance-instead, dogs that have been sterilized, dewormed and vaccinated must be released back into the same area from which they were captured; iii. Relocation mandate does not apply to dogs that are rapid, suspected to having rabies or display aggressive behaviour - These dogs should be kept in separate shelters after being sterilized and immunized and should not be released back onto the streets; iv. Municipal Authorities are directed to create dedicated feeding spaces for stray dogs in each municipal ward, with notice boards indicating that dogs should only be fed in these areas - Feeding dogs on the streets is not permitted, and those found in violation will face legal action; v. A dedicated helpline must be established by each municipal authority to report violations; vi. No individual or organization shall obstruct the implementation of these new directions - Anyone who obstructs a public servant in the discharge of their duties will be prosecuted; vii. Intervening individuals and NGOs who are considered 'animal lovers' must deposit Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 2,00,000, respectively, with the court Registry within 7 days - Money will be used for creating infrastructure and facilities for stray dogs; viii. Animal lovers may apply to the municipal body to adopt street dogs, and it will be their responsibility to ensure the adopted dogs do not return to the streets; ix. Scope of the matter beyond Delhi & NCR, directing the impleadment of all States and UTs to seek information on their on their compliance with the Rules, 2023; x. Court ordered the transfer of all similar pending writ petitions from various High Courts to the Supreme Court for analogous consideration. [Paras 24-35] In Re : 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2025 INSC 1018

Stray dogs - Supreme Court directs immediate pickup, shelter creation and no release back to streets - Warns of strict action against non-compliance and obstruction - Court emphasized the grim situation and the urgent need for action to combat dog bites and rabies, stating that the prevailing circumstances indicate a “systematic failure of the concerned authorities over the past two decades”- Directed government of NCT Delhi, MCD, NDMC and authorities of Noida, Ghaziabad, Gurugram and Faridabad to immediately start picking up stary dogs from all localities and relocate them to designated shelters - Held that there shall be no lethargy or compromise in this exercise and strict action will be taken against any individual or organization obstructing the forceful pickup of stray dogs - Directed to immediately create dog shelters across the NCR and report their creation to Court within 8 weeks - Shelters must have sufficient personnel to sterilize, deworm and immunize stray dogs and provide care - Dogs detained there are explicitly not to be released back onto the streets - Shelters will be monitored by CCTV to prevent unauthorized release of dogs - Directed that two responsible personnel must be present at shelters at all times with proper duty schedules - Helpline number to be created within 1 week for immediate reporting of dog bite cases - Directed Government NCT Delhi to provide detailed information on availability of genuine rabies vaccines - Rounding-up of stray dogs and creation of necessary infrastructure shall be undertaken simultaneously - Directed that the matter again be notified after four weeks with Status Report. [Paras 8-11] In Re : 'City Hounded By Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2025 INSC 977

Sustainable Development - Supreme Court reiterated the principle of 'sustainable development' which balances environmental protection with developmental activities – Held, any construction activity over 20,000 sq. mtr. would affect the environment, regardless of its purpose, and saw no rational basis for discriminating between different types of buildings - Supreme Court noted that education has become a flourishing industry and should not be exempt - Upheld Office Memorandum dt. 30th , January, 2025 stating that it was conducive to environmental interests as it clarifies that the 2025 notification also applies to State of Kerala. [Paras 22-24, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2025 INSC 961

Telegraph Act, 1885 - Section 16(5) - Supreme Court recommends creation of statutory appeal over District judge's compensation order under Section 16(3) - Noted that there is no provision for an appeal against District judge's compensation order forcing parties to resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court which typically does not resort to evidence or disturb findings of fact - First Appellate Court is required to address all issues considered in order impugned and decide the same by giving reasons - Held that there is a significant gap in the law, especially given the increase in litigation related to power and electrical projects and that there is no amendment in sections 10 & 16 of the 1885 Act - Supreme Court noted lack of uniformity in how cases under Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 are registered and handled - Referred different statutes like Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, etc. wherein remedy of appeal has been provided. [Paras 23, 27-36] Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd. V. Vinod, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2025 INSC 1004

Telegraph Act, 1885 - Uniform Compensation Rate – Held, it was a 'glaring error' for the High Court to apply a uniform compensation rate for land in different districts (Sonepat & Jhajjar) with varying characteristics and market values - A 100 km transmission line passes through areas with vastly different characteristics, such as proximity to highways and that a uniform rate is not a proper methodology for fair compensation - Correct method is to firstly assess the value of land and thereafter determine compensation payable to landowners - Set aside High Court's order and remitted matter for fresh consideration. [Paras 16, 19, 20] Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd. V. Vinod, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2025 INSC 1004

Temple Administration - Supreme Court appoints Ex-Allahabad HC Judge Ashok Kumar as Head of Committee to administer Bankey Bihari Temple - Supreme Court modifies previous order regarding the use of temple funds for land acquisition, restoring the position to status quo ante, where the State cannot use temple funds for land acquisition - Stays operation of the ordinance's provisions that grants the State powers to constitute a Trust for managing the temple's affairs, specifically Sections 3 & 5, until the validity of the Ordinance is resolved by the High Court - Supreme Court directs establishment of a High-powered Temple Management Committee to oversee the day-to-day functioning of the Thakur Shree Bankey Bihari Ji Maharaj Temple, noting the ineffectiveness of previous management - The Committee is tasked with planning the holistic development of the Temple and its vicinity, including privately negotiating and land purchases or directing the State Government to acquire land - Held that apart from 4 Goswami members on the Committee, no other Goswami or sevayat is permitted to interfere in the Temple's critical functions, except for puja/sewa and offering prasad to the deity - Supreme Court stays operation and further proceedings of Single judge of High Court in a matter concerning the Ordinance's constitutionality to avoid parallel proceedings, requesting the Chief Justice of High Court to list such petitions before a Division Bench. [Paras 16-36] Management Committee of Thakur Shree Bankey Bihari Ji Maharaj Temple v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 785

Tenancy - West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997; Sections 7 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 - Whether the provision of Section 7 of the Tenancy Act regarding the deposit of rent and filing of an application within the specified time, are mandatory or directory, and whether the benefit of Section 5 of the limitation Act, can be invoked by the tenant for condonation of delay – Held, the compliance required under by the tenant under Sections 7(1) and the first part of section 7(2) of the Tenancy Act regarding the deposit of rent and the filing of an application within the specified time is mandatory - Applicability of the limitation Act to proceedings under the Tenancy Act is subject to the provisions of this Act relating to Limitation - This means that if a shorter time period is specified for a proceeding under the Tenancy Act cannot be used to extend it - The term 'shall' in section 7(1) and first part of section 7(2) indicates a mandatory obligation on the tenant to pay or deposit rent - Section 7(2) allows for a one-time extension of upto 2 months, applies only to the payment of the amount specified in a Court Order after the rent has been determined - Since the tenant is required to 'deposit the amount admitted him to be due' together with an application for rent determination within specified time, the deposit and the application are considered a precondition for avoiding eviction - The term 'together' means 'simultaneously' or 'conjointly' - Therefore, a tenant cannot invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay in filing the application - Consequences for non-compliance are specified in Section 7(3) which mandates the tenant's defence against eviction “shall be struck out” if they fail to deposit or pay the required amount within the specified time or any granted extension - The consequences further reinforces the mandatory nature of provision - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 17, 19-21, 22-24, 28, 29, 33-35] Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School v. Ismat Ahmed, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2025 INSC 984

Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Section 2(1)(h) - Deceptively similar - Defined as those that so nearly resemble another mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion – Held, appellants failed to establish a prima facie case for an interim injunction and that there was no deceptive similarity between appellant's mark 'Blenders Pride', 'Imperial Blue' and 'Seagram's' and respondent's mark 'London Pride'- Supreme Court applied holistic comparison test, examining the visual, phonetic, structural and conceptual elements of marks on following grounds - i. It concluded that overall commercial impression of 'London Pride' is substantially different from the appellant's marks; ii. Anti-dissection Rule which requires a mark to be considered as a whole, it does not prevent a court from identifying the “dominant” element that influences consumer perception; iii. Publici Juris (common to trade) - The term 'Pride' was found to be a common, laudatory or non-distinctive term that cannot be monopolized - Noted that dominant components of appellants' marks were 'Blenders' and 'Imperial', while the respondent's dominant component was 'London', which introduces a distinct geographical identifier; iv. Consumer Perception - Products in question are premium and ultra-premium whiskies, suggesting that consumers are discerning and likely to exercise greater care in their purchases - This reduces likelihood of confusion - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 21- 35, 36, 45, 51] Pernod Ricard v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 803 : 2025 INSC 981

Trust - Constructive Trust - Supreme Court laid down tentative list which may signify that the society may be considered as a 'constructive trust' - i. the method of devolution of property to the institution or its acquisition and circumstances along with the intention behind the grant of property i.e. whether it was for the benefit of the organization/public beneficiaries or for the personal benefit of any particular individual/family; ii. Whether grant is accompanied with any obligation or qualified with a condition, either express or implied, regarding its use by the grantee; iii. Whether the 'dedication' was complete i.e. whether there was an absolute cessation or complete relinquishment of ownership of property on part of the grantor and subsequent vesting of the property in another individual for the said object; iv. Whether public user or an unascertained class of individuals could exercise any 'right' over the organization and its properties; v. the manner of use of profits accrued, more particularly, whether it is applied/re-applied towards the benefit of the organization and its objectives etc. [Para 137] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Unauthorized Construction - Howrah Zilla Parishad Bye-laws, 2005 - Regulation 2015 - Supreme Court appreciated High Court's action in addressing unauthorized constructions and emphasized that it is 'high time' for the High Court to handle such issues across the city of Calcutta in larger public interest - Held that it is high time that the High Court in larger public interest takes up this issue and ensures that each and every unauthorized construction across the city is dealt appropriately inn accordance with law - Held that High Court has looked into the Resolution dt. 12.08.2024, passed by the Howrah Zilla Parishad - Petition dismissed. T.S Construction v. Howrah Zilla Parishad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 858

University - A.J. Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015; Section 13(7) - Kerala University of Digital Sciences, Innovation and Technology Act , 2021 - Section 11(10) - Appointment of Vice-Chancellor - Supreme Court forms Search Committee headed by Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia (Chairperson) for Kerala University Vice-Chancellor appointments - The chairman is authorized to constitute separate or joint committees - including 2 members from Chancellor's list and 2 from the State's list - Held that Chairperson must be paid an honorarium of Rs. 3 lakhs for every day of proceedings of Search-cum-Selection Committee - Supreme Court laid down appointment process - i. Committee's recommendations endorsed by Chairperson, will be submitted to CM of Kerala; ii. CM can recommend shortlisted names in order of preference, if he believes a candidate is unsuitable their remarks and supporting materials must be sent to Chancellor; iii. The Chancellor will appoint VC from empanelled names, following CM's order of preference; iv. If Chancellor has any reservations against the names or CM's remarks, they can record their opinion with supporting reasons; v. any file where the CM & Chancellor have a disagreement will be sent to SC for a final decision - While this process in underway, Chancellor can issue fresh notifications to continue the current temporary VC in office in accordance with 6 month limit stipulated by Section 13(7) and 11(10) of the respective acts. [Paras 10-22] Chancellor, APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 815

Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (UAPA) - Section 18-20 – Bail – Held, no UAPA offence over attending meeting of organization which isn't banned - Upheld the order of granting bail to the accused by High Court citing it to be fully justified and reasonable citing that allegations against him were related to his connections with an organization named AL-Hind, which is not a banned organization under UAPA - High Court's order was passed in April 2022, and it would not be 'just and proper to interfere with the same at this stage'- Charges had not been framed and the trial had not yet commenced, despite the accused having been in custody for 5.5 years - The trial had not commenced despite a lapse of 5.5 years and that 'accused cannot be allowed to languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial' - Directed Trial Court to expedite and conclude the trial within 2 years, noting that there were more than 100 witnesses to be examined - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 8-13] Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 833 : 2025 INSC 1008