Supreme Court Weekly Digest September 2025 [Sep 1 - 10, 2025]

Citation 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 - 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 882

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) - Section 31(7)(b) - Award of interest - Pendente Lite interest - Whether a clause in the agreement barring interest on 'delayed payment/disputed claim' also bars the arbitral Tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest – Held, clause restricting interest on delayed payments by itself won't bar pendente lite interest - An arbitral tribunal can only be stripped of its power to award pendente lite interest if the agreement between the parties is explicitly or by necessary implication worded to bar it - A clause that merely prohibits interest on 'delayed payment' by itself is not enough to infer an express bar on the tribunal's power to award pendente lite interest - The power of an arbitral tribunal to award interest for the period between the date of cause of action arose and the date the award is made is subject to the agreement between the parties and is statutorily governed - The power to award post-award interest under section 31(7)(b) is not subject to the agreement between the parties and is statutorily governed - Arbitral tribunal in this case awarded pendente lite interest from the date the claim was affirmed, not from date of cause of action arose - There is no error in the award of pendente lite interest or post-award interest - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16- 24] Oil and Natural Gas Corp. v. G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2025 INSC 1066

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 2(1)(h) - Limitation for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award - When does the limitation period commence for a government department and whether the delivery of a signed xerox copy of the award to an authorized representative of the State constituted valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act, which would start the limitation period – Held, definition of 'party' under Section 2(1)(h) of the Act, which refers to a party to an arbitration agreement and for large government organizations, the award must be received by a person who has the authority and knowledge to understand the award and make decision to challenge it - An authorized representative, such as Assistant Engineer in this case, who did not have the decision-making authority to challenge the award, is not considered a 'party' for the purpose of receiving the award under Section 31(5) - Hence, the limitation period for filing an application to set aside the award under Section 34(3) does not begin to run from the date of such delivery - Limitation period commences only when the award is received by competent authority or person who is a 'party' and can decide whether to challenge the award - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 12 - 25] Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 867 : 2025 INSC 1062

Bail Cancellation - Grounds for cancellation – Held, very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancelling bail that has already been granted - Grounds for cancellation include - i. misusing liberty by engaging in other criminal activities; ii. Interfering with the investigation or tampering with evidence; iii. Attempting to influence or threaten witnesses; iv. Evading court proceedings; v. any conduct by the accused after being granted bail that makes a fair trial no longer conducive. [Paras 55- 59] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100(5) - Principles on framing additional substantial question of law - i. Substantial question of law must be grounded in parties' pleadings and findings of lower courts; ii. Jurisdiction to frame a new question of law is exceptional and should not be exercised routinely unless there is strong and convincing reason to do so; iii. The proviso allows the court to hear an appeal on any other substantial question law, which implies that at least one substantial question of law must have been formulated at the admission stage; the power to reformulate or add a question arises only if a substantial question of law has already been framed; iv. High Court must be satisfied that the new question is a substantial question of law and not a mere legal plea; v. Court is mandatorily required to record its reasons for framing an additional substantial question of law; vi. The opposite party must be given a fair and proper opportunity to contest the new question; framing a question while dictating the judgment without hearing the parties would be improper. [Para 18] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Anticipatory Bail - Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) - Section 18 - Applicability of Section 438 of CrPC – Held, anticipatory bail is permissible under SC/ST Act only if prima facie offence isn't made out - The bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which excludes the application of Section 438 CrPC, is not absolute - This requires a court to verify the complaint's averments and determine if a prima facie is established - The Court is not permitted to conduct a 'mini-trial' by evaluating evidence or other materials - The bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 is intended to uphold the Act's objective of protecting vulnerable SC/ST communities and ensuring social justice - The denial of anticipatory bail for these offences is not considered unreasonable or a violation of Article 14 of Constitution, as these offences are a distinct class - The bar is not held to be violative of Article 21 - High Court committed a 'manifest error' and a 'jurisdictional error' by evaluating witness testimonies and concluding that no offence was made out - The incident occurred outside the complainant's house, which was a place 'within public view' - The caste nexus was established and the humiliation was clearly intentional - Anticipatory bail was granted by overlooking and disregarding the bar of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, was a clear illegality - Appeal is allowed. [Paras 5-8] Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 869 : 2025 INSC 1067

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 215, 216, 223, 464 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Section 4, 6 - Misjoinder of charges/trial - Acquittal by High Court on Procedural grounds - Reinstatement of Trial Court's conviction - Held, High Court erred in its reasoning, acknowledging that there were minor variations in the evidence, Supreme Court found these natural and inconsequential, especially given in the socio-economic circumstances of the victim from a rural region - The victim's testimony was consistent across police and magisterial statements and during the trial - The evidence presented, including School TC and medical reports, conclusively proved the victim was a minor (aged 12-13 at the time of incident) and pregnant - Mere irregularities in the framing of charges or the conduct of a joint trial do not automatically invalidate the proceedings - Defective charge regarding the date of the offence did not mislead the accused, as the time frame was well-known to them throughout the trial - Joint trial, even if considered a procedural irregularity under Section 223 CrPC, did not cause any prejudice to the accused or result in a failure of justice - The principle of 'beyond reasonable doubt' should not be misapplied to allow culprits to walk free based on minor inconsistencies - A reasonable doubt must be serious and backed by reason, making the prosecution's version improbable - High Court's acquittal was a 'misapplication of procedure' - Appeal allowed. [Paras 26-33, 35-38] Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 864 : 2025 INSC 1061

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Anticipatory Bail - Supreme Court criticises High Court for asking why accused was not arrested instead of deciding anticipatory bail plea - Held that petitioner was not arrested for 4 years by itself was a good ground for the High Court to exercise its discretion and grant anticipatory bail - Supreme Court disapproved of the manner in which the High Court dealt with the anticipatory bail plea by passing a 'very cryptic and unusual order' and seeking an affidavit from the Director General of Police (DGP) as to why the accused had not been arrested for 4 years - The High Court should either allow the application for anticipatory or decline it on its own merits. Gursewak Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 873

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Held, there is clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case where there is a promise of marriage, the Court must very carefully examine whether the accused actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust - Supreme Court lays down four-step test for High Courts to quash criminal cases - i. whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable i.e. materials is of sterling and impeccable quality; ii. Whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of accusations as false; iii. Whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution / complaint and /or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution; iv. Whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice - If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC - Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial, especially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused - Supreme Court quashed summons issued to appellant for the offence of rape on false pretext of marriage on a complaint filed by complainant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-22] Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880

Companies Act, 1956 - Oppression and Mismanagement - Share transfer validity – Held, Oppression in company law has no straightjacket definition and takes many forms - Primary element of oppression is a 'lack of probity and fair dealing' that is 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful' and prejudices a portion of its members - While an isolated illegal act may not be oppressive, a series of illegal acts can collectively lead to the conclusion that they are part of a transaction intended to oppress the affected members - In a private limited company, the acts of directors are held to a finer standard to rule out the misuse of power for personal gain - Reducing a majority shareholder to a minority position through a mala fide act of the company or its directors is considered an act of oppression - A gift deed purportedly transferred shareholder's entire stake was found invalid because it violated the company's Articles of Association (AoA) - Clause 16 of AoA restricted share transfers by gift to a specific list of family members, which did not include a motherin-law - Share transfer forms were declared invalid because the share transfer form was signed by the appellant after its validity period had expired - Forms also showed clear overwriting and a mismatch of dates - Upheld the order of NCLT wherein it held the act of ousting appellant who held 98% of shares in company to be fraudulent and restored her directorship and shareholding - All actions of company in serial fashion demonstrate clear oppression and mismanagement in its affairs - Appeal allowed. [Para 29, 34-42, 43-50, 54] Shailja Krishna v. Satori Global Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 866 : 2025 INSC 1065

Companies Act, 1956 - Sections 397 and 398 - Oppression and Mismanagement - Scope of NCLT's jurisdiction – Held, NCLT and its predecessor, the Company Law Board (CLB), have wide jurisdiction to decide on all matters incidental or integral to a complaint of oppression and mismanagement - NCLT is not denuded of its power to provide diverse reliefs simply because a matter involves allegations of fraud, manipulation and coercion that might typically require a full-fledged trial - A literal interpretation of law should be avoided if it would lead a company's total chaos or mismanagement - A court should lean toward a construction of the statute that retains jurisdiction to mold relief to benefit the company and its members - Tribunal's purpose is to bring an end to the matters complained by providing a solution, not to prolong them or to put an end to the company itself. [Paras 29 - 31] Shailja Krishna v. Satori Global Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 866 : 2025 INSC 1065

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 14, 16 - Equality before law - Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment - Migration to unreserved category permissible or not - Held that this depends on the presence of a specific rule or policy - In absence of an embargo in recruitment rules or employment notifications, reserved candidates who score higher than the last selected unreserved candidate are entitled to migrate to and be appointed against unreserved seats - However, if an embargo is imposed by the relevant recruitment rules, such candidates are not permitted to migrate to the general category - Distinguished present facts of the case from Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119 and held that this case does not have universal application - The general principles from Jitendra Kumar case do not apply when there is a contrary circular or rule - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22, 32] Union of India v. Sajib Roy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 881 : 2025 INSC 1084

Constitution of India; Article 371D - Telangana Medical and Dental Colleges Admission Rules, 2017 - Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee), Act, 1983 (1983 Act) - 'Local Candidate' - Held, the authority of State of Telangana to define 'local candidate' for preferential admission to medical courses through subordinate legislation is a valid exercise of power under Article 371D and the Presidential Order - High Court's expansion of this definition under Article 226 was an impermissible interference with legislative wisdom - The rule defining a 'local candidate' based on residence and education within the State for a specified period is no arbitrary or violative of Article 14 - The definition is intended to benefit individuals with a real bond to the state, who are presumed to remain and serve the local population after they qualify - Upheld similar rules that provide for domicile or residential requirements for admission to educational institutions - High Court cannot expand a legislative definition based on its 'subjective satisfaction' - High Court's reading down of the rule to include any students with a residence certificate would lead to an unworkable and anomalous situation - There was no warrant for reading down when the definition is clear, in consonance with the Presidential Order - Set aside order of High Court and upholds Telangana Domicile Rule mandating 4 year continuous study in State with relaxation to children of govt. servants - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19, 22-25, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058

Constitution of India - Article 226, 227 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR / Chargesheet - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, Article 226 cannot be invoked to quash chargesheet if cognizance has been taken, remedy is available under Section 528 - FIRs or chargesheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognizance is taken but once cognizance is taken, the remedy lies under Section 528 BNSS, to challenge both FIR/Chargesheet and even the cognizance order - The High Court did have the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to consider the petitioner's grievance for quashing the FIR, chargesheet and any cognizance order - High Court misunderstood the ruling in Neeta Singh v State of U.P. 2024 - Order of High Court was set aside. [Paras 7-10] Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875

Delay in uploading judgments - Delay in uploading judgment after 2 years 5 months of pronouncing of judgment, is a matter of grave concern and a practice to be deprecated - However, there was no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts and concluded that the delay, by itself, was not sufficient to set aside the judgment - Delay in judgment uploading alone cannot nullify a conviction if the judgment is otherwise sound - Practice of High Courts deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal more particularly in criminal matters wherein the appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court - Such delays should not recur and reiterated the guidelines from the case Anil Rai v. State of Bihar to address delays in pronouncing and uploading judgements - Judgments should be made available to the parties within 3 months from the date of reserving - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 41-47] Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 879 : 2025 INSC 1081

Electricity Act, 2003 - Allocation and apportionment of coal linkage - 'Change in law' events – Held, an appeal to Supreme Court under Section 125 of the Electricity Act is only tenable on a substantial question of law - This is similar to the grounds for appeal under Section 100 of CPC, 1908 - The coal supply from all modes of procurement must be considered for the power plant as a whole and not for specific Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) - The firm and tapering linkage coal must be apportioned pr-rata among all beneficiaries based on the power supplied to them - No single power distribution company (DISCOM) can claim a priority for power supply based on the date of their agreement or the source of coal - Supreme Court reinforced the principle of non-interference with decisions of expert bodies like CERC (Central Electricity Regulatory Commission) and APTEL (Appellate Tribunal for Electricity) unless their decisions are arbitrary, illegal or contrary to mandatory statutory provisions - Coal shortages and associated costs must be shared fairly by all electricity purchasers from a power plant and that no DISCOMS can claim priority for power supply in an event of coal shortage - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 19, 20, 23] Haryana Power Purchase Centre v. GMR Kamalanga Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 877 : 2025 INSC 1079

Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 65A & 65B - Customs Act, 1962 - Section 138C(4) - Admissibility of Electronic Evidence - Non-Compliance of mandatory provision - Whether the acknowledgment of documents in statements recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act amounts to due compliance of Section 138C(4) – Held, Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act is a mandatory provision and Section 138C(4) of the Customs Act is pari materia to it - Supreme Court applied two maxims i.e. impotentia excusat legem (impossibility excuses the law) and lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform), to determine how the mandatory nature of the provision should be understood and complied with, depending on facts and circumstances of each case - Strict compliance with Section 138C(4) in the form of a specific certificate is not always necessary - In this case, documents on record, including the records of proceedings and the statements recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act, constitute due compliance - A certificate not in the prescribed format will not be rendered invalid, particularly when the authenticity of the documents is not disputed - Where substantial compliance is shown and authenticity is undisputed, the absence of a certificate does not invalidate the record of proceedings - Appeals partly allowed. [Paras 37- 47] Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Suresh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 860 : 2025 INSC 1050

Hindu Succession Act, 2005 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908- Section 114, Order 47 Rule 1 - Preliminary Decree - Review Jurisdiction - Scope of Review – Held, review proceedings are not an appeal in disguise and are limited to correcting apparent errors of fact or law, not for rehearing or substituting a view - An error apparent on the face of the record is a patent error, not one that requires a 'long-drawn process of reasoning' to establish - Courts ought not to mix-up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction - High Court's review order exceeded its jurisdiction- the review order recorded fresh findings on facts and overturned the earlier findings of the fact of the High Court - High Court had exercised or exceeded its jurisdiction by overturning the earlier findings of fact - Set aside High Court's order denying daughter her coparcenary right - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13-18] Malleeswari v. K. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 876 : 2025 INSC 1080

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 62 - Whether the claim of appellants which was verified and included in the list of creditors, should be treated as 'belated claimants' under Clause 18.4 of the Resolution Plan, entitling them to only a 50% refund and whether they are entitled to possession of their apartment – Held, once a claim is verified and admitted by the Resolution Professional (RP), it cannot be treated as 'belated' to deny substantive relief under a resolution plan - Noted that central issue did not hinge on whether the appellants initial physical claim was validly filed on Jan 11, 2019 - the undisputed fact was that the appellants' claim was resubmitted on February 7, 2020 and was subsequently verified by the Resolution Professional and included in the published list of financial creditors - Once a claim is verified and incorporated into the list of creditors, it gains full legal recognition within the CIRP - The appellants' case did not fall under Clause 18.4 of Resolution Plan, which is a 'residuary' clause for claims that were not filed, not verified, or not communicated to the resolution applicant - Since the appellant's claim was verified and admitted, it was to be treated under Clause 18.4(ii) read with Clause 18.4 (vi)(a), which applies to allottees with verified and admitted claims and provides for the delivery of possession or an equivalent alternative unit - The Resolution Plan itself distinguishes between verified claims and belated or unverified claims- Relegating the appellants, who had paid a substantial amount and had their claim admitted, to the status of a mere refund claimant would be a misapplication of the plan and would undermine the purpose of the IBC - It would be unjust to deny possession to bona fide homebuyers who have paid a significant amount and had their claim duly verified and admitted - Appeal allowed and directed Resolution applicant to execute the conveyance deed and hand over possession of the flat to the appellants. [Paras 32 - 38] Amit Nehra v. Pawan Kumar Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 882 : 2025 INSC 1086

Judicial Impropriety - Bail Order - Supreme Court criticises High Court for modifying bail condition when bail order was under challenge before Apex Court – Held, while High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court, as the highest appellate authority, can issue corrective directions binding on the lower forums - The High Court's action in modifying an order that was pending challenge before the Supreme Court ran contrary to the principles of judicial propriety and comity - When a matter is pending before the Supreme Court, a High Court should restraint and avoid passing orders that could 'circumvent, prejudice or render infructuous' the proceedings - High Court's conflicting exercise of jurisdiction should be strictly avoided - Supreme Court also expressed displeasure at the respondent's conduct, noting that respondent's counter-affidavit filed with the Supreme Court did not mention the application or High Court's orders - Set aside the High Court's order modifying bail and notice was issued to respondent. [Paras 8-13] Sreeja D.G. v. Anitha R. Nair, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 874

Legislative Powers - Source of Power v. Field of Legislation - The power to legislate is derived from Articles 245 and 246 of Constitution - Entries in 7th Schedule (Union, State and Concurrent Lists) are merely 'legislative heads' or 'fields of legislation' - 1983 Act, which enables the creation of admission rules, traces its power to Entry 25 of List III of Seventh Schedule and Article 371D. [Paras 15, 17-19, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Held, the Tribunal and High Court failed to consider the appellant's monthly income while calculating compensation - When a minor child suffers a permanent disability, compensation for the loss of income should be based on, at minimum, the minimum wages of a skilled worker in the relevant state at the time of the accident - Minimum wage for a skilled worker in Gujarat in 2012 (the year of accident) was Rs. 227.85 per days, which rounds to a monthly income of Rs. 6,836, added 40% towards future prospects and applied multiplier of 18 - Upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant's permanent functional disability was 90% - When a child is involved in an accident, the loss of income must be calculated using the minimum wages for a skilled worker in that state - Directed that if a claimant fails to provide proof of income, the opposing party, specifically the insurance company, is obligated to provide the tribunal with the applicable minimum wage as issued by the government - This directive be distributed to all Motor Accident Claim Tribunals via the Registrar Generals of the High Courts - Total compensation of Rs. 35,90,489/- is to be paid with 9% interest p.a. from the date of claim petition - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-16] Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel v. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 871 : 2025 INSC 1070

National Green Tribunal (NGT) Act, 2010 - Section 19, 22 - Principles of natural justice - Right to a hearing - NGT cannot abdicate its adjudicatory functions by relying solely on the report of a Joint Committee - Held that adjudicatory functions of NGT cannot be assigned to committees, even expert committees, decisions have to be that of NGT - An expert's committee's role is to assist the tribunal with a factfinding exercise, but the final adjudication must be done by the NGT itself - The NGT cannot 'outsource an opinion and base its decision on such opinion' - An adverse order cannot be passed against a person without impleading them as a party to the proceedings and giving them an opportunity of hearing - The NGT's approach in condemning a person unheard is contrary to settled principles of natural justice. [Paras 28] Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2025 INSC 1060

Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Promissory Note - Suit of Recovery of amount - Onus of Proof - Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that reduced the amount recoverable under a promissory note from Rs. 35,29,690 to Rs. 22,00,000 and restored the Trial Court's decree - High Court reduced the amount citing a lack of documentary proof for the cash portion of the loan – Held, once a promissory note is accepted, the onus is on the respondent to disprove the debt, not on the appellant to provide documentary evidence for cash payments - It is not uncommon for money transactions to include a cash component and that the absence of a receipt or bank transaction is not sufficient to negate the payment, especially when a promissory note exists - Initial presumption of legally enforceable debt comes from NI Act - High Court's view was erroneous and unsustainable - Appeal allowed. Georgekutty Chacko v. M.N. Saji, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 878

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Whether a compromise reached between parties in a case under Section 138 of NI Act can be a basis for setting aside a conviction, especially after the matter has been upheld by multiple courts – Held, the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is 'mainly civil wrong' and is specifically made compoundable under Section 147 of NI Act - A settlement, once voluntarily entered into by the parties, allows them to save themselves from the litigation process, and courts should not override such a compromise - The compromise deed dt. April 6, 2025 and an affidavit from respondent confirmed that a settlement had been reached - Respondent had accepted payment in full and final settlement of debt - Since a voluntary compromise was reached, the proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act could no longer be sustained and conviction had to be set aside - Set aside High Court's order. Appeal allowed. [Paras 6-12] Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 865

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education, 2009 (RTE Act) - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) - Referring of matter to CJI – Held, Article 21A postulates primary education to be a 'public good' that must be accessible and available to all - RTE Act is the State's legislative enforcement of this fundamental right - Supreme Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench to reconsider its previous decision in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, wherein it was held that RTE Act does not apply to minority institutions - Primary concern was that the exclusion of minority institutions from the RTE Act would 'offend the Article 21A right of students admitted in such institutions' by denying them statutory entitlements and benefits - Held that Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural trust Case focused on Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act and no other section and held that the entirety of RTE Act to be inapplicable to an entire section of society - To hold that entirety of the RTE Act is inapplicable does not appeal reasonable and proportionate - If RTE Act would not apply to minority institutions, they would stand denied of the various statutory entitlements and benefits that RTE Act affords to all children between 6- 14 years of age - Held that TET is held to be inapplicable to minority institutions, this would automatically result in a violation of Article 14 as differential eligibility criteria based on religious or linguistic character would be an impermissible classification. [Paras 186-191] Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861 : 2025 INSC 1063

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education, 2009 (RTE Act) - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) - Supreme Court mandates TET qualification for teachers in nonminority schools - Allows time for in-service teachers to clear test - Teachers appointed prior to the enactment of the RTE Act and have more than 5 years of service left, granted a time of two years to pass the TET - Held that TET is a mandatory minimum qualification for teachers, regardless of their length of service - Emphasized the importance of qualified teachers for imparting quality education, stating that a well-equipped teacher is crucial for molding the character and intellectual capabilities of students - All teachers seeking new appointments or promotion must have a TET qualification, otherwise, their candidature will not be considered - In-service teachers who have less than 5 years of service left, if aspires for promotion, will not be considered eligible without qualifying TET - To qualify for terminal benefits, such teachers must have put in the qualifying service in accordance with Rules - If any teacher has not put in the qualifying service and there is some deficiency, this case may be considered by appropriate department. [Paras 204-206, 208, 210, 214- 218] Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861 : 2025 INSC 1063

Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) - Section 3(1)(s) & (r) - 'Public View' - the term 'any place within public law' is distinct from a 'public place' - An incident occurring in location like a lawn outside a house, which can be seen by someone from the road, would be considered a place within 'public view'. [Para 5] Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 869 : 2025 INSC 1067

Succession Act, 1925 - Section 2(h) – Will - A will is a legal declaration of a testator's wishes regarding their property, to be carried out after their death - A will is not a transfer inter vivos, it is a posthumous disposition and can be revoked at any time during the testator's lifetime - A will must be attested by two or more witnesses - To be proven in Court, at least one attesting witness must be called to prove its execution - The propounder of the will must also remove any legitimate suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution such as an unfair or unjust disposition circumstances surrounding its execution, such as an unfair or unjust disposition of property or the propounder themselves taking a substantial benefit - The mere fact that a will is registered does not automatically grant it validity - Suspicious circumstances surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff - Appeal allowed and suit dismissed. [Paras 23-27] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Succession Act, 1925 - Sections 67 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 – Held, High Court should not frame and answer an additional substantial question of law under the proviso to Section 100(5) of CPC without a foundation in the pleadings, issues or evidence presented by the parties - Introducing a new legal argument, such as the applicability of Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, at the stage of second appeal creates an entirely new case for the plaintiffs and is improper - The court must record specific reasons for framing such a question and the opposite party must be given a fair opportunity to respond - The Trial Court and the First appellate Court had already established that the testators had a sound mind and the will was validly executed without any suspicious circumstances - The valid and genuine will which was duly executed and proved must be given effect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 23] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 53A - Part Performance - Difference between a registered sale deed and an agreement for sale or a contract for sale – Held, the doctrine of part-performance can be invoked as a defence against a transferor trying to eject a transferee - A key requirement for this defence is that the transferee must have taken or continued possession of property in part performance of the contract - A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties - While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. [Paras 12-16, 30, 31] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 54 - Sale of immovable property with a value over Rs. 100 must be made by a registered instrument - A contract for sale (agreement to sell) does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on the property - At best, it gives the buyer the right to file a suit for specific performance if the seller avoids executing a sale deed - A GPA (General Power of Attorney) is an instrument that creates an agency, authorizing the grantee to perform specific acts on behalf of the grantor - A GPA does not, by itself, constitute an instrument of transfer of immovable property, even if it contains clauses making it irrevocable or authorizing the attorney to sell the property. [Paras 18-22] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1974 - Procedure for sample collection - The results of an analysis of a sewage or trade effluent sample are not admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding unless the statutory procedure under Section 21(3), (4) and (5) is strictly complied with - Rigor of Section 19(1) of National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 is qua the procedure to be adopted by the NGT in conducting its proceedings - It cannot be stretched to abandon the statutory procedure laid down under Section 21 and 22 of the Water Act and by outsourcing investigation to administrative committees by overlooking the statutory provisions and basing its decisions on the recommendation of such administrative committee - This includes serving a notice to the occupier, taking and dividing the sample in their presence, and sealing and signing the containers by both parties - Held that NGT's order were vitiated due to the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice and the mandatory procedure under the Water Act - Set aside NGT's orders and clarifies that it is open to U.P. Pollution Control Board to carry out a fresh inspection, provided it adheres to the due process and statutory procedures - Appeal allowed. [Para 10, 21, 22, 27, 29-33] Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2025 INSC 1060

Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 - Nature & Scope – Held, Witness Protection Scheme is a remedial and curative measure designed to neutralize the effects of threat that have already materialized - Bail cancellation is a preventive and supervisory function of the Court, aimed at ensuring the trial proceeds without being gendered by intimidation - The scheme addresses the psychological impact of fear on witnesses, but it does not displace or dilute the established law of bail - Substituting the scheme for a bail cancellation application would render the court's authority and bail conditions meaningless - Supreme Court expressed dismay at the practice of Allahabad High Court of passing 'cyclostyled template order' in at least forty recent cases - Matter remanded for fresh hearing - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18, 36-38, 47, 61] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074