S.5 Limitation Act | Delay Of Entire Period From Start Of Limitation Till Actual Filing Date Must Be Explained : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has explained that for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. If the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days.

The Court noted that there is a cleavage of opinion expressed as regards the meaning of the expression “within such period” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein the expression has been understood to mean the period commencing from the last date on which the appeal or application, as the case may could have been filed i.e., the last day on which the period of limitation would have expired, up to the actual date on which such appeal or application is ultimately filed. In other words, if the period of limitation is, say, 90-days, delay has to be explained only for the 90th day till the day of actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. This was the view in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd AIR 1962 SC 361.

However, judgments in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh And Anr. v. State of Gujarat 1981 (1) SCC 495 and Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 took contrary views.

A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan, in the instant case, after a plain interpretation of Section 5, held that  phrase i.e., “within such period” includes both the original period of limitation prescribed as-well as the period of delay leading up to the actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. "There can be no question of construing “within such period” as making a reference either to only the original period of limitation or to only the actual period of delay after the expiry of limitation," the bench observed.

"we have no hesitation in saying that both the expressions, by a necessary implication indicate that the phrase “within such period” signifies that the period covered therein extends to not only the original period within which, the appeal or the application, as the case may be, should have been filed, if not for the delay, but also the period taken in addition to the prescribed period of limitation for filing such appeal or application, as the case may be," the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala stated.

"For the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days," the Court stated.

It was held that the view taken in Rewa Coalfields was not supported by the bare text of the provision or the precedents.

Also from the judgment- Delay By State Agencies Due To Administrative Lethargy Should Not Be Condoned : Supreme Court