Supreme Court Weekly Digest August 25 - 31, 2025

Animal Welfare – Vantara - Article 32 - Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Supreme Court noted that present writ petition alleges unlawful acquisition of animals, mistreatment of animals, money laundering etc. with no material of probative worth or supporting evidence - Such petitions ordinarily be dismissed, but Supreme Court decided to call for an independent factual appraisal to verify the allegations, particularly given the accusations against statutory authorities - Directed constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) composed of respectable persons of impeccable integrity and high repute to assist the Court by conducting a factfinding inquiry - SIT is to report by September 12, 2025. C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 835

Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 - Requirement of signature on arbitration agreement - An arbitration agreement can be inferred from the exchange of letters or other forms of communication that provide a record of agreement - Mere fact that a contract containing an arbitration clause was not signed by one party does not invalidate the agreement, particularly when the parties conduct clearly shows their acceptance of the contract's terms - When parties act in furtherance of a contract by fulfilling their obligations, such as supplying and accepting goods, furnishing letters of credit and referencing the contract in subsequent correspondence, this conduct demonstrates an unequivocal acceptance of the contract, including its arbitration clause. [Paras 14-15] Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2025 INSC 1036

Arbitration - Foreign Arbitration Agreement - Reference to Arbitration - Under Section 45 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a judicial authority must refer parties to arbitration if there is an agreement in writing for arbitration, unless it prima facie finds that agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed - Burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement lies with party seeking to rely on it and only prima facie proof is required before the referral court - The Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a 'mini-trial' on existence or validity of agreement, as that is a matter for arbitral tribunal - The arbitration agreement in the contract was binding and that matter should be referred to arbitration if prima facie case for an agreement exists - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 24- 28] Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2025 INSC 1036

Caste Certificate - Caste Certificate was issued while she was a minor - based on this certificate, she was admitted to the MBBS course on July 24, 2016, and completed her degree in 2021 - On July 7, 2022, Verification Committee declared that she did not belong to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) – Held, despite the fraud committed by her father, due to which a meritorious student would have her entire career ruined if the appeal was dismissed - While equity should follow the law, it found it appropriate to grant the appellant an opportunity to protect her career - Father was more responsible for creating this imbroglio due to his suppression of material facts - Regularized the appellant's MBBS admission, but held that she could not claim the status of 'Mannervarlu' ST in future - Degree certificate was to be considered final - Expressed concern that an eligible, meritorious candidate from ST category lost an opportunity due to appellant's admission - Supreme Court in order to compensate ordered the appellant's father to deposit Rs. 5 lakhs to the national Defence Fund within 2 months - If the Scrutiny Committee had verified the caste certificate earlier, the situation might not have occurred - Appeal was partly allowed. [Paras 20 - 33] Chaitanya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 853

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XLI Rule 27(1) - Additional Evidence - Whether it is necessary for an Appellate Court to consider the pleadings of the parties before adjudicating a prayer to lead additional evidence – Held, an Appellate Court must first examine the pleadings of the party seeking to introduce additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of CPC - This is to ensure that the case is supported by the party's pleadings - Without necessary pleadings, allowing additional evidence is an unnecessary exercise - Appellate Court must also consider the pleadings of the party seeking to lead additional evidence - High Court erred in allowing the defendant to present additional evidence without first examining whether that evidence was in line with the defendant's pleadings - Set aside order of High Court and instructed to re-examine the appeal and defendant's application to lead additional evidence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8-10] Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2025 INSC 1027

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 102 – Held, Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, which prevents a pendente lite transferee from judgment-debtor from resisting execution of a decree, does not apply where the objection is raised by a transferee from a third party, who was not a party to the suit - The transferees from third parties, are entitled to protection under Section 97-98 CPC, and can raise objection against the execution of decrees subject to the satisfaction of conditions mentioned therein - Rule 102 of Order XXI applies only to a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the immovable property which was subject matter of that suit pendente lite - If the person who is resisting or obstructing the execution of decree of possession of such property, is not the transferee of judgment debtor, i.e. he does not trace his title from judgement-debtor, bar of Rule 102 does not apply to him - Appellant derived his title not from judgement-debtor but from independent purchaser - Therefore, Rule 102 could not bar his objections against the execution of decree - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 13] Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2025 INSC 1044

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 102 - Supreme Court explains why this applies only to a transferee from judgment debtor - Held that Rule 102 intends to protect the interests of the decree-holder against the attempts of unscrupulous judgment-debtors and their subsequent transferees who indulge in activities and leave no stone unturned to deprive the decree-holders from reaping the benefits of the decree granted in their favour. [Para 9] Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2025 INSC 1044

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXX Rule 10 - Proprietorship Firm - Proprietary concern is only a business name and not a juristic person - A suit against the proprietor of a proprietorship is the real party being sued - Order XXX Rule 10 of CPC, is merely an enabling provision and does not debar a suit being filed against the proprietor directly – Held, a proprietorship concern is not a juristic person and is merely a trade name used by an individual for their business - A proprietorship cannot sue, it can be sued in its trade name under Order XXX Rule 10 CPC, which is an enabling provision - Proprietor is the 'real party' in a suit against a proprietorship concern - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4, 5] Dogiparthi Venkata Satish v. Pilla Durga Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2025 INSC 1046

Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXVI Rule 1 - Failure to enter witness box – Held, refusal of a party to a civil suit to enter the witness box and offer testimony, especially when the facts are within their exclusive personal knowledge, can lead to grave evidentiary consequences - A Court may draw an adverse presumption against the party who, despite being physically able to attend court, deliberately abstains from testifying without a valid reason - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 50- 58] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 362- Supreme Court laid down guidelines - Exceptional circumstances wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter or review its own judgment or a final order under Section 362 CrPC - i. Such power is expressly conferred upon Court by CrPC or any other law for the time being in force; ii. The Court passing such a judgment or order lacked inherent jurisdiction to do so or; iii. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain such judgment or order; iv. A mistake on the part of Court caused prejudice to a party; v. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to notice of Court while passing such judgment or order - Held that none of the exceptions apply to the present case. [Paras 34A] Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2025 INSC 1020

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 439 - Anticipatory Bail - Interim protection made absolute - Supreme Court previously granted protection from arrest to the appellant, on condition that he join the investigation - State-respondent filed a counter affidavit, admitting that the appellant's implication was based on a confessional statement from a co-accused but alleging that appellant had not cooperated with investigation by claiming he threw his mobile phone into a river – Held, no grounds to support the allegations of non-cooperation, stating that merely because nothing incriminating was discovered does not mean the accused failed to cooperate - State's affidavit did not mention any efforts to trace the appellant's phone or collect call detail records - Appellant had been granted similar protection in a prior case, deemed it appropriate to make the interim anticipatory bail order absolute, subject to appellant cooperating with the investigation and furnishing bail bonds before Trial Court. Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Sections 362, 340 - Power to review / Recall - Whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under Section 340 CrPC is permissible or not – Held, Section 362 CrPC explicitly prohibits a criminal court from altering or reviewing its judgment once it has been signed, except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors - Prohibition is 'complete' and prevents a criminal court from reviewing its own judgment - Proceedings under Section 340 CrPC are criminal in nature, as they can lead to a criminal trial and punishment - They are governed by CrPC and a review application under CPC is not maintainable - A Court become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the Courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-34, 39-41] Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2025 INSC 1020

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 317(1) - Removal of member of Public Service Commission on grounds of misbehaviour - This case arises from a reference by President of India for the removal of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, a member of Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC), on the ground of misbehaviour – Held, the charges of misbehaviour against Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage were not proved - The principle of 'collective responsibility' does not apply to a reference for removal under Article 317, as removal is individual and not collective - There was no direct evidence to prove the respondent's involvement in the paper setting, moderation or leakage - Allegations were not substantiated by cogent evidence and that her actions did not meet the threshold of 'misbehaviour' or even a 'lapse' - State's actions were based on prejudice without sufficient material to support a conclusion of misbehaviour - Supreme Court recommended that suspension be revoked forthwith and that she be entitled to all consequential and monetary benefits. [Paras 28, 29, 69-71, 75-77] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Constitution of India - Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983 (TSR Act) - Tripura State Rifles (Recruitment) Rules, 1984 (TSR Rules) - Executive Instructions v. Statutory Rules – Held, Executive instructions cannot supplant statutory rules that already occupy the field - The recruitment for the post of Enrolled followers was governed by the Tripura State Riffles Act, 1983 and Rules, and the cancellation of the process through an executive memorandum was not permissible - State failed to prove that the existing recruitment process was unfair or non-transparent - The Court affirmed that 'changing the rules after the game has begun' is not permissible - The recruitment process was at an advanced stage, with interviews already conducted and the application of the new policy, which abolished interviews, was contrary to this principle - Appellants, having participated in and cleared various stages of the recruitment process, had a legitimate expectation that the process would be completed - The cancellation was arbitrary and not justified on the pretext of 'larger public interest' - The Court directed the respondents to finalize and complete the recruitment process as per the TSR Act and TSR Rules within 2 months - Executive instructions issued under Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India cannot override the act done under the Statute and the rules made thereunder - The Executive instructions can only supplement the act and rules through which recruitment process was carried out, but it cannot supplant the specific provisions which already occupy the field - Burden is on the State to justify the decision on the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution and show how its decision was in furtherance of larger public interest - State has failed in discharging such burden - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31- 35, 42- 44, 47- 60] Partha Das v. State of Tripura, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 850 : 2025 INSC 1049

Constitution of India - 'Misbehaviour' - Meaning and Scope - The term 'misbehaviour' is not defined in the Constitution and must be given a wide import, not a narrow construction - It is to be understood in the context of the alleged misbehaviour, the office in question, and the standards required of a person holding such office - 'Misbehaviour' generally refers to conduct that could erode public faith and confidence in the constitutional office - It is a vague and elastic term encompassing various facets of conduct contrary to good conduct - Misbehaviour is different from 'proved misbehaviour' under Article 124(4) of Constitution - Standard of proof is not 'beyond reasonable doubt' but rather the ' reasonable preponderance of probabilities' – Held, allegations were general in nature and inquiry Committee did not name Ms. Bage as an accused or indicate her involvement in the paper setting, moderating or leakage. [Para 20-25, 27-28, 34, 35] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Civil Contempt - Wilful disobedience - Delayed compliance - Adjudication of new claims in contempt proceedings - Contempt petitions were filed by Petitioner alleging non-compliance with the Supreme Court's order dt. January 17, 2018, which directed the respondent bank to pay outstanding dues within 3 months - Delay was attributed to administrative difficulties following the merger of banks and difficulty in retrieving legacy records - While there was a delay in payment, the material on record didn't prove a wilful intent – Held, delay in complying with the Court's direction without any wilful or contumacious intent doesn't invite contempt of court - Rejected the claim for pensionary benefits citing that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used to raise new claims or seek reliefs not granted in original proceedings - Considering the prolonged litigation since 1980s and the decade long delay in disbursing retirement dues, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to award a lump sum payment to bring the matter to a close - Directed the respondent bank to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the LR of deceased petitioner as compensation for the protracted delay - Petition dismissed. [Paras 16-21] A.K. Jayaprakash v. S.S. Mallikarjuna Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2025 INSC 1003

Criminal Appeals - Delay in delivery of judgment - High Courts - Directions issued by Supreme Court – Held, if the high Court doesn't deliver judgment in 3 months after reserving, Registrar must place the matter before Chief Justice - Reiterated the guidelines issued in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar wherein Court directed that the parties are free to move an application before CJ of High Court for withdrawal of case and to be assigned to a different bench, if judgment is not pronounced within 6 months after being reserved - Many High Courts have adopted practice of pronouncing the final order without reasoned judgment which is then not delivered for substantially long time - It deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal. [Paras 7-10] Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 834 : 2025 INSC 1039

Death Penalty - Procedural fairness in capital sentencing – Held, Indian society no longer conceives criminal punishment purely in retributive terms and also measures quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility of human reform - Machinery which feeds the death-penalty system is itself fragile - Investigations rely on confessions extracted in opacity, recoveries whose provenance is contested and forensic material of doubtful rigour - Possibility of wrongful conviction can never be dismissed as a remote abstraction - Moving from pure retribution to genuine reform is not an act of undue leniency but it is a statement of faith in human capacity for improvement. [Paras 27, 28] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043

Death Sentence - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 – Held, jurisdiction under Article 32 is a 'special constitutional safeguard' that remains available to death row convicts, even after appeals, reviews and mercy petitions have been rejected, due to the irreversible nature of capital punishment - Procedural finality cannot prevent the Court from intervening to cure a constitutional violation that impacts life or liberty - Court has an inherent power to correct its own errors to prevent 'manifest injustice' - Supreme Court emphasized on Manoj an others v. State of Madhya Pradesh which mandated the collection of mitigating circumstances such as collecting comprehensive mitigating circumstances - including psychiatric, psychological and social-history reports - have become an 'indispensable' procedural safeguard - a death sentence imposed without these safeguards violates Article 14, 21 of the Constitution - Judgments of Constitutional Courts are presumed to apply retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise - Hence, death row convict is entitled to the benefit of the Manoj judgment even if their sentence was finalized before the guidelines were established - Petition under Article 32 is maintainable because the petitioner is seeking to enforce a right that was not available at the time of their prior judicial proceedings - Article 32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters - Reopening will be reserved for only those cases where there is clear, specific breach of new procedural safeguards, as these breaches are so serious that if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused person's basic rights like dignity and fair process - Maintained conviction of Petitioner and referred the matter to be heard on sentencing - Petition allowed. [Paras 21-26, 33, 42-58] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043

Electricity Act, 2003 - Section 86(1)(b) – Held, the fixing of the price for purchase of electricity and Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that incorporates such a price must be reviewed and approved by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission - A generating company and a distribution licensee cannot, through a private agreement, unilaterally execute a PPA or set a tariff for the supply of electricity within a State without the Commission's review and approval under Sector 86(1)(b) of the Act - Mandatory requirement of Section 86(1)(b) of the Act requires the Commission's review and approval for any changes to electricity purchase prices - Supplementary PPA dt. September 10, 2010, was executed independently and unilaterally by the parties and was never submitted to Commission for approval - Commission's order dt. February 9, 2010, which increased the tariff from Rs. 2.87 per kWh to Rs. 2.95 per kWh, did not apply to the appellant's case since its PPA stipulated a tariff of Rs. 2.50 per kWh, not Rs. 2.87 per kWh - Supreme Court did not interfere with the APTEL's order because it appeal was not filed against it - Revised tariff of Rs. 2.60 per kWh (based on weighted average) has been in use for a long time, and upsetting the process would not be appropriate at this late stage - Private agreements to change tariffs without Commission approval are invalid - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 21-31] KKK Hydro Power Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2025 INSC 1057

Electricity - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 56, 65, 73 – Held, Regulators cannot rewrite PPA under guise of equity - Sanctity of contract must prevail - PPA is a commercial arrangement with allocated risks and specific remedies - Parties rights and obligations must be governed by the explicit terms of contract - A delay in commissioning a 220kV evacuation system by a state instrumentality, even if beyond the developer's control does not constitute a Force Majeure event under the PPA's terms - Invoking the force majeure cluse requires a notice within 7 days of the event, which is a condition precedent - Omission to issue the required notice is fatal and cannot be remedied by relying on an inapplicable provision - A distribution licensee is entitled to encash the performance security if the developer fails to achieve the commercial operation date within the stipulated period, if no formal extension has been obtained or valid force majeure claim has been made - Right to invoke the guarantee is a specific contractual remedy that must be exercised in accordance with the contract's framework. [Paras 37-42] Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (CESC) v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 840 : 2025 INSC 1034

Electricity - Regulatory Jurisdiction – Held, jurisdiction of regulatory bodies like the State Commission and the appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) is to enforce the law and adjudicate disputes within four corners of a commercial contract - Regulatory bodies cannot under the guise of equity or fairness, rewrite the contractual terms, direct the restitution of amounts lawfully realized, or mandate alterations to tariffs and timelines in a manner inconsistent with the agreement - This principle applies even when the parties are state instrumentalities - Set aside order of APTEL - Appeal allowed. [Para 43] Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (CESC) v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 840 : 2025 INSC 1034

Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (PF Act) - Section 11(2) - Supreme Court set aside Karnataka High Court order and restored a writ petition, remanding the matter for a fresh decision after impleading Axis bank as a respondent - High Court is directed to examine the priority of first charge between the EPFO and the secured creditors in light of Section 11(2) of the PF Act and High Court must also consider if the EPFO created a charge on the properties to be auctioned by Axis bank prior to the auction - High Court has to first deal with this issue and determine if Axis Bank has the first charge and priority over the EPFO to satisfy its dues from secured property under the SARFEASI Act, 2002 - Appeal allowed. [Para 8 - 13] Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Ltd. v. Regional Pf Commissioner II and Recovery Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2025 INSC 1045

Environmental Law - Matheran Eco - Sensitive Zone - Paver Blocks on Roads - Supreme Court accepted recommendations of IIT Bombay Report and NEERI Report (expert bodies) and permitted the State government to lay clay paver blocks on the main road - Directed that no concrete bed should be used under the paver blocks, but other measures recommended by expert bodies, such as a non-woven geotextile layer, cambering of roads, and lateral drains, should be implemented - It was clarified that no paver blocks should be laid on internal roads or trekking routes. In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996

Environmental Law - National Green Tribunal (NGT) - Polluter Pays Principle - Environmental Compensation (EC) – Held, NGT has no power to direct ED probe under PMLA - NGT lacks jurisdiction to issue such a directive, as its powers are limited by Section 15 of NGT Act of 2010 - An FIR must be registered for a scheduled offence before invoking the PMLA - NGT's penalty, which was based on the company's turnover, lacked a rational nexus with the alleged pollution - A company's revenue or its quantum has no connection to the penalty for environmental damage - If the NGT found the penalty to be minimal, it should have referred to the CPCB's (Central Pollution Control Board) methodology instead of a company's turnover - Question of the maintainability of PIL at this stage, noting that initial reports from Joint Committee indicated violations of environmental laws - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-13] C.L. Gupta Export Ltd. v. Adil Ansari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2025 INSC 1035

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 50 - Opinion on relationship when relevant – Held, the testimony of a witness, even if not a blood relative, can establish a familial relationship under Section 50, if it is based on personal knowledge and longstanding acquaintance with parties - Opinion of such a person, expressed by conduct, is a relevant fact, and mere hearsay or gossip is insufficient - In a case where there is a lack of documentary evidence, such testimony can assume significant evidentiary value, especially if it remains unshaken during crossexamination. [Paras 22-25, 39-42] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 101, 102 - Burden of Proof and Onus of Proof – Held, a distinction exists between the burden of proof, which rests on the party asserting a fact and never shifts, and the onus of proof, which is a continuous process that shifts between parties based on the evidence presented - Once the plaintiffs have sufficiently discharged their initial burden of proof, the onus shifts to the defendants to rebut the claim with evidence. [Paras 43-48] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence - Rape and Murder – Acquittal – Held, prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of incriminating circumstances and pointed out several significant issues - i. DNA report was inconclusive and a supplementary report was inadmissible as the expert witness was not examined and the report was not presented to the accused under Section 313 CrPC; ii. 'Suspicious conduct' of the accused, cited by prosecution witnesses, was found to be a natural action for a labourer returning home from work and could not be considered an incriminating circumstance; iii. Recovery of a comb used, by the sniffer dog was deemed doubtful due to contradictory witness testimonies regarding its color - Procedure involving the dog squad was also not properly documented; iv. Recovery of the victim's underwear from the accused's field was found to be a 'planted recovery' as it was not mentioned in the original complaint filed by the victim's father- Present case is yet another classic example of lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure which has led to the failure of a case involving brutal rape and murder of an innocent girl child - The prosecution had 'fallen woefully short of proving the guilt of the accused-appellants by clinching evidence and acquitted them, giving them the benefit of doubt - Appeal allowed. [Paras 65 - 79] Putai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2025 INSC 1042

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Departmental Circulars and Guidelines - Binding nature on revenue authorities – Held, Court relied on Circulars issued by Ministry of Finance and Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), including the 2008 Circular and 2009 Prosecution Manual, which state that prosecution under Section 276C(1) should be initiated only after the IT Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) confirms a penalty for concealment of income - These Circulars are binding on the revenue authorities and can 'tone down the rigour of the statutory provision' - The revenue authorities in this case, failed to adhere to these binding instructions by filing the complaint before any such confirmation - The prosecution, lodged in defiance of the department's own binding circulars and continued even after the Settlement Commission's conclusive finding that there was no suppression of facts, amounted to a 'blatant disregard' of their own directives, citing such actions as a 'serious lapse' and are not justified - Set aside order of High Court and imposed costs of Rs. 2 lakhs on the revenue, payable to the appellant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31-33, 35- 38] Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2025 INSC 1048

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 276C(1) - Wilful attempt to evade tax - Quashing of prosecution - Whether the continuation of the prosecution, initiated before the Settlement application, was abuse of court's process – Held, the Settlement Commission's order was conclusive, and it found that the appellant had made a full and true disclosure of his income, satisfying the conditions of Section 245H - Commission's finding that there was no suppression of material facts meant there was no 'wilful attempt' to evade tax, a key element required for a successful prosecution under Section 276C(1). [Paras 12, 18-21] Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2025 INSC 1048

Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) - Inadvertent clerical error in filing shipping bills - Whether such an error, once rectified under Section 149 of Customs Act, can defeat a claim for MEIS benefits – Held, an inadvertent clerical error in shipping bills, once permitted to be corrected under Section 149 of the Customs Act, cannot defeat an exporter's substantive entitlement to MEIS benefits - Procedural mistakes, once corrected, cannot extinguish substantive rights - Beneficial schemes should be construed liberally and administrative technology should aid, not obstruct, the implementation of the law - PRC's rejection was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice because no reasons were given and no hearing was granted - Directed respondents to process the appellant's claim for MEIS benefits based on amended shipping bills and pass appropriate orders within 12 weeks - Emphasized the need for systemic correction by the Union of India, DGFT and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs to prevent genuine exporters from being forced into litigation over rectified procedural lapses - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11- 16] Shah Nanji Nagsi Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2025 INSC 1032

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 2(34) - Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 1963 (A.P. Act, 1963) - Section 3(1) - Andhra Pradesh Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 - Rule 12A - Section 3(1) levies tax on every motor vehicle 'used or kept for use, in a public place in the State' - Expression 'in a public place' not only describes but also limits the words 'used' and 'kept for use' - The liability to pay tax is not on ownership or registration, but on the use or keeping for use in a 'public place' - 'Public place' is a road, street, way or other place to which the public have a right of access – Held, if the public has no right of access to a place, it is not a 'public place' - The liability to pay tax under Section 3(1) of the A.P. Act, 1963, is contingent on the vehicle being used or kept for use in a 'public place' - A motor vehicle could not be subjected to tax for the period it was exclusively used or kept within the restricted premises, even if intimation of non-use was not given under Rule 12A - The vehicles operating exclusively within the enclosed premises of a factory or plant are not liable to pay motor vehicle tax, as such areas do not constitute a 'public place' - Motor Vehicle tax is compensatory in nature - It has a direct nexus with the end use - If a motor vehicle is not used in a 'public place' or not kept for use in a 'public place' then the person concerned is not deriving benefit from the public infrastructure, therefore, he should not be burdened with the motor vehicle tax for such period - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28, 29, 31, 33, 45-50] Tarachand Logistic Solutions v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 852 : 2025 INSC 1052

Police Rules, 1934 (Punjab) - Rule 16.2 (1) - Dismissal from Service - Unauthorised Absence – Held, disciplinary authority had primarily based the dismissal on the gravest act of misconduct, which was the 37 day unauthorized absence - The reference to past misconduct was merely to add weight to the decision and was not the effective reason for dismissal - The past conduct must be disclosed in the show cause notice - is applicable when the past conduct is the basis for the punishment, but not when the primary charge is a grave act of misconduct - Two parts of parts of Rule 16.2(1) of the Rules of 1934; the first part allows for dismissal for the gravest act of misconduct, while the second part addresses dismissal as a cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving unfitness for service - The requirement to consider the length of service and pension claims applies to second part and not the first - The dismissal of the Constable was for a 'gravest act of misconduct' under the first part of the rule, and therefore, the disciplinary authority was not obligated to consider his length of service - The dismissal was justified due to the Constable's gross indiscipline as a member of a disciplined force - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 25- 33] State of Punjab v. Ex. C. Satpal Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2025 INSC 1056

Public Service Commissions - Autonomy and Independence - Collective Responsibility - Public Service Commissions are independent constitutional bodies established to ensure that the recruitment process is free from political pressure, favouritism, and nepotism - Their members hold a position of significant constitutional trust and responsibility - Any subjective conduct or conduct that raises suspicion has the potential to erode public faith and confidence - The principle of ' collective responsibility', as applicable to a Council of Ministers, does not apply to the Chairman or members of a Public Service Commission - Allegation of misbehaviour is individual in nature, not collective – Held, Ms. Bage could not be held responsible for the failures of the Commission as a whole, especially since the 2 principle of collective responsibility does not apply. [Paras 43-46, 65, 68, 69] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Rickshaw Pullers - Rehabilitation of - Hand pulled Rickshaws – Held, the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws in Matheran is 'inhuman practice' and it should be stopped as it attacks human dignity - Continuing the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws 'belittles the constitutional promise of social and economic justice - To continue such human practice even after 78 years of independence and after 75 years of the Constitution being enacted and promising social and economic justice to its citizens would be betraying the promise - Directed State of Maharashtra to stop this practice in a staged manner within 6 months - Directed the State to evolve a rehabilitation scheme, using the model implemented in Kevadia, Gujarat, where e-rickshaw are given on a hire basis to underprivileged persons, including tribal women - Genuine hand cart and rickshaw pullers will be given priority in the allotment of e-rickshaws - State is also required to bear the expenses for training the allottees - That Scheme could be funded through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds and non-availability of funds would not be an acceptable excuse for non-implementation - Supreme Court stressed that the unique character of Matheran as a pedestrian hill station must be maintained. [Paras 32-49] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996

Right of Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Section 12(c) - Parens patriae - Supreme Court directed States/Union Territories are directed to conduct a survey to identify orphans who have been admitted under the RTE Act, as well as those who have been deprived of their right to educations and the reasons for their deprivation - During the survey, a concurrent effort must be made to admit deserving orphaned children into neighbourhood schools if they have not already been admitted - Granted 4 weeks to complete the survey, collect data, and file an affidavit regarding compliance - Other states that have not yet done so are directed to consider issuing a notification to include orphans in the 25% quota and take steps to ensure compliance - 'Child' includes 'orphan child' - If a state or union territory fails to issue such a notification, the Secretary of the Department of Education must file an affidavit explaining the reasons - Matter is scheduled to be listed on 9th September, 2025. [Paras 5-10] Poulomi Pavini Shukla v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra); Section 14 - Land Acquisition - Preferential Right of Owner - Primacy of owner's right over SRA's power - Validity of acquisition of land in a Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area) when the landowner is willing to redevelop it – Held, owner of a plot of land within a SR Area has a preferential right to redevelop the land - Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) can only undertake development if the landholders or occupants do not come forward with a proposal within reasonable time - Publication of the Section 3C(1) Declaration in Official Gazette is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of inviting a landowner to redevelop the land - Without special notice-cum-invitation from SRA to the landowner, the owner may be unable to prepare an SR Scheme due to the inaccessibility of technical information and surveys - A specific notice-cum-invitation to the owner is a necessary procedural requirement to ensure the owner's preferential right is not frustrated - State Government's power to acquire land under Section 14 is subject to the landowner's preferential right to redevelop - Acquisition process must be held in abeyance until the owner's preferential right is extinguished - Acquisition cannot proceed as long as the owner is willing to undertake development - There appears no cogent reason as to why, instead of enacting a self-contained code within Section I-A, the drafters of this legislation chose to incorporate an entirely distinct slum rehabilitation mechanism by amending the existing legislation through Section 3D - Court granted landowner a period of 120 days to submit a fresh SR Scheme for redevelopment - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 45- 48, 50-53, 64- 65, 68, 74, 84] Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2025 INSC 1015

Unauthorized Construction - Howrah Zilla Parishad Bye-laws, 2005 - Regulation 2015 - Supreme Court appreciated High Court's action in addressing unauthorized constructions and emphasized that it is 'high time' for the High Court to handle such issues across the city of Calcutta in larger public interest - Held that it is high time that the High Court in larger public interest takes up this issue and ensures that each and every unauthorized construction across the city is dealt appropriately inn accordance with law - Held that High Court has looked into the Resolution dt. 12.08.2024, passed by the Howrah Zilla Parishad - Petition dismissed. T.S Construction v. Howrah Zilla Parishad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 858

Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (UAPA) - Section 18-20 – Bail – Held, no UAPA offence over attending meeting of organization which isn't banned - Upheld the order of granting bail to the accused by High Court citing it to be fully justified and reasonable citing that allegations against him were related to his connections with an organization named AL-Hind, which is not a banned organization under UAPA - High Court's order was passed in April 2022, and it would not be 'just and proper to interfere with the same at this stage'- Charges had not been framed and the trial had not yet commenced, despite the accused having been in custody for 5.5 years - The trial had not commenced despite a lapse of 5.5 years and that 'accused cannot be allowed to languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial' - Directed Trial Court to expedite and conclude the trial within 2 years, noting that there were more than 100 witnesses to be examined - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 8-13] Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 833 : 2025 INSC 1008