Citation 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 - 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 969 Advocates Act, 1961 - Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa filed a disciplinary complaint against an advocate alleging professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, for obtaining a consent decree without the knowledge of a party and suppressing material facts from the Court – Held, at the stage of...
Citation 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 - 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 969
Advocates Act, 1961 - Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa filed a disciplinary complaint against an advocate alleging professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, for obtaining a consent decree without the knowledge of a party and suppressing material facts from the Court – Held, at the stage of cognizance, the Bar Council must record reasons based on a prima facie case of misconduct before referring a complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. A cryptic or laconic reference order without minimum discussion of allegations does not satisfy statutory requirements - The advocate had only endorsed the identification of the plaintiff's authorized representative in the consent terms, which remain undisturbed to date, and had no professional relationship with the complainant. Therefore, proceedings for misconduct were not justified - The Court quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings, holding that the complaint was frivolous and lacked foundation, imposing costs on the Bar Council for dragging the advocate to the Court without merit - The referral of a complaint to the disciplinary committee requires a reasoned satisfaction of a prima facie case of misconduct - Supreme Court imposes Rs. 50,000 cost on Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa for entertaining frivolous compliant against advocates. [Paras 29, 30-42] Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 943 : 2025 INSC 1147
Airports Authorities of India (AAI) - levy of service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo – Held, service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo, ruling that such services fall within the ambit of 'taxable services' under the Finance Act, 1994 - While 'handling of export cargo' is excluded from the definition of 'cargo handling service' under Section 65(23) of the Act, cargo handling service nonetheless qualifies as a 'taxable service' in terms of sub-clause (zzm) of section 65(105) was introduced with effect from September 10, 2024 - Definition of the taxable service is very wide and takes into its fold any kind of service that may be provided to any person by the Airports Authority in any airport - All kinds of services rendered by the Airports Authority in any airport are taxable services and are chargeable to service tax under Section 66 of the Act - Court distinguished between a 'definitional' section and a 'charging' section, stating that mere exclusion in the definitional section, does not preclude liability under charging section - If the service otherwise falls within the sweep of the taxing provision - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 9, 10, 13-21] Airports Authority of India v. Commissioner of Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2025 INSC 1141
All India Bar Examination (AIBE) - Supreme Court dismissed a petition challenging Rs. 3,500 free and other incidental charges levied by the Bar council of India (BCI) for the AIBE - Bar Councils cannot charge more than a statutorily prescribed Rs. 750 for enrolment - Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 would apply in so far as enrolment fess are concerned - Bar Council of India would incur huge expenses for the purpose of conducting of such examination and if they are charging Rs. 3,500/- and Rs. 2,500/- , it cannot be termed as violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution or any of the provisions of the Advocates Act - Petition dismissed. [Paras 2-5] Sanyam Gandhi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 940
All India Football Federation (AIFF) - Disqualification Events - Supreme Court examined 3 main grounds - i. Criminal charges - Disqualification based on framing of charges was diluted, only conviction with a sentence of 2 years or more will disqualify a person; ii. Public servant status - Modified the provision to restrict disqualification to Ministers and Government servants; iii. Tenure in other NSFs - Upheld mandatory cooling-off and term limits as per good governance practices - Directed AIFF to convene a special general body meeting for adoption of the finalized Constitution within 4 weeks - Supreme Court set boundaries for private partnerships, particularly regarding the master rights agreement (MRA), requiring AIFF to maintain ultimate accountability - Commercial arrangements exceeding 4 years or 5 crores requires 75% majority approval - Constitution once adopted shall mark a new beginning for Indian Football. [Relied on BCCI V. Cricket Association of Bihar 2018 9 SCC 624; Para 51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 77-78, 122] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131
All India Football Federation (AIFF) - Eligibility Criteria for Eminent Players - Fixing eligibility, Supreme Court reduced the threshold suggested by Justice L.N. Rao from 7 to 5 matches for men and from 3 to 2 matches for women, noting the limited pool of retired players - Rejected AIFF's suggestion to include domestic matches, favouring only internationally sanctioned matches. [Paras 40] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131
All India Football Federation (AIFF) - Supreme Court upheld inclusion of 15 Eminent Players (minimum 5 women) as voting members in the General Body of AIFF - Held that NSC 2011 provides a carve-out for prominent sportspersons of outstanding merit to have voting rights, overriding the general exclusion under clauses 3.9 and 3.10 - Supreme Court relied on FIFA Statutes 2022 and 2024, Article 111 & standard Statute and an International Centre for Sport Studies report to affirm best practices globally for including various stakeholders. [Paras 25, 30-33] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131
Anand Marriage Act, 1909 - Section 6 - Registration of Ananad Karaj - Supreme Court directs States/UTs (17 states and 7 UTs) to register Sikh marriages, make Rules under Anand Marriage Act within 4 months - Held that decades of non-implementation created unequal treatment of Sikh citizens across India and violated the principle of equality - The fidelity of a constitutional promise is measured not only by the rights it proclaims, but by the institutions that make those rights usable - In a secular republic, the State must not turn a citizen's faith into either a privilege or a handicap - When the law recognises Anand Karaj as a valid form of marriage yet leaves no machinery to register it, the promise is only half kept. [Para 8-10] Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920 : 2025 INSC 1127
Anand Marriage Act, 1909 - Section 6 - Registration of Ananad Karaj - The Supreme Court passed following directions for implementation of Rules regarding the registration of Sikh marriages - i. Every respondent that has not yet notified rules under Section 6 of the Act shall do so within 4 months from today - Rules shall be published in Official Gazette and laid before the State Legislature in terms of Section 6(4) of the Act; ii. With immediate effect and until such rules are notified, each respondent shall ensure that marriages solemnised by Anand Karaj are received for registration under the prevailing marriage registration framework without discrimination; if parties so request, the registering authority shall record in the certificate that the marriage was solemnized by the Anand Karaj rite - iii. No authority shall insist on an additional or duplicative registration under any other law once registration under the Act is granted, in view of Section 6(5) of the Act; iv. Every respondent, shall within 2 months, designate a Secretary-level Nodal officer to oversee compliance with this order; v. Union of India shall act as the coordinating authority and shall circulate model rules compiled from jurisdictions that have already notified; vi. No application for registration of an Anand Karaj marriage or for a certified extract shall be refused on the sole ground that rules under Section 6 of the Act have not yet been notified. [Para 12] Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920 : 2025 INSC 1127
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) - Section 31(7)(b) - Award of interest - Pendente Lite interest - Whether a clause in the agreement barring interest on 'delayed payment/disputed claim' also bars the arbitral Tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest – Held, clause restricting interest on delayed payments by itself won't bar pendente lite interest - An arbitral tribunal can only be stripped of its power to award pendente lite interest if the agreement between the parties is explicitly or by necessary implication worded to bar it - A clause that merely prohibits interest on 'delayed payment' by itself is not enough to infer an express bar on the tribunal's power to award pendente lite interest - The power of an arbitral tribunal to award interest for the period between the date of cause of action arose and the date the award is made is subject to the agreement between the parties and is statutorily governed - The power to award post-award interest under section 31(7)(b) is not subject to the agreement between the parties and is statutorily governed - Arbitral tribunal in this case awarded pendente lite interest from the date the claim was affirmed, not from date of cause of action arose - There is no error in the award of pendente lite interest or post-award interest - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16- 24] Oil and Natural Gas Corp. v. G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2025 INSC 1066
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) – Held, execution of an arbitral award cannot be stalled merely on the ground that an appeal under Section 37 of A&C Act is pending - Pendency of Section 37 appeal does not by itself, operate as a stay against execution of an arbitral award - Unless there is an express interim order staying enforcement the award-holder retains the right to proceed with execution - Execution Court should address objections to executability of the award as raised but cannot defer consideration of the execution application solely because of a pending appeal without any stay order. Chakardhari Sureka v. Prem Lata Sureka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 919
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) - Section 31(7) - Interest on arbitral award – Held, Section 31(7)(a) permits the arbitral tribunal to include interest in the award for the pre-award period at a reasonable rate, which is subject to agreement by the parties - Section 31(7)(b) mandates interest at 18% per annum on the award amount from the date of the award to payment unless otherwise directed by the award - If the arbitral award specifies a composite rate of interest, the award holder cannot claim additional 18% compound interest - Compound interest cannot be granted unless expressly awarded - Arbitral award here explicitly granted simple interest at 21% per annum till repayment as per the parties MOU, precluding additional or compound interest - The executing court's acceptance of full payment including interest was in accordance with the award - The High Court's remand for fresh consideration of interest was not justified - Set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17, 19-20, 24, 27-30] HLV Limited v. PBSAMP Projects Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 944 : 2025 INSC 1148
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 2(1)(h) - Limitation for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award - When does the limitation period commence for a government department and whether the delivery of a signed xerox copy of the award to an authorized representative of the State constituted valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act, which would start the limitation period – Held, definition of 'party' under Section 2(1)(h) of the Act, which refers to a party to an arbitration agreement and for large government organizations, the award must be received by a person who has the authority and knowledge to understand the award and make decision to challenge it - An authorized representative, such as Assistant Engineer in this case, who did not have the decision-making authority to challenge the award, is not considered a 'party' for the purpose of receiving the award under Section 31(5) - Hence, the limitation period for filing an application to set aside the award under Section 34(3) does not begin to run from the date of such delivery - Limitation period commences only when the award is received by competent authority or person who is a 'party' and can decide whether to challenge the award - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 12 - 25] Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 867 : 2025 INSC 1062
Arbitration – Challenge under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – Limited Scope of Interference – Jurisdiction under Sections 34, 37– Findings must not shock judicial conscience or violate fundamental policy of law – Scope restated - Supreme Court, examining a challenge to the setting aside of an arbitral award under Section 37, reiterates that grounds for interference are strictly limited, confined to cases of perversity, patent illegality, violation of public policy, or fundamental policy of Indian law - Appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is even narrower than under Section 34. [Paras 57–63, 69–71, 91–92] Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963 : 2025 INSC 1171
Assam General Sales Tax Act, 1993 - Sections 19, 21 - Reassessment after time - barred assessment - Scope and limitation – Held, on Tax matters, strict letter of law must be followed - No tax can be imposed by inference or analogy - Where initial assessments for the relevant years were held to be time-barred under Section 19, subsequent reassessment with prior sanction under Section 21 is not permissible - Section 21 applies only where no assessment has been made within the time limits specified under Section 19, not where time-barred assessments have already occurred - High Court erred in its interpretation by permitting reassessment post time-barred determination merely on the basis of Commissioner's sanction - Strict construction must be applied for fiscal statutes, and tax liability can be imposed only if the case falls strictly within the statutory provisions - No tax can be imposed by inference, analogy or presumed legislative intent - Appeal allowed. [Para 12-15] Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2025 INSC 1126
Bail Cancellation - Grounds for cancellation – Held, very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancelling bail that has already been granted - Grounds for cancellation include - i. misusing liberty by engaging in other criminal activities; ii. Interfering with the investigation or tampering with evidence; iii. Attempting to influence or threaten witnesses; iv. Evading court proceedings; v. any conduct by the accused after being granted bail that makes a fair trial no longer conducive. [Paras 55- 59] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 482 - Anticipatory Bail - Hierarchy of Courts - The concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the High Court for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS does not mean a person can directly approach the High Court, bypassing Sessions Court - The Hierarchy of Courts demands that a person seeking pre-arrest bail should not be allowed or encouraged to bypass the jurisdiction of the concerned Session court - Encouraging practice of directly approaching the High Court for anticipatory bail would flood the High Court with a large number of applications, creating a 'chaotic situation' - A significant number of applications would likely be granted at the Session Court level acting as a 'filtration process' before cases reach the High Court - In most states, there is a consistent practice requiring litigants to first approach the Session s Court for anticipatory bail and only if relief is denied, they can approach High Court. [Paras 6-9] Mohammed Rasal C. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 884
Central Excise Act, 1944 (1944 Act) - Section 2(f)(i) – Held, converting imported gas-generating sets (Gensets) into containerized 'Power Packs' by placing them in stell containers and fitting them with essential components amounts to 'manufacture' under the 1944 Act, making the final product liable to excise duty - the process of placing the Genset within steel container and fitting that container with additional, integral components brings into existence a new, distinct and marketable commodity - This process would thus amount to 'manufacture' under Section 2(f)(i) of the 1944 Act - Appellant is liable to pay excise duty on the goods manufactured - Two-fold test is laid down by Supreme Court for the purpose of determining whether an activity amounts to 'manufacture' - i. Transformation test (Whether a distinct product with a new name, identity, character or use emerges) and ii. Marketability Test (Whether the transformed product is marketable as such) - the transformation test and marketability test were fulfilled as the imported product was transformed into a new product with a distinct identity, name and character and is capable of being brought and sold in the market - Both the tests must be cumulatively satisfied for a process to constitute manufacture - Distinction between 'parts' and accessories' was discussed and additional components were held to be 'parts' necessary for the product's functioning, not mere accessories - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 24-25, 33, 41, 45, 46, 50, 52] Quippo Energy Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Ahmedabad – II, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2025 INSC 1130
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXXVII Rule 3 - Whether in a summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC, the court may allow a reply/defence without requiring an application for leave to defend as mandated - The Supreme Court explained the steps under Order XXXVII Rule 3 CPC for summary suits, emphasizing that - i. Defendant must, after entering appearance, apply for leave to defend disclosing genuine and substantial defence. ii. Court cannot allow the reply/defence to be filed without such application, lest the distinction between regular and summary suits is lost - Procedural deviation adopted by the High Court was held unsustainable and contrary to statutory scheme - Setting aside of the impugned order does not foreclose any options available to the defendant as per law and shall not prejudice the case of either party - Allowing a reply/defence on merits in a summary suit without leave of court effaces the procedural safeguard built into Order XXXVII CPC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] Executive Trading Company v. Grow Well Mercantile, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2025 INSC 1157
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 6A – Held, defendant cannot file counter claim against co-defendant solely - Such a counter claim is not maintainable - Counter claim filed well after the framing of issues is barred - Order VIII Rule 6A does not stipulate an express time limit, the outer limit for filing a counter claim is pegged as 'till the issues are framed' - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 26] Rajul Manoj Shah v. Kiranbhai Shakrabhai Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 912
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLVII Rule 7(1) - Doctrine of Merger and Review Jurisdiction – Held, doctrine of merger does not apply when an SLP is dismissed without reasons, permitting a review petition to be filed before the High Court - This principle does not extend to cases where the SLP is withdrawn rather than dismissed, as withdrawal constitutes abandonment of the remedy - An order rejecting a review petition does not merge the original decree and thus cannot be independently appealed under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the CPC - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 18, 29, 31] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100(5) - Principles on framing additional substantial question of law - i. Substantial question of law must be grounded in parties' pleadings and findings of lower courts; ii. Jurisdiction to frame a new question of law is exceptional and should not be exercised routinely unless there is strong and convincing reason to do so; iii. The proviso allows the court to hear an appeal on any other substantial question law, which implies that at least one substantial question of law must have been formulated at the admission stage; the power to reformulate or add a question arises only if a substantial question of law has already been framed; iv. High Court must be satisfied that the new question is a substantial question of law and not a mere legal plea; v. Court is mandatorily required to record its reasons for framing an additional substantial question of law; vi. The opposite party must be given a fair and proper opportunity to contest the new question; framing a question while dictating the judgment without hearing the parties would be improper. [Para 18] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 151 - Inherent power- Delay of 3966 days in filing second appeal – Held, High Court erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days based on administrative lapses and lack of follow-up by the State's officials - Such grounds do not constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Condoning such a delay would defeat the fundamental objectives of the Limitation Act, which are to ensure finality in litigation and prevent a litigant from being kept in a state of uncertainty - Delay by State agencies due to administrative lethargy should not be condoned - Supreme Court warned High Courts not to condone inordinate delays by State agencies on grounds of administrative lethargy and laxity - Appeal allowed. [Para 116, 171, 255, 260-263] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Anticipatory Bail - Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) - Section 18 - Applicability of Section 438 of CrPC – Held, anticipatory bail is permissible under SC/ST Act only if prima facie offence isn't made out - The bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which excludes the application of Section 438 CrPC, is not absolute - This requires a court to verify the complaint's averments and determine if a prima facie is established - The Court is not permitted to conduct a 'mini-trial' by evaluating evidence or other materials - The bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 is intended to uphold the Act's objective of protecting vulnerable SC/ST communities and ensuring social justice - The denial of anticipatory bail for these offences is not considered unreasonable or a violation of Article 14 of Constitution, as these offences are a distinct class - The bar is not held to be violative of Article 21 - High Court committed a 'manifest error' and a 'jurisdictional error' by evaluating witness testimonies and concluding that no offence was made out - The incident occurred outside the complainant's house, which was a place 'within public view' - The caste nexus was established and the humiliation was clearly intentional - Anticipatory bail was granted by overlooking and disregarding the bar of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, was a clear illegality - Appeal is allowed. [Paras 5-8] Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 869 : 2025 INSC 1067
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Principles governing the conduct of joint or separate trials - i. Separate trial is rule under Section 218 CrPC, a joint trial may be permissible where the offence form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Section 219-223 CrPC are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion; ii. The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons; iii. The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time; iv. Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated and; v. an order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible. [Para 16] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 197 – Held that issue of sanction to prosecute under Section 197 CrPC can be taken up before Trial Court at any stage of proceedings - the determination depends on the nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial - The petitioner is permitted to apply to the trial court for an exemption from personal attendance under these sections 228 and 355 of BNSS. [Paras 7 - 9] Ram Sagar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 891
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 439 - Anticipatory Bail - Supreme Court cautioned High Courts against directly entertaining anticipatory bail applications, stressing that litigants should ordinarily be directed to first approach the Sessions Court before invoking the High Court's concurrent jurisdiction - Held that this approach balances the interests of all the stakeholders, first by giving the aggrieved party a round of challenge before High Court, and this approach provides the High Court an opportunity to assess the judicial perspective so applied by the Sessions Court, in concurrent jurisdiction, instead of independently applying its mind from the first go - The High Court erred in granting anticipatory bail without valid reasons, ignoring aggravating factors including broad daylight contract killing and history of tense relations - Set aside bail order. [Paras 5-10] Jagdeo Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 965
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 415 – Cheating - Quashing of FIR – Held, the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, it must be shown that the false representation was of a material fact that induced the victim to act in a way that they wouldn't have otherwise - Since a fire NOC was not necessary for obtaining recognition, the alleged the use of a fake NOC could not have induced the Education Department to grant recognition - the vital link between the false representation and the alleged inducement was missing, meaning the essential ingredients of cheating were not met - Offences under section 468 and 471 IPC were not attracted because there was no dishonest intention to cause wrongful gain or loss, as the issuance of recognition was not dependent on the alleged forged NOC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 15-20] Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : 2025 INSC 1096
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Supreme Court questioned the timing and motive behind FIR, stating it appeared to be a retaliatory counterblast after losing in foreign courts - Conduct of respondent was found questionable and inconsistent with the claim of social integration in Austria - Noted that period of alleged cruelty extended beyond the marriage duration, creating further doubt – Held, for quashing FIRs under Section 482 CrPC, Court should look for prima facie disclosure of offence - FIR was quashed as retaliatory after divorce notice- Supreme Court cautioned High Courts against mechanically dismissing quashing petitions based solely on the contents of FIR, stressing that the surrounding context and circumstances of its filing must also take into account whether the FIR was a result of a counterblast or a retaliatory measure filed with an oblique motive just to harass the litigant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-14] Nitin Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2025 INSC 1128
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 215, 216, 223, 464 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Section 4, 6 - Misjoinder of charges/trial - Acquittal by High Court on Procedural grounds - Reinstatement of Trial Court's conviction - Held, High Court erred in its reasoning, acknowledging that there were minor variations in the evidence, Supreme Court found these natural and inconsequential, especially given in the socio-economic circumstances of the victim from a rural region - The victim's testimony was consistent across police and magisterial statements and during the trial - The evidence presented, including School TC and medical reports, conclusively proved the victim was a minor (aged 12-13 at the time of incident) and pregnant - Mere irregularities in the framing of charges or the conduct of a joint trial do not automatically invalidate the proceedings - Defective charge regarding the date of the offence did not mislead the accused, as the time frame was well-known to them throughout the trial - Joint trial, even if considered a procedural irregularity under Section 223 CrPC, did not cause any prejudice to the accused or result in a failure of justice - The principle of 'beyond reasonable doubt' should not be misapplied to allow culprits to walk free based on minor inconsistencies - A reasonable doubt must be serious and backed by reason, making the prosecution's version improbable - High Court's acquittal was a 'misapplication of procedure' - Appeal allowed. [Paras 26-33, 35-38] Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 864 : 2025 INSC 1061
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 218 to 223 - Equality before Law - Article 14 – Held, the Trial Court's order to segregate the trial of an accused, solely because he is a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), is legally unsustainable and violates the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution - While Section 218 if CrPC establishes a separate trial as the general rule, joint trials are permissible exceptions, particularly when offences are part of the same transaction - In the present case, since the prosecution's own case was based on an overarching conspiracy and common evidence, a joint trial was appropriate - All accused persons are equal before law, and preferential segregation based on an individual's public position or status violates the principle of equality under Article 14 - Segregating the appellant's trial without any legal or factual necessity amounted to arbitrary classification and undermined the integrity of the criminal justice process. Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Anticipatory Bail - Supreme Court criticises High Court for asking why accused was not arrested instead of deciding anticipatory bail plea - Held that petitioner was not arrested for 4 years by itself was a good ground for the High Court to exercise its discretion and grant anticipatory bail - Supreme Court disapproved of the manner in which the High Court dealt with the anticipatory bail plea by passing a 'very cryptic and unusual order' and seeking an affidavit from the Director General of Police (DGP) as to why the accused had not been arrested for 4 years - The High Court should either allow the application for anticipatory or decline it on its own merits. Gursewak Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 873
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 154 – FIR – Held, police officers, as 'sentinels' of the law, must be vigilant, prompt and objective in performing their duties, shedding any personal biases - Police's failure to register a FIR despite being informed of a cognizable offence was a total 'dereliction of duty' - As per Section 154 CrPC, Police are duty-bound to register a cognizable offence once they receive information - Supreme Court criticized the Superintendent of Police for not taking action on a written complaint sent by appellant's father as mandated by section 154(3) CrPC - Found it distressing that senior officials did not file an affidavit in the matter before the highest court, leaving it to a local police inspector - Directed the Home Ministry to form a SIT to investigate the appellant's allegations, register an FIR for the assault and take appropriate action - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16, 18-24] Mohammad Afzal Mohammad Sharif v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 894 : 2025 INSC 1100
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 154 - Registration of FIR - It is the duty of the police to register an FIR if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - The police are not required to go into the genuineness and credibility of information - High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC is not absolutely barred by the availability of alternative remedies - Held that when allegations pertain to the abuse of an official position and corrupt practices by public servants, such actions fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences that need to be inquired into - A preliminary inquiry is not necessary before the registration of an FIR in such cases - Report of a preliminary inquiry is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to oust a Constitutional Court's power to conclude that a cognizable offence has been committed - It is high time that those who investigate are also investigated to keep the public's faith in the system. [Paras 26 - 32] Vinod Kumar Pandey v. Seesh Ram Saini, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2025 INSC 1095
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 165 – Held, for search warrant under Special enactments, recording of reasons is mandatory - Inspection and seizure under Section 15 of the legal Metrology Act, 2009 require prior recording of reasons to believe and compliance with the provisions of the CrPC, including the necessity of a search warrant unless exigent circumstances under section 165 CrPC are satisfied - Presence of two independent and respectable witnesses during search under section 104 CrPC is mandatory - Premises for search include warehouses or godowns used for business, irrespective of whether they are open or closed to the public, and such premises are not deemed public places merely because they are accessible during business hours - Simultaneous issuance of seizure and compounding notices without recorded reasons negates the application of mind of the authority and violates principles of natural justice - Violation of procedural safeguards under section 15 of the legal Metrology Act and sections 104, 105 and 165 of the CrPC vitiates the search and seizure and renders subsequent action unsustainable - Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is maintainable in cases of jurisdictional errors and violation of natural justice in exercise of statutory powers. [Para 2, 3, 6, 11, 14-17, 19-21, 23, 24] ITC Limited v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 910 : 2025 INSC 1111
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 432 - Validity of section 376DA of IPC for prescribing a mandatory life sentence for the remainder of the convict's life is challenged - Right to seek remission - “shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life” – Held, even with the prescribed punishment an accused person still has the right to seek remission - this right is both a constitutional remedy under Article 72 and or Article 161 and a statutory right under provisions like Section 432 of Cr.P.C. or the BNSS - Each state has its own policy of remission, which is a reduction in the sentence, even in cases of death penalty or life imprisonment - A person sentenced under Section 376DA or 376DB still has the right to apply for a reduction of their sentence - Right to seek remission applicable even when convict sentenced to imprisonment for remainder of life - Supreme Court left open the question of law whether it was proper to prescribe a mandatory sentence, without giving discretion. [Paras 9 - 11] Mahendra Vishwanath Kawchale v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 897
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Bail and Anticipatory bail Applications – Held, while considering anticipatory bail, the Court must balance the liberty of individuals against the legitimate requirements of investigation - The gravity of allegations, abuse of official position, and non-cooperation with investigation can outweigh the ground of long delay in initiation of proceedings - Affecting personal liberty, particularly bail and anticipatory bail, should not be kept pending indefinitely - Bail courts must be sensitive to constitutional ethos and ensure expeditious disposal of such matters - An inordinate delay in passing an order related to a citizen's liberty is not in tune with the constitutional mandate under Article 21 - The allegations, including the abuse of official position and the appellants' failure to cooperate with the investigation despite a long period of interim protection, justified the denial of pre-arrest bail - The cancellation of the mutation entries did not efface the appellants' alleged initial role in certifying them - Supreme Court made strong observations on the inordinate delay by the High Court in disposing of the applications and underscored the importance of the expeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applications and reiterated guidelines from Satendra Kumar Antil Case - Such applications should be disposed of within a stipulated time frame - Directed to dispose bail applications within 2 months - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 16-18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2025 INSC 1114
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 438 - Bail and Anticipatory bail Applications – Supreme Court passed following directions - i. High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within a period of 2 months from date of filing; ii. High Court shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts prioritise matters involving personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments; iii. Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations in long pending cases with promptitude so that neither the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of undue delay; iv. Being the highest constitutional for a in the States, High Courts must devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. [Paras 18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2025 INSC 1114
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Cancellation of bail - Whether High Court can entertain a second application for cancellation of bail after rejection by the Sessions Judge – Held, there is no bar on the High Court exercising inherent powers under Section 482 r/w. 439(2) CrPC to entertain such application, even if one was rejected by the Sessions Judge - No restriction arises if the application is moved under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. [Para 14, 15] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Distinction between Cancellation and Revocation of Bail – Held, cancellation of bail is distinct from revocation of an order granting bail - Bail may be cancelled when the accused violates any of the conditions imposed - an order granting bail can be revoked if such an order is found to be perverse or illegal. [Para 17] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 - Role of Criminal antecedents – Held, mere criminal antecedents are not sufficient ground for denial or cancellation of bail absent other incriminating circumstances - antecedents may be a consideration but not sole ground to cancel bail, if the accused has long incarceration or satisfies other conditions for bail - Set aside order by High Court and restored bail to appellants - Appeal allowed. [Para 23] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR - FIR alleging rape on the pretext of marriage quashed - where the complaint appeared to be a vindictive act following administrative proceedings against the complainant – Supreme Court reiterates that inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) should be invoked to prevent abuse of process of law - Supreme Court noted that FIR was lodged 4 months after the alleged incident and after the issuance of the show-cause notice to the complainant - The sequence of events and timing suggested the complainant was an afterthought and instrument of vengeance, not a bona fide prosecution - Held that once ulterior motive is apparent, the Court must go beyond the formal averments of the FIR and examine attending circumstances to detect mala fides - Held that FIR and subsequent charge-sheet were manifestly attended with mala fides and constituted abuse of process - Appeal allowed. [Paras 12- 15] Surendra Khawse v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 968 : 2025 INSC 1143
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Held, High Court cannot grant anticipatory bail by recalling initial order of dismissal - Such restoration is impermissible and contrary to law - the Court emphasized that once an application for anticipatory bail is rejected with reasons, proceedings for recall / restoration is not permissible in law - Supreme Court set aside the recall order and left it open for parties to avail remedies available in law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4 - 7] Gurvinder Singh v. Jasbir Singh @ Jasvir Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 924
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Held, there is clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case where there is a promise of marriage, the Court must very carefully examine whether the accused actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust - Supreme Court lays down four-step test for High Courts to quash criminal cases - i. whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable i.e. materials is of sterling and impeccable quality; ii. Whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of accusations as false; iii. Whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution / complaint and /or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution; iv. Whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice - If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC - Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial, especially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused - Supreme Court quashed summons issued to appellant for the offence of rape on false pretext of marriage on a complaint filed by complainant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-22] Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Quashing – Held, conducting a mini trial at the stage of quashing proceedings is generally deprecated but in this case, no cognizable offence was made out against accused on the materials presented - The Supreme Court emphasized that brevity in judicial orders is a virtue, but in the present matter, the High Court justified its reasons for quashing - There was absence of any link between accused and the crime and Quashed the same - Upheld order of High Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5-8] State of Telangana v. Jerusalem Mathai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 961 : 2025 INSC 1173
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings - Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 406, 420, 120B – Breach of contract/Agreement to Sell – Held, the offences of 'cheating' & 'criminal breach of trust' cannot co-exist on same allegations - While the offence of cheating involves criminal intention from inception, and for criminal breach of trust there is lawful entrustment at the beginning, which is later misappropriated - Both theses offences cannot exist simultaneously on same facts, as they are 'antithetical' to each other - The complaint did not allege intentional deception at inception, or misrepresentation, nor were there facts indicating dishonest inducement to part with property. For the offence under Section 406 IPC, the Court found no evidence of entrustment or misappropriation as defined under Section 405 IPC. Offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust were held mutually exclusive, and the facts did not make out either. Initiation of criminal proceedings in such cases, mainly involving a breach of contract, amounts to abuse of process and vexatious litigation - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17, 18-21, 23, 26] Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 950 : 2025 INSC 1151
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Held, High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is limited and does not extend to appreciating evidence or conducting a mini-trial - It may intervene to prevent abuse of process or where prima facie no offence is made out - Quashing is justified, including mala fide prosecution and cases where allegations disclose no offence - The instant case falls within these categories, as multiple FIRs appear to be maliciously instituted due to an underlying civil dispute over land and money repayment. The proceedings are quashed as an abuse of process of court, mala fide and amounting to harassment - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11, 12-16, 20] Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 948 : 2025 INSC 1153
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Supreme Court quashed criminal case against petitioner, citing his age and an unconditional apology he made before the Court - FIR was registered for 'objectionable comments' made at Jaipur Literary Conference - Supreme Court condemned Petitioner's statements as 'very objectionable' and found them unbecoming of a person of his status, it noted that the criminal cases had been pending for about 12 years and that petitioner is now 90 years old - Supreme Court's decision to quash the complaints was based 'only by reason of the apology offered' - Petition Allowed. [Para 5] Ashis Nandy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 896
Companies Act, 1956 - Oppression and Mismanagement - Share transfer validity – Held, Oppression in company law has no straightjacket definition and takes many forms - Primary element of oppression is a 'lack of probity and fair dealing' that is 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful' and prejudices a portion of its members - While an isolated illegal act may not be oppressive, a series of illegal acts can collectively lead to the conclusion that they are part of a transaction intended to oppress the affected members - In a private limited company, the acts of directors are held to a finer standard to rule out the misuse of power for personal gain - Reducing a majority shareholder to a minority position through a mala fide act of the company or its directors is considered an act of oppression - A gift deed purportedly transferred shareholder's entire stake was found invalid because it violated the company's Articles of Association (AoA) - Clause 16 of AoA restricted share transfers by gift to a specific list of family members, which did not include a motherin-law - Share transfer forms were declared invalid because the share transfer form was signed by the appellant after its validity period had expired - Forms also showed clear overwriting and a mismatch of dates - Upheld the order of NCLT wherein it held the act of ousting appellant who held 98% of shares in company to be fraudulent and restored her directorship and shareholding - All actions of company in serial fashion demonstrate clear oppression and mismanagement in its affairs - Appeal allowed. [Para 29, 34-42, 43-50, 54] Shailja Krishna v. Satori Global Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 866 : 2025 INSC 1065
Companies Act, 1956 - Sections 397 and 398 - Oppression and Mismanagement - Scope of NCLT's jurisdiction – Held, NCLT and its predecessor, the Company Law Board (CLB), have wide jurisdiction to decide on all matters incidental or integral to a complaint of oppression and mismanagement - NCLT is not denuded of its power to provide diverse reliefs simply because a matter involves allegations of fraud, manipulation and coercion that might typically require a full-fledged trial - A literal interpretation of law should be avoided if it would lead a company's total chaos or mismanagement - A court should lean toward a construction of the statute that retains jurisdiction to mold relief to benefit the company and its members - Tribunal's purpose is to bring an end to the matters complained by providing a solution, not to prolong them or to put an end to the company itself. [Paras 29 - 31] Shailja Krishna v. Satori Global Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 866 : 2025 INSC 1065
Competition Commission of India Act, 2002 (CCI Act) – Held, CCI Act is enacted to establish a regulatory authority to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumer interests, and ensure freedom of trade - Under Section 26 of the Act, the Commission may direct investigation by the Director General if a prima facie case exists - The DG's report must be forwarded to parties, inviting objections or suggestions before the Commission proceeds further - Section 27 empowers the Commission to pass orders to discontinue anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominant position and impose penalties up to ten percent of average turnover or income of the preceding three years - Section 48 holds every person in charge of the company at the time of contravention liable unless they prove lack of knowledge or due diligence to prevent it. Directors or officers can also be held liable if contravention occurs with their consent or connivance - The principles of natural justice apply to the Commission's proceedings, and no penalty can be imposed without a show cause notice and opportunity to represent one's case - A single show cause notice based on the DG report suffices; no mandatory second notice with the proposed penalty details is required - The notice is to answer the contravention, not the proposed penalty - The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) erred in setting aside penalties imposed on individual office bearers on procedural grounds since notice and opportunity were given in terms of the Act - Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation and its office bearers were held guilty of anti-competitive conduct in violation of Sections 3, 31, and 33b of the Act and imposed penalties - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16, 19, 23-27, 29, 32-34, 38, 47, 61] Competition Commission of India v. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2025 INSC 1167
Condonation of delay - Judicial Discipline - Jurisdiction of Trial Court - Supreme Court noted that Trial Court refrained from exercising the jurisdiction just because the timeline prescribed by the Supreme Court for it to dispose of the proceedings was not followed by the Trial Court - Appropriate remedy available to him was to ask for extension of time but he cannot say that he has lost jurisdiction over the matter as the time allowed has lapsed - Magistrate's order was 'wholly misconceived and without authority' - Noted that the Trial judge's act was uncommon, Supreme Court directed the District Judge concerned to call for an explanation of the Judge concerned and report within a month. [Paras 4-8] Shiv Kumar Shaw v. Rekha Shaw, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 967
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (BPBA) - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country – Held, constitutional framework emphasizes the right to life with dignity under Article 21 and mandates a welfare centric approach to vulnerable populations, including inmates of beggars' homes - Such institutions are not penal facilities but places for rehabilitation and care, and must adhere to humane conditions consistent with constitutional morality - BPBA and corresponding Rules provide the statutory backdrop regulating beggars' homes, their management, and inmates' rights - Considered balance between public order and guaranteeing dignified living conditions and rehabilitation opportunities for inmates - Noted extensive oversight measures, multiple inspections, reports from authorities and NGOs, and continuing reforms addressing infrastructure, medical facilities, hygiene, nutrition, legal aid, and vocational training - Mandated a paradigm shift from punitive detention to social justice and protective custody with comprehensive rehabilitation. [Paras 11-15, 16, 17, 19-22] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country under following heads - i. Preventive Healthcare and Sanitation; ii. Infrastructure and capacity; iii. Nutrition and Food safety; iv. Vocational Training and rehabilitation; v. Legal Aid and awareness; vi. Child and Gender Sensitivity; vii. Accountability and oversight - Directed that every State/UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for Beggars' Homes, comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, Public Health authorities, and independent civil society members to prepare - i. Prepare and publish annual reports on the condition of Beggars' Homes and; ii. Maintain accurate records of illnesses, deaths and remedial actions taken; iii. In every case where the death of an inmate is attributed to negligence, lack of basic facilities, or failure to provide timely medical care; iv. The State/UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next kin of the deceased; v. initiate departmental and where warranted, criminal proceedings against the officials found responsible; v. State Govt's/ UTs shall maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates, recording details of admission, health, training, release and follow up. [Para 23] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 304(a) - Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (VAT) - Exemption from payment of VAT on sale of asbestos cement sheets/ bricks (containing fly ash 25%) was granted only to manufacturers within the State, challenged as violative of Article 304(a) of the Constitution due to discrimination against goods imported from outside Rajasthan – Held, for taxation under Article 304(a), discrimination exists if there is an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation creating an economic barrier and an unfavourable bias against goods imported from outside the State vis-à-vis local goods - It was found that the exemption was not grounded in any manifest public purpose, nor was it limited to a particular class such as "new industries" for a specified period - The notifications merely restricted the benefit to local manufacturers, whereas asbestos products containing the specified fly ash content manufactured outside Rajasthan would not get similar benefits - Exemption was found to be blanket, lacking intelligible differentia or rational justification linked to the stated policy objective; merely citing “public interest” was inadequate - Supreme Court distinguished Video Electronics, clarifying that the precedent applies only to case-specific exemptions for a narrow, new industrial class for a limited period, with valid justification; it cannot be used to justify general, indefinite or unjustified preferences - Rajasthan notification granting VAT exemption discriminates against similar goods from outside the State is ultra vires Article 304(a) - General or indefinite tax exemptions in favour of local manufacturers without clear and reasonable policy justification cannot be sustained - Appeal allowed. [Paras 12] U.P. Asbestos v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2025 INSC 1154
Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 14, 16 - Equality before law - Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment - Migration to unreserved category permissible or not - Held that this depends on the presence of a specific rule or policy - In absence of an embargo in recruitment rules or employment notifications, reserved candidates who score higher than the last selected unreserved candidate are entitled to migrate to and be appointed against unreserved seats - However, if an embargo is imposed by the relevant recruitment rules, such candidates are not permitted to migrate to the general category - Distinguished present facts of the case from Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119 and held that this case does not have universal application - The general principles from Jitendra Kumar case do not apply when there is a contrary circular or rule - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22, 32] Union of India v. Sajib Roy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 881 : 2025 INSC 1084
Constitution of India; Article 371D - Telangana Medical and Dental Colleges Admission Rules, 2017 - Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee), Act, 1983 (1983 Act) - 'Local Candidate' - Held, the authority of State of Telangana to define 'local candidate' for preferential admission to medical courses through subordinate legislation is a valid exercise of power under Article 371D and the Presidential Order - High Court's expansion of this definition under Article 226 was an impermissible interference with legislative wisdom - The rule defining a 'local candidate' based on residence and education within the State for a specified period is no arbitrary or violative of Article 14 - The definition is intended to benefit individuals with a real bond to the state, who are presumed to remain and serve the local population after they qualify - Upheld similar rules that provide for domicile or residential requirements for admission to educational institutions - High Court cannot expand a legislative definition based on its 'subjective satisfaction' - High Court's reading down of the rule to include any students with a residence certificate would lead to an unworkable and anomalous situation - There was no warrant for reading down when the definition is clear, in consonance with the Presidential Order - Set aside order of High Court and upholds Telangana Domicile Rule mandating 4 year continuous study in State with relaxation to children of govt. servants - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19, 22-25, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058
Constitution of India - Article 21 - Illegal detention - Supreme Court orders MP Govt. to pay Rs. 25 lakhs compensation to convict who spend extra 4.7 years in jail after serving sentence in a rape case - Petitioner was not released until 06.06.2025, despite completing the term in June 2021 - Delay amounted to unlawful detention and curtailment of liberty - Supreme Court raised concern over other convicts languishing unjustly and called for the High Courts to investigate the issue comprehensively. [Paras 2-8, 16-21] Sohan Singh @ Bablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 938
Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to fair trial – Held, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental aspect of Article 21- Segregation order was passed by the Trial Court suo moto, without prior notice or an application from the prosecution, and without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard - This is a serious procedural and constitutional infraction, stating that mere physical presence of counsel does not constitute a meaningful opportunity for a hearing - Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant - The discretion to file a chargesheet lies exclusively with the investigating agency - Noted that even if separate charge sheets are filed, offences arising from the same transaction should be tried together. [Paras 14 - 23] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113
Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to shelter – Held, right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 - Urged the Union Government to come up with a revival fund to provide financing for stressed real estate projects undergoing insolvency proceedings - Home-buying should not be treated as a mere commercial transaction or a speculative instrument - the State has a constitutional obligation to create a framework that ensures timely possession of homes and prevents developers from defrauding homebuyers - Speculative participants driven purely by profit motives cannot be permitted to misuse the IBC, which is a remedial framework for the revival and protection of sick companies - In case of real estate, the IBS's purpose is to protect genuine homebuyers, the judgment underscored, clarifying that such speculative investors have alternative remedies under the consumer protection laws, RERA, or through civil courts - Government cannot remain a 'silent spectator' and must fulfil its constitutional duty to safeguard homebuyers. [Para 20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110
Constitution of India - Article 226, 227 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR / Chargesheet - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, Article 226 cannot be invoked to quash chargesheet if cognizance has been taken, remedy is available under Section 528 - FIRs or chargesheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognizance is taken but once cognizance is taken, the remedy lies under Section 528 BNSS, to challenge both FIR/Chargesheet and even the cognizance order - The High Court did have the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to consider the petitioner's grievance for quashing the FIR, chargesheet and any cognizance order - High Court misunderstood the ruling in Neeta Singh v State of U.P. 2024 - Order of High Court was set aside. [Paras 7-10] Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875
Customs Act, 1962 - Section 110 – Held, provisional release of seized object won't extend time limit for issuing show cause notice in Pre-2018 cases - Where goods are seized under Section 110 of Customs Act and no notice under Section 124(a) is issued within prescribed or extended period, the consequence mandated by Section 110(2) is unconditional release to the person from whom the goods were seized - the existence or exercise of provisional release under Section 110A does not affect the statutory consequence mandated under Section 110(2) - when the statutory period for issue of show-cause notice under Section 124 of Customs Act lapses and extension is neither granted nor the conditions for further extension met, unconditional release of seized goods is mandatory under Section 110(2) - Provisional release orders under Section 110A do not override this consequence - Section 110A functions as an interim arrangement to allow release of goods, including perishable or fast-moving items, but does not in any way impede or limit the mandatory time limit in Section 110(2) - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11, 20-24] Union of India v. Jatin Ahuja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 922
Customs Act, 1962 - Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, 2005 - Whether export duty can be imposed on goods supplied from the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) to SEZ units under the provisions of the Customs Act or SEZ Act – Held, export duty on goods moved from DTA to SEZ units is not justified under the prevailing law, such goods are not subjected to export duty - It is a domestic supply and not an export outside India - SEZ Act creates a self-contained legal framework where the movement of goods from the DTA to an SEZ is defined as a form of 'export' for the purposes of entitlements and benefits under that Act, but it is not an export that would trigger a levy under the Customs Act - Section 12 of Customs Act is a charging provision which levies duty only on goods physically exported out of India - Section 26 of the SEZ Act, power is reserved to grant an exemption or a concession if under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, a duty is leviable as per the charging sections. [Paras 4, 6, 7] Union of India v. Adani Power, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 932
Customs Act, 1962 - Whether LG watch W7 imported by the appellant is classifiable under CTH 9102 19 00 (as claimed by appellant) or under CTH 8517 62 90 (as affirmed by department), eligibility for concessional basic customs duty and confiscation/ penalty liability - Supreme Court allows customs duty exemption to LG Electronics for Smart watch import from Korea - Held that the goods imported- smart watches- are classifiable under CTH 8517 62 90 and not under CTH 9102 19 00 - Tribunal erred denying the benefit of exemption notification no. 152/2009- on ground of lack of Certificate of Origin; Certificate of Origin as per notification requirements - There was no mala fide or dishonest intent by the appellant in making the customs declaration - Mere wrong classification or claim of exemption does not attract Section 111 or penalty provisions - Appeal allowed. [Paras 20-22, 28] L.G. Electronics v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 916
Delay in uploading judgments - Delay in uploading judgment after 2 years 5 months of pronouncing of judgment, is a matter of grave concern and a practice to be deprecated - However, there was no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts and concluded that the delay, by itself, was not sufficient to set aside the judgment - Delay in judgment uploading alone cannot nullify a conviction if the judgment is otherwise sound - Practice of High Courts deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal more particularly in criminal matters wherein the appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court - Such delays should not recur and reiterated the guidelines from the case Anil Rai v. State of Bihar to address delays in pronouncing and uploading judgements - Judgments should be made available to the parties within 3 months from the date of reserving - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 41-47] Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 879 : 2025 INSC 1081
Delhi Judicial Service - Judicial Officers - Perverse bail order - Supreme Court directed that two judicial officers in the Delhi Judicial Service must undergo special judicial training for a period of at least 7 days for the illegal and erroneous manner in which they granted bail to two accused- Directed Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has been requested to make arrangements, with a focus on sensitising judicial officers on how to conduct proceedings and the deference to be accorded to superior court rulings- Supreme Court referred judicial officers' approach as 'untenable' and bordering on 'perversity'- Noted that accused had misled High Court while enjoying four years of interim protection and later concealed the rejection of their anticipatory bail applications while seeking regular bail- Supreme Court expressed disappointment on having formally surrendered before the Court, the accused were permitted to leave the Court without any formal order of release- Criticized the Delhi High Court for overlooking the factual position and declining interference- Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-33, 40-42] Netisty Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. State Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 962 : 2025 INSC 1181
Dual Pricing Policy - Validity of the interim coal Policy dt. 15.12.2006, which increased the notified price of coal by 20% for the linked consumers of the non-core sector, was examined - The Court reaffirmed that price fixation process violates constitutional mandates or results in hostile discrimination - Judicial review extends to verifying relevant consideration and rational basis in classification but not to re-evaluating economic policy - The classification between core and non-core sector consumers for dual pricing was held to have a rational nexus to the objective of protecting vital national economic interests and common good, as core sector industries consume over 90% of coal and are critical for the economy - Differential pricing was upheld as consistent due to vital public utility functions - Higher prices for non-core industries, producing non-essential goods, can be justified given their minimal impact on the public – Held, only test to ensure that there was no arbitrariness or unfair discriminatory practices at play, was to see whether such dual price fixation was based on reasonable classification in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution - Appellant was held empowered to notify interim prices under the deregulated regime of the Colliery Control Order, 2000 and the there is no restriction on price notification pending policy formulation by the expert committee - The respondents are not entitled to a refund of the excess of the excess amount paid amount paid under Interim Coal Policy absent evidence that they had borne the cost themselves and not passed it on to consumers - Burden was on respondents to prove no unjust enrichment - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-19, 52-65, 70-75, 79-88, 96-113, 114-115] Coal India Ltd. v. Rahul Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2025 INSC 1103
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Validity of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 upheld (paras 128-129). Lands reserved for common purposes including utilized and unutilized, vest in Gram Panchayat and are to be used for village needs - Bachat land, which has not been reserved for common use under the scheme, remains the proprietary land of the contributors and must be redistributed among them per their share - Compensation is not payable where acquisition is for common purposes and the beneficiary is not the State but the proprietors themselves via Gram Panchayat management - distinctions between acquisition by the State and modification of rights benefiting proprietors through Panchayat management of common land - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 24-43, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58-62-64] State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2025 INSC 1122
Electricity Act, 2003 - Allocation and apportionment of coal linkage - 'Change in law' events – Held, an appeal to Supreme Court under Section 125 of the Electricity Act is only Electricity Act, 2003 tenable on a substantial question of law - This is similar to the grounds for appeal under Section 100 of CPC, 1908 - The coal supply from all modes of procurement must be considered for the power plant as a whole and not for specific Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) - The firm and tapering linkage coal must be apportioned pr-rata among all beneficiaries based on the power supplied to them - No single power distribution company (DISCOM) can claim a priority for power supply based on the date of their agreement or the source of coal - Supreme Court reinforced the principle of non-interference with decisions of expert bodies like CERC (Central Electricity Regulatory Commission) and APTEL (Appellate Tribunal for Electricity) unless their decisions are arbitrary, illegal or contrary to mandatory statutory provisions - Coal shortages and associated costs must be shared fairly by all electricity purchasers from a power plant and that no DISCOMS can claim priority for power supply in an event of coal shortage - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 19, 20, 23] Haryana Power Purchase Centre v. GMR Kamalanga Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 877 : 2025 INSC 1079
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of Proof – Held, onus to prove legal necessity lies on the alienee-purchaser of the joint family property - The purchaser is not required to prove facts exclusively within Special knowledge of the coparceners or HUF, consistent with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Onus of proof on the stranger-purchaser cannot run counter to the principle of reverse burden enshrined in Section 106 of the Evidence Act and saddle him with the liability to prove facts which are within the special knowledge of the coparceners of the HUF. [Paras 16-19] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Held, for joint disclosure statements, made by multiple accused simultaneously, to become admissible under Section 27 of the Act, high scrutiny is needed to rule out the possibilities of tutoring of the accused - Courts must exercise heightened caution, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the disclosures were genuine, independent and corroborated by other evidence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 26 - 31] Nagamma @ Nagarathna v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2025 INSC 1135
Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 65A & 65B - Customs Act, 1962 - Section 138C(4) - Admissibility of Electronic Evidence - Non-Compliance of mandatory provision - Whether the acknowledgment of documents in statements recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act amounts to due compliance of Section 138C(4) – Held, Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act is a mandatory provision and Section 138C(4) of the Customs Act is pari materia to it - Supreme Court applied two maxims i.e. impotentia excusat legem (impossibility excuses the law) and lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform), to determine how the mandatory nature of the provision should be understood and complied with, depending on facts and circumstances of each case - Strict compliance with Section 138C(4) in the form of a specific certificate is not always necessary - In this case, documents on record, including the records of proceedings and the statements recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act, constitute due compliance - A certificate not in the prescribed format will not be rendered invalid, particularly when the authenticity of the documents is not disputed - Where substantial compliance is shown and authenticity is undisputed, the absence of a certificate does not invalidate the record of proceedings - Appeals partly allowed. [Paras 37- 47] Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Suresh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 860 : 2025 INSC 1050
Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Last seen theory - Supreme Court acquitted accused for rape-murder case, on following grounds - i. Prosecution failed to establish a clear and convincing motive; ii. Testimonies of the witnesses who claimed to have last seen the accused with the victim were unreliable due to significant delays in recording their statements and the fact that they did not see the victim with the accused; iii. The links in the chain of circumstances were broken; iv. There is strong inference of evidence planting; v. the DNA report, which was primary basis for conviction, was considered unreliable and inconsistent - Held that death penalty can only be imposed in the rarest of rare cases on unimpeachable evidence - Trial Court had not properly evaluated mitigating circumstances before awarding it and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12, 51- 56] Akhtar Ali @ Ali Akhtar @ Shamim @ Raja Ustad v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 890 : 2025 INSC 1097
Forfeiture of Alwara lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli - Supreme Court dismisses allottees' plea against Collector's 1974 order for forfeiture of Alwara lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli - The rights vested in the appellants fall under the OA specifically governed by emphyteutic principles, not general land revenue laws - The doctrine of lex specialis applies, giving precedence to the OA over the 1917 Portuguese Land Law under which the appellants sought relief, which was raised belatedly and not considered at earlier stages - The High Court rightly interfered with concurrent findings of fact upon showing perversity, misreading and ignoring evidence - Delay or long inaction by the administration does not amount to acquiescence unless there is deliberate waiver of rights; mere delay does not bar rescission - That appellants' pleaded waiver and acquiescence were rejected due to lack of evidence and failure to plead such grounds initially - Held that rescission was in exercise of statutory power by the Collector duly delegated by the Administrator, based on noncultivation contrary to Article 12 of the OA and was not mala fide - The 1971 Land Reforms Regulation repealed prior laws but saved pending proceedings; thus, the rescission proceedings initiated prior to its enforcement were valid - The principle of law on waiver against the Government requires intentional relinquishment of rights which was not made out here - No estoppel against government in exercise of sovereign, legislative or Executive power. [Paras 4, 8-11, 16-23, 33-38, 40-46, 60-62, 54-63, 70-74, 80-85] Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2025 INSC 1145
Hindu Law - Power of Karta to alienate Joint Family Property - Legal necessity - Onus to proof - Supreme Court reiterated that the Karta of a Hindu undivided Family (HUF) has the power to alienate joint family property for legal necessity or benefit of estate, and such sale binds the interests of all undivided members, including minors and widows - The discretion of the Karta in determining legal necessity is wide and each case turns into its facts - Noted that family necessities may include payment of government revenue, marriage expenses (of male coparceners or daughters), maintenance, necessary litigation to recover property, funeral expenses, and debts for family business - The existence of legal necessity must be judged on the facts and circumstances of each case - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11, 20, 21] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) - Section 29, 8 - Locus standi of State - Validity of will - Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 - Probate of will – Held, State cannot invoke Doctrine of Escheat to challenge a will which is granted probate - Government is a stranger to the property when a Hindu hireless male dies with a will - The state's locus standi to assail the probate grant was negated by the Court, as the case involved testamentary succession, not intestate succession attracting Section 29 of HAS - The Court emphasized the doctrine of escheat under section 29 applies only when an intestate leaves no heir qualified under the HAS - It has to be ascertained as to whether there are any Class1 or Class 2 heirs, agnates or cognates - Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the HAS Act, Section 29 of the said Act would apply as it would be a case of failure of heirs - Since probate was granted by the High Court, the legatees under the will, had the right to succeed - Held that it is only in the event of intestate succession. Section 29 of the HAS Act applying that there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased male Hindu on the government and not otherwise - Supreme Court imposed Rs. 1 lakh each on Petitioners for suppression and clarified that only heirs or persons entitled to succeed could seek revocation under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, if probate was wrongfully granted. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5 - 6] State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 906
Hindu Succession Act, 2005 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908- Section 114, Order 47 Rule 1 - Preliminary Decree - Review Jurisdiction - Scope of Review – Held, review proceedings are not an appeal in disguise and are limited to correcting apparent errors of fact or law, not for rehearing or substituting a view - An error apparent on the face of the record is a patent error, not one that requires a 'long-drawn process of reasoning' to establish - Courts ought not to mix-up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction - High Court's review order exceeded its jurisdiction- the review order recorded fresh findings on facts and overturned the earlier findings of the fact of the High Court - High Court had exercised or exceeded its jurisdiction by overturning the earlier findings of fact - Set aside High Court's order denying daughter her coparcenary right - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13-18] Malleeswari v. K. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 876 : 2025 INSC 1080
Indirect Discrimination - Despite qualifying preliminary, mains, and interview stages of Jharkhand Combined Civil Services Competitive Examination, appellant was disqualified for non-appearance in the medical examination prescribed post-interview – Held, strict adherence to procedural instructions is generally required but found that no penalty for non-appearance at medical exam was prescribed - Reiterated principle that procedure is handmaid of justice and cannot be used oppressively to defeat substantive rights, and exceptions to it, where non-compliance should not automatically result in dismissal unless specific conditions apply - Ambiguity in the press advertisement about the medical examination date created a genuine doubt for appellant's non-appearance, which was not deliberate or mischievous - The appellant belonged to Scheduled Tribe, and indirect discrimination principles under equality jurisprudence were considered relevant - A one-time relaxation was directed by the Court to allow the appellant to appear for medical examination with creation of a supernumerary post and continuity of service benefits excluding back wages - The High Court order was set aside, allowing the appeal with directions for the medical examination to be conducted and appropriate appointment made. [Paras 6, 7, 10-21] Shreya Kumari Tirkey v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 937
Insolvency and bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7 & 5 - Financial creditor - Homebuyer v. Speculative Investor – Held, a genuine homebuyer under the IBC is one who intends to take physical possession of the residential unit, whereas a 'speculative investor' is one who enters a transaction with the sole purpose of generating profits and no intention to obtain possession - the determination of whether an allottee is a speculative investor is a factual inquiry guided by the parties intent, considering factors like the nature of the contract, number of units purchased and presence of assured returns or buy-back clauses - Schemes with assured returns, compulsory buybacks, or excessive exit options are in reality 'finality derivatives masquerading as housing contracts. [Paras 18-20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 62 - Whether the claim of appellants which was verified and included in the list of creditors, should be treated as 'belated claimants' under Clause 18.4 of the Resolution Plan, entitling them to only a 50% refund and whether they are entitled to possession of their apartment – Held, once a claim is verified and admitted by the Resolution Professional (RP), it cannot be treated as 'belated' to deny substantive relief under a resolution plan - Noted that central issue did not hinge on whether the appellants initial physical claim was validly filed on Jan 11, 2019 - the undisputed fact was that the appellants' claim was resubmitted on February 7, 2020 and was subsequently verified by the Resolution Professional and included in the published list of financial creditors - Once a claim is verified and incorporated into the list of creditors, it gains full legal recognition within the CIRP - The appellants' case did not fall under Clause 18.4 of Resolution Plan, which is a 'residuary' clause for claims that were not filed, not verified, or not communicated to the resolution applicant - Since the appellant's claim was verified and admitted, it was to be treated under Clause 18.4(ii) read with Clause 18.4 (vi)(a), which applies to allottees with verified and admitted claims and provides for the delivery of possession or an equivalent alternative unit - The Resolution Plan itself distinguishes between verified claims and belated or unverified claims- Relegating the appellants, who had paid a substantial amount and had their claim admitted, to the status of a mere refund claimant would be a misapplication of the plan and would undermine the purpose of the IBC - It would be unjust to deny possession to bona fide homebuyers who have paid a significant amount and had their claim duly verified and admitted - Appeal allowed and directed Resolution applicant to execute the conveyance deed and hand over possession of the flat to the appellants. [Paras 32 - 38] Amit Nehra v. Pawan Kumar Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 882 : 2025 INSC 1086
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 - Section 62 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings (CIRP) - The Supreme Court quashed the NCLT and NCLAT judgments approving the Resolution Plan and directed initiation of liquidation proceedings - It was held that the Resolution Plan was not in conformity with statutory provisions, particularly Sections 30(2) and 31(2) of the IBC - The Court clarified the concept of "person aggrieved" under Section 61 of the IBC, including personal guarantors and erstwhile promoters, who have locus standi to challenge Resolution Plans - Held the strict timelines mandated by Section 12 of the IBC for completion of CIRP to avoid delays that frustrate the Code's objective of timely insolvency resolution - The Court reiterated the non-justiciability of the commercial wisdom of CoCs (Committee of Creditors) in approving Resolution Plans - Supreme Court held that the CoC loses authority upon approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority, and the "erstwhile CoC" has no statutory recognition postapproval. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2025 INSC 1165
Judicial Impropriety - Bail Order - Supreme Court criticises High Court for modifying bail condition when bail order was under challenge before Apex Court – Held, while High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court, as the highest appellate authority, can issue corrective directions binding on the lower forums - The High Court's action in modifying an order that was pending challenge before the Supreme Court ran contrary to the principles of judicial propriety and comity - When a matter is pending before the Supreme Court, a High Court should restraint and avoid passing orders that could 'circumvent, prejudice or render infructuous' the proceedings - High Court's conflicting exercise of jurisdiction should be strictly avoided - Supreme Court also expressed displeasure at the respondent's conduct, noting that respondent's counter-affidavit filed with the Supreme Court did not mention the application or High Court's orders - Set aside the High Court's order modifying bail and notice was issued to respondent. [Paras 8-13] Sreeja D.G. v. Anitha R. Nair, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 874
Judicial Service Recruitment - Supreme Court Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in exercise of review jurisdiction by reopening settled issues regarding cut-off marks and eligibility- Re-computation of cut-off marks and conducting a fresh main examination for candidates scoring below the original cut-off was impermissible exercise of review jurisdiction - Preliminary exam cut-off marks are sacrosanct once declared, and candidates failing to meet them cannot be considered in main examination - Conduct of second main exam for physically impaired candidates was a distinct case and could not justify a third main exam - Affidavit by High Court Registrar confirmed no ineligible candidate would be considered for appointment, allaying apprehension of respondents. [Para 9, 11-14] High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Jyotsna Dohalia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 936 : 2025 INSC 1137
Judicial Service Recruitment - Under the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1994 (as amended), the eligibility criteria for the Civil Judge Entry Level post were revised by an amendment to Rule 7 on 23/06/2023 - The amendment stipulated that only advocates who have been practising continuously for at least three years, or those who have secured the specified minimum marks in their first attempt without any ATKT (Allowed To Keep Terms), are eligible to apply - The validity of these restrictions was challenged but ultimately upheld - A recruitment advertisement dated 17/11/2023 was issued for 199 posts - Following the preliminary examination, results were declared based on cut-off marks, and candidates who scored below the cut-off were not permitted to appear for the main examination - A review petition was allowed by the High Court, which directed a re-computation of the cut-off marks and a fresh main examination for eligible candidates who had previously scored below the earlier cut-off - This order was appealed by the High Court Registrar. High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Jyotsna Dohalia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 936 : 2025 INSC 1137
Legislative Powers - Source of Power v. Field of Legislation - The power to legislate is derived from Articles 245 and 246 of Constitution - Entries in 7th Schedule (Union, State and Concurrent Lists) are merely 'legislative heads' or 'fields of legislation' - 1983 Act, which enables the creation of admission rules, traces its power to Entry 25 of List III of Seventh Schedule and Article 371D. [Paras 15, 17-19, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058
Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 65 and Article 59 - Suit for possession - Void v. Voidable document – Held, an instrument of sale is not executed by the owner, it is void ab initio and considered a nullity - If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, and would be void - In such a case, the owner is not required to seek cancellation of the instrument or a declaration that it is void - A suit for possession based on title can be filed, and it will governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which provides a limitation period of 12 years from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff - Article 59, which provides a 3 year limitation period, applies to fraudulent transactions that are voidable, not void - High Court erred in applying Article 59 of the Limitation Act - When sale deed is void, suit possession governed by limitation period of 12 years under Article 65 instead of Article 59 - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-31; 34, 39, 40] Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 900 : 2025 INSC 1105
Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - State instrumentalities - Public interest - “within such period” – Held, the expression 'within such period' under Section 5 of Limitation Act means the entire period from the date the cause of action accrued until the date of actual filing, not just the period after prescribed limitation expired - A party seeking condonation of delay must explain what prevented them from filing the appeal or application within the statutory period of limitation - If the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100 days - Total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of officers of the State and its agencies should not be given a premium - Condonation of delay is not a matter of right - while a liberal approach is preferred to achieve substantial justice, negligence and inaction cannot be ignored - A delay should not be condoned merely because doing so would benefit the State - the principle of 'public interest' cannot be used to justify the State's inaction and lethargy - The law of limitation is founded on public policy and is based on the maxims interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniiunt. [Paras 41-50, 59-61, 71] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - Section 22-24 – Held, the Tribunal under the 2007 Act, has the power to order the eviction of a child from the property of the senior citizen, if there is a breach of obligation to maintain senior citizen - The High Court erred in allowing the appeal on the ground that the respondent was also a senior citizen as per Section 2(h) of the 2007 Act because at the time of filing the application before the Tribunal, the respondent was not yet a senior citizen (Respondent's age was 59 years at that time) - The relevant date is the date of filing of the application - 2007 Act being a welfare legislation should be construed liberally to advance its beneficent purpose of protecting senior citizens - It is well settled that the Tribunal can order eviction of a child or relative from the property of the senior citizen where there is a breach of obligation to maintain the senior citizen - The respondent, despite being financially sound, did not allow the appellant to reside in his properties, thereby frustrating the object of the Act - High Court's decision was untenable and erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 947
Medical Negligence – Held, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) overstepped its jurisdiction by creating a new case that was not based on original complaint - Complainant had not alleged any deficiency in antenatal care, rather, he had asserted that tests were prescribed and undergone - A decision must be based on the case pleaded and that a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings - Multiple medical boards, constituted at the request of the complaint, had reviewed the case and found no 'gross medical negligence' in the management of the patient by the treating doctors - The doctor cannot be held liable for an unfavourable outcome without strong evidence of negligence, and that Courts and Consumer Forums should not substitute their own views for those of medical specialists - Appeal allowed and directed complainant to return Rs. 10 lakhs. [Paras 23-30] Deep Nursing Home v. Manmeet Singh Mattewal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2025 INSC 1094
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Held, the Tribunal and High Court failed to consider the appellant's monthly income while calculating compensation - When a minor child suffers a permanent disability, compensation for the loss of income should be based on, at minimum, the minimum wages of a skilled worker in the relevant state at the time of the accident - Minimum wage for a skilled worker in Gujarat in 2012 (the year of accident) was Rs. 227.85 per days, which rounds to a monthly income of Rs. 6,836, added 40% towards future prospects and applied multiplier of 18 - Upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant's permanent functional disability was 90% - When a child is involved in an accident, the loss of income must be calculated using the minimum wages for a skilled worker in that state - Directed that if a claimant fails to provide proof of income, the opposing party, specifically the insurance company, is obligated to provide the tribunal with the applicable minimum wage as issued by the government - This directive be distributed to all Motor Accident Claim Tribunals via the Registrar Generals of the High Courts - Total compensation of Rs. 35,90,489/- is to be paid with 9% interest p.a. from the date of claim petition - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-16] Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel v. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 871 : 2025 INSC 1070
Motor Vehicles Accident – Compensation – Held, minimum wages cannot be determined solely on the basis of a person's educational qualification, without reference to the nature of work carried on - Taking into account that victim that the victim would reasonably have been employed as an accountant upon graduation, fixed a monthly income of Rs. 5,000/- in 2001, with 40% addition towards future prospects, including medical expenses, attendant charges, pain and suffering, loss of amenities and marriage prospects - Supreme Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 40.34 lakhs besides directing the insurer to pay an additional Rs. 20 lakhs towards verified medical expenses incurred by victim's parents during his lifetime - Considering victim's bright prospects, minimum wages unsuitable for income estimation. [Paras 4-7] Sharad Singh v HD Narang, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2025 INSC 1164
Multiple First Information Report (FIRs) - Principles on FIR Clubbing and Transfer – Held, prayers for clubbing of FIRs from various states and for future FIRs are overambitious and outright illegal, as the power to grant such relief for future FIRs does not exist under any law - The power exercised in under Article 142 of the Constitution was with the consent of the States and cannot be replicated as a matter of course - Subsequent FIRs concerning the same cognizable offence must be treated as statements under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C., ensuring fairness to complainants who may file protest petitions - In cases involving financial fraud with investors across multiple states, clubbing all FIRs into one police station is impractical due to the necessity of producing geographically dispersed witnesses during trial - Where consolidation was permitted only for FIRs within Madhya Pradesh, and explicitly rejected transfer of cases from Karnataka and Jharkhand, reinforcing the principle of jurisdictional limits. [Paras 12-15] Odela Satyam v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2025 INSC 1174
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) - Section 52A - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 65B(4) – Held, non-production of contraband in trial not fatal if seizure, sample-drawing duly recorded as per Section 52A NDPS Act - Retrial may be ordered only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and that non-production of contraband cannot justify such a course where electronic evidence, duly certified under Section 65B of Evidence Act, along with records - Once an electronic evidence was certified under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, it is admissible in evidence and there's no requirement that the evidence must be supplied to each witness - If clarification was needed, Appellate Court could have recalled witnesses or admitted further evidence under Section 391 CrPC, instead of ordering a fresh trial - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21, 25, 29, 31 - 33] Kailas Bajirao Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2025 INSC 1117
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) - Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and held that in cases where a builder charges a high rate of interest (18% p.a.) for delay by the buyer, equity and fairness demand that the same rate be awarded to the buyer when the builder commits default in offering possession, when justified by conduct and delay - directed refund of the principal amount paid by the appellant to the respondent with interest at 18% per annum, enhancing the rate from the 9% awarded by NCDRC due to the respondent's persistent delay, harassment, and inequitable conduct - held that there is no absolute rule of parity in interest and compensation rates between builders and buyers, but reasonable compensation must be determined case-to-case - Held that a manifestly unfair bargain in the contract can be judicially corrected - Interest charged by builder can be granted to buyer - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-12, 19-20] Rajnesh Sharma v. Business Park Town Planners Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2025 INSC 1149
National Green Tribunal (NGT) Act, 2010 - Section 19, 22 - Principles of natural justice - Right to a hearing - NGT cannot abdicate its adjudicatory functions by relying solely on the report of a Joint Committee - Held that adjudicatory functions of NGT cannot be assigned to committees, even expert committees, decisions have to be that of NGT - An expert's committee's role is to assist the tribunal with a factfinding exercise, but the final adjudication must be done by the NGT itself - The NGT cannot 'outsource an opinion and base its decision on such opinion' - An adverse order cannot be passed against a person without impleading them as a party to the proceedings and giving them an opportunity of hearing - The NGT's approach in condemning a person unheard is contrary to settled principles of natural justice. [Paras 28] Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2025 INSC 1060
NCLT, NCLAT Vacancies must be filled on war footing - RERA must be adequately staffed – Held, dedicated IBC benches with additional strength should be constituted - Services of retired judges may be utilized on ad hoc basis until regular appointments are made - Noted that though such directions were issued earlier also, no effective step has been taken in the ground - Directed the Union Government, within three months, to file a compliance report on measures taken to upgrade NCLT/NCLAT infrastructure nationwide - Recent closure of Chandigarh NCLT and portions of Delhi NCLT due to water seepage in Courtrooms and chambers of members underscores the urgency of robust infrastructural support - Noted that government shall prioritise e-filing, video conferencing and dedicated case management systems for IBS matters. [Para 24] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Promissory Note - Suit of Recovery of amount - Onus of Proof - Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that reduced the amount recoverable under a promissory note from Rs. 35,29,690 to Rs. 22,00,000 and restored the Trial Court's decree - High Court reduced the amount citing a lack of documentary proof for the cash portion of the loan – Held, once a promissory note is accepted, the onus is on the respondent to disprove the debt, not on the appellant to provide documentary evidence for cash payments - It is not uncommon for money transactions to include a cash component and that the absence of a receipt or bank transaction is not sufficient to negate the payment, especially when a promissory note exists - Initial presumption of legally enforceable debt comes from NI Act - High Court's view was erroneous and unsustainable - Appeal allowed. Georgekutty Chacko v. M.N. Saji, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 878
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Section 138 Proviso (b) - Principle of strict construction of penal statutes - Whether notice is valid where demanded amount differs from the cheque amount – Held, compliant under Section 138 is not maintainable if demand notice didn't mention exact cheque amount and typo error cannot be a defence - If the amount mentioned in the demand notice varies from the cheque amount, then the complaint is not maintainable - The notice in terms of proviso being a provision in penal statute and a condition for the offence, it has to be precise while mentioning of the amount of the cheque which is dishonoured - Quashed complaint filed under Section 138 of NI Act on the above ground as the amount mentioned in the notice was not same as per the cheque - Even if the cheque number mentioned in the notice was correct but amount was different, it created an ambiguity and differentiation about the 'said amount' - Notice stood bad in law - Section 138 being penal, must be strictly construed, no leniency allowed for errors in amount mentioned in legal notice as the offence is technical and procedural compliance is mandatory. [Paras 5-8] Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahruden Noorul, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 927 : 2025 INSC 1133
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Whether a compromise reached between parties in a case under Section 138 of NI Act can be a basis for setting aside a conviction, especially after the matter has been upheld by multiple courts – Held, the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is 'mainly civil wrong' and is specifically made compoundable under Section 147 of NI Act - A settlement, once voluntarily entered into by the parties, allows them to save themselves from the litigation process, and courts should not override such a compromise - The compromise deed dt. April 6, 2025 and an affidavit from respondent confirmed that a settlement had been reached - Respondent had accepted payment in full and final settlement of debt - Since a voluntary compromise was reached, the proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act could no longer be sustained and conviction had to be set aside - Set aside High Court's order. Appeal allowed. [Paras 6-12] Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 865
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138, proviso to section 142 - Supreme Court quashed complaint, citing that there cannot be an 'automatic or presumed condonation' of a complaint filed beyond the statutory time limit - When a complaint is filed beyond the mandatory time limit, a proper application or affidavit must be filed by complainant disclosing the reasons for delay - Held that the High Court's opinion that a separate application for condonation of delay is not a 'statutory mandate' under Section 142(b) of the Act was also erroneous - Court is obligated to take note of a complaint being filed beyond the limitation period, consider the reasons disclosed for the delay, and come to a 'judicious conclusion' that condonation is justified before taking cognizance and issuing summons. [Paras 6-9] H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 889
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 299, 300 and 307 - Causation and proximate cause in homicide - Is offence of murder made out when death occurs days after fatal injury - Supreme Court reaffirmed that, to establish culpability for murder under Sections 299 and 300 IPC, death must be a direct consequence of the injuries inflicted, even if delayed by complications such as septicemia or pneumonia - Mere lapse of time or intervening medical conditions do not disrupt the casual chain unless they constitute an independent supervening cause removing the connection between injury and death - Held that the adequacy or efficiency of medical treatment offered to the victim is wholly irrelevant in determining criminal liability under Section 302 IPC, as per explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC - If the injuries are dangerous in nature, the penetrator is responsible for ensuing fatal complications, regardless of potential recovery through optimal medical care - Delay in death due to medical complications or protracted treatment does not diminish the offender's liability from murder to culpable homicide - Conviction under Section 307 IPC requires proof of intention or knowledge as defined under Section 300 IPC - Even if the injuries are not fatal, intention inferred from weapon used, body part targeted and persistent assault is decisive - High Court erred in downgrading the conviction from murder to attempt to murder solely based on the prolonged survival of victim and alleged lack of proper treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 25-27, 30, 31, 40-49, 57, 59-61, 66, 67] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2025 INSC 1107
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 299, 300 and 307 - Supreme Court laid down following propositions to be followed by the Courts while dealing with cases where there was a delay in death resulting from an injury- i. If injury was fatal and intended to cause death, it is murder under Section 300 (1st part), even if death occurred later due to complications; ii. If injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course, it is murder under Section 300 (3rd part), despite delayed death; iii. If injuries were imminent dangerous to life, it is murder under Section 300 (4th limb), regardless of medical treatment or complications; iv. If complications flow from injury, the accused remains liable for death; v. if complication was remote, it may be culpable homicide, if inevitable, it is murder under Section 302; vi. Even if no single injury was sufficient, courts can infer intent to kill if injuries collectively were fatal; vii. Courts must see of injuries were naturally sufficient to cause death, intervening causes don't reduce liability unless too remote. [Para 69] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2025 INSC 1107
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302, 304 Part I- Right of private defence – Held, the right of private defence is a valuable right that serves a social purpose and should not be narrowly construed - it cannot be weighed in a 'golden scale' or with 'arithmetical precision' - a Court must view the situation from the perspective of a common and reasonable person, not with 'detached objectivity' or a 'hyper technical approach' - when an individual is faced with an imminent threat, such as being shot by an assailant, it is unreasonable to expect them to apply a 'rational mind in exercising his right of private defence' - the right of private defence can be exercised when there is a reasonable apprehension of an offence and it is not necessary for the offence to be actually committed- the force used should not be disproportionate, but a person in 'imminent and reasonable danger' of death or grievous injury cam inflict harm, even extending to death, on their assailant - Since the deceased was the initial aggressor and attacked the appellant with a pistol, the appellant's retaliation was a justified act of private defence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6 - 8] Rakesh Dutt Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 892
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 3(2)(v) - Supreme Court acquitted appellant and held - i. that prosecution's case, at its highest, shows that a long-standing neighbourhood quarrel between the families escalated; ii. Appellant had been acquitted of all other offences, including unlawful assembly, rioting, causing hurt and criminal intimidation and these acquittals have become final; iii. For an offence under Section 306 IPC, there must be clear mens rea and a direct or active act that leaves the deceased with no option but to commit suicide; iv. Casual words spoken in a fit of anger, without intending the consequences, do not constitute abetment - Held that harassment faced by victim, did not constitute instigation to the extent that she was left with no other option but to take her life - Set aside conviction and High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-23] Geeta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2025 INSC 1089
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 394, 482 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Cognizance and Framing of charges – Held, the High Court's procedure of remanding without liberty for fresh investigation or inquiry by the Trial Court was contrary to law - Trial Court was required to independently form satisfaction with regard to applicability of Section 394 IPC based on full materials, including police investigation and witness statements - Trial Court's reliance solely on affidavits filed by complainant's witnesses to take cognizance under Section 394 IPC was disapproved - Supreme Court emphasized on the necessity of producing entire statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and case diary for proper evaluation by the Trial Court - The addition of offences based on private affidavits should not be mechanically done by the Trial Courts and they must ensure fairness by relying on proper investigation or directing further probe when allegations of suppression arise - Supreme Court remanded with direction to the Trial Court to call for the complete investigation materials and further investigation if necessary, followed by framing of charges. The investigation must be free, impartial, and all relevant material should be disclosed. [Para 5-10] Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 966
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Omnibus allegations and lack of specifics – Held, mere omnibus statements without particulars cannot form the basis for prosecution under Section 498A - No direct allegations regarding offences under Section 377 and 506 IPC were made against the present appellants; rather such allegations were confined solely to the complainant's husband - Continuation of these proceedings for these offences against the appellants was held to be an abuse of process of law - Where the FIR or complaint, even if taken at face value, does not prima facie constitute any offence, quashing is permissible - Vague and general allegations, without specific overt acts, do not justify the continuation of criminal proceedings - Quashed criminal proceedings - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 9-13] Sanjay D. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 960 : 2025 INSC 1168
Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Section 498A - Matrimonial Complaints – Held, cases arising out of matrimonial disputes have to be scrutinised with great care, taking into account pragmatic realities - Courts have to be careful and cautious in dealing with complaints, allegations have to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection in order to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law - General allegations of harassment without pointing out specific details would not be sufficient to continue criminal proceedings against any person - Sweeping accusations against relatives in dowry-related cases 'must be nipped in the bud' to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC - Set aside High Court's order and quashed FIR - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22] Shobhit Kumar Mittal v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2025 INSC 1152
Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) - Supreme Court allowed application seeking modification of the time schedule for pharmacy courses in terms of the proposed schedule - this new schedule will be effective from academic session 2026-2027 - application for an extension for the academic year 2025-2026 is also allowed, with deadline for completing approval processes extended to September 30, 2025 and the deadline for compliance/appeals extended to October 10, 2025 - Proposed schedule would have the academic session start on August 1 and the last date for student admission be August 15 - New schedule would also include a one-month extension period for the PCI to use in case of unforeseen circumstances. [Paras 5, 6] Parshavanath Charitable Trust v. All India Council For Technical Education, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 895
Practice and Procedure - Criminal Trial - Adjournment and day to day trial - Section 309 CrPC - Right to speedy trial - Duty of Trial Court - Supreme Court reiterated that Section 309 of CrPC (now Section 346 of BNSS, 2023) mandates that once examination of witnesses begins, the trial must proceed from day to day until all witnesses in attendance are examined, save for special reasons recorded in writing - The Court expressed disapproval of the conventional practice where examinationin-chief is recorded in a particular month and cross-examination follows in subsequent months, emphasizing that such adjournments, unless based on compelling and recorded reasons, undermine the legislative intent of speedy trials - The right to speedy trial is integral to Article 21 of the Constitution and extends to all stages of criminal proceedings, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision, and retrial - Delay in cross-examination or piecemeal trial, unless occasioned by unavoidable circumstances and with reasons recorded, is a practice condemned by the Court and violates not only statutory mandates but also constitutional guarantees. [Para 12, 13, 20-25, 28, 31] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2025 INSC 1155
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) - Section 19(3)(a) – Held, the alleged invalidity of sanction cannot be a ground to discharge an accused in a criminal case under PC Act - Approach of High Court was 'contrary to law' - A Trial Court's order cannot be interfered with on the ground of invalidity of sanction unless it is shown that a failure of justice has resulted due to it - Validity of sanction cannot be questioned at the stage of discharge - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4-8] Karnataka Lokayuktha Police v. Lakshman Rao Peshve, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 941
Procedural Defects – Jurisdictional Error – Modification of Contract Terms by Arbitral Tribunal – Mandate under Section 28(3) of the Act - The Arbitral Tribunal's modification of contract terms without material evidence, and reliance on conduct/e-mails not amounting to unequivocal waiver or valid estoppel, was held to be a jurisdictional error - Set aside order for exceeding arbitral jurisdiction - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 88–92] Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963 : 2025 INSC 1171
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Section 6 - Conviction and Sentence - Judicial Caution against Re-Traumatization – Held, appellant was convicted and sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act - The prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to be detailed, coherent, and free from exaggeration or inconsistency - Her testimony was reiterated before the Trial Court and corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence, which confirmed signs of recent forcible sexual intercourse - The victim's age was established through her birth certificate, placing her unambiguously below 12 years at the time of the incident - Courts must remain vigilant against procedural submissions being used as harassment tactics, particularly in cases involving child sexual abuse - Reiterated that requests to recall a child victim after trial conclusion and concurrent findings of guilt raise serious concerns about secondary victimization - Such attempts must be discouraged to protect the integrity of the victim's testimony and public confidence in justice delivery - the Supreme Court expressed anguish that no compensation had been awarded to the victim by either the Trial Court or the High Court - In exercise of its constitutional duty to provide meaningful redress Supreme Court directed the State of Arunachal Pradesh to pay Rs. 10,50,000 as compensation. [Paras 7-12] Arjun Sonar v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 935
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, merely touching the private parts of a minor girl will not constitute the offence of rape under Section 375, 376 AB of IPC or penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act - Such conduct would instead amount to offence of 'aggravated sexual assault' as defined under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act as well as the offence of 'outraging the modesty of a woman' under Section 354 IPC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Laxman Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 928
Provincial Insolvency Act - Section 37 - Annulment of Insolvency and Initial Litigation - The insolvency process was annulled after liabilities were discharged under Section 35 - Supreme Court stayed the district court's transfer order - After remand, the District Court dismissed the transfer application and directed cancellation of the sale deed executed by the official receiver - Supreme Court emphasized the duty of appellate courts to carefully examine trial court's factual findings, interfere only on material irregularity or evidential flaws, and provide detailed reasons when reversing findings of fact - Supreme Court restored the District Court's judgment dismissing the transfer application and cancelled the sale deed executed by the official receiver – Held, Section 37 of the Act states that completed, final, lawful transactions done by the Insolvency Receiver should remain valid even if the insolvency is later annulled - The High Court had erred in assuming that the 1983 transfer deed was final and beyond challenge - Section 37 protects only those transactions which are validly and conclusively carried out during insolvency - A transfer that is based on fabricated documents or on an order which is later annulled cannot be treated as “duly made” and therefore cannot be shielded under the saving clause. [Paras 15-18, 25, 27-29] Singamasetty Bhagavath Guptha v. Allam Karibasappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2025 INSC 1159
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 - Debt Recovery Tribunal – Held, the e-auction notice and sale held by the DRT were invalid for non-disclosure of statutory dues of DDA and failure to comply with provisions of the Income Tax Act and Income Tax Certificate Proceedings Rules, 1962 regarding proclamation of sale - Banks failure to disclose encumbrances of property in auction notice invalidates sale - The auction purchaser, though innocent and bona fide, was entitled to restitution as the sale was in violation of lease terms and statutory provisions - The Court quashed and set aside the auction and sale confirmation, directing refund with interest to the auction purchaser while upholding the DDA's rightful claims - The principle of restitution flows from the very heart of justice that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the instance of another and that those who suffered without fault should, so far as money can achieve, be restored to the position they once occupied - The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised wherever the justice of the case demands - Appeal allowed. [Para 23-27, 30-32] Delhi Development Authority v. Corporation Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953 : 2025 INSC 1161
Resolution Plan - Supreme Court disapproved the delay in implementation of the Resolution Plan, holding it was unjustified and contrary to the Code's mandate - Held that payments to financial creditors must precede operational creditors unless otherwise specified in the Resolution Plan, overruling contrary practice - It further found that the Resolution Plan approval freezes claims and bars fresh claims outside the authorized plan, ensuring certainty for the Successful Resolution Applicant - Recognized the dilatory tactics by erstwhile promoters attempting to derail CIRP, imposing costs on frivolous applications and emphasizing the primacy of timely resolution in public interest - Held that commercial decisions of CoCs are binding and beyond judicial review save for limited exceptions enumerated in the IBC - Appeals allowed. [Para 6, 7, 13, 14, 16–18, 46-49, 56-58, 64, 65, 67–68, 120, 134-136, 164-165, 187-190] Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2025 INSC 1165
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education, 2009 (RTE Act) - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) - Referring of matter to CJI – Held, Article 21A postulates primary education to be a 'public good' that must be accessible and available to all - RTE Act is the State's legislative enforcement of this fundamental right - Supreme Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench to reconsider its previous decision in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, wherein it was held that RTE Act does not apply to minority institutions - Primary concern was that the exclusion of minority institutions from the RTE Act would 'offend the Article 21A right of students admitted in such institutions' by denying them statutory entitlements and benefits - Held that Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural trust Case focused on Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act and no other section and held that the entirety of RTE Act to be inapplicable to an entire section of society - To hold that entirety of the RTE Act is inapplicable does not appeal reasonable and proportionate - If RTE Act would not apply to minority institutions, they would stand denied of the various statutory entitlements and benefits that RTE Act affords to all children between 6- 14 years of age - Held that TET is held to be inapplicable to minority institutions, this would automatically result in a violation of Article 14 as differential eligibility criteria based on religious or linguistic character would be an impermissible classification. [Paras 186-191] Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861 : 2025 INSC 1063
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education, 2009 (RTE Act) - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) - Supreme Court mandates TET qualification for teachers in nonminority schools - Allows time for in-service teachers to clear test - Teachers appointed prior to the enactment of the RTE Act and have more than 5 years of service left, granted a time of two years to pass the TET - Held that TET is a mandatory minimum qualification for teachers, regardless of their length of service - Emphasized the importance of qualified teachers for imparting quality education, stating that a well-equipped teacher is crucial for molding the character and intellectual capabilities of students - All teachers seeking new appointments or promotion must have a TET qualification, otherwise, their candidature will not be considered - In-service teachers who have less than 5 years of service left, if aspires for promotion, will not be considered eligible without qualifying TET - To qualify for terminal benefits, such teachers must have put in the qualifying service in accordance with Rules - If any teacher has not put in the qualifying service and there is some deficiency, this case may be considered by appropriate department. [Paras 204-206, 208, 210, 214- 218] Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861 : 2025 INSC 1063
Right of persons with disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 - Articles 14, 19, 21 – Held, Indian legal framework on disability rights has evolved from a charity based model to a rights-based framework - this shift is guided by statutory enactments and constitutional mandates - This Act was enacted in line with India's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) - It guarantees substantive rights, including community living and protection from abuse - Judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution to reframe disability as a structural disadvantage requiring active redressal and inclusion - That failure to ensure accessibility constitutes systematic exclusion and infringes on the equal protection clause of Article 14 - Reasonable accommodation is essential for substantive equality under Article 14, but also cautioned against framing the value of a person with a disability in terms of productivity - Supreme Court expressed concerns over the denial of general category seats to persons with disabilities who score higher than the cut-off marks for the unreserved category - Directed Union Government to explain if appropriate steps have been taken to ensure that PwDs, who score higher than the general cut off, are given 'upward movement' by accommodating them in the general category - Direct consequence of not providing upward movement to the meritorious candidates applying under the category of PwD would be that even when a candidate with disability scores higher than the cutoff for unreserved category, such a candidate would invariably occupy the reserved seat thereby denying the opportunity to a lower scoring candidate with disability to make claim on the said post - this defeats the very purpose of reservation under Section 34 - Directed monitoring of the implementation of RPwD Act, 2016 to be undertaken under the name and style of a project called 'Project Ability Empowerment' and assigned the task to 8 NLUs across the country and project report shall be filed within 6 months. Reena Banerjee v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2025 INSC 1101
Safeguarding the interests of homebuyers - Supreme Court directed every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with local revenue authorities upon payment of at least 20% of the property cost by buyer - To protect senior citizens and bona fide homebuyers, contracts that significantly deviate from the Model RERA agreement to sell, or that incorporate returns/buyback clauses where the allottee is over the age of 50, must be supported by an affidavit sworn before the competent Revenue Authority, certifying that the allottee understands the attendant risks - Held that in projects at nascent stages, 2 such as where land is yet to be acquired or construction has not commenced, proceed from allottees shall be placed in an escrow account and disbursed in phases aligned with project progress, as per a RERA-sanctioned SOP - Every RERA shall devise such SOPs within 6 months. [Paras 21] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110
Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) - Section 3(1)(s) & (r) - 'Public View' - the term 'any place within public law' is distinct from a 'public place' - An incident occurring in location like a lawn outside a house, which can be seen by someone from the road, would be considered a place within 'public view'. [Para 5] Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 869 : 2025 INSC 1067
Search and Inspection - Supreme Court distinguished between search and inspection – Held, inspection refers to the verification of the books, records or documents at the premises of a person, which is generally permissible under the respective law upon compliance with the pre-requisites of authorization, recording of reasons to believe, and permission from competent authority under law - A search, on the other hand, has a wider connotation - It implies the power to look in any place for any materials, goods, books or documents believed to be secreted or concealed, which may evidence a violation and may be liable to seizure or confiscation. [Para 19] ITC Limited v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 910 : 2025 INSC 1111
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 - Retrospective application of amended Section 13(8) – Held, the amended provisions apply to all cases where auction notice was issued after 01.09.2016, regardless of the loan sanction date - the amended restriction and its procedural nature render it applicable to pending actions, aligning with principles outlined in precedents - Supreme Court summarised principles on retrospective application of legislations - i. Presumption against retrospectively is not applicable to enactments which merely affect procedure or change forum or are declaratory; ii. Retroactive/retrospective operation can be implicit in a provision construed in the context where it occurs; iii. A provision can be held to apply to cause of action after such provision comes into force, even though the claim on which the action may be based may be of anterior date and; iv. A remedial statute applies to pending proceedings and such application may not be taken to be retrospective if application is to be in future with reference to appending cause of action; v. SARFAESI Act is a remedial statute intended to dela with problem of pre-existing loan transactions which need speedy recovery. [Paras 179-183] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 - Section 13(8) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 60 – Issue of Right of Redemption under SARFAESI Act - Held, mortgagor's right of redemption survives until the completion of sale by way of a registered conveyance and mere auction or issuance of sale certificate does not extinguish this right - The amended provision extinguishes the right of redemption of the borrower in the event he fails to repay his dues and redeem the asset before publication of the Auction Notice - This unambiguous language used in the amended provision of Section 13(8) furthers the object and reasons of the SARFAESI Act for which it was enacted i.e., to ensure that the lender is able to enforce his security interest at the earliest and with least possible intervention of the courts - The right of redemption is a statutory right and not a contractual one, and it is subject to modification by special Laws like SARFEASI Act - Supreme Court flags inconsistency between Section 1398) of Act and Rules on borrower's redemption right, urges government to amend - Appeal allowed. [Paras 51-55, 68, 75-76, 115] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 - Writ Jurisdiction in SARFAESI matters – Held, High Courts should refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction in SARFEASI matters, which is vested with the DRT alone - Highlighted the impropriety of financial institutions and banks approaching Constitutional Courts instead of forums designated under SARFAESI law - The original borrower was recognized to have the right to challenge the auction and sale certificate validity by appropriate legal steps before competent forums - Supreme Court expressed disturbance at the manner in which the settlement in Lok Adalat was arrived at and questioned the Bank's intentions regarding departmental proceedings against erring officials responsible for the litigation - Matter to be treated as part-heard. [Paras 1,2, 6-9] Mohammad Zubair Ahmad v. Punjab National Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 939
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - One Time Settlement Scheme (OTS) - Eligibility criteria and conditions - Failure to comply with up-front payment requirement under OTS Scheme - Principle of natural justice and eligibility considered – Held, defaulting borrower cannot claim OTS benefit without fulfilling bank's conditions - The High Court erred in directing reconsideration without considering the mandatory up-front payment clause, which disentitled the respondent's application from processing - Respondent did not make the mandatory upfront payment if 5% of the OTS amount as required under Clause 4(i) of the Scheme - The rejection letter did not mention this ground, but courts can uphold administrative orders on alternative grounds found in the record if fairness is maintained - Principle that invalid orders cannot be later validated by additional grounds unless fairness and notice are ensured was emphasized - Supreme Court granted respondent liberty to make fresh OTS proposal, not under 2020 Scheme - Appeal allowed. [Paras 25-29, 40, 44, 45] State Bank of India v. Tanya Energy Enterprises, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2025 INSC 1119
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (SARFAESI Rules) - Held, i. Rules 8(6), the proviso thereto, Rule 8(7) and Rule 9(1) of the SARFAESI Rules do not speak of any separate or distinct notice of sale that is required to be issued by the secured creditor for the transfer of the secured asset by way of lease, assignment or sale in accordance with any of the methods enumerated in Rule 8(5); ii. The different manner in which the notice of sale has to be served, cased, published, affixed, uploaded as stipulated in Rules 8(6) and 8(7) of the SARFAESI Rules, do not constitute separate notices of sale by themselves, they are part and parcel of one single composite intended 'notice of sale' of the secured asset by the secured creditor, by any of the mode of sale listed in Rule 8(5); iii. Similarly, the stipulation under Rule 9(1) of a third-days gap between the date of publication of notice of sale and the date of actual sale does not impute a distinct characteristic to the public notice in the newspaper in contrast to the notice of sale that is served to the borrower; iv. The embargo enshrined under Rule 9(1), that no sale, in the 1st instance shall take place before the expiry of 30 days, would be reckoned from the date of issuance of the 'notice of sale', which would include both the public notice of sale in the newspaper and the service thereof to the borrower; v. Under Rule 8(6) read with Rule 9(1) both the notice of sale can be served as well as published in the newspaper, simultaneously on the same date; All that is required under Rule 9(1) is that 30 day gap is maintained between when the notice of sale is served, affixed and published. [Paras 116-118, 161, 162] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144
Service Law - Migration of reserved category candidates to unreserved category - Relaxations availed – Held, Office memorandum, which disallows migration for candidates who avail of 'relaxed standards' like age and experience, does not apply to relaxations in physical standards such as height, weight and chest - Supreme Court drew a distinction between relaxations in age, experience, and written examination standards and variations in physical measurements - Different physical standards for genders, castes or geographical locations are not 'relaxations' in same sense as age or experience concessions - They are distinct parameters for different categories of candidates - Availing physical relaxation doesn't bar reserved candidate from general category selection if rules don't forbid. [Paras 9-12] Uma Shankar Gurjar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2025 INSC 1083
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - Section 2(n), 3(2), 9 - Complaint of sexual harassment filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 9 - Whether the subsequent administrative actions against the appellant would constitute sexual harassment under the Act to extend the limitation period – Held, a complaint of sexual harassment must be filed within 3 months of the last incident, or within an extended period of 3 months, for a total of 6 months - the definition of sexual harassment includes unwelcome acts of a sexual nature as well as circumstances such as implied or explicit threats of detrimental treatment in employment or creating a hostile work environment - For subsequent actions to be considered part of the sexual harassment, there must be a direct link between the new action and a prior overt act of sexual harassment - A distinction exists between a 'continuing wrong' where the injury persists, and a 'recurring wrong', where a fresh cause of action arises each time - Administrative actions taken against the appellant, such as her removal as Director, were collective decisions of the Executive Council based on an independent complaint - These actions were administrative in nature and did not create a gender-based hostile environment - they were not directly linked to the prior sexual harassment and did not constitute a continuing wrong - the last incident of sexual harassment was in April 2023 and the complaint filed in December 2023 was time-barred - Directed VC-respondent no. 1 to mention judgment in his resume - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 14 - 32] Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 902 : 2025 INSC 1106
Special Leave Petition - Maintainability of Second Special Leave Petition – Held, withdrawal of a special leave petition (SLP) without obtaining liberty to file a fresh petition bars a subsequent challenge to the same order, as the principle of public policy embodied in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to SLPs under Article 136 of the Constitution - Second SLP is not maintainable when the earlier petition was unconditionally withdrawn, particularly where no liberty was granted to approach the Court again, and the litigant seeks to re-agitate the same issue after exhausting review remedies. [Paras 19-21] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140
Speedy Trial - Supreme Court issues guidelines and suggested that the High Courts Chief Justices on their administrative side to issue circular for the District Judiciary - i. Proceedings in every trial shall be held expeditiously; ii. When stage of examination starts that shall be continued from day-to day until all the witnesses in the attendance have been examined; iii. When the witnesses are in attendance before Court no adjournment or postponement shall be granted without examining them; iv. Court should not grant adjournment to suit the convenience of the advocate concerned except on very exceptional grounds like bereavement in the family; iv. Presiding Officer of each Court may evolve the system for framing a schedule of constructive working days for examination of witnesses in each case; v. Summons or process could be handed over to the public Prosecutor in-charge of the case to cause them to be served on the witnesses, as per schedule fixed by the Court. [Paras 35-37] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2025 INSC 1155
Succession Act, 1925 - Section 2(h) – Will - A will is a legal declaration of a testator's wishes regarding their property, to be carried out after their death - A will is not a transfer inter vivos, it is a posthumous disposition and can be revoked at any time during the testator's lifetime - A will must be attested by two or more witnesses - To be proven in Court, at least one attesting witness must be called to prove its execution - The propounder of the will must also remove any legitimate suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution such as an unfair or unjust disposition circumstances surrounding its execution, such as an unfair or unjust disposition of property or the propounder themselves taking a substantial benefit - The mere fact that a will is registered does not automatically grant it validity - Suspicious circumstances surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff - Appeal allowed and suit dismissed. [Paras 23-27] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059
Succession Act, 1925 - Sections 67 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 – Held, High Court should not frame and answer an additional substantial question of law under the proviso to Section 100(5) of CPC without a foundation in the pleadings, issues or evidence presented by the parties - Introducing a new legal argument, such as the applicability of Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, at the stage of second appeal creates an entirely new case for the plaintiffs and is improper - The court must record specific reasons for framing such a question and the opposite party must be given a fair opportunity to respond - The Trial Court and the First appellate Court had already established that the testators had a sound mind and the will was validly executed without any suspicious circumstances - The valid and genuine will which was duly executed and proved must be given effect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 23] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071
Telangana Judicial Service Rules, 2023 - Rule 5 (5.1)(a) - Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Telangana Judicial Rule, which mandates that a candidate aspiring for a District Judge appointment must have practised for at least 7 years in the Courts in Telangana - Rule 5(5.1)(a) mandates that candidates for direct recruitment as District Judges must have practiced as Advocates in High Court or Courts under control for not less than 7 years as on the date of notification - Held that 2023 Rules were validly enacted with retrospective effect, the High Court referred exclusively to the Telangana High Court and not others and Petitioners did not meet the 7 year advocate practice requirement - Directed the High Court to declare results and appoint candidates who qualified the examination but did not meet the eligibility criteria as a special case, without monetary benefits or seniority arrears, strictly limited to the facts of the case. [Paras 8-12] Usha Kiran Kshatri v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 957 : 2025 INSC 1169
Tenancy - Supreme Court sends tenant to Jail for not vacating premises and imposes Rs. 5 lakhs fine on aged co-tenant - Found guilty of deliberate and wilful non-compliance of Supreme Court orders dt. 20.09.2024 and 09.09.2025 - Direction were given to the District Judge to appoint a bailiff with police help to take possession of the premises within two weeks - An inventory of tenant articles shall be prepared and kept in safe custody for delivery, if demanded - Appellate authority shall report action to the Supreme Court Registrar. [Paras 3 - 7] Laxmi Construction v. Harsh Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 956
Tender - Bid Disqualification - Judicial Review – Held, a bid pursuant to a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) can't be rejected solely for non-production of the document that was not prescribed in the NIT - The tender authorities cannot impose conditions not expressly stated in the tender document - The disqualification was invalid for the following reasons- i. Clause 5(D) of the NIT did not explicitly mandate the submission of the JV agreement itself to prove proportionate share; the work execution certificate provided by the appellant, which clearly stated its 45% share in the JV (Joint Venture), was a valid document for this purpose; ii. The tender's conditions must be clear and unambiguous - Since NIT did not explicitly require the JV agreement, the tendering authority could not reject the bid for its nonsubmission; ii. Rejection of the bid as 'incomplete' under Clause 8.1 was contrary to NIT's terms because the required work execution certificate had been submitted; iv. High Court's decision to go beyond the reasons provided by the Tender Evaluation Committee and disqualify the appellant based on the washery committee under Clause 5(B) was improper - Partly allowed and remanded the matter to High Court for a fresh determination. [Paras 13 - 24] Maha Mineral Mining & Benefication v. Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2025 INSC 1085
Tender - Rectification of financial bid after opening - Inadvertent mistake – Permissibility - Judicial Interference - Whether a bidder, after the financial bids have been opened and the bidder declared as lowest, can be allowed to rectify its financial bid by treating a per day rate quoted erroneously as the total contract period rate, thus potentially becoming the highest bidder – Held, financial bids in public tenders can't be altered after opening - Sanctity of process can't be compromised for more revenue - The Division Bench erred in allowing rectification of the bid after opening the financial bids, holding that the tendering authority had the discretionary power under Clause 5B(v) of Instructions to Bidders to seek clarifications at any stage of the tender evaluation process, which when extended to allow rectification of BOQ rates, unsettles the tender process - The principle that rectification of financial bids is impermissible post-opening is fortified by the facts that the bidder filled both figures and words pertaining to 1095 days, and the alleged mistake was not a bona fide inadvertent error but indicates negligence - Judicial interference in tender processes warrants utmost restraint and is only justified when there is mala fide, arbitrariness, or public interest is adversely affected. Mere error or procedural irregularity does not justify interference, especially if it affects the sanctity and finality of the tender - Non-joinder of the highest bidder (appellant) during the High Court proceedings, whose interests were adversely affected due to the rectification allowed to the respondent, vitiated the impugned order, violating principles of natural justice - The public interest in contractual commercial transactions is not confined to the quantum of revenue but also includes adherence to tender conditions and ensuring finality in the tendering process - Appeal allowed. [Paras 20, 30, 32-34, 40, 41. 43-44, 50] Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways v. Mandeepa Enterprises, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 911 : 2025 INSC 1108
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 53A - Part Performance - Difference between a registered sale deed and an agreement for sale or a contract for sale – Held, the doctrine of part-performance can be invoked as a defence against a transferor trying to eject a transferee - A key requirement for this defence is that the transferee must have taken or continued possession of property in part performance of the contract - A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties - While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. [Paras 12-16, 30, 31] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 54 - Sale of immovable property with a value over Rs. 100 must be made by a registered instrument - A contract for sale (agreement to sell) does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on the property - At best, it gives the buyer the right to file a suit for specific performance if the seller avoids executing a sale deed - A GPA (General Power of Attorney) is an instrument that creates an agency, authorizing the grantee to perform specific acts on behalf of the grantor - A GPA does not, by itself, constitute an instrument of transfer of immovable property, even if it contains clauses making it irrevocable or authorizing the attorney to sell the property. [Paras 18-22] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059
Waiver and Estoppel – Interpretation of Contract – No Oral Modification Clause – Requirements for Valid Waiver – Estoppel Distinguished from Waiver – Jurisprudence Clearly Restated - that waiver under Section 63 of Contract Act is intentional relinquishment of rights by the promisee without need for consideration or agreement, requiring deliberate, explicit intention - Estoppel and waiver distinguished - Estoppel is predicated on conduct and representation, while waiver is intentional abandonment. Estoppel barred by No Waiver/No Oral Modification clauses unless unequivocal representation and detrimental reliance are established. [Paras 29–31, 33-34, 74, 86] Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963 : 2025 INSC 1171
Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Constitutional validity of the Act - Amendments were challenged primarily on the grounds of violation of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 300A of the Constitution - Composition of the Central Waqf Council and State Boards allowing non-Muslim majorities, and scrutiny on discriminatory provisions such as those requiring demonstrable practice of Islam for 5 years - Supreme Court upheld the legislative competence of Parliament and found no manifest arbitrariness warranting interim relief, underscoring protections for government properties from wrongful Waqf declarations, the secular nature of Board and Council functions, and wider remedies available under the Amended Waqf Act - Supreme Court stayed this provision till the State Governments frame rules for providing a mechanism to determine the question as to whether a person has been practising Islam for 5 years or more - Without such a mechanism, the provision will lead to an 'arbitrary exercise of power - Held that objections to inclusion of non-Muslims in statutory councils did not transgress religious freedoms as the functions are secular and advisory - Held no prima facie ground for interim stay and upheld the Act's constitutionality, emphasizing the need to respect legislative intent and due process in safeguarding Waqf properties. [Paras 34, 35, 38-41, 43-54, 72-80, 111-124, 182-186] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116
Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Exclusion of rights of STs and restricted applicability in tribal areas - Government properties Exemption - Held that it was justified on constitutional protections under Article 244 and special legislative measures recognized in judgement of Amrendra Pratap Singh Case and 5th and 6th Schedules - Held that registration provisions are not arbitrary and registration is necessary to check misuse - Upheld provisions excluding government properties declared as Waqf, allowing inquiry by designated officers - This protects government interests - Appointment of CEO not necessarily Muslim was allowed as the CEO functions under Board Control, which retains Muslim majority - Deletion of provisions permitting non-Muslims to create Waqf- supporting trusts was upheld as consistent with Islamic nature Waqf and availability of alternative trust forms - Upheld the provision that waqf can be created only by a person showing or demonstrating that he is practicing Islam for at least 5 years - Upheld that deletion of section 104 of the original Waqf Act is not arbitrary - Supreme Court stops government from denotifying Waqf Lands disputed as encroachments till Tribunal's decision on Title. [Paras 51-53, 102, 131-136, 177-179, 189-190, 194-197] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116
Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Waqf by user - Section 3(r)(i) - Waqf Act, 1995 - Deletion of this section - Supreme Court upheld deletion of 'waqf by user' concept - Held that if Mutawallis for a period of 102 years could not get the waqf registered, as required under the earlier provisions, they cannot claim that they be allowed to continue with the waqf even if they are not registered - Now they cannot be heard to say that the provision which now requires the application to be accompanied by a copy of the waqf deed is arbitrary - Held that if the legislature in 2025 finds that on account of the concept of 'Waqf by User', huge governments properties have been encroached upon and to stop the menace, it takes steps for deletion of the said provision, the said amendment, prima facie, cannot be said to be arbitrary - Registration of Waqfs was upheld - ample time of 6 months was provided. [Paras 107, 143, 145, 150-152] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1974 - Procedure for sample collection - The results of an analysis of a sewage or trade effluent sample are not admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding unless the statutory procedure under Section 21(3), (4) and (5) is strictly complied with - Rigor of Section 19(1) of National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 is qua the procedure to be adopted by the NGT in conducting its proceedings - It cannot be stretched to abandon the statutory procedure laid down under Section 21 and 22 of the Water Act and by outsourcing investigation to administrative committees by overlooking the statutory provisions and basing its decisions on the recommendation of such administrative committee - This includes serving a notice to the occupier, taking and dividing the sample in their presence, and sealing and signing the containers by both parties - Held that NGT's order were vitiated due to the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice and the mandatory procedure under the Water Act - Set aside NGT's orders and clarifies that it is open to U.P. Pollution Control Board to carry out a fresh inspection, provided it adheres to the due process and statutory procedures - Appeal allowed. [Para 10, 21, 22, 27, 29-33] Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2025 INSC 1060
Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 (WP Act, 1972) - Recognition of Zoo Rules, 2009 (Rules 2009) - Central Zoo Authority Guidelines – Held, Vantara's acquisition of animals in Green Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre run by Reliance Foundation at Jamnagar, Gujarat is as per regulations - SIT was constituted including retired judges and senior officials - As per SIT Report - all animal acquisitions, imports and welfare practices strictly confirmed to statutory requirements under the WP Act, 1972, Rules 2009, CITES, Customs Act, 1962, and PMLA, 2002 - SIT noted that specific animal transfers like that of 'Madhuri' elephant and held that such transfers were effected in compliance with High Court and Supreme Court orders and were found lawful - Import permits and statutory documentation were held to be conclusive - Neither Courts not authorities could re-examine underlying foreign legal compliance after valid CITES and Indian permits were issued - Noted that facilities exceeded statutory and international benchmarks, mortality rates were consistent with global averages, and allegations of cruelty, trafficking, misuse of funds or commercial trade were dismissed as baseless - Supreme Court directed closure of all complaints or proceedings on the same set of allegations, barring further judicial or administrative scrutiny on issues for furnishing the full SIT report to Vantara - Petitions dismissed. [Paras 4-7, 9-12, 14, 17] C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 913
Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 - Nature & Scope – Held, Witness Protection Scheme is a remedial and curative measure designed to neutralize the effects of threat that have already materialized - Bail cancellation is a preventive and supervisory function of the Court, aimed at ensuring the trial proceeds without being gendered by intimidation - The scheme addresses the psychological impact of fear on witnesses, but it does not displace or dilute the established law of bail - Substituting the scheme for a bail cancellation application would render the court's authority and bail conditions meaningless - Supreme Court expressed dismay at the practice of Allahabad High Court of passing 'cyclostyled template order' in at least forty recent cases - Matter remanded for fresh hearing - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18, 36-38, 47, 61] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074