'Trial Can't Be Separated Only Because Accused Is MLA' : Supreme Court Quashes Direction To Segregate Trial Against Legislator

The Supreme Court on Friday (Sep. 12) quashed the Punjab & Haryana High Court's order directing a separate trial for Haryana Congress MLA Mamman Khan solely on the ground of his being an MLA. The Court held that while speedy disposal of cases involving public representatives, as stressed in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (2023), is necessary, it cannot justify deviating from the law to deny a public representative the right to a joint trial where such trial is legally permissible.

“While expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is undoubtedly desirable, such administrative prioritization cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Cr.P.C. or the constitutional mandate of equality. Segregating the appellant's trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process.”, the court observed.

A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan was hearing a plea by MLA Mamman Khan challenging the High Court's decision that upheld the trial court's order directing a separate trial against him in the 2023 Nuh violence case, in which six people were reportedly killed. Khan, along with other co-accused, had been booked for allegedly instigating the violence arising out of the same transaction.

Setting aside the High Court's ruling, the judgment authored by Justice R. Mahadevan held that the High Court erred in upholding the trial court's order for a separate trial of Khan. The Court noted that the trial court's reasoning was flawed, as there were no distinct facts, the evidence was inseverable, and no prejudice to Khan had been demonstrated to justify segregation. It further emphasized that when offences form part of the same transaction, a joint trial under Section 223 CrPC is appropriate, since the material and evidence collected pertain to the same alleged incident.

“Most importantly, the appellant's status as a sitting MLA cannot, by itself, justify a separate trial. All accused stand equal before the law, and preferential segregation militates against the equality principle enshrined in Article 14. While the right to speedy trial is an essential facet of Article 21, it cannot be secured at the cost of fairness.”, the court said.

“Segregation was ordered not on any legally recognized ground – such as distinct facts, severable evidence, or demonstrated prejudice – but solely on account of the appellant's political office..”, the court added.

“In the present case, the evidence against the appellant is identical to that against the co-accused. Separate trials would necessarily involve recalling the same witnesses, resulting in duplication, delay, and the risk of inconsistent findings. The High Court, in affirming the segregation order, failed to appreciate these consequences and confined itself to the discretionary language of section 223 Cr.P.C without evaluating whether the factual circumstances justified such segregation. Therefore, we hold that the segregation of the appellant's trial, without any legally recognized justification, is unsustainable in law and violative of the appellant's right to a fair trial under Article 21.”, the court held.

Accordingly, the matter was remitted to the trial Court with a direction to conduct a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused, in accordance with law.

Also, the Court laid down the following propositions regarding the joint trial :-

(i) Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 Cr.P.C; a joint trial may be permissible where the offences form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Sections 219 – 223 Cr.P.C. are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion;

(ii) The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons;

(iii) The two paramount considerations in such decision making are whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time;

(iv) Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another, which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the trial is bifurcated; and

(v) An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely because a joint or separate trial was possible; interference is justified only where prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown

Cause Title: MAMMAN KHAN VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904

Click here to read/download the judgment

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) : Dr. S Muralidhar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Prasanna S., AOR Ms. Rupali Samuel, Adv. Mr. MA Karthik, Adv. Ms. Ninni Susan Thomas, Adv. Ms. Pallak Bhagat, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Thukral, A.A.G. Mr. Akshay Amritanshu, AOR Ms. Pragya Upadhyay, Adv. Ms. Drishti Saraf, Adv. Mr. Nikhil Goyal, Adv. Mr. Ravi Vashisht, Adv.