Is Offence Of Murder Made Out When Death Occurs Days After Fatal Injury ? Supreme Court Lays Down Tests

The Supreme Court ruled that the lapse of time between an injury and the victim's death does not, by itself, justify reducing a murder charge under Section 302 IPC to attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC, so long as the death is directly traceable to the injury. The Court clarified that the correct test is whether the death was a natural, probable, or necessary consequence of the injury. If the complications leading to death are a likely or inevitable outcome of the original injury, the offence amounts to murder.

“where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.”, the court explained.

A bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan heard the case that arose from an incident in which the Appellant trespassed into the house of deceased victim, assaulted him, and threw him from a terrace. The victim suffered severe injuries, including a spinal cord injury that left him paralyzed. He remained bedridden for nine months before succumbing to septicemia and pneumonia, which medical evidence linked directly to his paralysis.

While the trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC for murder, the Chhattisgarh High Court altered the conviction to Section 307 IPC, citing the nine-month gap between injury and death and raising doubts about the adequacy of medical treatment. Dissatisfied, the accused appealed to the Supreme Court.

Since, the State didn't appeal against the alteration of charge from Section 302 to Section 307, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala refused to interfere with the High Court's decision to convict the Appellant for offence of attempt to murder, however made significant observations, as an academic exercise, against the gross error committeed by the High Court.

The Court noted that the injuries inflicted by the appellant never healed and ultimately proved fatal due to complications arising during treatment. It held that the High Court erred in reducing the conviction to attempt to murder merely on the ground of the time gap between the assault and the victim's death

“In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the three doctors referred to above, the cause of death of deceased Rekhchand was cardiorespiratory failure. The injuries suffered by him at the time of assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore hepatic dysfunction. The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 of the IPC. The deceased ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries. The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not, in our view, alter the culpability. In the case in hand, there had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to snap the chain of causation. It would have been quite a different matter if the original injuries had healed meanwhile or ceased to be dangerous to life and the fatal complications had set in unexpectedly. If that would have been so, the appellant herein would then at any rate be entitled to the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death.”, the court observed.

“We are taken by surprise as to on what basis the High Court has recorded a finding that the deceased succumbed to the injuries suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment. There is absolutely no evidence in this regard. Not a single suggestion in this regard was put by the defence counsel in the cross-examination of the doctors. Even otherwise this aspect is wholly irrelevant in view of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC. In other words, according to the High Court, since, the deceased died after about nine months from the date of the incident due to lack of proper treatment the case is not one of murder. This finding in our opinion is erroneous. On one hand, the High Court believes that the cause of death was due to injuries suffered by the deceased, and on the other hand, takes the view that as he died after nine months due to lack of proper treatment the offence would fall within Section 307 of the IPC.”, the court added.

The Court laid down the following propositions to be followed by the Courts while dealing with cases where there was a delay in death resulting from an injury:

a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC.

b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC.

c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.

d. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.

e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.

f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not merely of culpable homicide.

g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death.

h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance. What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course.

i. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction under Section 307 IPC was affirmed.

Cause Title: MANIKLAL SAHU VERSUS STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905

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Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Padmesh Mishra, Adv. Ms. Vastvikta Bhardwaj, Adv. Ms. Neelam Singh, AOR Mr. Vijant, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Adv. Mr. Shivam Ganeshia, Adv. Ms. Akanksha Singh, Adv. Mr. Ambuj Swaroop, Adv. Mr. Kapil Katare, Adv. Mr. Prashant Singh, AOR Ms. Rajnandani Kumari, Adv.